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BRADLEY'S "PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC."<sup>1</sup>

BY S. W. DYDE.

(*Concluded.*)

e. There is one other topic, the discussion of which will reveal the nature of Bradley's standpoint, but we might well hesitate to enter upon any consideration of it. That is the nature of the category of Subject and Attribute, which introduces us into the realm of inference. One might be disposed to think that already the nature of Bradley's fundamental doctrine had been taken from its concealment, and its connection with the principle laid down in the prolegomena ascertained. But while it can scarcely be expected to receive much new light, yet hitherto the question has been concerning judgment alone, and not inference. The work would be somewhat incomplete if the whole of inference were passed over in silence. Consequently, it will be our task in this section first to outline the connection of judgment with inference, and then to discover the general law which operates in every case of inference. Both of these will be in large measure but a repetition of what Bradley has himself done. Lastly, it will be

<sup>1</sup> "The Principles of Logic." By F. H. Bradley, LL. D., Glasgow, Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1 Paternoster Square, 1883.

shown how Bradley has, in his peculiar conception of the one category of subject and attribute, failed to grasp the true theory in its entirety. It is at once apparent that much will be said which properly belongs to the third portion of the essay. The excuse is that we are now nearing the third portion, and are only anticipating a few things that probably, after all, find a more fitting place here than anywhere else. First of all, then, as to the nature of the connection between judgment and inference.

Inference, as distinguished from judgment, may roughly be called manner as distinguished from matter. When we judge we deal with propositions as in a sense formed materials. The propositions are held apart from our judging of them. We behold what we have done, not that we have done it. The result is of more importance than the process. If we could believe that matter was independent of mind, and that mind only arranged the materials given to it from without, and had to arrange them in a certain way, because, in fact, they were found to be in reality so arranged, then we could not know of such a process as inference. In a syllogism, judgment seems to be the external and particular side, while inference is the universal side, or the side of the thinking subject. If we examine the process through which we go in order to bring about such and such a result, we find that it is our mode of inference. Inference is no doubt found already in the material given to thought. The work of the mind may be said to be crystallized, and so in a manner materialized. It can thus be analyzed as though it were so much given material. No doubt, again, as we examine the product of thought, while we admit that in order to there being that product at all the thinker must have inferred, yet we have in the very examination made use of inference. The discovery gained by analysis, that in order to have the material before us the thinker must have inferred, is a new inference. Popularly speaking, the inference we discover may be styled a result, and the new inference a process. Or, again, we might say that the inference discovered was a result, that the process through which we went in its discovery was a process of inference, and that finally, by means of that process, we arrived at a new inference. But these distinctions are of no consequence. Inference may be looked upon as a process or as a result, according as we emphasize the thinking subject in the former or the thought object



in the latter. However, it is important to bear in mind that, whether it is looked on as a process or as a result, it is in the one case a process of thought, and in the other case a result of thought.

But, we may be asked, what of the materials given to inference, upon which thought works and out of which is to be obtained the new inference? And this is a question of considerable moment. These materials are themselves inferences, the results of former thought. They are not independent of consciousness, and thrust upon us from a world without, but they are facts, truths, thoughts. When we examine them we discover that they in turn have been obtained by inference from previously obtained facts, truths, thoughts. Of course, it is plain that our very examination of them proves conclusively that they are not now independent of our consciousness, and the very fact that they can be examined by our consciousness shows that they are not independent of consciousness. But, apart from that, they are actual results deduced from thought data. We may go back farther, and still farther, but no other result will be obtained than that, after our latest experiment, we have what we had at first—facts still complex, still reducible. If we have been looking for something which would serve for a starting-point, which would be itself simple and irreducible, we have failed. The very nature of the inquiry would predict our failure. If a thing can be absolutely simple, it can never be aught but that which is absolutely simple. If a point is without parts and without magnitude, one thousand points are still without parts and without magnitude. If a point is without magnitude, we might keep moving it forever, and (if we can understand the paradox) it would never move at all. But we have taken a compound and endeavored by a certain process to reach the simple. If the complex has been based upon the simple, it could not be a complex. Or, again, to say that a simple is based upon a simple is an absurdity. To speak of antecedent and consequent is to destroy the simplicity of the antecedent and of the consequent. Besides that, we are caught in the toils of our own process, for the more we analyze and subdivide, the more complex does our result become. Every new step backward is a new relation, and a discovery of still more primitive inferences. There is always this irony of thought manifesting itself at every attempt to get rid of thought. The more we simplify, the more complex our product becomes.

For, as we have just hinted, we have only to look at the series of inferences as a series of relations to comprehend at once that a step backward in the series is a new relation; and, if we keep on, we at last load the ever-fleeing simple with a burden of relations which it is unable to bear.

In all inference there is thought. Indeed, it is hard to discriminate at all between thinking and inferring. We have been accustomed to consider thinking and relating as synonymous, and now to these two must be added inferring. Bradley himself sees no difference between inferring and reasoning, looked at from the standpoint of the process, and there can be no difference between reasoning and thinking. Now, thinking or reasoning is uniting. That we have learned from Kant, who places all knowledge under the synthetic unity of apperception. All I know is *my* knowledge. All the various elements in the heterogeneous stock of odds and ends comprised under "What I know" are reduced to a single interrelated whole when it is seen that each and every item is related to the ego. When we say "Polly wants a cracker," we have, to put it in Bradley's words, related the ideal content, "the wanting of a cracker," to that portion of reality, the parrot, called Polly. We have united in one judgment these two elements. Examination would doubtless show that each of these elements is the meeting-point of other elements too numerous to mention, and so is not really elementary but complex. But, viewed from the standpoint of the judgment "Polly wants a cracker," the ideal content and the reality are properly called elements. Supposing, now, that we give utterance to the above proposition in the presence of Polly herself, and that the bird takes up the cry, it will not have gone through the same mental process as we. We cannot say exactly what mental process is performed by the parrot, but we have good reasons for concluding that it is not identical with our own. It does not, then, unite, think, relate, judge, infer *consciously*. To do that seems the privilege of man. But what we wish to arrive at is that, though man may relate consciously, is it not possible for him to be at times pretty much in the same position as the parrot? Are not many things said and done many times by many men parrot-fashion? If so, then it would seem that a man might speak without inferring, but only, be it noticed, if he could speak

without the slightest spark of consciousness. The words thus uttered would be a judgment in form but not in spirit.

But this leads to a point of more immediate interest. We have seen, by the preceding inquiry, that for consciousness judgment was never a mere matter of words, that just because it was for consciousness there was a relation which made of the elements a new whole. Without consciousness the elements would still remain elements, no matter how often the sound was repeated. With consciousness a new thing was produced, or, as might be said, something was added to our information. We have come upon the old question of Analysis and Synthesis. Analysis pure and simple is an impossibility. To analyze a notion, sticking no matter how closely to the notion, and then to express the result in the form of a judgment, is to infer. Mere analysis for a human being would land him at the position of a parrot. In all thinking, therefore, there must be a synthesis, and some new thing is added to our information. This may not be accepted, and in one sense it may not be true. Many, especially those who are secluded and have little opportunity of coming into contact with people or books, have but few ideas, and these ideas are made to go the rounds, so to speak, and to do yeoman's service every day of the week without variation. Can such be said to be adding anything to their information? But these objections are aside from the point. A farmer, for example, may say every day of the week, and every week of the year, "Fine morning to-day!" but the expression has or has not significance. If it is utterly meaningless (and we doubt if it can ever be), the farmer has not thought, and is so far on a level with the parrot. If it has meaning, it is a piece of information, for we could not have said it yesterday. But by analysis may be meant that simple iteration which means nothing. For instance, it is asked, What is a boat? Answer is made, "A boat's a boat, that's what a boat is." That may be called a vain repetition. If so, it is not identical with, but directly contrary to, analysis. If there were analysis there would be a meaning in the answer. To analyze "boat" and get "boat" is surely a very impotent procedure. It is no analysis at all. Yet, if we want to see the germ of inference even here, it has only to be shown that the answer emphasizes the existence of the boat—or, if any one is inclined to cavil, the answer plainly

demonstrates the man's inability to define the object in question. It therefore points to this judgment, viz., the referring of the inability to define to the individual questioned.

From the above it may have been already gathered that judgment and inference are essentially one. If the conclusion of a syllogism is taken as an example, it may be viewed as a judgment when special regard is had of the matter it contains. It may be viewed as an inference when it is considered as following from the premises. One and the same assertion might be viewed as a judgment or as an inference; to put the matter in another light, according to the word or words upon which was laid the stress of the voice. If I say, *e. g.*, "It is white" in such a way as to emphasize the simple existence of the object, that might be called a judgment. If, on the other hand, I say it in such a way as to emphasize the particular mode of existence, it might be called an inference. Or, again, remembering that thought is the relation of an ideal content to reality, we might call that a judgment which made peculiarly prominent the reality, and that an inference which rendered prominent the ideal content. He who judges would seem to be immersed in the external present. He who infers would seem to be looking beyond the present, and gathering together its relations. It is easily seen that these are mere distinctions and not radical differences. In truth, there can be no real difference between judging and inferring. I suppose that they probably deserve some separate treatment, and yet a separation of them even in treatment tends toward a separation in actual fact, and Bradley has, it may be unwittingly, fallen into the snare. As soon as we permit ourselves to entertain the notion that judgment and inference are separable processes we have suffered to gain admittance that insidious theory which will continue to propound that the existence of an object may be separated from its relations. With that the unknowable has already been set up. So much do we do when we with nothing but the most innocent intentions imagine that we may judge before we infer.

Bradley has himself (p. 386) expressed the points of agreement and difference between the aspect of judgment and the aspect of inference. "A is" is a judgment; "A must be" is an inference. He says: "Any judgment whatever may be turned into reasoning by a simple change. For we have merely to suggest the idea of

the opposite—we have only to suppose that the truth is otherwise—and at once the predicate, which we already possess, excludes that suggestion, and returns to itself as what *must be* true. It now is real *because* it must be so; and it is necessarily truth, for it has entered the field of ideal experiment, and returned victorious." This is admirable. But Bradley, not content with exhibiting the difference of aspects, goes on immediately to assert that such difference of aspects can only be accounted for by root differences. He continues: "This process may seem frivolous, since it turns in a circle. Frivolous it undoubtedly is when applied to judgments, but it is very different when used on mere ideas. Take any idea, suggest it of the real, and find it compatible; bring it into collision with other ideas disparate with itself, see that it defeats them in open competition, and then go on at once to assert its truth. Valid or invalid, it certainly is inference." From this we conclude that while inference is the manipulation of an idea, judgment is at least not that. Afterward Bradley becomes bolder, and says that judgment has to do with "suggestions of sense!"

These are, however, the dividing lines between judgment and inference in Bradley's estimation. (a) Judgment may be circular; inference cannot be circular. "A is because it is" is a circular judgment, *i. e.*, it tells us nothing that we did not know, it adds nothing to our information, and yet it cannot be denied that it is a judgment. This case was dealt with before, when we made use of the illustration of the boat. But Bradley would now say that "A is because it is" appeals to the fact of our seeing or touching, or having seen, or having touched, the object in question; but it gives no reason for its existence, *i. e.*, the judgment "A is" rests upon a suggestion of sense! But A may not be present to sense; it may be present to thought. Even so, if the judgment "A is" rests mainly upon the fact that we know it is, that is giving no reason for its existence. We have not, then, inferred its existence from anything. At first sight this view would seem correct. But it has come to a decision too hastily. Instead of saying that we have not inferred its existence from anything, it is only entitled to say that we cannot call to mind the reasons why we judged that A is. Accordingly, when we repeat with emphasis "A is because it is," we are actually maintaining that while we cannot make "A is" an explicit inference, we will continue to hold that the reasons,

though unknown, are undoubtedly there. (b) The second objection is but a repetition of the first. Bradley says: "Judgments may be received from others, and these are not inferences." One may assert "A is" merely from hearsay. But if I assert "A is," because I was told so by one upon whom I can rely, I mean that "A is" is an explicit inference for my informant, though but a concealed one for myself. Or again, if I vehemently assert "A is because it is," when a friend of mine is my only authority, my statement is equivalent to the judgment "My companion is veracious." So long as words possess meaning, and meaning for the person using them, for that person they are an inference. (c) The third objection is only a repetition of the first and second. "Judgment rests on suggestions of sense, and these suggestions are never uniform." "Suggestions of sense" is an ambiguous phrase. It may mean "suggestions by the senses," or "suggestions by the mind which have arisen because of a certain sensation." If we mean the former, then sensations are independent of consciousness, and the mind is passive while receiving them. This interpretation will scarcely hold water, and is a repetition of the old fallacy. If it means the latter, then "suggestions of sense" have been resolved into suggestions of the mind, or, in reality, judgments, and the difficulty has melted away. (d) Bradley, in the opening of Chapter III, raises a man-of-straw objection by saying that sometimes we judge of X by sticking on Y to the outside. In that case the Y is not a function of synthesis. We judge, therefore, but do not infer. True, Y is far from being a function of synthesis in that case. It is nothing at all. In some inexplicable way it comes from without, and is tacked on to X mechanically. Bradley says this is not inference, and he is right. But it is neither inference nor anything else but nonsense. If, however, Bradley will maintain that the tacking on is done by thought, then Y cannot come from without, and X-Y is an inference. It may be the most nonsensical thing imaginable, but it is still a nonsensical inference. Unless, indeed, Bradley is prepared to cut out from the region of inference all that is false, malicious, or frivolous, he must admit that X-Y is an inference, even though X-Y should be "The moon lays eggs." If it is a judgment, it must be an inference. If Bradley will argue against its being an inference, every argument he brings forward will tell against its being a judgment. (e) Bradley next says that

Reproduction is not always inference. Here he enters psychology, and we may well refuse to follow him. But he says: "An object may excite vague feelings of pleasure or a dim sense of pain. Now, we may not say that such object is the cause of such pleasure or such pain, and yet we know we have the pleasure or the pain." To this it can be replied that, if we know the pain as *our* pain, or the pleasure as *our* pleasure, we have referred the feeling to the self, and so inferred. If, on the other hand, *we do not know* that a certain object is the cause of the feeling, then, of course, we cannot infer it. We can only infer that it has a cause, because that is given in the effect. If so, then it is absurd to talk of the object being a *datum*, for the object is not given at all. We do not know it. The datum is our feeling, and it is on that that we have built. Bradley supposes that something beyond consciousness can in a *vague* and *dim* way (very much Spencer's words) exist for consciousness—so vague and dim that, although there, nothing can be inferred.

A short review of Bradley's essential position may be given before proceeding further. In this portion of his work he has woven about himself a web from the meshes of which he has found it impossible to extricate himself. Beginning, I believe, with the, it may be, unreflected conviction that judgment and inference were practically identical, he treated first of judgment and then of inference. Tyrannized over by the progress, in time, of his own work, he is led to consider that some difference, more or less radical, must exist between them. Hurried on by this pressure from behind, he has ventured not simply to leave it an open question whether or not he did actually separate between the two, but to set down in order some fundamental disagreements, and these once again conduct him to the unknowable. Such were the stages of his downfall.

The next point is to state and explain the general law which underlies every possible inference. Here Bradley becomes polemical. Provisionally there is set up the principle, "Related to the same are interrelated." Bradley, with considerable show of reason, maintains that such a law is too loose and wide. "A runs faster than B, and B keeps a dog (C)" is an example of the above rule, and yet we cannot relate A to C, *i. e.*, we cannot draw any inference from such premises. It follows, then, that we must cur-



tail the principle. After curtailment, it assumes the shape, "Related within the same category to the same are interrelated." The difference between the second and the first seems one of importance. There has been added the qualifying phrase "within the same category." Bradley, however, now wishes to prove that, while the former was too wide the latter is too narrow, for in peculiar cases you may pass from one category to another, so that it is not always "within the same category." The peculiar cases are all connected with the category of Subject and Attribute. Bradley gives as examples of this: "Gold is heavier than lead, and lead is a metal." "A = B, and B is in my pocket." Here, undoubtedly, we pass from one category to another, and we have in both cases the category of Subject and Attribute. If, then, we can draw a legitimate conclusion from the premises, we have proved that the principle is too wide. The inference which Bradley draws from the second example is "A = something which is in my pocket."

Two questions might very fairly be asked at this juncture. First, is the principle "Related within the same category to the same are interrelated" essentially different from the principle "Related to the same are interrelated"? Secondly, if so, is Bradley's criticism against the second form of the principle valid? Any attempt exhaustively to answer the first question would lead to a discussion, the length of which would be quite out of proportion to the size of this essay. The answer given to it depends altogether on the construction put upon the phrase "the same" in the law "Related to the same are interrelated." In the example quoted, "A runs faster than B, and B keeps a dog (C)," B in his capacity of runner, and B in his capacity of dog-owner, are considered "the same." If no objection is taken to that view, then Bradley is correct. But exception, I think, may very properly be taken to that view. In the judgment "A runs faster than B," B is looked upon as a runner, and only those qualities of B are introduced which go to make him capable of running a race. In the judgment "B keeps a dog," B is now present in an entirely different capacity. B as a runner and B as possessor of a dog are, for logical purposes, two quite distinct beings. It might justly be objected, then, that the above example contains the fallacy of *quaternio terminorum*. But at once Bradley might answer, "Yet



'the same' must include differences. If you exclude all differences you at the same time do away with your identity; if you retain any differences you leave room for the fallacy of four terms." The reply seems to be that so long as the differences are differences in an identity, which identity is the very point made prominent in the judgment, then the argument is not fallacious. "A runs faster than B, and B can outstrip C," are premises from which any one can deduce an inference. "The same," in this case, is B as a runner. B as a runner is not a point; he is not mere identity, but an identity amid differences. He is present in the same capacity in both judgments, while the differences are precisely all the varying qualities which united make B the runner he is. Change these qualities and you still have a racer, but one who now can get over the ground with increased, or, it may be, with diminished, speed. Here, again, is sameness amid diversity. Accordingly, if this interpretation be correct, the second form of the principle, "Related within the same category to the same are interrelated," is, after all, only an explanation of the first, and so far it has not been successfully assailed. But the second question now awaits an answer. Is Bradley's criticism of the second form of the principle valid? In support of his criticism he gave two examples, already quoted, viz., "Gold is heavier than lead, and lead is a metal," and "A = B, and B is in my pocket." The inference he drew from the second of these was likewise given, viz., "A = something which is in my pocket." Is this a valid inference?

Now, we already know that B is in his pocket; but there may be (and the possibility is all that is required) C, D, E, X, Y, Z in his pocket too. The inference, notice, does not mean that A = C or D or Z. The inference really is "A = a *particular* something which is in my pocket." It will be hard to see wherein that conclusion has added anything to the premises "A = B, and B is in my pocket." Again, it might be urged that the inference should relate the extremes, and not an extreme to the middle term. In the above example the pocket is the third term, and Bradley has established no relation between it and A. But he afterward replies that it makes no difference what the inference is, provided it be a new relation. The inference may consist in a new relation between A and B. But no number of relations between B and C, D, etc., will make a new relation between A and B. No number

of attributes of B alters in the slightest the relation between A and B. The relation existing between A and B holds good irrespective of the relation which B may bear to other things. The relation of A to B allows, in its very statement, for new attributes of B, or new attributes of A. A or B, when attributes are added to it, is, it is true, in a sense altered, *i. e.*, we know more of it. It would seem as if, when B was altered, the relation between A and B would be altered as well. But the relation between A and B is a specific relation, and, unless B is changed so as to affect that relation, no change is made in the relation.  $A = B$  is a relation of equality, say of weight. We may discover that B is hard, white, without taste, in a certain place, etc. But these relations do not affect its weight, so that our discoveries make no change in the relation of A to B. Bradley might hereupon reply that we may know, *e. g.*, that A is white, and we may not know that B is white. We experiment, and so discover that B is white. Will that not modify the relation subsisting between the two objects? They may have been equal as regards weight before, and their equality might have been known, but is not the relation of whiteness a new relation? Certainly, we answer. But notice now your syllogism:

A is white,

B is white.

∴ So far as color is concerned, A and B are alike.

In this syllogism you have not crossed from one category to another, but have remained throughout within the category of subject and attribute.

A somewhat similar criticism may be adopted in the case of the first example. This is Bradley's complete statement. "Gold is heavier than lead, lead is a metal, therefore, lead-metal (*i. e.*, some metal) is lighter than gold, or metal may be lighter than gold." We may surmise that Bradley's evident anxiety to get a respectable-looking conclusion out of the premises indicates his fear that the conclusion is not altogether valid, and so it turns out. For (a) we may set aside the conclusion, "Metal may be lighter than gold," because that is only a weaker statement of the first conclusion. It only means "Metal may be lighter than gold, if it is lead," *i. e.*, "Lead is lighter than gold." (b) We may, secondly, do away with the bracket "some metal," for that only means "some particular metal," *i. e.*, "lead." Our conclusion then is, "Lead is

lighter than gold," or, "Lead, which is a metal, is lighter than gold," at which no one will be greatly astonished who already knows that gold is heavier than the metal lead.

Bradley, in order to account for what he thinks he has proved, viz., that we may pass from one category to another under peculiar circumstances, states that the categories are not all on the same footing. Now categories, as categories, must be on the same footing or else they are not all categories. Spencer has taken very much the same position in his "First Principles." There he tries to maintain that space, time, matter, etc., are *ultimates*, and yet wishes to prove that they are reducible to force, *i. e.*, that there is an ultimate behind ultimates. Such a position, it is plain, if we attach any meaning to words, sacrifices either the ultimate or the ultimates. So with Bradley, if there is one category which has claims upon the term category, upon which the rest of the categories have no claim, then the rest must be set aside. It or they are not categories. So far as we have yet gone, we have not found that the category of subject and attribute has any title to uniqueness.

Once more, in the chapter on Fresh Specimens of Inference, we have an opportunity to observe Bradley's idea with regard to Subject and Attribute. In that chapter he is engaged in a hand-to-hand conflict with the principle "Related within the same category to the same are interrelated." It is not our concern any longer to take part in the fray. But from a fitting point of observation we may descry the nature of the struggle. Emphasis will thus be laid upon the motives of the combatants. Apart altogether from metaphor, it may have been noticed that Bradley had as yet only generally dealt with the above principle. Now he brings to bear upon it a multitude of concrete specimens of inference. He marshals them under (a) Three term constructions, (b) Arithmetic, (c) Comparison, etc.; but that particular subdivision interesting at this time is A (*ii*) in which he maintains that an attribute and a relation are two distinct things, and that therefore a subject might possess an attribute without being related. He says, "But there follows close a further consequence. We have reasoned to a whole C-B-A, and this whole may have a new quality, X. But, if so, we have reasoned from terms in relation, C-B and B-A, to no new relation but to the presence of a fresh

quality; and hence, once more, our formula has broken down." By "formula," Bradley means the general law of which we have been speaking. This whole quotation is a consequence of what Bradley believes he has proved in a preceding paragraph. He there said, "If A is given to the right of B, and B again to the right of C, I may judge that the terms are arranged as C-B-A." Bradley would desire to show by this that the general law is too narrow, for C and A are both related to the same thing (B) within the same category, and yet the conclusion is not an interrelation of C and A, but a new whole C-B-A, in which B plays as distinguished a rôle as either of the others. By means of the critical process already employed it might be easily seen that the real whole is C(-B)-A, *i. e.*, B is not otherwise present than to show the new relation between C and A. The relation C-B is a premise; the relation B-A is a premise. Therefore the conclusion cannot be concerned with either of these, for these it already has. It is concerned, however, with the relation of C-A, and of course through B, so the new relation may be written C(-B)-A. But this is not the present question. Bradley states (*cf.* quotation) that from the premises C-B and B-A we *by reasoning* reach not a new relation but a quality, X. In obtaining C(-B)-A, if reasoning is relating, and if we have reasoned at all (Bradley acknowledges that we have), then we must have reasoned to a *new relation*. No doubt there may arise one thousand qualities—one thousand Xs—on the discovery of the new relation. The perception of each one of these qualities is just another inference. But that has nothing to do with the present discussion. If we have not a new relation in the whole C(-B)-A, then the quality X can be found in C-B and B-A without putting them together as C(-B)-A. The finding of such a quality in C-B or B-A is a process of inference. If, on the other hand, we have reasoned to a quality from the fragments C-B, or B-A, then we have no whole C(-B)-A. But Bradley, for the sake of clearness, gives an illustration: "I sail round land, and reconstruct my course by a synthetic process, and the whole shore that I combine is then interpreted as belonging to an island. A-B, B-C, C-D, D-F, F-H become, when united, the perimeter of the island, and from this circular frontage I go to the name and the other qualities possessed by islands. The circular shape and self-contained singleness are more than the mere interrelation of the

premises, and need not be got from previous knowledge of islands. You do not go outside the construction to get them, the whole would not be itself without them; and yet they are another side of that whole, which is distinct from the putting together of the parts. But, if so, surely you have reasoned to a quality." Let this illustration be taken up step by step. (a) To obtain this perimeter you must make a series of inferences ("synthetic process" of Bradley) thus, A-B, B-C, A-B-C, etc., etc. When we have completed the series, we have A related in a certain way, *i. e.*, through B C D, etc., to H, and that is all. But here there may be some confusion, owing to the fact that, while Bradley has hitherto taken A B, etc., to be points, he now means them to represent lines. The truer form of the inference will therefore be "The line A B is of such a shape (arc of  $60^\circ$ ), the line B C is of such a shape ( $60^\circ$  more), therefore, the line A C is shaped thus (arc of  $120^\circ$ )." In process of time we would get a circle, or something like a circle. That is the first step. (b) This shape is then in Bradley's phraseology *interpreted* as belonging to an island. It is easy to conceal a world of meaning in a word. Bradley had once before unwittingly covered up a theory under unphilosophic words, and this is another instance. What is the significance of "interpreted," when itself interpreted, but this? "An island is a piece of land surrounded by water; we have sailed round this piece of land,  $\therefore$  it is an island." The term "interpreted" thus conceals an additional inference. (c) Bradley has from the circular frontage, or shape, gone to the name. We have expanded the manner of his going. He adds, "From this circular frontage I go to the name and other qualities possessed by islands." But the name of an island is not one of its qualities. The name has a meaning, and, when it is understood, it will furnish all the qualities that belong to an island as an island. We have, then, got no *other* quality so far. But Bradley replies, "The circular shape and self-contained singleness do not come from interrelation of the premises, and need not come from previous knowledge of islands; and yet we could have no whole, no shape without them. Without the shape we could not have the interrelation." It seems like a contradiction to assert with one breath that the circular shape does not come from the premises, and with the next to assert that the shape and the premises are inseparable. But it is

not a contradiction. Bradley has here failed to distinguish between shape and circular shape. It is evident that he is much more intent upon the picture he has drawn in his book than the imaginary sail and the imaginary island, so you may turn to that. The argument will then read, "The line A B is such a line, the line B C is such a line,  $\therefore$  the line A C is such a line." By a series of inferences we get a figure; it may be circular, or again only rounded, or again square. But that is all. We do not even obtain a knowledge of the shape as a particular shape without comparison, *i. e.*, in truth, without further inference. Because we have drawn lines, there must be shape, but certainly not a definite shape, unless we know beforehand the shape we meant to draw. That would be equivalent to a "previous knowledge of islands" in the illustration used above. The inference in full is in any case, whether we have a previous knowledge of the shape, or whether it was necessary to perform measurements after the shape was drawn: "A circle is of such a nature, this shape is of such a nature,  $\therefore$  this shape is or is not like a circle." The circular shape, accordingly, does not come with the mechanical draught. The original outline gives out no occult essences which strike us unawares, and are then called qualities. The particular shape of the island or the picture is certainly a quality of that island, but a new inference has added that quality to our knowledge of that particular piece of land.

We are, perhaps, now ready to receive from Bradley an announcement which without preparation might have caused uneasiness and alarm. It is one thing vaguely to insinuate that so and so may be your view, and quite another thing to bring it into the broad daylight. Bradley is about to come forth from his place of concealment. If I have been understood to this point, one thing at least will have been made clear. That is, that to be conscious of and to relate are convertible terms. It is true that consciousness may, and often does, relate uncsciously. That fact only affords adscititious evidence that relating is not an arbitrary employment of thought. It only adds weight to the assertion that, whether it will or not, thought must relate. The quality of an object will, if known, be a relation for the percipient subject. A quality that is not a relation will flee definition and be lost in the shades. In opposition to all this Bradley drops a feeler, so to

speak, when he says (p. 3), "The complex of qualities *and* relations which a fact contains makes up its content." If the reader has perused only the few lines which precede the quotation he will only be able to wonder why Bradley said "qualities *and* relations," and whether he intends afterward in any way to distinguish them. After much hesitation, he states his view (p. 264), which leaves us still in doubt as to what he thinks is the difference between quality and relation. He confesses (cf. note, p. 264) "The ultimate connection of quality and relation is a most difficult problem," but leaves us to infer that though possibly, if any one could dig sufficiently deep, he might find that these two had coalesced, yet, first of all, can you dig so deep? and, secondly, for practical purposes, you certainly do not. This answer means that metaphysicians may be left to debate the question. Logicians must accept a difference between qualities and relations. It is an old device of Bradley's to shift the responsibility of proof from logic to metaphysic, and then naïvely to assert, "I am not at present dealing with metaphysic." But his readers are not always satisfied with being deluded into believing that they are in pursuit of something with flesh and blood, and then being left suddenly to hobnob with a ghost. Besides that, they cannot help suspecting that Bradley was himself uneasy upon the question, and did not care to be too hard pressed. It may be a thankless task to run the fox to ground, but the first remark that comes is, that the dividing wall between logic and metaphysic is not so high as Bradley seems to think. They merge imperceptibly one into the other. When you are dealing with logic you are dealing with metaphysic, and no amount of vigorous shaking of the head will serve to contradict that fact. The next remark is that, as logic and metaphysic are at least the same in kind, no distinction between qualities and relations which is not valid for the one will be valid for the other. If, ultimately, as Bradley says, qualities and relations are reducible, then they should never be separated. If, that is, when looked at in the truest light, they are found to be identical, is there any excuse for looking at them in any other light? or is logic a perversion of metaphysic? The fact that, with the above in view, Bradley still maintains that, for logic, qualities and relations must remain distinct, makes his readers believe that, when he further says they are ultimately reducible, he contradicts himself. If



he contradicts himself, which position is the one that enters into the life of his theory! Our whole discussion has gone to prove that the view that qualities and relations are distinct things is the one which is sometimes more plainly, sometimes more dimly, seen to constitute the backbone of nearly every chapter of his work.

The question of the connection between quality and relation is one with the connection between the principle of identity and the principle of difference, the principle of synthesis and the principle of analysis. Almost in so many words Bradley says that the qualities of an object constitute its sameness and the relations its differences. It would be hard for Bradley to state what was the sameness of an object apart from difference, but his words seem to indicate that an object might have sameness in one part of it and difference in another. He is still at the materialistic point of view, and introduces temporal and spatial relations where there are none. This is seen in his illustration of the sun. The sun is at once a fiery mass and has rays. The fiery mass constitutes the sameness or identity of the sun. The rays constitute its differences. The former contains its qualities, the latter are its relations. Thus he at once places identity and diversity on different levels. This is perfectly consistent with other portions of his work. Qualities are not relations for him, though these two may be the same for those engaged in metaphysical subtleties and *vice versa*. Qualities seem to belong to the thing *per se*, relations connect that thing with others. With regard to the object itself, qualities are positive and relations negative; with regard to the world at large qualities are negative and relations positive. There is certainly a plausibility about the theory put in this light, but it is only the plausibility of names. When we cast away the relations we still have the qualities, and we ask Bradley what they are. The answer, most likely, will be, "The object is in itself white, hard, etc." But we need not stay to show that without comparison and relation we never would have had whiteness nor hardness. Besides, the mere giving of the name casts to the winds the whole theory. Either these qualities are connected *as qualities* one with another, or else each quality must be erected into a separate and independent object. If so, will the new object have qualities? You are in the toils of an infinite series. Further, if each quality is something peculiar, then for that very reason it is



related by exclusion both to relations and to its brother qualities. The more you box up an individual quality, or the more you are determined to keep it distinct, the stronger have you made the bond of relation. "I am not" may convey as much meaning as "I am." Here once more there crops up Bradley's desire to exalt the category of subject and attribute. Time, space, etc., etc., are relations. Let them stand aside. Subject and attribute hold the same connection with each other as the object and its quality. Let it be admitted into the *sanctum sanctorum*. But the word "quality" implies something of which it is a quality. The quality is *related* to its subject, and thus relations have with impious hands violated the sanctuary.

It only needs to be added that, when you separate between quality and relation, you obtain something not a relation, something, *i. e.*, which cannot be specified or defined. The quality of an object apart from its relations comes to mean the inexpressible or the indefinable. You are not then very far removed from the old bug-a-boo, the unknowable. But that has now almost ceased to frighten.

The third and last portion of our work is now begun. To it was assigned the task at least of enumerating the portions of Bradley's book which have been tried and not been found wanting. Little more will be done than to present the positive truth in the "Principles of Logic," free from admixtures with (*a*) what was true, but negative, *i. e.*, the critical portion of his work, and (*b*) what in his positive theory has failed to make its peace with the principle laid down in the introduction. No endeavor will be made to furnish a synopsis of what Bradley has himself done, but simply to make more clear the logical nexus. That will in all probability bring to the surface what for a casual reader of Bradley might be wholly overlooked. The first step in this not very gigantic project has happily been already taken. That was the showing that judgment and inference were not two different processes, but essentially one. That at once lessens by half the seeming magnitude of our enterprise. It will not be necessary, when a certain position has been taken with reference to judgment, fox-like, to double on our track, and prove the same position with regard to inference. When it is done once, it is a pleasure to know that it is done once for all. With this assurance there is left still the following—to

trace from the beginning to its end an act of judgment. Starting from the potentiality of judgment, that is, the fact of knowledge, and selecting in a manner arbitrarily a particular object or event, we may in imagination follow along the path over which thought must travel until it reaches its goal. This goal is the positing of another fact of knowledge. Taking our departure from knowledge, we make our journey and return upon knowledge with an additional fact. Thus our knowledge has been increased. Here all such questions about the repetition of the same words fail to disturb us, as they undoubtedly occupy a lower plane. They are merely temptations placed in the way to obstruct a free inquiry.

It might be stated at the outset that the above plan will find a starting-point in the disjunctive judgment, and will proceed through the hypothetical to the categorical. In so doing, a principle is called into exercise which is variously known by the names of Analysis and Synthesis, or Identity and Contradiction. This method exhibits the forward movement, or the movement from the point of view of synthesis. Bradley has adopted a somewhat different plan. He has begun with the categorical, and shown how first of all it implies the hypothetical, and next the disjunctive, and then discussed the nature of the underlying principles. That plan exhibits the backward movement, or the movement from the point of view of analysis. Both start from knowledge, Bradley from a given fact exhibiting by a *regressus* its essential connection with the mass of facts, we from the facts of knowledge proceeding toward a single fact.

First of all, then, we must posit knowledge. Any attempt to get rid of knowledge ends always in self-contradiction. The denial of knowledge is itself knowledge. If any one should shrink from denying out and out the existence of knowledge, but should at the same time affirm modestly that he cannot say whether or not there is knowledge, even then there is implied in his statement that he knows that he doesn't know. If he disclaims even that knowledge and says, "I do not know that I know that I do not know," we can retort that that is still an unqualified assertion, and, so far, knowledge for him. If he recedes further, it will soon take him more than one or two breaths to announce his real position, and we can leave him unburdening himself of his weary and monotonous load of ignorance to the only things that will exist

long enough to hear even the end of the beginning—the everlasting hills. It is true that in the history of the individual there can be reached a point of time when for him there was no knowledge, but that is not at all the question. It is no objection to show that individual knowledge must have an absolute beginning in time, for knowledge exists quite apart from any individual. It can certainly never be known that there was a time for universal consciousness when there was no knowledge; for, even if such had been the case, consciousness could never have become conscious of it. To be conscious of and to know are synonymous terms. To say that for consciousness there was a time when there was no knowledge is to say that consciousness could be conscious that it was not conscious. It asserts that consciousness can be both conscious and not conscious. It is plain, then, that, even if consciousness had a beginning, it cannot be conscious of its own beginning, and, therefore, for consciousness there can be no beginning. We must then posit consciousness. But consciousness left to itself would be forever a blank. For consciousness to be conscious of itself, it must at the same time be conscious of the not-self. So at once for the realization of consciousness arises the distinction between the self and the not-self. This distinction of the self and the not-self is for the self, so that the self and not-self do not fall apart into hopeless dualism, but are united into one whole. This distinction, which is no more a discrimination than a union, arises from the very nature of consciousness, and is an act of knowledge. If we posit consciousness, we must posit knowledge.

Having obtained a single piece of knowledge, we require no other examination to explain all the knowledge that we possess. But it cannot be asserted that, because consciousness could not be consciousness without actual knowledge, therefore we, as conscious, have all knowledge. That would be ignoring the distinction between potentiality and actuality. While consciousness, to be consciousness, must posit knowledge, it does not therefore posit as actual all possible knowledge. Consciousness only asserts that, while I know such and such things, I have at the same time the capacity to increase my knowledge. This has already been treated of in the introduction. We conclude, therefore, that the very nature of knowledge compels a search for further knowledge. Having actual knowledge, with a capacity to know more, and that

combined with the conviction that there is more to be known, we are ready to maintain that it is a necessary and imperative step, though possessed of knowledge, for us to endeavor to extend it.

Knowledge may be extended in many very divergent ways. These ways are the different branches of science (in its widest sense). Every branch becomes, in one sense, an independent whole, itself capable of infinite extension. It again ramifies into numerous subdivisions, until finally the vast system of knowledge becomes so complex and intricate that one human intelligence has to be satisfied with becoming acquainted with a small fraction. Now, consciousness, while testifying to the fact that it is capable of knowing, never drives, necessarily, into one particular channel of knowledge. External causes determine our particular course of study. When we, in consequence, for logical purposes, select a single act of knowledge for examination, the selection must be arbitrary. Let the subject, arbitrarily chosen, upon which further light is about to be sought, be the principle of heat. The principle of heat may be called, for convenience, A. Few are entirely ignorant of the nature of heat. It is not long before children learn through hard experience that "Fire burns." What is known of heat may be called b, c, d, etc. Our knowledge of heat may then be expressed in the judgments, "A is b, c, d, etc." Now, it is known, not only that "A is b, c, d, etc.," but also that "A is not not-b, not-c, not-d, etc." The reference of b to A at once excludes the reference of the not-b to A. We have, then, implicit in the positive judgment "A is b," the negative judgment "A is not not-b." Besides this, the judgments "A is b," "A is c, etc.," are all categorical. From these categorical judgments as a starting point, we must reveal the process by which thought is enabled to add continually to its already existing content.

There is already deposited, as secured, the fact not only that "A is" but that "A is b, c, d." We have, moreover, the additional fact that, while "A is b, c, and d," the predicates b, c, and d do not exhaust A; *i. e.*, that A is not only b, c, and d, but something else as yet unknown. What A still further is we may proceed to discover. So far as known, A may be anything that is not already excluded by b, c, and d. It depends, that is, upon our knowledge of A, whether the number of possible predicates shall be many or few. If we have already a comparatively extensive

knowledge of A, then the possible predicates will be few, inasmuch as b, c, and d are relatively rich. If, on the other hand, little is known of A, its possible predicates will be many, inasmuch as b, c, and d are relatively poor. Let it be granted that our knowledge of A (and so of not-A) is such that there comes before us the judgment "A may be e, and f, and g, etc." If this is the way in which our ignorance or partial knowledge presents itself, the solution is easy. "A may be e" means "A is either e or not-e," and we have before us at once a disjunctive judgment in its simplest form. A disjunctive judgment in its simplest form is one in which the predicates take upon themselves the character of exclusive alternatives. When it was experimented upon the A would be found to be either e or not-e. The next step would be to treat f as you have treated e, and so on until you have run over your whole stock of predicates. But if the judgment presents itself in the form of exclusion, viz.: "A is e, or f, or g, or h, or . . .," what then? It does not seem so simple a matter to reach the most elementary form of disjunctive judgment. When you say "A is e, or f, or g, or h," you mean that A is one of these, and only one; or, in other words, A is one and no other, *i. e.*, A is either e or not-e. In the very words, "A is e, or f, or g, or h," is implied the disjunctive judgment with exclusive alternatives. No advance can be made until you put your judgment either implicitly or explicitly into this form. When that is done, then you analyze or experiment upon A, and discover whether A is e or not. The judgment "A is e, or f, or g, or h or . . ." implies in the speaker a knowledge of e, and f, and g. His endeavor is, then, by a careful examination of A to find out with which of these A must coincide. You take the first. "A is e or not-e." Upon examination, you may come to any one of three conclusions. (a) You may fail in the tests you have applied to reach any positive knowledge with regard to A, and so assert, "I do not know;" but that cannot be a final conclusion. (b) You may find in A attributes which lead you to assert, "A is compatible with e." (c) Lastly, you may find in A attributes which demonstrate that A is incompatible with e. If (b) is the result, then you at once conclude "A is e," and you have reached your categorical. If (c) is the result, then you are only in a negative categorical position. A is not e. That leaves "A is f or not-f," or "A is g or not-g," to be tried in its

turn; and so the process goes on. The most complicated result is certainly (*e*). If, then, we conclude *A* is not *e*, the whole of the next step would be as follows:

*A* is not-*e*.

Not-*e* is *f*, or *g*, or . . .

∴ *A* is *f*, or *g*, or . . .

By this means you have disposed of *e* entirely, are again at your starting-point, and are ready to deal with *f* as you have done with *e*.

But one naturally asks, When will the process be complete? When, in that way, do you reach a categorical? To obtain a correct answer it must be borne in mind, first, that the possible predicates are never an infinite number. The number of the predicates, as has been already remarked, is limited by what is known of *A*, and by what is known of not-*A*. The task is not, therefore, an endless one. A positive judgment will be reached when the predicates have been exhausted. In one sense, however, positive results are obtained before that point is reached. When it is found that *A* is not-*e*, for example, if not-*e* is anything positive (and if our lesson has been learned it cannot but be positive), by an additional judgment there is got a positive conclusion with regard to *A*, thus:

*A* is not-*e*.

Not-*e* is *x*, *y*, *z*, etc.

∴ *A* is *x*, *y*, *z*, etc.

But that is, so to speak, turning off from the highway; that is fixing the attention on *x*, *y*, *z*, rather than the *e*, *f*, *g*. Our interest centres in the main proposition, "*A* is *e*, or *f*, or *g*, or . . .," and so the question is again asked, "When in this proposition do you reach a terminus?" Bradley here introduces a peculiar principle called by him "I must because I cannot otherwise." Supposing that *e*, *f*, and *g* are all the possible predicates, then Bradley means that when we discover that *A* is neither *e* nor *f*, we are forced into believing that "*A* must be *g*," because we have no other course open. That means that, whether we will or not, we are compelled to judge "*A* is *g*." That way of stating a theory, which contains the elements of truth, leads the reader to believe that the reaching of the categorical is, after all, but a leap in the dark. Bradley means that, if we only knew more, we might

perceive that the number of predicates of  $A$  were much larger than we had conceived, and that, in consequence, with greater knowledge we might find that  $A$  was not  $g$  at all, but something else. We concluded that  $A$  was  $g$  not because we had found qualities in each which render the judgment true, but only because in our short-sightedness we had failed to find any qualities in  $A$  and  $g$  which would render the judgment false. But Bradley is here in error. If  $e$ ,  $f$ , and  $g$  are not all the possible predicates of  $A$ , then, when it is perceived that  $A$  is not  $e$  nor  $f$ , we do not assert that  $A$  is  $g$ . Certainly, any such conclusion would be wholly unwarranted. " $g$ " must be dealt with in precisely the same manner as  $e$  and  $f$ .  $A$  and  $g$  are both summoned to appear for examination, and any one of three possible sentences may be pronounced upon them. These three have been already mentioned: (1) I cannot tell; (2)  $A$  is  $g$ ; (3)  $A$  is not  $g$ . If by thorough examination it has been concluded that  $A$  is  $g$ , then the other predicates which at first presented themselves may now be dismissed. The reason why they can be dismissed now, when they could not have been dismissed before, is, that, since the judgment was set forth in full, our knowledge of  $A$  has been continually increasing. A time must come eventually when the candidates will not require to be heard *singulatin*, but may be set aside in batches. If, on the other hand, it is declared that  $A$  is not  $g$ , then other predicates must be searched for, and examination must be stayed till they are found. Never in the process, so far as I am able to see, do we light upon any such principle as, "I must because I cannot otherwise," if such a principle argues to the imbecility of reason. Indeed, if on examination it is discovered that  $g$  must be positively related to  $A$ , then we do pronounce " $A$  is  $g$ " according to the rule "I must because I cannot otherwise." But the principle then only means that reason cannot contradict itself, or that reason must be rational. That reason cannot contradict itself is a mere truism, which has no particular applicability to any discussion. It would then be the strength and not the infirmity of reason to assert, "I must because I cannot otherwise." But, when Bradley says that it is owing to our ignorance that we announce such a rule, he has made this rather curious blunder. He has, in the first place, treated the proposition " $A$  is  $e$ , or  $f$ , or  $g$ , or . . .," as if the predicates were exhaustive, has cut away  $e$  and



f, and then been compelled to assert the relation of *g* to *A*. When that was done, in the second place, he is suddenly startled with the astounding truth that he does not know everything, and that after all the predicates *e*, *f*, and *g* may not be exhaustive. He therefore concludes that it was owing to our ignorance that we judged "A is *g*." It is a pity that the conviction of his "ignorance" had not dawned upon him in time to prevent him from imagining at all that *e*, *f*, and *g* were exhaustive. If it had, then he might have seen that, without any positive evidence for the relating of *g* to *A*, reason would never have made the relation. Having trusted it formerly not to admit *e* without positive proof, he could not have been far astray in fancying that it would not be any more lenient in the case of *g*. His blunder was, after having assumed that *e*, *f*, and *g* were exhaustive, to turn right-about-face with no better reason than to insert his principle, "I must because I cannot otherwise."

This is in the rough an outline of the process through which thought goes in reaching a categorical judgment. In that process many things still remain implicit, and it will be necessary to return now to the disjunctive judgment. This can be done with a clear conscience, as it has been shown that the material of thought must be thrown into the form of a disjunctive judgment. Thought must go from the indefinite "A is *e*, or *f*, or *g*," to the definite A is *e* or not-*e*. In a few moments it will be seen that every advance, and this one among the number, is only possible through introduction of the hypothetical. At present, however, we have to finish with the disjunctive. Let this be the disjunctive judgment, "Heat is either a subtile substance or molecular motion." This cannot be final, for reason refuses to consider that a definition of heat. Reason asserts that it must be one, and proceeds to discover which one it is. In denying that a disjunctive judgment is final, reason works upon the principle that absolute contradictories cannot exist. If it were possible for two absolute contradictories to exist, the disjunctive judgment would be the only possible form of judgment. Bradley in some measure recognizes the truth of this theory. His own view concerning contradictions is as follows: "That disparates, or incompatibles, or contraries exist is the fact on which the principle of contradiction is based. It takes for granted the nature of things in which certain elements are



exclusive of others." This does not mean that two things can possibly be absolutely exclusive in the rigid sense of the word "exclusive." It does not mean that there are any two things which are wholly unrelated. Such a view is a contradiction in terms. First of all, if we say that two objects are mutually exclusive as regards space, and mean by that that two objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time, we are correct. One object occupies one space, and the second object occupies another. These two spaces may be one inch or one thousand miles apart. Yet, as each space is only a portion of space itself, each part of space is related to all other parts through the whole. It is not necessary to enter into any discussion concerning the nature of space. But it may safely be said that as a material object is not a material object unless it occupies space, so every material object is related to all others through the particular space occupied by each. The same holds true with regard to time. There is only one time, and all objects are in time. Accordingly, the principle might be adopted, as the other aspect of the one quoted from Bradley, "No two things that are comparable are wholly unlike or dissimilar, *i. e.*, wholly exclusive." The truth is, that the two things declared mutually exclusive are both in consciousness. Even if they did not possess anything else in common they do possess that, and cannot be, therefore, absolutely exclusive. But, possessing that, they possess more. Let us state the assertion and see what more they do actually possess in common. It is this: "Two things may be absolutely exclusive." First of all they are not absolutely exclusive, for both are related to the self. But apart from that let the statement be analyzed. It is "*two things* may be absolutely exclusive." Now, so far as each is called a thing (whether that thing be temporal or spiritual, material or immaterial) they are not mutually exclusive. Again, so far as this thing and that thing make *two* things they are related. Each is related to the whole as a unit. Each is one and therefore numerically related to the whole. But it may be argued that we have begged the question in stating the principle as "*two things* are mutually exclusive." Our opponents would rather say "A and B are mutually exclusive." Their design is palpable. They would empty the objects to be compared of all content. They understand that, just so far as we predicate anything of A or B, these

are not absolutely exclusive. So they assert A and B are absolutely exclusive, maintaining at the same time that A and B are void of all content. Without stopping to show that what is void of all meaning does not exist for consciousness at all, or in other words that what exists for consciousness must have more content than the bare abstraction of relation to consciousness, we will take our opponents on their own ground. Let us suppose A and B to be devoid of all meaning. Inasmuch as *both* are without meaning, both are alike in that respect. They are not mutually exclusive, because they are absolutely identical. This leads naturally to the other aspect of the truth, and that is that while there must be identity there cannot be mere identity. If A and B were utterly devoid of content, it would be nearer the mark to say not that they were absolutely opposed, but that they were absolutely identical. If each is utterly devoid of content, having no marks to distinguish it from the other, then both are one. But they cannot be utterly devoid of content. At least both are present to the self. It is this existing for consciousness which, while preserving the identity of A and B, at the same time preserves their difference. Identity is the permanent relation to consciousness. It cannot disappear, because consciousness cannot disappear. But, in preserving the relation of A and B to mind, we are compelled to preserve more. That is equally a necessity of reason. There can never be found the bare abstraction called relation to consciousness. *A thing* is not only related to consciousness, but it must be related to consciousness as a *thing*. A and B are not only related to consciousness but they are related to consciousness as A and B. When you have A and B related to consciousness you have their identity. But, as you must have them related to consciousness as A and B, you have their difference. Thus it is that you are perpetually disclosing the truth that identity and contradiction, permanence and change come and go together, and that it is just self-consciousness which, while it must make distinctions, is perpetually reconciling them.

From this it is apparent that, while relative contraries may exist, absolute contraries cannot exist. It is the nature of relative contraries to become absorbed in a higher unity. But the opposite aspect must also be insisted on, viz., that no two things can become a simple unity. It is impossible for relative contraries so

thoroughly to be merged in each other as to lose their individuality. The nature of the unity would in that case be a unity that excluded differences. But a unity that excludes differences is a total blank. Therefore, while we say that contradictories cannot be absolute, we say with equal force that relative contradictories must exist. In the judgment, then, "Heat is either a subtile substance or molecular motion," it may be said that, so far as the predicates "subtile substance" and "molecular motion" have attributes in common, heat is both. So far, however, as their attributes are opposed, heat must be one and not the other. Having reached this position, the next step is to state in order the points of agreement and the points of difference in the two predicates. Especial prominence is given to the points of difference. When that is done, you assert, by means of a hypothetical judgment, that if heat possesses such and such attributes it is molecular motion; if it does not possess them, it is not molecular motion. As the predicates of heat are considered exhaustive, not-molecular-motion is equivalent to subtile substance. By means of Analysis and Synthesis, *i. e.*, by various processes of judgment or inference, we discover what characteristics heat exactly has. If these attributes are possessed by one predicate to the exclusion of the other, we thus judge:

Heat has x, y, z, as attributes.

Molecular motion has x, y, z, as attributes.

∴ Heat is molecular motion.

*i. e.*, Heat is not a subtile substance.

Again there has been reached the categorical, which is at the same time affirmative and negative.

It is easily seen that, if attention is paid to the exact process which is performed in order to obtain a categorical, while the affirmative conclusion is definite, the negative implied in it is also definite. In the case of common every-day judgments the definite negative seems almost to disappear. In judging, for example, "It is a man," it would be difficult to assign as a negative any other judgment than "It is not not-man." In the case of well-known objects the contrast is so fleeting and so instantaneous that it becomes almost unconscious. If, however, the man were standing at a distance, in a field where there were a number of high stumps, then a careful examination would require to be made.

“It is a man” would then have as its negative “It is not a stump.” When ordinary judgments are formed, it would seem that the negative is more indefinite in proportion as the positive is definite; but definite would only mean in such an assertion explicitly present to consciousness. In reality, the more definite the positive, the more definite is the negative. It would be an idle remark to maintain that the judgment “Heat is molecular motion” has as its negative Heat is not not-molecular motion, and say, because of that, that the positive judgment was, so to speak, a mere point, while the negative included the rest of the known universe. That overlooks the truth that molecular motion, equally with not-molecular motion, has its relations to the whole world. In one sense it may be that one judgment includes all possible judgments. But “includes” simply means “is related to.” In the rigid meaning of include, one judgment cannot include any other judgment. The judgment Heat is not not-molecular motion is only rendered inclusive if Heat is not a subtle substance by another definite inference or judgment. To obtain this judgment a contrast is instituted between molecular motion and subtle substance, in which the variance between them becomes prominent.

The next topic is the hypothetical judgment. Hypothetical does not mean doubtful, but only conditional. Inasmuch as all knowledge is conditioned by the knowing subject, all knowledge must be hypothetical. We fix a judgment as hypothetical when we declare its conditions. “A is” is a declarative statement, or a categorical judgment, but that judgment leaves to be understood the conditions of A’s existence. These conditions must be present, though unexpressed. When we bring to the front the conditions, and say, “A is on certain conditions,” or, “Given such and such conditions and you have A,” our judgment has become hypothetical. Bradley has done good service in showing that every judgment must be hypothetical because every statement must be conditional. His exposition of this subject is exceedingly good, and leaves little to be said. But one remark may be made. It has been shown that we advance from the body of truth to a new truth by various means. The way of advance is marked by many imaginary halting-places. Each of these halting-places means the insertion of a condition. Every condition, however, has been shown to be a necessity of reason. We have knowledge, but we

must increase our knowledge. Unless that is done, we cannot expect to arrive at new truth. The necessity for increasing knowledge is the first condition. Again, when there has been presented the judgment "A is e, or f, or g, or . . .", reason once more asserts that it is unsatisfied, and bids us advance. Its command is to select. What is selected is, from one point of view, arbitrary. The motive guiding the selection is, at least, extraneous to the question, but the selection is itself a necessity. Only on condition of such selection can advance be made. Thus, a new condition is introduced; our judgment has become more hypothetical, and yet the condition was a necessity of reason. There has been reached the judgment "A is e or not-e." Once again a condition is introduced, "If A has such and such attributes, it is e or not-e"; so that, by means of another necessary condition, by further hypothesis, we reach the categorical "A is e" or "A is not-e."

Little need be said of the categorical. It has been shown to imply all the rest. Pains has already been taken, likewise, to prove that a categorical judgment is either negative or affirmative, according to the point of view. Indeed it wholly depends upon the individual's point of view whether, in dealing with the disjunctive, he shall end with an affirmative or a negative categorical. Both the positive and the negative are implied from the outset.

Upon the nature of the distinction between the "possible," the "necessary," and the "actual," a word or two may be said in conclusion. In the judgment "A is e or not-e," both e and not-e are considered possible. Possible is a term wholly relative to our actual knowledge. It is only because we are to some extent ignorant of real A that the two possible predicates arise. The ignorance is, however, a necessary ignorance; so the possible, if we may so speak, is a necessary possible. Both e and not-e are possible at the stage of the disjunctive judgment. Soon we get beyond that stage. Examination is had upon A, and the possibility of the one predicate passes into probability, while the possibility of the other sinks into bare possibility, or, vulgarly speaking, something like one chance in ten. From the probability we go not directly to actual e, but to the sum or the totality of the conditions or relations which make e actual. It would seem that when we have recognized in A all the qualifications required for the assertion

of the actuality of A, we hesitate, and say first "A must be," and then "A is." But the true distinction between the necessary and the actual is not a difference in time. The true distinction is only a difference in the point of view. Let us illustrate. Suppose a number of people are searching for a missing child. They come first upon traces, then upon some article of clothing, then upon fresh footprints, indications which necessarily point to the child's immediate vicinity. The cry is raised, "It must be here." The next moment, "It is here, it is found." The illustration furnishes us with a fair idea of the difference between the necessary and the actual. But it has this defect, that it introduces the temporal element. Between the "must be" and the "is" there is no distinction of before and after. Apart from that, notice that the necessity rests upon sure indications of the child's proximity. It is the negative assertion almost that it is found. The indications at least proclaim that the child is nowhere else; and that is only the negative of the assertion "It is here."

A both exists and has relations. Looking at A in its positive aspect we would assert "A is." Looking at A in its negative aspect—or from the point of view of its relations—we would assert "A must be." These relations necessitate A's existence; *i. e.*, when we say, "A must be," we mean that these relations cannot point to anything else. "A must be" is equivalent to "B, or C, or D cannot be."

Last of all has come the categorical. It is the poorest or the richest form of judgment, according to your standpoint. As implying all the preceding, it is undoubtedly the richest. As in a sense rejecting all the preceding, it is the poorest. Acknowledging its connections it can occupy the loftiest seat. Disowning its connections it is scarcely worthy of a place at all. Looking at it in the latter aspect, Bradley says that the Analytic judgment of sense is the most meagre. But the former aspect is, from the stand-point of our whole exposition, probably the more correct. The goal has been reached, and, with new impulse and energy refreshed, thought is prepared to start again.

## PLATONISM AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN THOUGHT.

BY L. J. BLOCK.

It would seem that Philosophy has fallen on evil days. Once the undisputed queen of the sciences, and recognized law-giver in the realm of the Knowable, she appears now to occupy a region from which the buoyant life and fruitful energy of the times have receded, sending solitary and confused echoes into her expanse of loneliness, sad and muffled reminders of departed glories and extinguished authorities. The world-embracing fantasy of deeply brooding India, multitudinous in strangely commingled creations of spirit and nature, afforded her a harborage of mystical and cloudy supremacy; mother of nations, and mythologies, and world-comprehensions, India could not be other than philosophic. Memnonian Egypt—turning her colossal-stated front to the sunrise, and responsive to the earliest influence of the morning radiance, symbol of upturned humanity to the permeating and moulding Universal Thought, which converts all things into its own everlasting similitude and reflection—was, throughout her life and history, but a philosophic meditation on Death and Immortality. And radiant Greece—the genuine and joyous youth of the world, mankind's first recognition of itself as the solution of the riddles propounded by the abyss of potencies that engirt him, that exquisite equipoise of soul and sense which is the birth of beauty and its perfect embodiment—found the study of Universal Ideas as noble a pursuit as the disintegration of nature into abstract elements, which have no subsistence outside of the ideas which underprop and vivify them. Through the gloom which domed the welter and tumult of the Middle Age, that second chaos from whose throes and anguish was born the leagued independence of modern nationalities, shone two lights, as the sun and moon thereof, Religion and the Philosophy of the Schoolmen.

But we of the enlightenment and illumination have changed all that. We have discovered reality, and turned our faces away from the subjective phantasmagoria that deceived our misguided forefathers. Sensuous certitude and the abstract classifications



of science have put to flight the winged and mist-clad idealities of philosophy. Science has encamped on the very battle-field from which her elder sister has retreated in scorn, and haughtily triumphs in a conflict on which the one antagonist disdains to enter.

But, after all, so-called Positive Thought and the supporters of the gospel of limitation are not altogether assured that their victory is final and absolute. That steady splendor and typical manifestation of recent English philosophic tendencies, G. H. Lewes, whose spiritual transfusion into the life and work of the greatest of modern novelists modified her latest creations not wholly to their artistic completeness and wholesomeness of significance, finds himself necessitated to quote as introductory of his attempted systematic exposition of his world-view, "Problems of Life and Mind," the following words of his fellow-doubter, Stuart Mill, from whom such utterances are as little to be expected as from himself: "England's thinkers are again beginning to see, what they had only temporarily forgotten, that the difficulties of Metaphysics 'lie at the root of all Science; that these difficulties can only be quieted by being resolved, and that, until they are resolved, positively whenever possible, but at any rate negatively, we are never assured that any knowledge, even physical, stands on solid foundations.'"

It is indeed so. All science terminates in problems whose solution lies alone in the gift of divine philosophy. The constitution of matter, the interaction of forces, theories of heat and explanations of light, the relations of brain-structure and thought-interfusion, the origin of life and the fundamental aspects of the evolution-hypothesis, thrust the reason at last into the domain which pure speculation holds in right indefeasible and inalienable. The admirable monograph of Judge Stallo, recently published, has shown how inadequate is the thought of science, for the clearing up of the difficulties itself has met face to face in the inevitable process of its development.

And, *pace* Stuart Mill and the rest, a negative solution is an impossibility. The doctrine of the limitedness of thought, in what form soever presented, is so beset with difficulties and contradictions that one must hold it in ignorance of its complications, or in sheer despair, as a drowning man catches at straws. There is no direction in which Mind is so limited as in this of its own limitedness. Indeed, its limitation here is so marked that it cannot



even perceive it except by the extraordinary procedure of shutting its eyes to the whole subject intended to be envisaged. In this case it is only the blind who see. How could Mind set a limit to itself without transcending that limit? The very act, being continent of the limit, constitutes a totality of which limitation is only an antithetical phase. How can we *not* know a beyond which we know as limiting us, or how can we know ourselves as limited without knowing the limitary potencies which render it possible that we should be limited at all? It is impossible for thought to posit a beyond which shall limit it, and yet say in the same breath that the beyond is unknowable: for the beyond is as much a relative to thought, and is truly limited by thought, and therefore determined in its nature and essence by it, as thought is finited and circumscribed by the posited Unknowable. Surely it is a manifest contradiction for knowing to affirm that which is *per se* unknowable. We may affirm that our knowledge is inadequate, that subjects of investigation have not been fully fathomed, that the Universe is exhaustless to the restless research of man, but that the energy of knowing should demonstrate its hopeless incapacity to know—never. The supposititious Unknowable, when exposed to the relentless alchemy of reason, vanishes into the merest vapors of abstraction and “leaves not a rack behind.” Moreover, the upholders of the merely relative knowing claim at least one knowledge as absolute, viz., that all knowing is relative; this, by an extraordinary inconsistency, is held as absolute certitude; but to some mercilessly logical Hume of the future such a position will show itself to be utterly untenable, and the abyss of complete negation and skepticism will again engulf the so-called exact sciences as well as the results of pure speculation. Perhaps this consequence has already come.

But just here is the transition to genuine thinking and the proof of the reality and absoluteness of knowledge. If Thought posits itself and the beyond itself in an integrating unitary act, the antithesis falls within it, and the whole of the knowable resides within the sphere of its regulative laws and constitutive exploits. Thought projects itself over against itself, and the act of diremptive projection is at the same time the act of self-recovery in completed self-recognition. To imagine something outside of this total process of universal spirit, a mysterious and forever inaccessible

force, a marvellous *Ding-an-sich*, as Kant phrases, a twilight obscurity of potency to which may be relegated at will all the great problems of human life and destiny, a modern Limbo differing from the Miltonic one, being no receptacle for faded follies, delirious delusions, exploded hypotheses, but a prison-house wherein to lock from sight and influence our aspirations to know what we are, our faith in personal responsibility, on which is based all goodness and freedom, our glimmering apperceptions of the infinitude of our destiny; in short, everything that makes it worth our while to be and do, is only to allow the intrusion of the imagination into the realm of the reason. Imagination has deluded philosophy with many a fiction, and with none more remorselessly than with this of the thing in-itself, out of relation and incapable of determination. That which is out of relation is unknowable, says Herbert Spenser; we may add that it cannot be at all, as life is as much an intertexture of relations as knowledge. *Entia non multiplicanda præter necessitatem* is an excellent logical maxim, and against such logical exorcism the vapid and tongueless ghost of the thing-in-itself has not a single self-contradictory syllable to utter.

Universal Thought establishes a totality of relations which persist within its self-constituting medium, and, as universal product, are identical with its creative potencies. This totality presents itself in three aspects: First, as primordial thought of itself, or God; secondly, as essential representation of the full circle of Thought's potentialities, or the Universe; thirdly, as the organic unity of these opposites in an everlasting perfection of life, in which we "live, and move, and have our being." This is the God whom we all ignorantly worship, and whom Philosophy declares unto us. This is the being which Plato establishes as the foundation of his system in the great dialogue of the Parmenides, and which he there paradoxically describes as both being and not being; this is the *ἡ νοήσεως νόησις*, the thought which thinks itself, with which Aristotle concludes his *Metaphysics*; this is the ineffable First Cause of Proclus, which is superessential and wholly defecated from the worlds that depend from it; this is the *ens realissimum* of the Schoolmen, the substance of Spinoza, the *Indifferenz* of Schelling, and the *Idee* of Hegel. Here all the great thinkers converge; such is the outcome of the History of Philosophy.

Into the atmosphere and comprehension of this highest sphere of Truth penetrate the three great teachers and refiners of Mankind—Art, Religion, Philosophy. Art manifests this most real of realities and most ideal of idealities to the race through the medium of sensuous forms; Religion reveals it in mythic narrative as the essential groundwork of all consciousness, and the indwelling spirit and energy of all character; Philosophy seizes it as the imminent self-realizing idea of the world and history, an organic totality combining all knowing and being, all cognition and life, all potentiality and realization, the timeless and spaceless synthetic unity, wherein all history and astronomy are shrivelled up as flax in the fire, or rather *aufgehoben*, to use a Hegelian technicality, or held in solution as a solid substance in some chemical mixture of liquids. Such a comprehension of the Universe could not be merely a subjective creation of the individual mind; this is not *my* thought or *your* thought; it is thought universal, thinking itself, which reflects itself in you or me because it can only come to itself, and reveal its inmost principle, by its infinite self-reflections, which are the countless human souls whose pilgrimage is toward a goal, obscure only from an exceeding splendor of light. Surely in this comprehension there is enough of mystery to satisfy those who appear to be much alarmed lest the miracle and strangeness of existence should be all explained, and the monotony of too much understanding should weary us with its too crystalline purity of circumambient ether. Life ascends from knowledge to knowledge, and its peak and summit are the mid-effulgence of the sun; not a nebulous Ginnunga Gap, frost-bound and ice-clad, where all things are whirled upon and against each other in measureless and inextricable confusion. All real thinking is universal thinking, not individual thinking. The great discoveries in science and metaphysics were, so to speak, in the air before they were enunciated; usually they are made simultaneously by various workers in the same field, with no possible shadow of co-operation. Had Newton, and Leibnitz, and Hegel not lived, their great systems would have been developed by other minds; we do not possess thought; much rather does it possess us, and in its self-revelation we become cognizant of objective verity. The unity of scientific investigation could not be maintained by a host of isolated and uncommanded workers; science is a unity from the beginning;

that unity captains the array of toilers at every moment, and discloses the hoards of buried truth in the rocky bowels of the universe. Truth, not merely relative to us, but the invincible gold—that is the medium of interchange between the intellects and souls of men, and the palpable demonstration that the nations are of one blood and kin to what is deepest and noblest in the unfathomed scheme of things.

The attitude of thought toward this infinite reality is fourfold. Thought at first accepts its own conclusions with a certain *naïveté* and unquestioning faith. Speculation is primarily not beset with tinidities or critical examinations and re-examinations. The fundamental principle assumed or found is unhesitatingly used as a solvent for the facts of nature and history. Systems are constructed, and their defence bristles with the defiance of assertion upon assertion. This first attitude of thought to the objective world is dogmatic, and wanting in genuine method. But opposing systems emerge into view with formidable swiftness and completeness, and an argumentative settlement of these disputes seems an impossibility. Disputation discovers constant support for the accepted alternative in the depths of either consciousness, and victory refuses to settle upon either standard. The way is cleared for the transition to the second attitude of thought toward objective verity.

Here criticism commences, but of a wholly external and separatist tendency. The essential duality pervasive of all thinking springs into bold and appalling relief. The antitheses of the permanent and the transient, of rest and motion, of thought and being, of the subjective and objective, of the potential and the realized, of freedom and necessity (the catalogue may be indefinitely extended), furnish a shifting and bewildering labyrinth of apparent uncertainties from which the so-called common-sense mind recoils. An abstract monism, whether scientific or metaphysical, affords no refuge in this storm of colliding contradictions; if we plant ourselves upon matter, the explanation of spirit, like the ghost of the murdered Banquo, will confront us in the mid-bustle and heyday of our carnival; if we assume spirit, the atomic theory of matter hurls its dust upon us, and is like to put out our eyes; if we talk of an excluded middle or intermediate, and grant validity to either side of the antithesis, we are tossed for reiterated impale-

ments from one to the other horn of the dilemma until we are fain to find peace and breath in a confession of hopeless ignorance and established skepticism. We become disciples of the great Englishman, Hume, and are satisfied that nothing is to be known and nothing is to be done.

But at this stage the third aspect of thought intervenes, and saves us from ruin. The doctrine of the strict interdependence of facts and ideas, the impossibility of predicating this without that, the discovery that explicit acceptance and strenuous defence of one view bases upon the implicit acknowledgment of diverse and even contrary truth, forces us upon the dialectical procedure, of which so many dialogues of Plato are consummate and imperishable examples. The dialectical movement is a necessity of thought, and has emerged into greater or less prominence in every great philosophical era. Plato is the dialectician *par excellence* of antiquity. Socrates, with true Athenian urbanity, takes for granted the point of view claimed by his interlocutor, and, by a series of adroitly contrived questionings, compels him to recognize the presuppositions of his thought, the relations and priorities without which his thought would be unthinkable, and often ends by landing him in a confession of validity in the opinion he began the discussion by antagonizing. This is the famous Socratic irony, no fantastical play of idle acumen, alert for the detection of inconsistencies, but an essential procedure of real thinking.

The dialectical point of view, however, is not wholly positive. The categories here swim in a Bacchant maze of transmutation, and proceed from nowhere to nowhither, or rather from everywhere to everywhither. Dialectics must rise to the height of the organic idea, the unity, as Hegel says, of comprehension and reality. The elucidation of the organic idea, its necessary phases and their interdependence, is the business and talk of philosophy. Say what we may, do what we will, we cannot escape the fate of reasoning beings; and reason, herself an organic unity, can be satisfied with no lesser principle as the explanation and reason of what is only the summit and perfection of all reasoning processes.

These four phases of speculation are illustrated with singular clearness in the history of Greek thought. With Thales begins a period of genuine philosophizing. His fundamental principle is of course a material one, and there is no effort at systematic expo-

sition. The world of nature, with its infinite potencies and mutable forms, is, nevertheless, one spectacle, and thought rejoices in the effort to find unity underlying all this diversity. Various systems of philosophy arise: the Pythagorean, with its primal postulate of number or proportion, and the Eleatic, which carries abstraction to its extreme verge of pure being. With Parmenides, venerable and majestic prototype of the great thinkers, nothing is but the permanent, the moveless, undetermined, immutable one. The contradiction here is apparent; the phenomenal and transitory may be ejected from the abstract developments, but reality stubbornly refuses to be argued out of existence. The great problem of ancient speculation rises above the horizon: the reconciliation of the permanent and the transitory, the one and the many, the unchangeable and the ineffable, with the mutable and expressible, of being and non-being. With the Eleatics terminates one movement of this antithesis; the world of sensuous apprehension had disappeared on being subjected to the alembic and crucible of the philosophers; in defence of it arises Heraclitus with his doctrine of the becoming. Not the one is, but the many are; not the stable and fixed, but the eternally changing. You cannot put your foot in the same stream twice. Against the abstraction of unity Heraclitus sets up the abstract multiplicity. As Thales called his first "water," calm, equable expanse, so Heraclitus calls his first "fire," restless, flickering, fantastical. The chasm is sought to be bridged by subsequent thinkers in various ways—by the Atomists in a materialistic, by Anaxagoras in an idealistic way. But in this clash of conflicting opinions Philosophy had lost its primal naïve, dogmatic tone; it was thrust back on itself in a reflection on its method and process. The sun of the Sophists had arisen.

The Sophists led the skeptical opinion of the times. The faith in the traditional deities of the land had been shaken, and the prevalent looseness of morals was either a cause or effect of the unsettled condition of speculative thought. Logical subtleties, convincing demonstrations of both sides of a hypothesis, exaltation of the individual above the universal, justification of personal whim against the rational necessity of established law and governance, were the disorder of the day. Protagoras formulated the prevailing creed in his dictum that "the man is the measure of the uni-

verse"; be it understood "the man," not "man"; the individual, not the community. This negative phase of Greek thought terminates in Socrates and his disciple and expounder Plato.

The *πρὸς στῶ* from which Socrates moved the ancient world is the conception of the Good; no subjective whim, no empirical realization of wish or desire, but the unity of will in the individual and moral law in the universe. The Sophists had emphasized empirical subjectivity, *my* will or *your* will, as limited earth-born creatures, denizens of time and space, and assailed by hosts of merely physical wants and cravings; Socrates emphasized absolute subjectivity, the will of the world-spirit or the gods, whose necessity is eternally realized in the institutions of the world, and whose freedom is absolute obedience to its self-constitutive laws. But the standpoint of Socrates is essentially dialectical, and in some sense negative. Part of his business is to destroy traditional moralities out of which even the semblance of life had departed; he comes not to bring peace, but a sword. Positive, that is, constructive philosophy, no longer dogmatic but critical, and conscious of its method, begins with Plato, forerunner and teacher of the greatest mind of antiquity, Aristotle.

The dramatic character of the Platonic writings allies itself very closely with the Socratic method of teaching. Science and philosophy advance by slow degrees to the stage of systematic exposition; they are at first mythologic and poetic, and only after many results have been achieved does the need of a simple though prosaic fashion of presentation make itself felt. The Platonic dialogues occupy a middle ground between poetical exponents of metaphysical subtleties, like Parmenides and Empedocles, important fragments of whose poems are yet extant, and dispassionate writers, like Aristotle, with whom scientific accuracy is a paramount consideration. The form of dialogue is here no external assumption of an imaginary enrobement, for the sake of increased attractiveness and heightened charm, as Savage Landor insinuates in that superb conversation supposed to have transpired between Plato and Diogenes, but the inevitable draperies in which philosophy at that epoch and under those conditions must by natural and necessary process walk clothed and resplendent. The dialectical movement of thought was still not wholly freed in conception from its concrete exemplifications, although the later dialogues lose much



of the dramatic coloring, and the long and laboriously explanatory speeches obscure the interlocutors into semi-invisibility.

Nothing, surely, can surpass the charm of the earlier dialogues. With a foreground of the smooth Ægean Sea, under the marvellous blue skies of Greece, and within the nestle and shadow of plane-trees or olive-groves, a company of friends meet to discuss the high themes of virtue, or fortitude, or temperance. The urbane conversation flows through shadow of profundity and shine of humor unto a predetermined outlet, often an arm of the infinite ocean, that roars and whitens beyond; but the current is so gracious, the movement is so gentle, that all seems a discovery to which a happy chance or favoring gods have led us. The negative outcome of many dialogues is only apparent; the positive conclusions glimmer as through a veil, unformulated, but stimulants of awakening thought and growing reason.

The central figure in these earlier dialogues is Socrates. He is the principal speaker, the incomparable disputant, the embodiment of wisdom. Socrates, the historic individual, formulated no system; for physical and metaphysical speculations he exhibited decided distaste, not to say aversion; the ethical problem was the one which supremely interested him. There is no Socratic philosophy, but a Socratic life and discipline. To emulate his example, to reproduce his virtues, to assimilate unto his lofty and serene character, became the labor and endeavor of his listeners and followers. Such a life lent itself easily, or perhaps necessitated, an ideal and semi-mythical treatment. In the Platonic dialogues he appears with mien and lineaments more than human. He is the ideal manhood walking the streets of Athens, and radiating divinest influence on all who come within the potent sphere of his personality. All knowledge shines in his eyes, all goodness resides in his words. Most gloriously is he compared in the *Symposium* to those statues of satyrs, which, being opened, disclose golden images of the gods.

In the more speculative dialogues, however, Socrates occupies an inferior place, or disappears altogether. In the *Parmenides*, the venerable and venerated sage, whose name gives title to the piece, defends a position from which, strange to say, he would have revolted in life. In the *Sophist*, that bewildering maze of tenuous abstractions, a certain mysterious Eleatic stranger conducts



the argument to its fitting and convincing close. In the *Laws* the main burden of exposition falls upon an unnamed Athenian; and even in the *Symposium* the ultimate deliverance is attributed by Socrates to the Theban Diotima. With deepening insight, Plato assumed a more or less critical attitude toward his great friend and master.

The dialogues most readily divide themselves into four classes. Into the vexed question of a genetic and internally articulated arrangement of the dialogues I shall not here enter; nor does it seem to me a matter of paramount importance whether they be grouped by threes or fours. The division of philosophy into four parts, one of Plato's great discoveries, which has become one of the conventionalities of thought, and whose importance we, who have grown up under its sway, are therefore likely to underestimate, affords the basis of classification. The dialogues are propædeutical, or introductory, logical, physical, ethical. Under the last section must be included the discussions of Beauty, which to Plato is only the visibility of the Good. No man escapes the spirit of his time; if he antagonizes it, his character and work reflect his struggle, and receive their prevailing determination from it. The great man consummates all the endeavor and achievement of his land and period, and sets sail in the fragile bark of his thought from the ports and cities of the known out into the mist and darkness of the unknown. Many of the dialogues are polemical in their nature. Against the Eleatic abstraction of being or the one, that which is without distinction or determination, a kind of Greek anticipation of the modern Unknowable, the Stranger in the *Sophist* demonstrates the necessity of not being, or the many. The *Protagoras*, the *Gorgias*, the *Enthydemus*, are levelled against the Sophists, a class of persons who, with Plato, are constantly universalized representation of the essentially misleading and false, whether of form or content, on speculative thought. The rehabilitation of the Sophists by the historian Grote seems, to some extent, a matter of supererogation; doubtless, many of them were very estimable men. In Plato, they belong to the ideal framework of his structure; the real Gorgias is no more delineated than the real Socrates; as the one is incarnate wisdom, the others are incarnate opposition to the true and absolute. The portrait of the Sophists is for all time; they are present with us as with Plato.

Of the propædætical or introductory dialogues I have already sufficiently spoken. In the logical dialogues the main interest resides in the theory of universal and necessary ideas. This theory has been travestied by grave and laborious misapprehension without stint or limit; the unguarded expressions of a discoverer have been distorted into every form of absurdity; purely modern blunders have been laid at the door of the philosopher, and his students have divested his threshold of the noisome litter, time and again, to no purpose. The dispute about the Platonic ideas is no dead issue; it is more than the echo of thunder that has vanished into the nothingness of sound; it is a living controversy of to-day, and Modern Science clasps hands with Plato across the centuries and announces with him the reality and veracity of the necessary laws of the world. The ideas are not abstractions hypostatized as spiritual things referred to some fine ether, who knows where, and operating on the world in some wholly incomprehensible fashion; they are not even categories, as the term is ordinarily understood; but they are those universal processes of soul and things, which are no figments of the thinking reason, but the actuality, as we know and find it. We speak of the reign of law; Plato spoke of the reign of Ideas. That there are universal laws of things is the wonderful discovery of the great philosopher; that these laws are no dead mechanic formalities, but living, real processes, and indeed the only real living process, in whose eternal self-returning movement all things and events are noduses, so to speak, or concretions, is the doctrine divulged in these writings. And Modern Science accepts this realism, and can have no part nor lot with a shallow nominalism that affirms the so-called laws of nature to be merely groupings of phenomena, set up more or less for individual behoof and convenience.

With the doctrine of Ideas the doctrine of Reminiscence is in close accord. Here, too, the mythologists and rapid readers, the Sir William Hamiltons and such like devourers of great books, in defiance of the principles of intellectual digestion, have made havoc with the intent of the seer, and foisted on his paternity their own crude and misbegotten progeny. He who runs cannot read Plato any more than Kant, or Hegel, or Herbert Spencer. The magnificent allegories of the *Phædo* have been taken with a perverse literalness, and the alert imagination has busied itself with the preg-

nant problem in what sort of a space and time, in what spiritual configuration of geography souls may have had abiding habitation before like meteors they flashed their way to the earth we know. But the doctrine of reminiscence is a part of Plato's doctrine of knowing. To know reality we must know the Ideas; but Ideas are not only the substance of things, but the substance of the knowing process as well. Truth is not created by Thought, but is imminent in the procedure of Thought to its discovery. Consciousness contains, latent or implicit, the truth which becomes clear by its deepening development; we may therefore be said to re-collect or recover the verities of which we had been oblivioned in the earlier and inadequate stages of our knowing. Be it said here that this is no discourse on "innate ideas" or "intuitions" of the Scotch philosophers. Plato's *aperçu* of the immortality of the soul is now not far to seek. The Ideas being immanent in the process of knowing, and the Ideas being the eternal substance of the world, immortality is assured by an ascent into the realm of Ideas. Hence the statement ascribed to Plato that philosophers alone are immortal; but the statement is misleading. Immortality is not a gift thrust into the lap of every one, whether he would or no; it is an achievement wrought by the soul in its flight toward the Good. The destructibility or indestructibility of the individual soul is a subject of minor importance; an eternity of sameness in vice or the monotonies of our daily living is less desirable than the blessedness of rest after struggle and failure. Immortality is only worth having if it means growth in wisdom, profounder faithfulness in the service of the Good; but Plato nowhere intimates that the probationary experiences of the soul are limited; the opportunities of making the successful endeavor are infinite.

The physics of Plato are contained in the obscurest and most difficult of his writings, the "Timæus." They are mainly interesting as extraordinary anticipations of the results of modern investigation. The wave theories of heat and light; the circulation of the blood; the polarities involved in the crystallization of the chemical elements; the division of substances into solids, liquids, gases, ethers, expressed by him under the terms earth, water, air, fire; the Schelling dictum that spirit sleeps in nature, dreams in the animal, is awake in man, with others needless to be specified—are found here briefly or *in extenso*. The book is said to be a revision of an

older Pythagorean writing, and the fantastical Pythagorean number-language seems extremely difficult of satisfactory interpretation.

The ethics of Plato and his idea of the State or Republic are synonymous. With him morals are only concretely managed as realized in the institutions of the world. Abstract Right is only the formal universality of law dirempted from the institutional organism, whose process is its life and reality. He was a reactionist in politics and a stay-at-home in relation to political duties. The democracy of his time seemed to him hopelessly corrupt, and doomed to a speedy extinction. His effort was to disclose an ethical system, which should meet the wants of his nation and forestall the impending ruin. The freedom of the individual seemed to him fraught with the gravest danger to the commonwealth; Alcibiades had been a fellow-pupil of Socrates. Hence the organization of the Platonic State—philosophers as rulers, the strong and able-bodied as defenders, the remaining mass as farmers and producers. Hence, also, the four so-called cardinal virtues—wisdom, the virtue of the rulers; fortitude, the virtue of the soldiery; temperance, the virtue of the laborers; and justice, the virtue that assigns to each its part and unites them all in harmonious reciprocity. The individual having disappeared in the general weal, the denial of the right to private property and the community in marriage follow as necessary implications. Education is an essential business of the State, that each may fulfil his separate function, although each is at the same time to be a reflection of the whole. These views must not be confounded with the socialism of to-day; this is the modern democratic movement run mad, while the Republic and Laws of Plato are the intensest reaction against the upheaving and mischievous tendencies of similar ebullitions of his time.

The Platonic philosophy, considered as a whole, has two characteristics rarely united and apparently contradictory. On the one hand, it is dialectical, methodical, scientific; on the other, it refuses formulation, wanders at will through the caprices of dramatic dialogue, abounds in mysticism. The great rôle which it has played in the philosophical movement of the planet reproduces accurately these attributes. Standing, as it does, at the great confluence of tendencies, it appeals with singular power to the most

diverse capacities of intellect and soul. Science and myth, clearness and mysticism, unite in it to fashion the art-product of philosophy. For once sense and reason cease their quarrel, and the white statue of philosophy is the result, the "one thing perfect in this hasty world."

Moreover, all genuine philosophical syntheses have their distinctive functions in the evolution of the all-embracing world-philosophy. Philosophical systems connect themselves by pedigree and inheritance, and this aristocracy denies admittance to the multitude of pretenders, and recognizes its own by infallible signs and portents. Here is a hierarchy older and more venerable than any other, serene in the possession of unshakable power, and quite content to let the outer clamor pursue its windy ways to the certain issue of its self-annihilation. Much that is ordinarily called philosophy has no claim to the title, and the historians of philosophy have given ultimate verdict against the vociferations of many a great reputation. One of the problems of history has been to discover the real line of thinkers, and thus discover the real movement of thought. Schwegler, for instance, denies a place to Auguste Comte; and what he would say to some more recent developments is not difficult to surmise.

The movement of the world-thought may be said to have three phases or periods, which may be termed, respectively, objective, subjective, and universal. The ancient philosophical movement was objective; the modern and mediæval, subjective; the movement of the future, already begun and fairly outlined, will be universal. In ancient objective thought, mind and matter stood in no antithesis such as we predicate; the diremption between thought and being, which makes so great a figure with us, existed only in an implicit, undeveloped fashion; to the ancients, knowledge was the union of subject and object, and their great problem was to reconcile the permanent, the one, the good, with the transitory, the many, the caprice of the individual. With Plato, to know was to be, and to be was to know; the nightmare of the empirical Berkeleyan idealism would have been to him inconceivable. The emphasis of the subject as opposed to the object belongs to modern thought and life, and their reconciliation, without detriment to either, is the task yet to be performed. Philosophy will then return to the freedom and joyousness of its earlier speculations.

The place of Plato in the objective period of thought, if not the highest, is yet, perhaps, the one of largest influence. It is not unlike the position of Immanuel Kant in the thought-world which is our dwelling and environment. In him all streams of speculation converge; from him they proceed again with deeper, wider currents, and in newer, nobler directions. In the Neo-platonic schools that arose after the completion of the encyclopedic Aristotelianism we see that return to the earlier thinker which invariably ensues with the failure of a generation to grasp and comprehend the deepest truth vouchsafed to it. These scholars and disciples of Plato diverge as they relate themselves to the mystical or dialectical phase of the master's work. The ecstasy or intuition of Plotinus, that swoon of the soul out of the multiplicities of sense-perception into essential oneness and acquaintance with the universe as a totality, belongs to the mysticism of Plato; the triads of Proclus, each universal and inclusive of all the others, and yet of unequal comprehension, so that they form a hierarchy from the superessential and ineffable one to the shapes and principles of the corporeal and mundane sphere, belong to the logic of Plato. But throughout the Neo-platonic schools the religious spirit is regnant; hence their prevailing mythologic tendencies. The effort is heroically made to find the profoundest of significance in the religious myths of their race; the triads of Proclus, a genuine result of free philosophic insight, receive from him mythic appellations, as Jupiter, Venus, Ceres, and the rest. The theological phase of ancient religion is fairly inaugurated. It is a time of ferment and intense activity; the Gnostic heresy is only a Neo-platonic explanation of the world; what remains of the ancient life, conscious dimly of its imminent doom, forges with restless eagerness in these varying systems of thought and commentaries on Plato's *Timæus* or *Theology*, weapons of offence and defence. It is to be again remarked that this seething activity proceeds from Plato, not Aristotle; the epoch is religious, not scientific.

Against this tumult of opinions and creeds Christianity arose in controversy. But in every intellectual conflict the vanquished is to some extent the victor. By its own inherent strength Christianity could not achieve all; her armor was welded and fashioned in Greek workshops, her sword was toughened and sharpened in Greek fires. Oriental monotheism was incapable of conquering the

Western world; that was too abstract, too remote, too unvital, to persuade Greek or Teutonic barbarian. Before Christianity was competent to dissipate Neo-platonic heresies, she was obliged to take up those lofty reasonings into her own substance and convert them into her own fibre and constituency. St. Augustine is a convert from Platonism; in his soul the Orient and Occident come to resplendent and fruitful nuptials. The union of Hebraism and Hellenism is consummated; the new faith has received outer equipment and accoutreing, and is prepared to set forth on her career of victorious knight-errantry. It is thus that Platonism underprops and gives strength of arm to the new spirit that has come into the world. The mystical side of Platonism and constant usage of representing the pure Ideas in mythic guise and habiliment give it especial aptitude to enter alliance with religious conceptions and symbols; and the mystics of subsequent ages have, with marked unanimity, gone back to Plato as their source and fountain-head.

Thus Christianity, in the triumph over Platonism, was conquered in her turn. With the complete establishment of the new religion and the annunciation of her circle of dogmas arises an activity, great and intense, within the strict limits she has set. Upon this activity authority has imprinted its seal. Important and far-reaching as are the questions discussed, they yet remain within the pale of promulgated prescriptions; they are properly theologic, not philosophic; for theology differs from philosophy in this, that the former moves within the charmed circle of the faith, while the latter claims the infinite realm of freedom for her own; her distinctions do not come to her from without, but are part and parcel of her life and purpose. The Schoolmen based their subtle speculations not upon Platonism, but Aristotelianism; and the reason is not far to seek. In Aristotle, Platonism comes to a full consciousness of itself; myth, and story, and dramatic coloring have vanished; clear, prosaic, scientific exposition take their place. In the Schoolmen, likewise, Platonizing Christianity rises to an envisagement of its significance and function; the two great masters of "those who know" repeat that transmission of idealities which constitutes their internal bond and unity. But the corruption of a faith through plenitude of success and power reproduces in a measure the condition of its primal foundation and construction.



Mind returns upon a different and higher level to the effort of original pursuit and apprehension. The negative phase inherent in the dialectical movement of world-history subjects existing institutions and belief to a remorseless criticism of destruction, and the corresponding positive phase begins anew with mysticism and mystery. Even in the height and culmination of long-subsisting creeds the novel and alien spirit manifests its beginnings. Platonism emerges again as a guiding-star to men's souls and hearts, benighted in the glooms of Church lost to spiritual interests in the greedy lust for temporal power. The Florentine Academy, with Marsilio Ficino at its head, and the Platonizing Pico Mirandolo, are portents of the times; in England and Spain poets and philosophers abandoned the sterilities of scholasticism, and drank deep at the fountain which bubbles up bright and fresh amid the fadeless charms of the Old Academe; the "Faerie Queen" of Spenser is only Platonism set to the divinest music of English Poetry; and one has only to turn to Shakespeare's little-read "Troilus and Cressida" to see how far even purely logical speculations proved attractive to the poetic temperament of the Renaissance. But it is in Germany that the renewed study of Plato displays the noblest fruits; the great systems of Nicholas of Cusa and Meister Eckhart, the preaching of a mystic like Tauler, even such works intended for popular circulation, like the "De Imitatione" and the "Theologia Germanica," both in method and substance, owe more to Plato than any previous philosophy.

Then approaches the emancipation of philosophy. Thought demands absolute freedom; prescription, dogma, authority, are futile to impose their restrictions; nay, authority itself must validate its claims before that highest authority—Universal Reason. So-called axiomatic thinking affords no safeguard against the invasion of free speculation; axioms, intuitions like the remainder of authoritative doctrines, are frail barriers which the might of thought sweeps before it like straws. With Descartes, and Locke, and Voltaire, the right of speculation to be free was matter of profoundest interest; and no nobler heritage was ever left to posterity than this right which has become a commonplace to us. But this conflict is, after all, precursory to modern philosophy; that philosophy begins with the more recent positive thinkers. Plato in life preferred the retirement of literary seclusion to the



noisier and showier triumphs of a public career; and, like his life, his thought has never been a lover of contest or tumult. As a soldier in the battle of freedom he makes no great figure; but in the securer and more lasting successes of peace he finds a congenial element and sphere of influence. When the smoke and dust of battle have disappeared down the winds, philosophers are discovered again perusing the exhaustless volumes of the Greek forerunner in the intellectual race. Hegel and his school owe a vast debt to Plato, and the Hegelianizing Frenchman, Cousin, is not behind the German in his study of the ancient and somewhat forgotten books of curious lore. Indeed, Hegel may be said to have re-discovered Plato, and no account of the latter's system yet made is comparable with the one to be found in Hegel's "History of Philosophy." In England, Coleridge, that mighty impulse and stimulant to thought, if fragmentary and inconsecutive in productiveness, reawakened the Platonic enthusiasm; and the transcendental movement in New England, which found in Coleridge one of its great inspirers and illuminations, had much to do with the divine dialogues. I quote from Emerson: "He has indicated every eminent point in speculation. He wrote on the scale of the mind itself, so that all things have symmetry in his tablet. He put in all the past, without weariness, and descended into detail with a courage like that he witnessed in nature. One would say that his forerunners had mapped out each a farm, or a district, or an island, in intellectual geography, but that Plato first drew the sphere."

Moreover, up and down the ages are scattered devout disciples who have found intellectual sustenance and inexpressible solace in these writings. In solitude of spirit they have given their hours and days to the comprehension of this wisdom; they have written their books, and sent them forth, secure in the conviction that they would reach the ear of those for whom they have been intended; and even now are found readers who shake the dust, thick-accumulated dust, from the leaves of Henry More, or Sir Thomas Browne, or Norris, and find them fresher and more invigorating than many belauded productions of to-day. Where least expected, the Platonic seed seems blown by the continual wafture of the winds of destiny, and the plant springs up and blossoms in unmistakable beauty and likeness. In our own State, a heroic scholar,

Dr. H. K. Jones,<sup>1</sup> has made a synthesis of these writings, surprisingly subtle, and so distinctly original as to merit the epithet, American.

The title of Plato to the highest eminence cannot be disputed; he belongs to the lineage and order of the greatest of mankind. He accepted universal intelligence as veracious, and the only organ of veracity; he penetrated into the profoundest mysteries of thought, and was not deterred from speculations of boldest flight and longest wing; he well understood that an external limit to thought, in what form soever posited, was an unthinkable contradiction. His discoveries of the priority of the universal to the particular; of the imminence of truth in the necessary procedure of thought; of the self-recognizing reason as the substance of thought and things; of the four ascending grades of knowing, from the fluctuating and unseizable vagaries of sense to the permanent and inclusive ideas or processes, or universal laws of the rational part of the soul; of the self-evidencing method of thought, to which he gave the name that has become fixed, the dialectic, with his *aperçus* of the nature of the Good and Beauty, and of the immortality of the soul—remain as indestructible parts of that heritage of established and demonstrated reality which is now and must forever be the life of the race and the condition of its progress. At the great turning-points of history he has borne before advancing humanity the flambeau of inspiration that has made possible progress through the enveloping darkness; and I, for one, do not believe that his functioning is over. There is yet abundant work for the Platonic Philosophy to do, and, as in the past, it will be nobly done; the great thinker points forever to that realm of universal ideals, that philosophy, the spirit and beauty of all philosophies, which is at once the medium and potency of all life, and the solution of all problems. Over the portal of that realm, truly called Philosophy, he writes no legend of despair, and limitation, and nescience, but, in letters of imperishable flame, the inspiring, ennobling words: *Introite nam hic dei sunt*. Enter, for here are the Gods.

<sup>1</sup> Of Jacksonville, Illinois.

## HENRY JAMES, THE SEER.

BY CAROLINE ELIOT LACKLAND.

Henry James spoke his message to mankind with no uncertain voice. He saw creation from the creative side: "Given the Creator, to find the creature." He admits that, in his warfare against Science and Philosophy, he stands before the organized world of Sense and Science as did David before Goliath, "his only weapon a simple sling and pebble." He scorned to win recognition through a coterie of flatterers, or a literary ring. He stood alone, defending what seemed to him the right path to truth, against opposing thousands. In trumpet-tones of warning and remonstrance, oft-times with bitterness and harsh impatience, he struck the knotted scourge of his sarcasm upon the necks of those who aroused his anger or contempt. Prophets and reformers live before their day, and Henry James proved no exception to the rule: "Now being dead, he speaketh!" and ears before closed, through pride or prejudice, are opened to receive his words.

Mr. James was born in Albany, June 3, 1811. He was educated at the public schools, at Union College, and at Princeton Theological Seminary. For some time he also studied law. Possessing an independent fortune, he surrendered himself to studies best suited to his peculiar turn of thought. His co-workers in intellectual research and reform were Emerson, Parker, William Lloyd Garrison, Ripley, Horace Greeley, Thoreau, Alcott, and Margaret Fuller. From obituary notices I learn that he passed much time with Carlyle, Tennyson, Mill, and Lewes. But to his profound study of the writings of Swedenborg he owed the greatest influence that directed the course of his life and teachings. He impressed the fact upon his readers that Swedenborg himself would have abhorred an ecclesiasticism built upon his own name, and claimed that his (Swedenborg's) doctrines should be infused into, and adopted by, all Christian sects (as indeed they more or less, consciously or unconsciously, have been!) After his remarkable lectures on Moralism and Christianity, Mr. James published, in 1854, his book entitled "The Church of God not an Ecclesiasticism"; in 1855, "The Nature of Evil"; in 1857, "Christianity

the Logic of Creation"; in 1866, "Substance and Shadow." Three years later he published "The Secret of Swedenborg." His last published work was in 1879—"Society the Redeemed Form of Man." For many years he lived in Cambridge, Mass., but returned to Boston, where he died, December 19th, at 71 years of age, after a month's illness. His two sons are well known in literary circles, one being Professor William James, of Harvard, the other Henry James, Jr., the novelist. In person, Mr. James was short, erect, with a noble head, and keen, searching eyes; affectionate, witty, sarcastic, humorous, he let each mood of his character tell for his life-work without fear or servility. Sweeping the moral atmosphere with electric and devastating force, and anon descending like refreshing rain upon souls athirst for spiritual truth, he was alike unmoved by misapprehension or contumely.

To the Mother Church alone he conceded the right of an Ecclesiasticism. As a conservator of the Faith, but of the Faith not yet revealed or understood, but typified, and, in its first inception, outlived! he looked upon Ecclesiasticism as only the husk, containing the precious kernel conserved unto the fulness of time; he valued the Church as the sacred casket that had protected and preserved certain unrealized and unmeasured treasures far more precious than the casket itself, and (I quote from another) "he believed that the spiritual verities held for the race in earthen vessels of ecclesiasticism, and established philosophy, transcend the sphere of that which held them, and only can be interpreted and accepted by advanced spiritual comprehension." If, however (he says), we are to have *any* Ecclesiasticism, let it be that which has come down to us hoary with human use; which is associated with the world's best names and memories, which has always (in spite of a thousand infirmities) pillowed the revered head of age, diffused a timely awe in the heart of childhood, nursed the sentiment of human brotherhood, until (mark this), until science has grown intelligent enough to grasp it, and which is still capable of expanding to all the ritual needs likely to be begotten of a larger spirit; we want no newness of the letter, but only a newness of spirit.

He believed that the established theology was entirely incompetent to deal with the vital, fundamental question of the Nature and Origin of Evil! In answer to a lady of St. Louis, who wrote

to learn from him his views respecting miracles, he asserted that he "believed and upheld the truth and necessity of miracles as facts of *human* nature! *Not material facts* belonging to scientific understanding, but purely metaphysical facts, half-way between flesh and spirit," and, as he says, only recognizable to the spiritual understanding which uses them as *ultimates* merely of truth; the word "miracle," he says, "expresses unlimited action in the subject of it, which means a power of acting above Nature—*MERE NATURE*. Nature cannot impose a limit upon human nature, and when human nature rises to the point of transcending mere nature it is a *divine* act of the divine side of man over the natural. Christ we therefore accept as Divine, and he alone transcended, to this great degree, the side of Nature. The miraculous evidences may not be scientific; they may declare the senses incompetent, but sense has no authority in religious things. Miracle has spiritual truth behind it, and needs not to depend on 'sense.' It would lose all force did it require 'sense' to attest its verity."

Mr. James's private letters to his friends reveal a tenderness and sweetness of nature in strong contrast to his often defiant public utterances; he believed in social determination, in finding the real life outside of one's selfhood! Immortal life to him meant the absorption of his conscious personality or selfhood into universal interest, or Race interest. To find one's neighbor in the highest sense is at once to lose and find one's self. He honored the impulse of good in the heart rather than the intellectual perception of truth. With regard to certain views of philosophers in respect to the private subjectivity of selfhood, Mr. James writes to Mr. Abbot: "This private subjectivity of selfhood which *you* affirm and *I* deny is not the least identical with you or me regarded as subjects of life or consciousness, but only as subjects of a certain vicious ontology, or a conventional science of being, among men, by which we are supposed to possess spiritual life or being in ourselves directly or primarily, and in our race or nature quite derivatively or secondarily.

Selfhood is not inherent in our consciousness or real life. Mr. James says of himself: "I am willing to avow myself an abject Christian," meaning that he recognizes himself to be but a mould or form, into which the divine influx can penetrate; the effort of the soul to perfect itself *for* itself is to him the acme of refined selfish-

ness; to join with God in love for others is the immortal life of the soul. To live simply *to save one's soul* is a suicidal separation from the divine principle of spontaneous love! The immortal consciousness of the individual soul he never disputes, but that immortal life can be gained by working for it with the latent thought of one's own place in the kingdom as the inspiring motive he refuses to concede. The soldier in battle, whose courage and devotion are due to personal ambition, may die at the cannon's mouth, but his cause is a lost one, in every sense. The religious hypocrite loses this world and the next as well, his sacrifice of self being upon the altar of his own selfishness. "The unitary mind of man, as involving all time (the race mind), is its only true subject; and its only true object, as including all space, is the universe of existing things; you and I cannot, as individuals, lay claim to any real selfhood, since this is the arrogance of Adam and Eve, seeking in and of themselves to be like unto gods and a law unto themselves." Man cannot claim to have life in himself when there can be but one life which cannot be divided; individual souls cannot contain life in and of themselves without becoming individual Gods, and there is but one God, one Life, out of whom proceeds the influx that informs his *human* creatures with power to comprehend the meaning of free choice, and to freely choose union with divine nature, through the potentiality of human nature, or to freely choose separation from God by union with animal, physical nature alone. Mr. James says, therefore, "You and I, consequently, can never constitute either our own true subjectivity or our own true objectivity, since in the former event we oust the unitary mind of man, and in the latter we displace the universe of existence." "Selfhood is a strictly subjective illusion in man—an illusion primarily in the sphere of feeling and thence of thought. You can only deny this by denying his creatureship. Man is, in virtue of the creative perfection, a rigidly social form of life or consciousness. True Religion is not the effort of a man to perfect himself, but to give himself, for others."

Having only recently begun the study of the writings of Mr. James, I am unwilling to risk going entirely out of my depth by speaking at large of his remarkable works; their meaning I have only been able to seize in glimpses, for their brilliancy perplexes, whilst throwing marvellous light. One point, however, and a most

important and pivotal one, of his philosophy I am trying to present for consideration at this time—viz., the views of Henry James respecting the nature and origin of evil. His earliest intellectual research was to satisfy his own mind, and subsequently that of others, as to how evil in the creature could consist with perfection of the Creator. Neither Orthodoxy nor Philosophy availed him here; both (as he says) taught a complete independence between Creator and Creature in order to the very inception of evil. "To prove this independence was to legitimate every issue of it." The solution of the problem he found satisfactorily and permanently through the development of the ideas he drew from the teachings of Swedenborg. His own philosophy was based upon these teachings, yet was quite a thing in itself notwithstanding. That this problem of evil still remained unsolved, proved that the question still remained unanswered as to how a dependent creature of God comes into such relations of independence as to arouse in man's bosom a sentiment of responsibility. The pride of selfhood is the basis of evil (evil as incidental to good). Man imagines himself to be something, because God in his creative Love has elevated human nature beyond mere nature, that he might therefrom create unto himself children, likenesses, derivations, *not duplicates*, of Himself! Out of nature God has evolved a being capable of spiritual life. That which is mere nature, with all its various stages of change, formation, and reproduction, cannot and does not contain the mould of moralism out of which the human being is born again into spirituality. The natural man is, however, as much a mould or form, as passive a receptacle as related to God, as is the mineral in its relation to the touch of life above it. Man is the highest organic animal into whom is breathed the breath of life, spiritually speaking, but still *into* whom it *is breathed!* To himself he is not a law, although his pride of imagined real selfhood causes him to think that he is; neither is he a mere puppet, since he is a moral being, a prepared receptacle for God's inflowing spiritual life; but he must learn to look outside of himself for his soul's life and its informing powers. He must, like Abraham, bring, to the altar of his discovered consciousness of choice of obedience to God or obedience to Nature, the sacrifice of his dearest natural self, his very inmost self, his pride of selfhood.

To eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil is when man



mistakes his natural instinct and pride of selfhood and regards his consciousness and potentiality as an actuality in himself. To eat of this forbidden fruit is to imagine the mould, or the receptive and prepared human nature, to be the divine nature. "Self-consciousness, which is the *natural* human (mark this, not the *divine* human) form of consciousness, is born of the union of the *will* and the *instinct*. Man in such a sense becomes both objective and subjective to himself, but strictly within the bounds of the *natural human!* He is the subject of his nature in the realm of sense, and the object of it in the realm of ideas." His understanding, his metaphysical being, constitute the basis of his receptivity, of God's divine influx. The newly born human body is physically prepared with lungs which receive the air at its birth. This in-breathing establishes the physical life of its animal existence; his awakening intelligence and consciousness of power of choice constitute his human nature. Into this mould flows the influx of God, the divine breathing, and man becomes a living soul, informed by the divine spirit.

Evil is incident to good as the darkness is to the light; it is not a thing in itself, but is made to seem so by man's perversion of God's plan. Man is a trinity of being within himself, when following God's will, and thereby he becomes a likeness, a child. Selfhood, as he seems to possess it, reveals a moral basis within himself; he sees intelligently that he has choice. Instinct in the animal is its only guide to choice of food and environment. No moral basis lies in the merely animal nature; it can do no right or wrong. It cannot be conscious of a higher nature, possessing it not. Good and evil are alike unknown to it, and right and wrong have no basis in its being; in the animal, as animal, is no receptacle for Spirit (or divine influx). The human natural is the mould into which God flows, and in conjunction with whom man becomes a child of God. From thenceforth, from the creation of the first man, there arises a being with divine as well as animal instinct. The soul yearns and seeks for God as naturally as the body seeks food. Adam's, or human nature's first existence, was perforce a state of innocence. God saw that his last creative act, that should link the race unto himself, was good. The equilibrium of man's "moralism," as Henry James terms it (for his vernacular is peculiar to himself), "the equilibrium of man's moralism was



perfect." Man was innocent, but not yet virtuous, and virtue must be the result of experience and choice.

Man had as yet neither committed sin, omitted performance of duty, nor practiced goodness; inherent in his being lay the power of intelligent choice; this would enable him to become angel or demon; he had not yet had the experience of ages to supplement his intelligence; his gift of free choice seemed to him as a part of himself, self-bestowed, to be self-asserted; he did not realize the Giver of choice, only the choice! From the moment that man's receptivity as human is accomplished he is prepared for the inflowing of the Divine life. The plant feels the inflowing warmth of the sun; the stone is dead to its rays; the one is prepared to receive, the other remains unchanged. Shall the clay, as it turns on the wheel, say, "I turn," and not "I am turned"? Shall the planet say, "I shine," and not rather, "from the Sun I receive my all"? There is but one Life, and while it cannot be divided it can be communicated, even as the vine sends life into its branches. Man as human is created free, for God wishes no slaves. His children are his joyous servitors, his thankful recipients, realizing that they need his glory, which they can neither increase nor lessen. First innocent, then aliens, then idolaters (or blind seekers after God), then under revealed Law, again under the Gospel of the Redeemer, the race has stood before, gone from, and is now returning to God! Race interest, Race redemption, universal Divine Natural Humanity, is to be the outcome of creation.

God never created Evil as Evil. It is an incident to good, necessitated as shade to substance. God never meant alienation from himself as a path to himself. There is no departing from him but to fall. The laws of spiritual as well as physical gravitation prevent "a falling up." To say that God should have created man so that evil would have been impossible is an absurd blasphemy. The whole trend of his creative power is to elevate Nature into Human Nature, and Human Nature into the Divine Nature. All Nature is innocent; man alone is virtuous. Human Nature can, through Almighty God's abounding love, rise into spiritual life, and *can* depart from it, if the Fatherhood of God is rejected and scorned. The reversion of God's mighty wheel of purpose, the going back by human nature to Nature, is the unpardonable sin, and is to grieve away the Holy Spirit. Man is

free, if he so wills, to take the safe incline by which God drew him heavenward as a path of headlong departure from God! Is Nature in itself evil, since it is the necessary basis for human nature? Is freedom sin, when it is the basis for spiritual life? Man cannot originate the elements out of which he chooses his destiny; he is alike unable to create the primary conditions for his rise toward God, or his fall from him. The Redeemer opened the eyes of man's soul to the sins of his spirit. The deepest sinfulness lies in *a state of the soul*. Adultery and murder may be as effectually committed (so far as the soul is concerned) as the very acts of crime. It must be God who joins together, where sacramental marriage is, and there is no real death but the death unto righteousness.

Those who would study Mr. James must look for a diamond in the very rough! His vernacular is confusing and thwarting; one must dig for his fine gold, and it comes in blinding dust as well as in nuggets. Mr. James could never have been a popular writer; he uses neither tact nor diplomacy in rooting out error. That he boldly attacked an ecclesiasticism built upon the name of Swedenborg disturbed the spiritual pride of those who claimed, as did the Jews, a monopoly of enlightenment and blessing. This frozen lake of spiritual pride could never bind his warm and glowing sympathies. But he did not lay claim to saintliness, and realized his own limitations to their fullest extent. At this day of adjustment—when the new is opening up the hidden treasures of the old, when past and present join hands to sift truth from error, when transition is enlightenment, and disintegration is not real but seeming—the long-asked questions of the How and Why with regard to Creation, the Nature of Evil, the divine humanity of Christ, are questions answered! One by one the forms of dogma conserved by the old ecclesiasticism declare themselves as only "sacred vessels," in that the inner truth they hold has been veiled until Science, Philosophy, and Religion should together break their seal. The Holy Ghost, the Spirit, and combined and united influence of all truth, still broods in active and enlightening force over the chaos of mingled truth and error in men's minds. Theologians, Scientists, Philosophers, are but the divided fingers of the all-containing hand of truth, upon and within which each, in God's good time, shall rest at last in Unity of Faith and brotherhood.

DANTE'S *PURGATORIO.*

BY SUSAN E. BLOW.

The theme of Dante's "Purgatorio" is the purification of the soul. It describes not a place, but a process; not a future possibility, but an ever-present reality. It represents the eternal transition from evil to good, and all struggling souls may find in it a reflection of their conflict and a sure prophecy of their final victory. Wherever there is spiritual development, *there* is Purgatory.

The theory of the poem is that goodness is not a dower, but an achievement. This second kingdom is one in which by effort "the human spirit doth purge itself." Man is a worm "born to bring forth the angelic butterfly." Paradise is at the top of a precipitous mountain. The climbing in the beginning is tiresome and painful, but "aye the more one climbs the less it hurts." There is nowhere in the poem a trace of the heresy which confounds what man is with what he may become, and which paralyzes effort by ignoring the significance of choice.

The sin which must be overcome is described variously as mist, slough, scum, blindness, and smoke, and as paralysis, languor, malady, weight, crookedness, and knot. As mist, slough, scum, blindness, and smoke, it is that which prevents us from seeing the true; as languor, weight, malady, and paralysis, it is that which impedes our pursuit of the good; as crookedness and knot, it represents the deed which must be undone before there can be any right doing.

The source of all goodness is God. Man becomes good by opening his heart to receive the stream of influence always pouring toward him from God. Holiness is not an evolution, but a revealed and communicated life. Sin in its last analysis is the substitution of self for God; the assertion of an abstract individualism as against a universal life; the futile effort of a withering branch to maintain its being apart from the vine to which it properly belongs. In the fifteenth Canto of the "Purgatory" Dante sets forth this view with great clearness, explaining that the goodness, infinite and ineffable, which is above "always gives of itself so much as it finds ardor." In the "Convito" he illustrates the

same truth by suggesting how differently the light of the sun is received by the dull clod of earth, by pure gold, by precious stones which refract its rainbow-colors, and by the mirror through which it is concentrated into a burning point. Finally, in the "Paradiso" he again repeats that the "brightness is proportioned to the ardor, the ardor to the vision."

In this view of the relationship of the soul to God is grounded the true conception of human freedom. Man is free when he knows, loves, and wills the good. Until then his freedom is ideal, not actual—something he may conquer but does not possess. He wins liberty by renouncing caprice; or, in other words, achieves selfhood by crucifying self. He becomes a freedman of the universe only by a self-emancipation from the slavery of ignorance and sin. Hence Virgil introduces Dante to the stern warden of Purgatory as one who is seeking liberty. Statius declares that only after five hundred years of pain has he felt "a free volition for a better seat." Not until he is near the summit of the purgatorial mount does Dante feel "for flight within him the pinions growing," and it is when they stand upon the topmost step of the long stairway that Virgil declares to him,

"Free and upright and sound is thy free-will,  
And error were it not to do its bidding:  
Thee o'er thyself I therefore crown and mitre."

Man rises above choice through long exercise in right choosing. Holiness becomes an impulse only when it has long been a habit. Spontaneity in goodness is the final triumph of persistent and painful conflict with besetting sin.

The coin fresh from the mint of thought shows clearly its character and value. Circulation dims its lustre, wears away its substance, and blunts its edge. We pass it from hand to hand, careless of its lessening weight, and not even glancing at its fading image and superscription. Familiarity with a truth is generally in inverse proportion to its comprehension, and in the end there comes a time when men know it so well that they cease to think it.

Such has been in our day the fate of the truth which declares the relationship of each individual life to the life of God. As a real thought it seems to have almost died out of the minds of men.

From a quickening principle it has shrunk into a formula; from a burning conviction it has faded into a sentiment, and we are now admonished that we assail its sanctity when we try to think it. Such admonition ignores the fact that thought conditions feeling by supplying the object which feeling demands. Even in the animal it is vision which arouses desire, as it is desire which stimulates to act. Thought, feeling, and will are not independent, but each lives in and through the others. If we do not see how God's grace is poured out upon us, we shall soon cease to feel the out-pouring.

To really re-think our relationship to God we must consciously expand our faith in revelation. A living God is acting on our living souls. He has not once spoken and then forever relapsed into silence. He has not once shone on the world and left to it only this remembered light. Day by day he is shining to our eyes and speaking to our hearts. The infinite universe is His self-revelation, and by its reaction defines to us His perfection and our defect.

In the scientific doctrine of modification through environment we have the beginning of a true thought of relationship to God. To complete it we need only recognize that environment is spiritual as well as physical, and that it is not fixed but infinitely expansive. In a word, it stands for the totality of influence bearing upon the individual object, and it has the beneficent quality of widening and deepening to meet increasing need. In it resides the fulness by appropriating which the individual develops. Evolution, therefore, truly conceived, is not the thought of a less by its own inherent power becoming a greater, but the far deeper thought of actual nothingness lifted into being by the communication of life.

By the rewards and penalties of nature man learns physical laws, and through the reaction of organized humanity upon the individual is developed the sense of moral law or the ideal of duty. All spiritual development is grounded in man's existence in the species. Culture is the process through which the individual reproduces within himself the experience of the race. Its goal is the complete realization of the species within the individual, and its essential condition such an attitude of man as shall render him accessible to the influence of mankind. This insight enables us to define goodness as perfect self-activity, realized in the perfect com-

munion of each man with all men. Communion must be perfect in order that experience may be shared, activity must be complete in order that it may be reproduced. Hence, in sloth and selfish exclusion may be found the seeds of every vice. Still deeper consideration reveals sloth as the paralysis resulting from self-exclusion, and thus reduces the infinite variety of the poisonous growths of sin to the single fatal germ of spiritual pride.

We hide from ourselves the reality of God's action on our souls by blinding our eyes to the truth of mediation. We practically forget that, though the source of inspiration is the Divine Spirit, its instruments are men, and its organ is the Church. What truth do we know to-day which has not been declared to us by the voice of man? What man who has declared truth has not proclaimed that to him it was given by inspiration of the Spirit? The Spirit is the indwelling life of that great Church which, in the profoundest sense, is the "Mother of the Soul," and this Church is organized humanity, ever revealing to individual man the divine ideal which, as soon as recognized, he identifies with his own deepest self. Because there is One Spirit in all men, man can combine with man; because this Spirit is divine there is the possibility of communion with God.

Instruments of grace are the mighty institutions which, revealing and enforcing ideal standards, enable the individual to measure his own defect and inspire him to overcome it; a store-house of grace is that great "deposit of faith," the true literature of the world; a "Means of Grace" is every work of Art in which is incarnate a Spiritual truth; "Channels of Grace" are all honest experiences of sorrow or joy; "Ministers of Grace" are the strong thinkers who redeem our feeble thought—the heroes who spur our languid wills and the saints whose ardor fans into fresh flame the dying embers of our devotion. The revelation is manifold and yet one; the inspiration from of old and yet ever new; the grace thus variously bestowed (as the old theologians truly taught) prevenient, co-operant, and illuminant—for it comes to us before we seek it—it fortifies our feeblest endeavor, and crowns our persevering struggle with the beatific vision of final truth.

Only with this thought of universal mediation in our minds can we understand the symbolism of Dante throughout the "Purgatory." Virgil, his Guide, personifying human reason, describes himself

as an instrument of Grace. "I came not of myself," he declares, "but a Lady from heaven descended, at whose prayer I aided this one with my company." Purgatory has a warden, for defect demands guidance, and laggard spirits must be spurred to run toward the purifying mount. When night falls and danger threatens, angels descend to guard the praying shades. By the divine Lucia, Dante is borne in his sleep to the presence of the angel who guards the gate of Purgatory. Only at the entreaty of the three celestial Virtues does Beatrice turn upon the poet her holy eyes and unveil to him the beauty of her face, and only "as reflected in her eyes" can he behold the mystic Griffin shining, "now with the one now with the other nature." Throughout the sevenfold realm mediation is the central truth recognized by the repentant Spirits. "Make known my state to my good Costanza, for those on earth can much advance us here." "Tell my Giovanna that she pray for me." "I pray thee to pray for me when thou shalt be above." "Thus speedily has led me to drink of the sweet wormwood of these torments my Nella with her overflowing tears." Such are the petitions and such the acknowledgments of the souls who, as Dante himself tells us,

"Only pray that some one else may pray,  
So as to hasten their becoming holy."

Prayer is the expression of spiritual life. The more spiritual life there is in the world, the more swiftly is the individual borne forward on its strong currents. The more people there are who love well, says our poet, the more can each one love, "for as a mirror the one reflects the other." Conversely the good of one is the good of all, and hence when a single soul in Purgatory has prevailed over its sin the whole mountain shakes with joy and rings with a psalm of thanksgiving.

Having restored ourselves to participation in Dante's vitalizing thought, that man achieves goodness by appropriation of the divine life which is always offering itself to him, we may follow him in his journey through the realm of purification. This realm is figured as "the hill which highest toward the heavens uplifts itself." It rises from an island, and its base forms an Ante-Purgatory where souls are detained until they have atoned for delay in repentance. Around the mount of Purgatory proper run seven terraces whereon

are punished the seven deadly sins. Stairways rough and steep lead up from terrace to terrace, and upon the summit of the mountain is the Earthly Paradise. Around the shore of the island grow the rushes, which symbolize humility, because they alone of plants yield to the shock of waves. With them must Dante be girt before he can enter Purgatory. The cord of humility must take the place of that cord of mere human strength with which he had once thought to "catch the leopard of the painted skin," and which in his journey through the Inferno he had resolutely cast into the pit of fraud. Proud self-confidence, by excluding the soul from influence, paralyzes its powers, while humility, which makes man teachable, is the antecedent condition of all mental and spiritual growth.

The changed attitude of the soul is the significant distinction between the Purgatory and the Inferno. The spiritual universe is always the same, but it is differently reflected in the mirror of individual consciousness. The soul steeped in sin has become a distorting mirror which gives back love as hate, and heaven as hell. Each denizen of the Inferno might echo the despairing cry which Milton puts into the mouth of Lucifer: "What matter where, if *I* be still the same?" The consciousness of the penitents in Purgatory is a mirror which reflects truly but feebly—a glass over which there is a mist which must be removed. The repentant spirit knows its own sin, but at first defines goodness negatively as simply the opposite of itself. In the recoil of pain it recognizes the antagonism of its evil deed to the spiritual whole and resolves on amendment; but the true spiritual ideal hovers before it dimly, being obscured by the clouds and smoke of its own sinful passions. There is, in a word, still indwelling sin, but there is no longer a consent of the will to sin.

How the change is brought about, who can say? Not through sinning, for sin is refusal to learn the lesson which grace is teaching through the ministry of pain. To me it seems that each soul should tremble in mingled rapture and fear before its own blessed and yet so often fatal power of choice. Grace may constrain, but it cannot coerce. Love may appeal, but it cannot compel. Two things are sure: Against his own will and without his own effort no man can be made holy or wise. To influence his will nothing will be left untried. How will the struggle end? I do not know.



May man forever defy influence? I cannot tell. What I do know is that every committed sin sinks the soul into deeper darkness—fires it with more burning antagonism—freezes it in a more stagnant isolation. Sin is a help never, a hindrance always, to the progress of the spirit.

As the poets stand among the bending rushes on the island shore there arrives a boat steered by an angel and bearing souls to Purgatory. In contrast to the blasphemies of the spirits who assemble "on the joyless banks of Acheron," these shades are chanting the great psalm which, under the veil of the deliverance of Israel from Egypt, declares the deliverance of the soul from sin. "Not unto us, O Lord! not to us, but to thy name give glory," is the refrain, "and hope in the Lord" the burden of the song. Sin projects internal limit as external fate, and curses not itself, but "God and the human race." Repentance sees that evil lies not in the universe but in self, and thus converts even the inward limit into vanishing defect. With the sense that we are slaves who may achieve freedom, emancipation was begun. What matters present ignorance to the heir of all knowledge? In foretaste of the joy which shall come with the morning, what becomes of the sorrow of the night?

Traversing the region of Ante-Purgatory, the poets meet four classes of penitents whose common characteristic is that they have deferred repentance until the end of life. The differences between them are very suggestive. The first throng seem to be moving their feet and yet seem not to move forward, thus suggesting effort without advance. These souls "have died in contumacy of Holy Church," and are condemned to wait "outside the bank thirty times told the time that they have been in their presumption." The spirits of the second class stand listlessly in a shade behind a rock, and Belacqua, who is their typical representative, sits "embracing his knees, holding his face down low between them, and shows himself more careless than if Sloth herself his sister were." These are the simple procrastinators, and their condemnation is to remain outside the gate of Purgatory for a time as long as the time of their procrastination. The third throng are moving slowly forward and singing the "*Miserere*." These are they who have been slain by violence, but, admonished by a light from heaven, repented at the last hour, and, "both penitent and pardoning," issued

from life, reconciled to God. The fourth class embraces kings and princes who deferred repentance through the pressure of temporal cares. It is near sunset when the poets come upon them in a valley bright with grass and flowers, and fragrant with the sweetness of a thousand odors. These spirits sing a song of praise, and follow it with a prayer for protection during the rapidly descending night.

We understand Dante just so long as we keep constantly in mind that all his descriptions are external images of spiritual states. With him sin is not one thing and penalty another external to it, but the inevitable reaction of sin is the penalty of sin. So salvation is ceasing to be evil and becoming good. Ante-Purgatory, as a whole, signifies that initial phase in the process of transition in which the soul simply turns away from evil. It represents a state of aspiration which has not yet deepened into energy—a sympathy with good which precedes its ardent pursuit. Souls in this stage of development do not see God, but are quickened by desire to see him. The hovering ideal is not defined, but is “a substance of things hoped for and an evidence of things not seen.” During this part of the journey the one injunction of Virgil is, to be “steadfast in hope,” and the witness of the spirits is, that return to good is possible “so long as hope has anything of green.”

As the progressive emptying of self is the condition of a progressive recognition of the ideal, those souls who are most steeped in selfishness have before them the longest and most painful struggle. The four groups of spirits we have just considered typify four different grades of character. The presumptuous pride which excludes itself from influence condemns itself to movement in which there is no progress. The man who will not combine with other men cannot advance. He who will hear no teacher and read no books must remain in his ignorance. He who defies the laws and penalties of society crystallizes his own defect. Not listening to the voice of the great spiritual church, he makes himself “an heathen man and a publican.” His is the supreme violation because holiness is the complete interpenetration of the individual and the universal life. Therefore, by every act he retrogrades, and with profound insight the poet declares that to undo his deed will require “thirty times told the time that he has been in his presumption.”

For every moment of slothful procrastination man pays the penalty of loss of power, and persistent inaction must result in paralysis of the will. He who refuses to climb shall surely be brought to ask, "What's the use of climbing?" Nor is inertia acknowledged inertia overcome. Only by seeking the whip and spur of active influence, and by effort kept up in despite of pain, can the supine sluggard lift himself—he who sits crouching rise to his feet, and he who stands listless begin a forward march.

The penitents slain by violence illustrate a higher grade of character. By the act of pardoning their slayers they have entered into the divine life of forgiveness. This new light dawning within them makes their darkness visible, and they pant and pray for the cleansing fire and the purifying stream. So through care for the welfare of their subjects the princes in the valley have promoted their own. They have achieved a virtue which points to its own consummation. Reaching down to give help, they have learned to reach upward to receive it. The true King is himself a type and prophecy of the King of Kings, and, by reflecting the divine ideal, he begins to aspire toward it.

In the Valley of the Princes, Dante falls asleep and dreams that an eagle with feathers of gold swooping upon him snatches him upward to the fire. Out of this dream he wakes to find himself at the Gate of Purgatory, and is told by Virgil that during his sleep he was borne thither by Lucia. That the dream is a "shadow of coming events," the poet himself tells us, declaring that in sleep "the mind almost prophetic in its visions is"—as in a related passage he affirms that "oftentimes before a deed is done sleep has tidings of it."

In a valuable appendix to his translation of the "Purgatory" Butler points out that "the eagle was from the earliest Christian times an emblem of the soul which most aspires to meditate on divine things, and as such was adopted for the special cognizance of St. John;" and he notices also that the fire up to which the poet is borne is the Empyrean Heaven or abode of that "Perfect Deity who alone perfectly sees and knows himself." In plain words, the dream anticipates a revelation of the divine ideal, and implies that through contemplation of this ideal the soul shall be changed into its likeness. "Beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, we are changed into the same image from glory to glory."

The vision discerned is matched with the momentum acquired, for the poet wakes to find himself beyond the negative region of Ante-Purgatory, and in view of the true entrance to the cleansing mount. Herein is mirrored a universal fact of spiritual experience. How often after what has seemed like fruitless search for truth do its premonitions dawn upon the mind apparently unsought! How often after a moral struggle in which we seem to be growing worse instead of better do we suddenly find ourselves transported to a region of purer moral aspiration! The essential fact is the preceding struggle. Only he who persists in moving his feet, even when he seems not to move forward, shall dream of the eagle or be borne upward by Lucia. Grace can bestow only "so much of ardor as it finds," and thus, though all good is a gift, it is also a conquest. Yielding to passion, the unconscious transition is to a lower depth, as Dante swooning on the banks of Acheron wakes to find himself upon the brink of Hell.

All true representations of the origin and progress of moral development have implied more or less clearly that only an inward vision of the ideal convicts of sin and inspires to effort. Whatever view may be taken of the history of the Jews, two things are certain. Of all ancient nations they had the clearest consciousness of God and the deepest sense of their own sin. The total revelation of the books of Exodus and Leviticus may be compressed into the two declarations—"I am the Lord your God," and "Ye shall be holy, for I am holy." Immediately following this attained consciousness of truth and duty come the record of the sedition of Miriam and Aaron, the rebellion of Korah, the repeated murmurings of the whole people, the plague of fiery serpents, and the elevation of the symbolic serpent of brass. Translated from figurative representation into direct statement, the lesson taught is that the vision of truth defines existing defect. Sedition, rebellion, and complaint were not new in the world; what was new was the sense of their exceeding wrong. "Sin was in the world," says Paul, "before the law, but I had not known sin but by the law." The sting of conscience results from perception of what we are, in the light of what we should be.

In accord with this view of moral progress, Dante's dream of the Empyrean is followed by his profound self-abasement at the gate of Purgatory. Three stairs lead up to the gate. The first is

marble white, and in it the poet "mirrors himself as he appears;" the second is dark and uneven, and cracked lengthwise and across; the third is flaming red, as "blood that from a vein is spurting forth." These stairs symbolize that candid self-recognition which issues in heart-broken sorrow for sin and ardent consecration to God of the "life-blood of body, soul, and spirit." Drawn over them by Virgil, the poet prostrates himself at the feet of the angel, who guards the gate and whose gray robe symbolizes the "ashes of repentance." He smites upon Dante's forehead with a sword, describing thereon seven "P's," marks of the seven germinal sins which must now be purged from the penitent soul; plies the lock first with the silver key, "symbol of the science which discerns the true penitent," then with the golden key, "image of absolving power," and at last pushes open the gate with the significant exclamation,

"Enter—but I give you warning  
That forth returns whoever looks behind."

The song of the "*Te Deum*" falls upon the ear, and thus "praising God and acknowledging him to be the Lord," the poets cross the boundary-line which separates regret from repentance, aspiration from energy, mere desire from consecrated resolve.

In Purgatory proper is represented the gradual elimination of that indwelling sin against which the soul in Ante-Purgatory has entered its protest. Evidently, therefore, we must expect to find upon the ascending terraces diminishing degrees of sin and increasing degrees of participation in the divine life. The process is not one in which the soul is "left empty and garnished," but one wherein evil is crowded out by expanding good.

As holiness is living in the universal life, those sins are most heinous which most consciously repudiate existence in the species and assert a naked, defiant, and self-destroying individualism. Hence, farthest from the Earthly Paradise is the terrace of the proud, as deepest in the Inferno is the frozen circle of the traitors, in whom pride reigns supreme. The characteristic of pride is that it applies to things spiritual the law of the unspiritual, and desires monopoly where the very nature of the object desired demands division. The belief that there *may* be, the desire that there *should* be, or the resolve that there *shall* be an unshared

excellence constitutes the first degree of pride. In its second degree pride rejoices in another's lack; and in its final phase it repudiates the spiritual good which will not be monopolized.

Envy, which is punished upon the second terrace, may be crudely distinguished from pride through the fact of a different relationship to its object. The proud man (in his own estimation) already excels his neighbor, but the envious man perceives that his neighbor excels him. To himself the latter seems only seeking equality; the former is consciously insisting upon monopoly. Envy asks for itself *more* and for its neighbor *less*; pride demands for itself *all* and grants to its neighbor *none*.

Anger differs from envy and pride both in the degree and the permanence of its insistence upon self. As its supreme type, Dante chooses Haman, who, "because Mordecai bowed not nor did him reverence," prepared a gallows and sought to have him hanged; and he describes the angry man as one who "through injury appears so to take shame that he becomes gluttonous of vengeance." Thus anger would seem rather an inability to sustain an imagined wrong than a deliberate desire to inflict wrong, and we may trace its root to that undue self-esteem which, insisting upon a recognition beyond its deserts, conceives itself injured when such recognition is withheld.

The common characteristic of pride, envy, and anger is distorted self-love, but the supremacy of self is greatest in pride and least in anger. Advancing to the terrace of Sloth, we find self subordinated, but not overcome. The soul accepts as its ideal the universal life, but, clogged by the impediment of self, cannot at once create its image. The heart has turned to its true object, but its love is still a feeble flame. It must be fanned into a fervent heat which shall burn out all lesser loves and thus accomplish the soul's emancipation from appetite in its three forms of covetousness, gluttony, and lust. This work is achieved upon the higher terraces, and then the soul, "purified through suffering," is welcomed by the song of angels to the kingdom prepared from the foundation of the world.

So long as the soul contradicts the spiritual universe it must feel the recoil of the universe as pain. Hence, upon each terrace of Purgatory is imaged the suffering which is the reaction of sin. The bodies of the proud are bent double by the burdens on their

backs: the eyelids of the envious are sewn up with iron thread; the angry are involved in thick smoke, and upon the terrace of the slothful "the power of the legs is put in truce." Prostrate and immovable the avaricious purge their sin; in hunger and thirst is punished the gluttony which beyond measure followed appetite, and in purifying flame is burned away unholy love.

The symbolism of the punishments is apparent. The principle of spiritual life is to grow by giving and by sharing to increase. This principle re-enforces the humble man but presses with intolerable weight upon the proud soul which has repudiated it. Nothing blinds the eyes like envy, and anger creates a smoky moral atmosphere in which all duties are obscure. The inevitable outcome of slothful disuse is loss of power, while avarice, loving supremely earthly things, lifts not the eye toward heaven, and, by extinguishing the love of good, destroys the stimulus to action. Thus, in the truest sense, the avaricious man is prostrate and immovable. The reaction of unbridled appetite is craving, associated with satiety, and through burning shame the souls of carnal sinners must press forward toward the benediction of the pure in heart.

The recoil of the spiritual universe is, however, not the characteristic mark of the purgatorial state. This is even more clearly defined in the "Inferno," where the violation is supreme. Thus, as against the slow and painful progress of the proud in Purgatory, we have their stultification in the "Inferno": the purgatorial smoke of anger becomes in the "Inferno" boiling mud and a river of blood, while the craving and satiety of penitent gluttons are in the impenitent intensified into the rending of voracious Cerberus and the descent of the "Eternal accursed cold and heavy rain." What the Inferno lacks, and Purgatory possesses, is the vision of the Ideal. It is this which incites the activity through which alone defect can be cancelled, and the effort to actualize it is rewarded by its clearer revelation.

Upon the rock-walls which bound the terrace of the proud are carved typical examples of humility. This is the most external representation of the Ideal in Purgatory, and follows first upon its symbolic prophecy in the dream of the Eagle. To the envious the ideal of mercy is proclaimed by a passing voice, implying thus an internal sense which makes possible its immediate recognition

Meekness is revealed in an inward vision, and when we reach the terrace of the slothful we find that the spiritually discerned ideal has become a conscious inciting motive. "Quick, quick"—cry the eager spirits—"so that the time may not be lost by little love," and they spur themselves to fresh ardor by recalling how "Mary to the mountain ran, and Cæsar, that he might subdue Iberda, thrust at Marseilles, and then ran into Spain." In the souls of those who mourn their avarice the ideal has become so clearly defined that they themselves discern the logical relation between their sin and its punishment, and begin to comprehend the fundamental principle of recoil. To the self-convicted glutton even temptation is turned into warning, and from amid the very branches of the tree for whose fair fruit he hungers comes the voice which bids him pass on farther without drawing near. The souls upon the final terrace have attained a higher sanctification, for they have learned that subordination of the lesser to the holier love which destroys temptation and emancipates the soul from the danger of a fall. The meeting penitents do not need to avoid each other, but they "kiss one with one, without staying, content with short greeting." Moreover, both the gluttonous and incontinent have come to love their purifying pain, and have penetrated into the "divine depths of the worship of Sorrow." The former declare that the same "wish leads them to the tree which led the Christ rejoicing to say Eli;" and of the latter we are told that they vanish in the fire "like fish in water going to the bottom." Thus, in each advancing stage of development, the ideal becomes a more internal, inclusive, and inciting power.

Increasingly illuminated by the truth, the soul realizes more profoundly the sin that contradicts it. Hence, the revelation of ideal types of character is complemented by vivid presentations of the seven deadly sins. The humility of the Virgin throws into relief the pride of Lucifer, and the love of Orestes accentuates the envious hate of Cain. For the same reason, with decreasing sin comes increasing sensitiveness of repentance. "O noble conscience and without a stain," sings the poet, "how sharp a sting is trivial thought to thee!" By the souls who are being purged of avarice we are told "that no more bitter pain the mountain has." Nowhere does Dante manifest such shrinking as in view of the cleansing flames of the topmost terrace; and it would even



seem that the crowning moment of his anguish is that in which, arraigned and condemned by Beatrice, he falls swooning upon the bank of Lethe. So the final judgment comes for each one of us when, with awakened eyes, we gaze upon Him whom we have pierced. Seeing what He is, we see all we are not.

Twice in the course of his progress from the gate of Purgatory to the Earthly Paradise does Dante sleep and dream. The first dream comes to him after he has painfully circled around the circle of Sloth, the second after he has issued from the flame, and, wearied in his ascent toward the summit of the mount, "of a stair has made his bed." In the one he has a vision of a deceiving Siren, who, seeking to allure him, is put to flight by a "Lady saintly and alert;" in the other he beholds a beautiful woman walking in a meadow, singing and gathering flowers. Her song is a key to Dante's theory of the method of spiritual development:

"Know, whosoever may my name demand,  
That I am Leah, and go moving round  
My beauteous hands to make myself a garland,  
To please me at the mirror; here I deek me;  
But never does my sister Rachel leave  
Her looking-glass, and sitteth all day long.  
To see her beauteous eyes as eager is she  
As I am to adorn me with my hands:  
Her seeing and me doing satisfies."

Taken in connection with the vision of the Eagle, which anticipates the poet's transition to the gate of Purgatory, the inner meaning of these dreams becomes clear. As the flight to the Empyrean was a symbolic presentation of the soul's ascent to God through contemplation of his nature, so the Siren shows the fleshly sins which must be overcome before the divine ideal can become incarnate in the man; and the "Lady saintly and alert" typifies the will, now purged of sloth, and sanctified by the vision of the truth. It is worthy of note that after the ascent from the terrace of Sloth sin is no longer described as obscuring vision, but only as impeding progress. We hear no more of "the smoke-stains of the world," though much still of "the malady which all the world pervades," the need of "unloosing the knot of debt," and the obligation to "circle around the mount which straightens those whom the world made crooked."

The third dream is a synthesis of the other two. If vision reacting upon desire incites to effort, so effort crowned with achievement makes possible clearer vision. To be good is to see the good, and only in identification with the divine is the divine fully revealed. When development is complete there is no real distinction between the active and contemplative life. Leah may still gather flowers, but she does so that she may please herself at the mirror; or, in prosaic statement, activity is to her simply the condition of insight. Dante's waking experiences correspond, moreover, with the premonitions of his sleep, for when he comes into the Earthly Paradise it is by Matilda (identified by all commentators as the type of sanctified activity) that he is drawn through Lethe and led to Beatrice.

In order to understand the spiritual state figured by Dante in the Earthly Paradise we must keep clearly in mind the thought of Purgatory as a purifying process. Progress through the seven-fold realm means the gradual elimination of selfishness, and, as correlative to this, increasing degrees of spiritual fellowship. It is worthy of note that throughout this second division of the Divine Comedy references to God are few and indirect. The vision of God is the blessedness of the Heavenly Paradise. The Earthly Paradise is a transition toward this joy, and represents a state of mind in harmony with the Church, or, differently expressed, entrance into the life of God as incarnate in the world.

The order of Dante's experiences in the Earthly Paradise is very suggestive. Declared by Virgil king over himself and free either to sit quiet or to walk among the beauties which surround him, he feels "eager to search in and around the heavenly forest," and moves forward until his progress is barred by a stream so clear that by comparison earth's most limpid waters seem obscure. Upon the opposite bank he sees Matilda gathering flowers, and learns from her that this stream is Lethe, which, "issuing from a fountain safe and certain, descends with virtue which takes away all memory of sin." Then suddenly warned to look and listen, the poet "beholds a lustre run athwart the spacious forest, and hears a delicious melody in the luminous air." This light and music herald the revelation of the Church, imaged as a triumphal chariot drawn by Christ under the form of the Griffin; a mystic animal which, being half-lion and half-eagle, symbolizes that union of the divine and human "which neither confounds the natures

nor divides the person." Preceding the chariot are seven apparently self-moving candlesticks, representing the seven gifts of the Spirit; and the books of the Old Testament personified as twenty-four elders clad in the white garments and crowned with the lilies of faith. Surrounding the chariot are the four apocalyptic beasts, crowned with green, the color of hope, and representing the four gospels; four nymphs robed in purple, who personify the moral virtues of Prudence, Temperance, Justice, and Fortitude; and three nymphs clad in white, green, and red, and denoting the theological virtues of Faith, Hope, and Charity. In the rear follow seven elders, robed in white but crowned with the roses of love, and representing the remaining books of the New Testament.

Very evidently we have here the representation of a visible institution, and not a revelation of its invisible life. But suddenly out of the midst of the great procession arises a solitary cry—"Come with me, my spouse, from Lebanon," shouted three times by "one from heaven commissioned." It is echoed by all, and then, "in the bosom of a cloud of flowers, covered with a white veil, wrapped in a green mantle and vested in color of the living flame," Beatrice descends upon the Chariot of the Church. Spontaneously the mind reverts to the apocalyptic vision of the Holy City, the new Jerusalem coming down from God, "prepared as a bride adorned for her husband," and recognizes in this descending Beatrice an image of the indwelling Spirit of that great heavenly Church of which all churches on earth are but types and symbols.

Dante's treatment of Beatrice gives us the key both to his poem and his poetic method. For obviously the Beatrice of the Divine Comedy is primarily the woman Beatrice Portinari. In the "*Vita Nuova*," describing the moment when he, a child, first met her, a child, Dante affirms, "At that instant the spirit of life which dwells in the most secret chamber of the heart began to tremble with such violence that it appeared fearfully in the least pulses, and trembling said these words: 'Behold a God stronger than I, who coming shall rule me.'" There is an echo of this description in the passage of the "*Purgatory*" which narrates the descent of Beatrice. The spirit of the poet trembles with awe, and, through the occult influence proceeding from "the fair and saintly Lady of his heart," feels "the mighty influence of an ancient love." It is a revival of "the power sublime that had already pierced him

through in boyhood," and he "quenches ten years of thirst" in the "light of the eyes whence love once drew his armory." Yet though truly the woman, Beatrice is not the woman alone. "Sitting with ancient Rachel," she suggests the contemplative life, and, "gazing like an eagle at the sun," she indicates its perfection. Still more profoundly apprehended as "One who withdrew from singing Hallelujah to rescue the wanderer from the dark wood"—as one whose stern salutation caused Dante to fall prostrate in contrite shame, and as one whose eyes reflect the Griffin and are themselves "the splendor of the living light eternal"—she shines forth the image of that grace which seeks and convicts the sinner, illuminates the penitent, and, by giving itself to the soul, makes the soul like itself. The Beatrice of Dante is thus one with the "Eternal Womanly" of Goethe, and represents that divine principle which always energizes to draw up the imperfect into the blessedness of its own perfection.

The vision of Beatrice is followed by Dante's passage through Lethe; or—if we may translate the poet's figure—being quickened by a higher revelation, he is pricked with a thornier penitence and thus made susceptible of a further purification. Having crossed the stream that takes away the memory of sin, he joins the procession of the Church, and then, in deeper communion with her who is "light 'twixt truth and intellect," his spirit grows prophetic. With penetrating eyes he scans the history of the Church and beholds worldly power bringing forth spiritual pride with its triple progeny of heresy, schism, and moral corruption. Upon his quickened ear falls the mournful music of the angelic chant—"O Lord! the heathen are come into thine inheritance; thy holy temple have they defiled." Thus he passes out of the communion of the visible into that of the invisible Church, and, regenerated by the waters of Eunoë, becomes "pure and disposed to mount into the stars."

Contrasting with the "Inferno," which pictures the outcome of selfish individualism in the stultification of the individual, "Purgatory" traces the redemption of man out of individualism into social communion. It treats of the soul's relation to God, not directly but as mediated by the Church, and its lesson is that in the organic relationship of the individual to the social whole is grounded the possibility of spiritual development. Hence the su-

preme sin is "Contumacy of Holy Church;" and upon the ear of the Church descends Beatrice, the immortal image of divine grace. How, through the Church, the individual is lifted into participation with the divine, is the theme of the "Paradise," whose consummation is reached when the soul, "inspired by abundant grace," presumes "to fix its own sight upon the Light eternal."

The only obstacle to spiritual growth lies in ourselves. Goodness divine, which "spurns from itself all envy," is forever shining in ideal beauty and drawing the soul with cords of love. If we do not see the heavenly vision, it is because we are blinded by sin; if we do not press forward toward it, it is because we are clogged by sin. Well, therefore, shall it be with us if we take to ourselves the stern rebuke and exhortation of the grave warden of Purgatory:

"What is this, ye laggard spirits?  
What negligence, what standing still is this?  
Run to the mountain, to strip off the slough  
That lets not God be manifest to you!"

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## THE HUMAN FORM SYSTEMATICALLY OUTLINED AND EXPLAINED.

BY WILLIAM H. KIMBALL.

In order to carry the matter in view as directly as possible to its normal issues, let us formulate in a way to denote the involved elements:

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| I.<br>SENSORY FORM. | { | <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1<sup>1</sup>. <i>Sense-Sense</i> implies an anchorage in the powers of Corporeal Sense; basic power <i>felt</i>, not expressed.</li><li>2<sup>1</sup>. <i>Reason-Sense</i> operates these powers in a way to train, school, and educate them, both in their forms and activities.</li><li>3<sup>1</sup>. <i>Wisdom-Sense</i> operates them in their fulness, both as powers and orderly activities.</li></ol> |
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II.  
REASON FORM.

- 1<sup>2</sup>. *Sense-Reason* simply anchors in the powers of Rational Sense; gives a dim *sense* of rational power and attainment.
- 2<sup>2</sup>. *Reason-Reason* operates in the unschooled or partial condition of these powers during educational experiences.
- 3<sup>2</sup>. *Wisdom-Reason* operates in the conditions of Rational Mastery by the powers fully educated.

III.  
WISDOM FORM.

- 1<sup>3</sup>. *Sense-Wisdom* anchors in the powers of Sophiaal Sense; a dim sense of power by amplest Wisdom.
- 2<sup>3</sup>. *Reason-Wisdom* unfolds and schools these powers amid the toils and limitations inherent to educational experience.
- 3<sup>3</sup>. *Wisdom-Wisdom* realizes the power of Sophiaal Mastery, and is thus the consummating term to the form in view.

The first degree of these powers (1<sup>1</sup>, 1<sup>2</sup>, 1<sup>3</sup>) is innate to the Human Form in primary constitution.

The second degree (2<sup>1</sup>, 2<sup>2</sup>, 2<sup>3</sup>) is inevitable to Human Development, operated by that constitution.

The third degree (3<sup>1</sup>, 3<sup>2</sup>, 3<sup>3</sup>) is necessary to fulfil in human knowledge and power, and fix man in the Divine Mastery to which the primary scale of constitutional sensibility entitles him, and for which development qualifies him.

The first, second, and third elements of *Sense in itself* are indicated by definitions 1<sup>1</sup>, 2<sup>1</sup>, 3<sup>1</sup>.

The three elements of the Reason form *in itself* are indicated by definitions 1<sup>2</sup>, 2<sup>2</sup>, 3<sup>2</sup>.

The three elements of Wisdom *in itself* are indicated by definitions 1<sup>3</sup>, 2<sup>3</sup>, 3<sup>3</sup>.

The initial and static base of the whole form, *as a one*, is indicated by 1<sup>1</sup>, 1<sup>2</sup>, 1<sup>3</sup>.

The whole form, *as one*, in generative toils, is indicated by 2<sup>1</sup>, 2<sup>2</sup>, 2<sup>3</sup>.

The composure or fulness of the whole form in glorified power is indicated by 3<sup>1</sup>, 3<sup>2</sup>, 3<sup>3</sup>.

Thus are seen, under this law of *trinity* as measuring and defining instrument, both the successive and simultaneous order of degrees, both of which are requisite to full thesis, analysis, and synthesis, such as shall prove truly comprehensive and authenticate our survey as positively scientific.

It is a prevailing principle that no element of power is simple and limited to one form of expression. The Human Form being a diversified *One* distinctly constituted in *threefold order*, an element that pervades one degree of this trine pervades all; remembering always that it varies in each degree in strict conformity to the nature of each.

It is clear enough that man, as creaturely subject, cannot *know*, in commanding manner, during the schooling or educational processes inevitable to his minor degree of manhood. Nor can he then, in any respect, realize the needs of his nature as such a subject. He is, at the very first, invested with a full scale of human power by constitutional endowment. But he surely cannot actually realize those powers until they become fully educated, educed, drawn out, and established to experience. So, it is seen, when he is mainly educated in his minor degree of powers—the degree that plants him in the primary experience of the corporeal scale (1<sup>1</sup>, 2<sup>1</sup>, 3<sup>1</sup>)—his interests and powers are of a very coarse and grovelling nature, however complete they may be in that particular form of manhood.

And we may also see that this Human Form may be very thoroughly educated and empowered in the major degree (1<sup>2</sup>, 2<sup>2</sup>, 3<sup>2</sup>)—the degree of rational power—and yet have no experience and knowledge of highest realities in supreme Life and Being, as knowledge and experience necessary to complete manhood. It may here be a power in all the range of rational or special science and ethical activities, and still have no gleam of the Light that steadily illumines the maximum degree at *its* amplest realization. For the best light of lower realms can never illumine the higher. It may *illustrate*, as moonlight illustrates sunlight, but it cannot *illuminate*. And only in case the higher is first known can it illustrate *to the understanding*. It is the ministry of lower forms to image or *represent*, never to directly display, or truly *present*.

So it is seen that we must not only come into a *divin sense* of

the highest, as represented by 1<sup>3</sup>, 2<sup>3</sup>, 3<sup>3</sup>, but we must become educated in its powers—must become fully empowered in it as “the way, the truth, and the life” of Divine Fulness before we can realize the composure and rest to which we are entitled by the indwelling wants and powers of the Human Form as primarily constituted. Then we come into our highest powers of *being*, *knowing*, and *doing*. Then the immeasurable wealth of creative endowment becomes a wealth common to the human experience. Then the minor, who was necessarily held under the rigors of tutelary discipline during the partial, unsettled, and riotous conditions of his powers, takes the position of conscious mastery in Divinely matured Sonship, and becomes the perfect freeman in his own right. For here he becomes rightly qualified, and so is given full possession and use of that to which he was born, and toward which his previous training tended.

Here we come to a distinct understanding of the proposition: “The laws of the human mind are the laws of all things.” We see that the laws of human constitution make it a threefold form of innate, unmanifest power. We see that this time form goes forth, under the rule of Creative Wisdom, in unfolding educational processes amid innumerable rigors, limitations, contrarities, conflicts, and goadings of every kind; and we find that it comes, finally, to its maturity and regal majesty of form and activities in a manner befitting its innate vitality and the glory of Creative Wisdom that thus fashioned and formed it. Under this rule of insight to the laws—(1) of mental constitution, (2) of mental development, (3) of mental maturity in ultimate fulness—we have a clew to the essential “law of all things.” We find a universal law (1) of indefinite unity in potential *being*, (2) of manifest diversity in contrariety in actual processes of *appearing*, (3) of composite unity, diversity in unity in the end or design attained.

So, it is simply the laws of creation that are thus formulated and defined. And they are thus delineated as a code so firm in unitary science that by it all matters of human life and experience may be duly explored and consistently rated; the simplicity and positiveness of the ruling being so marked and real as to make it a rest rather than a tax upon the intellect.

Creation, accordingly, is not a wilful exploit of creative power



operated to project merely physical and animate existences, but it is (1) a reality in essential Being, as uncreated power of Life; (2) it is a series of productive operations of that Being through all the resistant struggles of creaturely selfhood during human development; (3) it is a perfect fruition in those operations divinely consummated, by which the creature himself realizes all the fullness of Creative Being, and reflects his glories continually. The light here found is literally "the Light of the world."

We find, therefore, the ruling principle of the *first degree* of all mind, thought, and things to be that of static unity or repose in innate power; the ruling principle of the *second degree* is that of active contrariety in the productive energies of that power in generative and developing processes; and the ruling principle of the *third degree* is that of composing fullness—of actual consistency so emphatic and real that it not only impresses with the repose and order of its own form, but gives a true insight to all the toils and seeming inconsistencies that were before experienced or observed. Hence, conditions of *mind, thought, or activities* in human experience that carry with them aught of immaturity, inconsistency, confusion, strife, partiality, and distress of any sort, surely betoken uncreated or unfulfilled conditions. They are conditions that are peculiar to the second degree in creative order, are wholly confined to its realm or sphere of operations, and can give no better indication of the real nature and glory of Creative Wisdom than the painter's palette, spread with discordant colors and confused pigments, can indicate the genius of the artist. Only when the canvas becomes duly laden with a consistent combination of those colors in the revelation of a perfect conception of the artist can we read the real glory of his power, and applaud his name accordingly.

So, likewise, Creative Wisdom can only be known and devoutly worshipped *through Created Form consummated*. The Human Form must be Divinely perfected—made to embody and image or reflect, in accordant activities, the infinite glories of the Divine Name—ere Wisdom can be justified of her children.

Perverted or partial vision will look doubtfully upon a creative system that involves the distresses and apparent inconsistencies of the second term (1<sup>o</sup>, 2<sup>o</sup>, 3<sup>o</sup>). It will prompt the objection: "With infinite Wisdom and Power in a Creator, how can evil,

with all its dire consequences, come into the creative system? How, if there really be such presiding wisdom and power in the case, were it possible for the evils that stain poor human nature, and fill the world with pains and groans, to come into our experience? Why were there not one steady, *unruffled* flow of the great stream of life from the Creative Fountain?"

Such questionings—common as they are—imply a very narrow field of vision on the part of the questioner. For the present occasion they are sufficiently answered by saying (what a moment of serious reflection will confirm) that, without a projection into states of conscious freedom in a rank selfhood that completely inverts the Creative Wisdom, and begets all the evils and pains inevitable to such unqualified freedom, there could be no actual creature—no conscious otherness than God in any way that would authenticate creaturely subjectivity. At most, there could be nothing above mere instinctual subservience to a power of life that would make the subject only an animate machine, a dead level in living form, minus all power of spiritual assent. Such a form in nature could have animal vitality, but no particle of human spirit—no personality capable of feeling one throb of worshipful regard, and so would be void of all spiritual equipage by which to mount to the empyrean heights of full creation *in the freedom of God*. It could forever lie in mere animal indifference, but could never spring responsive to emotions of Creative Life. For how could a life *naturally* full—full by the mere fact of having been launched—ever aspire to *spiritual* fulness? How, but by *supernatural* endowment in a germ of moral subjectivity which were sure to unfold into conscious spiritual selfhood and the freedom that it carries, could man be the conscious creature of God, and competent to partake of the felicity of God's bounties of Life at last? It were clearly impossible to ascend to the bliss of Divine fulness in any other way. Besides, how were there any other way for an intelligent appreciation of the blessed life than through the afflictions and pains of unblest experience? A bliss that was not defined by its opposite, as an actual experience, would be no bliss to man, for human intelligence is grounded in contrarities of experience. Hence, we may surely know that the second creative degree (1<sup>2</sup>, 2<sup>2</sup>, 3<sup>2</sup>), with its manifold discordances and pains, cannot be dispensed with. It is the indispensable middle ground

of full creation itself—1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>d</sup>, 3<sup>d</sup>. Without crucifixion—both in creative and creaturely realms—there could be no glorification.

If a doubt here arise as to the creature's triumph, finally, over the evils that beset and sting him during the developing throes of the second degree, let it be remembered that the Creative Germ inherent to the first degree, as the Eternal Word—"the Life that lighteth every man that cometh into the world"—is a quenchless power that never falters nor yields, however much it becomes inverted or obscured by the overlying human grossness—the darkness that *comprehendeth not*—during the processes of moulding and operating the creaturely life. Rank growth in the corn inverts and obscures the life of the seed-form. Crude materials and the toilsome labors of the artist invert and misrepresent the conception that flamed in his soul as a quenchless vision, and that finally transfigures that material into glorified form. Is the Creative Word less efficient to achieve its infinite designs in its creature than are corn-life and art-genius efficient to their ends? Shame on the thought that deems it possible. All of the visible and invisible powers are tributary to his ends. Natural and Spiritual worlds are both instrumental to his purposes, as natural day and night together serve to carry human powers forward in natural form and functions. Natural and Spiritual worlds are simply tributaries to the Divine Natural.

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## HUME AND KANT.<sup>1</sup>

BY G. H. HOWISON.

I. Hume's question, *How are judgments concerning matters of fact possible by mere reason?* brings to view an element in the theory of knowledge that is neither to be evaded nor dispensed with. Real cognitions, as Hume penetratingly sees, are all dependent on the principle of causality: since, now, the latter is nowhere to be found within the entire range of experience, we come, no doubt, by the new insight that *experience is not an adequate*

<sup>1</sup> Outline of four lectures delivered at the Concord School of Philosophy, in July, 1883.

*ground of real knowledge* ; but, as the principle in question seems by the same token to originate in the mere phantasy of reason, it appears to be invalidated, and from the empirical standpoint, which is, however, unavoidable, we come inevitably upon Hume's question, which must be answered without any evasion.

This question now, which by implication reads, Why are the judgments aforesaid not utterly impossible on the face of the matter? brings in its train A THREEFOLD DIFFICULTY. *First*, How is any absolute morality—any morality grounded in religion—possible? or, How is a knowledge of *transcendent* realities possible—how is a transit from the sensible to the supersensible possible in general? *Second*, How is even any system of rights possible; any system, that is, founded on justice? for if morality loses its foundation on absolute truth (which is possible only through knowledge of the transcendent), and consequently turns out, and law with it, to be merely the expression of feeling and habit, all authority comes down to mere force, and any such thing as patriotism seems therefore impossible. *Finally*, as by the dissolution of the principle of causality all knowledge of the future from the *past* is reduced to pure illusion, how is such knowledge possible at all?

II. To this threefold branching of the problem presented by Hume there is A COUNTERPART THREEFOLD IN KANT'S SYSTEM OF "CRITICISM." *First*, Kant aims to rescue absolute morality, and likewise the validity of a transit by thought from the sensible to the supersensible generally, by his doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason: it is only as *legislative*, he declares, that reason is actually universal—only thus does it reach the full realization of a rational nature; God, freedom, and immortality are not to be made out by theoretic *seeing* at all, but solely by that *a priori* *volition* which simultaneously posits duty as a categorical or absolutely unconditional imperative, and those transcendent existences as postulates without which this absolute law would fail of any fulfilment. *Next*, he aims to establish upon the same principle the authority and thoroughgoing justice of the political order; the State, he teaches, obtains a genuine right only by protecting the freedom of each individual so far as this comports with the freedom of every other under that imperative of reason which alone, as absolutely categorical and yet set up by the individual himself,

puts freedom and obedience alike on firm foundations. *Finally*, he seeks to explain and warrant the possibility of a predictive science of nature by his epoch-making theory of "transcendental idealism;" the science in question, he maintains, is only possible, though in this case is certainly possible, on condition that the objects to which it refers shall be, not things in themselves, but only *phenomena*—only the *appearances* of the things, as these are seen in the *a priori* forms of the percipient subject; in brief, nature is, as to its *form*, the creation of the mind—is transcendently ideal; as to its *matter*, however, in order to save perceptive cognition from being illusion, there is requisite an element in our cognitive faculty that is purely *sensuous*—*i. e.*, strictly susceptible of what is *given* out of the things in themselves; in other words, an element (or component) of mere *receptivity*.

III. But this theory of Kant's, whether in the one or the other of its main branches, fails of any thorough solution of the difficulties raised by Hume. *First*, the primacy of the practical reason is an *unarticulated* principle, tacitly *accepted*; in no case is it possible to save the practical reason at the expense of the theoretical; for if the existence of God is *theoretically* incognizable, every so-called postulate of the practical reason becomes a mere condition or requisite for the carrying out of an *impulse*—of a mere *drift*—whose warrant is utterly unknown and forever unknowable. *Secondly*, the famous "Categorical Imperative," as Kant deals with it, is not only an empty *formal* law, but is, besides, an unestablished *assumption*, quite in the manner of the Scottish philosophers so ridiculed by Kant himself; and, in the light of this fact, the entire ground for the passage to the supersensible by means of the practical falls away. *Finally*, the doctrine of the "transcendental," precisely because it does contain that foreign element of receptivity, is no solution of the enigma concerning the knowledge of the future; if a something wholly foreign to the percipient subject is necessary in order to any knowledge at all, it becomes forever impossible to predict what sort of course a world of sense is to have whose essence consists in the result of interaction between *a priori* forms and unknowable things; and, with this realized, the ground for the passage from the past to the future, even within the present world of sense, disappears.

IV. We need, then, a thorough reconstruction, enlargement,

and improvement of the Kantian procedure, if we are definitively to reduce the problems of Hume. By any theory whatever that persists in setting up the mere *immanency* of the human mind as an adequate conception of human nature, there is "No thoroughfare." Only by the conjunction of a real *transcendency* with the limitation that appears from the standpoint of experience to characterize our powers shall we ever come out into the open country of an unconditional knowledge, *even within the bounds of possible experience*; real knowledge of an order of *nature* even is conditional upon knowledge of transcendent realities; and the possibility of such knowledge must either be permanently surrendered, or else nature must be so conceived, and the conception justified, as to flow *wholly* from the same system of principles that gives form and reality to the percipient subject. In short, the Kantian rift in our nature *a priori*—the assumed chasm between pure intellect and pure sense, between *power* to conceive and mere *susceptibility* to perceive—must be closed up, or, rather, be proved non-existent, by being exposed as unintelligible and self-cancelling; our faculty of conscious being, the cognitive organism *a priori* that confers existence upon us, must be seen as wholly self-contained—as one and continuous from centre to circumference; space and time must be discovered to be strict categories as truly as causality—must be raised from so-called pure percepts into pure concepts, from mere forms of susceptibility into discharges (*Functionen*) of spontaneity; causality (into which all the Kantian categories are really subsumable) must be seen to *involve* space and time—to contain them ideally as the terms, founded in its own nature, of its own self-fulfilment; and sensibility must come to be understood as simply the last term in that process of particularization (or self-dispersion still always held in harmony by the originating unity), apart from the completion of which, intellection would fail of its own self-established idea—would fail, in short, of self-intelligibility, and therefore of intelligence.

The pathway, now, to the desired open country—to this over-spanning unity of understanding and sense, this *continuous* identity that shall embrace difference and conjoin form and matter, bare conception and clothing sensation, in one indivisible whole—lies through a new and more thoroughgoing critique of the pure categories, whereby it shall be shown that *all cognition is but the*

*phenomenizing of the Unity subsisting in Kant's THREE IDEAS, and that the latter, as CAUSES PURELY SELF-DETERMINING, are actually CONSTITUTIVE of sensible objects, as well as of the human intelligence that perceives them.* In short, the Three Ideas must be shown to form a veritable *system*—a self-organizing unity, originated and sustained by the self-activity of the Supreme Idea, the *Ens realissimum*, the absolute Self-completeness or Perfection; this Supreme Idea, simply in fulfilment of its own ideal nature, perpetually manifesting itself in the other two, as percipient and perceived, subject and object, self and world. The one Supreme Idea will thus be seen to involve in its own ideal reality not only *immanence* in the intellection of particular subjects (percipients), but necessary *transcendence* of it; and, as the very ideality of the Idea will thus consist in an incessant reaching out of its unity, to develop and enfold the infinite particularity in lack of which it would be meaningless void or pure nonentity, this identity that thus contains a forever assimilated difference must, in virtue of this true self-existence, this inherent transcendency, be acknowledged to be a *real* universal, unconditional and living, and thus to fulfil the infinitude of meaning that we are wont to designate by the sacred name of God. From this it would follow that all *pure* knowing—all knowing that succeeds in realizing its own nature—since it is real participation in a universal (*i. e.*, divine) consciousness, is a knowledge of the actual truth—of the truth, that is, as it must appear to any intelligent being whatever.

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## NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

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### TWO LAY SERMONS.

#### I. THE SOCIAL PHASE.

“As all the members, being many, are one body, so also is Christ.”—1 Cor. xii, 12.

SYNOPSIS.—I. Practical discrimination of the Social from the Individual Phase of Religion.—II. The Four Elements of the Social Phase, as so discriminated.—III. Review of the Mediatorial Office of Christ.—IV. Review of the Indivisibility of the Temple of God.—V. Review of “the more sure Word of Prophecy.”—VI.



Review of "the Power of the Keys."—VII. Progressive function of the Social Phase, in its normal subordination to the Individual Phase.

I. There are two texts from the Pauline Epistles which seem not to have been adequately appreciated and developed in their substantial connection with the two great commandments of the Gospel Dispensation: "Hast thou faith? Have it to thyself before God" (Rom. xiv, 22); "Speak every man truth with his neighbor, for we are members one of another" (Eph. iv, 25). Considering, on the one hand, the undeviating testimony of the ages that individual faith is the sustaining principle of probational or religious life, and, on the other, the summary and most mature declaration by the Divine Founder of Christianity, that the purpose of his coming into the world was to "bear witness unto the truth," these texts may be regarded as especially illustrating, the one the individual and the other the social phase of Christian life. The decree, indeed, here holds good, "What God hath joined, let not man put asunder," so that the second even of these precepts is, doubtless, "like unto the first." But, however inseparable in fact or in practice, they must evidently be distinguished in theory or in doctrine, if it be only for the sake of appreciating the ground of their subordination, which must itself become a fact of practice, as we learn to regard the Lord Jesus Christ as the Ladder of God, reaching from earth to heaven. Apprehending that a more definite intelligence of the social phase of the work of religion may be a present need of the Church and of the world, owing to which need the individual phase may be too exclusively and self-complacently dwelt upon, and therefore itself be the more imperfectly appreciated, I confine myself in these remarks to the consideration of that social phase, secondary though it be, save as the other may be incidentally suggested thereby.

II. The few observations which I have to make on this subject will be, for the most part, drawn from, or traceable to, four important articles of scriptural truth—two of them, it has seemed to me, largely neglected and almost allowed to lie dormant, and two not so much neglected (indeed, more or less vigorously disputed) as vaguely and variously understood or apprehended. The first two articles to which I refer are, first, the Mediatorship of the Lord Jesus Christ, as being distinctively that office of Lawgiver prefigured in the Hebrew Dispensation by the leadership of Moses, whereby He, through his "spirit of life" (Rom. viii, 2) and their individual faith, progressively and adaptively influences the thoughts and, through these, the lives of believers, "even unto the end of the world"; and, secondly, the Indivisibility of the Temple of God, or "the body of Christ" (John ii, 21; 1 Cor. vi, 19; Eph. iii, 6, etc.), save into "lively



stones," or living individual members, and the consequent inapplicability of the word "temples," as in the plural, to those constituent portions of the same. The other two articles of Scripture, so to speak, which I have to cite, are, first, the "more sure Word of Prophecy," adduced by the apostle Peter (2 Pet. i, 19) as the light or lamp of the unconverted world; and, secondly, the so-called "Power of the Keys" (Matt. xvi, 19, xviii, 18), also more or less casually associated with the name of that apostle, and also, not unnaturally, especially laid claim to by the great formalizing Church which regards him as its spiritual patriarch. Of that "more sure Word" I will here only say that, unless we will rudely sever the obvious connection of text and context (as they who confound the record with the revelation may here be tempted to sever it), we must understand by it some present influence which is (not precisely more true, but) more direct, unmistakable, and efficacious than even the most solemn and impressive "voice from heaven," which may be now a thing of the past, and so mere matter of record. Upon "the power of the keys" it may suffice for the present to quote the view of John Hales, of Eton, as reproduced by Principal Tulloch, in his "History of Rational Theology in the Seventeenth Century": "The Power of the Keys is simply the privilege of declaring or opening the message of Divine love to mankind. It has no relation to any priestly or judicial function in the Christian ministry. All who have themselves received the Divine message, or to whom the kingdom of heaven has been opened, have, equally with the clergy, the keys of this kingdom committed to them. 'Every one, of what state or condition soever, that hath any occasion offered him to serve another in the ways of life, clergy or lay, male or female, whatever he be, hath these keys, not only for himself, but for the benefit of others. . . . To save a soul, every man is a priest. To whom, I pray you, is that said in Leviticus, "Thou shalt not see thy brother sin, but thou shalt reprove and save thy brother?"'"

Let us now review these four articles of scriptural and Divine truth, and consider how they may be found to converge and in their perfection to coincide in a true view of the social phase of the work of religion.

III. The Mediatorial Office of our Lord, as thus discriminated, being necessarily manifested in the social realm of reason or intelligence, as distinguished from the more individual one of fleshly, and the more transcendental one of spiritual experience (these corresponding, it may be presumed, to those other offices of vicarious Atonement and heavenly Intercession); and reason or intelligence, though it may not be the largest or deepest ground of communion, being still the only possible common ground between the believer and the unbeliever, or between the Church

and the world—that Mediatorial Office, as thus understood, or as supplying that supernatural light in which alone nature can be rightly read, and mankind be made “of one mind,” must plainly be the primary influence of social efficiency. It is in the exercise of this office that we may conceive the still abiding Spirit of Christ to equip the members of the Church (not the Church proper or collective, whose office as an organization may be said to be rather to direct, restrain, and regulate its own unweaned children in the truth) for the conversion of the world, and regard the sufficiently matured among them as ministering angels, mounting and condescending on “the Son of man” or Ladder of God (John i, 51) to diverse degrees of the Divine life, or even of the natural knowledge of Divine truth.

IV. If the Mediatorship of Christ be thus the primary influence, the Indivisibility of the Temple may with equal propriety be called the fundamental fact of true social life, seeing that by virtue thereof the oneness of man is known as corresponding with the unity and simplicity of Divine truth, so that the exercise of candor, sincerity, and diligent inquiry must surely result in an ever-growing agreement. The temple must be thus regarded as including the whole multitude of unforsaken mankind (John i, 16; 1 Tim. iv, 10); and in this broad view of it as the Church potential, some members of the Church actual may perhaps find enlargement of intelligence and service. “One thing,” sang the man after God’s own heart, “have I desired of the Lord, and that will I seek after; that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life, to behold the beauty of the Lord and to inquire in his temple.”

V. Could the “more sure Word of Prophecy” be justly identified with the mere record of revelation or so-called “written Word of God” on the one hand, or, on the other, with that conscious individual manifestation of the Divine Light with which more spiritual professors may have been tempted or even constrained to confound it, it certainly could not claim much notice as a social influence. But even inspired literature must be subordinate to inspired life. In religion as little as, if not less than, elsewhere, can word-teaching anticipate or supplant object-teaching, or convey anything more than the deceitful show of knowledge. As Christ is formed in the obedient believer, so that he may be said to be even the mother of the Saviour (Matt. xii, 50), he must in all ages be qualified to “bear witness” in some degree as having substantially been with Him “from the beginning” (John xv, 27). Hence there may be as much right reason as capricious perversity in that trait of the natural man, which was so concisely commemorated by Prof. Christlieb, in an address before the New York meeting of the World’s Evangelical Alliance in

1874: "The Christian is the world's Bible, and the only one which it will read." It should be observed, however, that the Apostle's teaching does not imply that the record is in no sense a word of prophecy, but rather the reverse. It only makes it secondary to the ever-growing "light of the present age."<sup>1</sup>

VI. "The Power of the Keys" will thus perhaps be seen to be nothing else than the individual administration of the "more sure Word" in all the provinces of life and thought in proportion to the individual believer's own insight and illumination. "Thou hast given a banner to them that feared Thee, that it may be displayed because of the truth" (Ps. lx, 4). It is that testifying to all realized truth which most effectually, although (because animated by the all-believing charity) more or less indirectly, and so attractively rather than aggressively, confounds and vanquishes all error. It may be called the connecting axis of the two phases of religious or truly working life, under that figure of polarity which has been employed by Bunsen, and without which, or the allied symbol of sex, the abounding ambiguities of that life might be found baffling mysteries rather than serviceable equipments. "History has been fruitful of good only in so far as it has been the result of the harmonious action and reaction of two poles, the life of the individual and [that] of the community. . . . All that is great takes its rise from the individual; but only in proportion as he offers up his individual self to the whole." I would couple with these strong words an echo in rhyme, originally published to illustrate a study of "Polarity in Character," or Sex in Mind.<sup>2</sup>

"Give thanks for insight of the dual force,  
Exposed at last, as marshalling the course  
Of human history!  
Reason Divine, thro' instinct of the soul,  
Grants thought the sureness and the vigor whole  
Exerted socially  
By it o'er all with whom the social bond  
As yet leads not to that control beyond:  
No other mystery  
Competes with that of this interior sex  
Running through all life's coquettings complex.  
On human dignity  
Faith must hang partly till the soul be quite  
Turned by the 'inward' to the 'inner' Light."

["Clew."—1 Cor. ii, 15.]

<sup>1</sup> "It is not the owning of the light as it shone in the foregoing ages which will now commend any man to God, but the knowing and subjecting to the light of the present age."—*Penington*.

<sup>2</sup> "Journal of Speculative Philosophy," vol. xi.

VII. The social phase of religious life, as indeed of any subordinate life which may be weakly imagined to be divorced from the religious, is the permanently, if not the pre-eminently, progressive phase. It involves the education of the race as well as of the individual, reaching potentially to the end of time, and contemplating the full realization or conscious fulfilment in or by man of the Divine purposes in human life and in the outward creation. "Wisdom is the principal thing," said King Solomon, "therefore get wisdom; and, with all thy getting, get understanding." And the "Greater than Solomon," "I have many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now. Howbeit, when He, the Spirit of truth, is come, He shall guide you into all truth." The present responsibility and prospective labor which still open before the earnest inquirer might indeed be appalling were it not for the assurance, which all true life and history and literature to him convey, of continued Divine guidance and enlightenment in all timely research, even in that most difficult of pursuits, the knowledge of self. For even the Science of Thought, or Metaphysics, can no longer be a dreary and comparatively unproductive wilderness, when the Lord Jesus Christ is recognized as being Himself the vitalizing Principle of human intelligence, and as so exerting, through his illuminated vicegerents and their conscious or unconsciously subalterns—Christ-worshippers, or mere hero-worshippers—his prerogative of Mediatorship in God's secret but growing government of the New Jerusalem. There, indeed, and there only, shall all antagonism between the Individual and the Social be superseded, and all men "know even as they are known." Meantime, there may be profit to some in the reflection that, if the intellectual life be superior to the physical, the highest function of "the things which are seen" may be to illustrate "the things which are not seen."

"Grant first, as all must grant at last, that truth  
External is but the symbolic sooth

Of truth interior.

Read, then, in outward life's immense fact,  
Gravely implied, the powers which here distract

Existence at its core.

By that sure lode t'escape distraction's realm  
Aspire, with child-like faith at reason's helm,

Nor look back to the shore

Crowded with siren-semblances of bliss.

Regaining so the life controlling 'this,'

Out of its larger lore,

Furnish to all whom wisdom may not vex

The proof and promise of the law of sex."

[*" Climacteric."*—Jno. xii, 31.]

II. THE COLLATERAL TIES.<sup>1</sup>

"That they without us should not be made perfect."—HEB. xi, 40.

SYNOPSIS.—I. Office of Theology.—II. Obstacles of thought and feeling.—III. Matrimony a province of Theology.—IV. Matrimony, therefore, a field of progressive illumination.—V. Present obscurity.—VI. Elements of the problem, Grace within and Providence without.—VII. Possible precedence of the Fraternal Tie over the Marital.

I. While the scriptural distinction between the Church and the world shall be valid, or at least until the time for its abrogation may be presumed to be at hand, it must evidently be in vain to attempt to popularize religion, in the vital and individually important sense of the term, or to impress the multitude of mankind with a due sense of the importance of church interests. But theology, or the mere science of religion, as a branch of objective knowledge, and a mere branch until the birth of self-knowledge shall rectify the relations of all other knowledge, we may reasonably and rightly hope to popularize. Such popularization is evidently our only rational means of continued moral reformation, either in the world or in any section of the professing Church, by the continued correction of conventional fiction, by the consequent promotion of parental and filial sympathy and communion,<sup>2</sup> and by a progressive interpretation into common language<sup>3</sup> of the pre-eminent privileges of saintly experience.

II. Social errors, both of thought and of feeling, are, of course, more or less immediately the result of individual errors. Every fiction which has become at all habitual with any individual must evidently be so far an unconscious deviation in his views of truth from the reality of things. Every fiction, therefore, which has obtained such currency in any community as to be fitly styled conventional, plainly becomes a defect in the prevailing standard of Divine and universal truth, entailing, in proportion as the principles involved are of fundamentally sacred interest, a practical deviation of social sentiment from the underlying but overruling reality of church doctrine. Without conventional fiction there can indeed be no practically prevailing morbid sentiment.

III. The true doctrine of matrimony is an inseparable part of church reality and of church history. Explicitly and implicitly, literally and metaphorically, it has the fullest sanction of the best life and literature of every age, although definiteness of statement seems to have been largely neglected, pos-

<sup>1</sup> Revised from original issue in the "Lutheran Observer," under title of "Morbid Sentiment," Philadelphia, 1872.

<sup>2</sup> Mal. iv, 6.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Cor. xiv, 13.

sibly on the ground that, to a sensibility and experience capable of apprehending the subject, the extent and nature of its significance would become at once self-evident, and such statement accordingly superfluous. Matrimony, again, being pre-eminently an affair in which the masses of mankind are governed by example rather than precept—by vague social impulse rather than by clear individual reflection—is naturally one of the last subjects upon which there can be room for the free promulgation of perfect precept without violating the spirit of the injunction, "Give not that which is holy unto the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine." Officious precision must ever be either, on the one hand, superfluous and impertinent, or, on the other, inexpedient and injurious.

IV. All imitative life, however, is a species of fiction; and there is a point at which all fiction must be overtaken by reality, all the vagueness of romance by the demonstration of reason, all the poetry of life be confirmed by the prose of life, if the crude life is not to become an unsound life, without first even temporarily maturing into the possibility of usefulness. Upon the subject of matrimony, as upon every other, definiteness of statement must ever be upon the whole increasingly attainable, admissible, and necessary, with whatever tide-like undulations and seeming retracings of progress, until "the earth shall be filled with the knowledge of the glory of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea."

V. The institution of matrimony is certainly, in the present age, in many Christian communities, invested with a halo of romance, which is often both a false lure to those without its pale and a deceitful resource to those within. There is, on the one hand, on the part of those who by the mere *a posteriori* rule of outward experience should be most competent, a widely prevailing incompetency to define it as a means; and, on the other hand, on the part of young and inexperienced minds, a corresponding tendency to overestimate and to pursue it as an end. The one party seems thus often constrained to connive at the temporary self-deception of the other, and to accept at its hands an undeserved and sentimental homage, until the great magic circle is crossed and the inevitably deceived find themselves in the ranks of the alike inevitably deceiving, in their turn to exercise a rule of romance over the fresh candidates for life and immortality, in whose eyes the glittering bubble of worldly position may eclipse the splendors of an eternal inheritance. In the intellectual mist or atmosphere of confusion thus perpetuated, not only is the distinction between the means and the end in matrimony naturally lost sight of, but also the true force of that sacred and Divine significance of which its wide prevalence, even as so imperfectly apprehended, has made it a most convenient and important symbol. The Spirit of Divine love, which is accessible only

through the prayer of faith, and which alone can cast out the slavish power of fleshly lust in all its Protean transformations, can alone save us from the losses and dangers of this palpable darkness. Trusting in that only infallible illumination, I crave the most charitable reception of these observations and reflections from any who may attempt their perusal.

VI. For the development of a sound doctrine of matrimony, some preliminary consideration would seem necessary of the distinction between the dividual and the individual elements in human life, and in the work of the blessed Mediator between God and man.

While mankind individually are saved by the individual work of Christ in his own Person and severally in ours, it is observable that as a race our hope lies in what may be called his social work, or in his present universal and more or less external manifestation, in matter and in mind or thought, as the Power by which or in whom "all things consist." If this be the case, we may not derogate from the office of our Lord as the only Saviour by saying that the hope of mankind as a race lies in the fact that the results of well-doing—what we may call the trophies of a true or unselfish culture—become embodied in individual organization, and are transmissible by inheritance along with meaner or more fundamentally physical characteristics, so long at least as the culture of the individual may be found to comport with the propagation of the race. There is undeniably a sense in which the inner life of the race may be and is enlarged in an extended intelligence of and mastery over its surroundings; and without some due appreciation of this fact we can not truly apprehend nor efficiently argue from the prevailing standard of intelligence in any particular age of the world or section of society. Through unconscious superficiality and servility, while human nature shall remain the, at best, ambiguous thing which it now is, imperfect and perverted conceptions of its own truly accepted standards and ruling influences must be generally current, however the conceptions may upon the whole advance with the reality. Class distinctions so intersect each other, and classes accordingly so overlap each other, that the true precedence of ideas must become more or less lost to all but the most comprehensive and discriminating views; and the confusion is doubtless welcome to the wily adversary of souls, whose commonest and most plausible subterfuge, perhaps, lies in the idolatrous assumption of some one, or more than one, Divine influence in society, which does not begin with the manifestation of God in the individual. But the truth abides that all sound argument as to present realities and future possibilities must begin by an emancipation from merely numerical and material considerations, in



that internal and supernatural realm of experience which is open to all individually only by the door of "faith to themselves before God."

VII. If it be indeed true or conceivable, as has been intimated, that the fraternal tie, as understood and appreciated by the ideal man or the highest type of the individual, satisfies all the social cravings of nature, it follows that even the holy institution of marriage cannot be essential to the ideal standard of any, the principles of nature and the laws of progress being the same in all. The temporary distinction between theory and practice must, of course, be as valid here as elsewhere, making marriage more or less largely a practical necessity, deserving of every Divine and human sanction; but equally obvious seems the inference that with the perfection of the race the marital institution may become obsolete.

While marriage, therefore, is doubtless a holy ordinance—so much so that it becomes a mere question of words whether or not it is to be ranked as a special sacrament or means of grace—we can only overreach ourselves by attaching to it an importance or a dignity which it does not possess in the Divine economy.

The Scriptures, while finding in it a convenient and efficient, because familiar, metaphor of heavenly things, clearly intimate limits to both its duration and its present utility. The terrible vengeance also which King David and his people of old drew upon themselves by glorying in their numerical strength, and the modern fact that one who was perhaps the most influential champion<sup>1</sup> of democracy at the most critical period of American history was a notorious unbeliever in Divine truth, have some illustrative bearing upon this subject, although to our own age, perhaps, more directly significant of the growing danger of political pride and corruption. Everywhere, in Church or in State, in general society, or in the domestic circle, demoralization and unhappiness must follow the mistaking of means for ends; and nowhere, perhaps, is the mischief of morbid sentiment more insidious and far-reaching than in the exaltation, so natural to the feminine or conventional<sup>2</sup> mind, of the marital over the fraternal tie. It is certainly, at least as yet, an open question whether the marital, even in its happiest exemplification, may not, as but initiatory, occasional, and disciplinary, be regarded as being but a ready means; and the fraternal, in its full significance, as being consummatory, universal, and permanent, and therefore the worthy end of that means. "Holy Writ," while ever adapted, in the first place, to the sensibility and capacity of those to whom it may have been originally addressed, is not wanting in diverse intimations and indications of such a precedence.

<sup>1</sup> Thomas Paine.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Cor. xi, 3.



Much has been revealed to mankind since the declaration, "Secret things belong unto the Lord." As the culmination of the world's history approaches, let us not relax our diligence in inquiring the remaining mind of the Spirit,<sup>1</sup> if it be only by way of ensuring the due development of the truth already received.

If in the course of this development it shall appear that all vindictive, commercial, and matrimonial metaphors respecting the conduct of the spiritual life have alike been adopted by the gracious and ever-practical Holy Spirit of the omniscient God, in pure condescension to the inveterate entanglement and imprisonment of our race in fallen ways, and in groveling views of the Divine nature and of human duty, and that the one lesson which underlies and pervades the seemingly heterogeneous doctrines of the Gospel is simply the duty and glory of union and communion with God and one another in combating error and in "bearing witness unto the truth,"<sup>2</sup> surely nothing but a retrospective morbid sentiment which has not escaped the "beggarly elements" can shrink from joyfully accepting that crowning and peaceful result.

"Lift, lift thy glance, O mortal! troubled, sad,  
And lose thy griefs and fears in thoughts of Heaven!  
There wait thee solid joys. What most thy heart  
Hath yearned to find, yet ever sought in vain  
Through perished hopes and crosses ever new—  
Sweet rest, with full content thou there shalt know.  
Thy cup of blessing filled, thou shalt behold  
Divinest splendors, all things bright and fair;  
With which compared, earth's purest loveliness  
Remembered shall all unsubstantial seem,  
A shadow and a type."—["Home," by Dr. Ray Palmer.]

RICHARD RANDOLPH.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.

### IN LEBENSFLUTHEN.

#### I.

##### *Les Bords du Rhin.*

Gayly prance the haughty steeds,  
Gayly flaunt the banners all,  
Before them the blue Rhine speeds,  
All the trumpets loudly call.

Each knight thinks on his lady,  
Each squire of his dame so true:  
Drooped the banners silently,  
Tenderly the bugles blew.

<sup>1</sup> John xvi, 13.

<sup>2</sup> John xviii, 37.

## II.

*Pre-Existence.*

Dear child, and would you kiss me ?  
 You are not mine, I know you not ;  
 Yet your sweet eyes seem to ask me,  
 "Hast thou so soon forgot?"

Yes, I and thou are of one race ;  
 I did not think to meet thee here,  
 So long have fatal time and place  
 Sundered, yet drawn us near !  
 There,—no more shall I mistake thy face,  
 Whatever form thy spirit wear.

## III.

*The Omen.*

I dreamed last night  
 A happy dream ;  
 To-day my heart is light,  
 My heart is light ;  
 No more shall come the night,  
 Fair morrows on me gleam.  
 I took her hand in mine,  
 She kissed me twice and thrice,  
 Twice and thrice,  
 And would not let me go.  
 Happy was I in my sleep ;  
 Oh, dark and weary days !  
 Quenched be your feeble light,  
 And let me slumber deep,  
 Till I shall feel the glow  
 Of those warm kisses through the night,  
 Till she has kissed me twice and thrice,  
 Twice and thrice,  
 And will not let me go.

## IV.

*The Wreck.*

Bright were the skies  
 And calm my heart ;  
 I saw the Happy Isles arise  
 There where the stars depart.  
 I sailed straight on ;  
 I thought I neared the strand  
 Where all my toil would soon be done ;  
 Rocks, rocks on every hand,  
 Nowhere see I any land,  
 But a Siren beckons among the rocks and sand.

## MR. EDWIN WALLACE.

[Our readers have seen with deep regret the announcement of the death of Mr. Edwin Wallace, the brother of Professor William Wallace, of Balliol College, Oxford. His translation of Aristotle's great work on the Soul ("De Anima"), which exercised a profounder influence on European thought during the Middle Ages than any other book, has made him the benefactor of all students of philosophy. His translation is a marvel of philosophic accuracy and scholarship. We reprint the following obituary notice from the "Oxford Magazine" for October 15, 1884.—Ed.]

The early death of Mr. Edwin Wallace, of Worcester, which took place on Monday, October 6th [1884], at Davos Platz, will be felt as a personal loss by many attached friends in and out of Oxford. Those of us who, only a fortnight ago, saw him before he left home to spend another winter at Davos Platz, were fain to think, as he did himself, that there was an improvement in his health, and to entertain good hopes of his recovery. But this was not to be.

By Mr. Wallace's death, not only have many of us in and out of Oxford lost a friend valued for the singular sincerity of his character, but the life has closed of one who, as student, thinker, and teacher, had already accomplished much and gave promise of accomplishing more.

As a student Mr. Wallace was, from his Undergraduate days at Balliol and Lincoln upwards, indefatigable. His philosophical reading, both in ancient and in modern authors, was most extensive. Few, if any, men, at least of his own standing in Oxford, can have read so extensively in philosophy. Some of the results of this reading were from time to time given to the world in the form of notices and reviews, marked by great insight into the spirit and value of the works reviewed—full of sympathetic appreciation even where the conclusions were not such as the reviewer could accept. Mr. Wallace's chief work, however, as a student was the study of Aristotle. The first published result of this study was a little work, "Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle" (1875), originally intended for the use of the author's own pupils. To meet the demand of a wider circle of readers a second and enlarged edition was published in 1880, and in 1883 the Cambridge University Press published a third and still more enlarged edition, which has taken, and is likely to hold, its position as a standard text-book. Mr. Wallace's edition of the "De Anima," which appeared at Cambridge in 1882, is the work with which his name as a student of Aristotle will, however, be chiefly identified. The "De Anima" is distinguished even among the harder Aristotelian writings for its perplexities, textual and other; and in editing it Mr. Wallace could not fail to arrive at some conclusions on difficult points, which other students, rightly or wrongly, thought mistaken. This was inevitable, and only proves the truth of the saying *χαλεπὰ τὰ καλὰ*: for, after all deductions have been made on the score of minute points, the fact remains that this edition, as a whole, is a very considerable work, being, as it is, the first English edition of the "De Anima," which it interprets, not only with learning and acuteness in the special notes, but with remarkable philosophic ability in the general introduction.

As a thinker, Mr. Wallace was distinguished by a constitutional earnestness of mind

which caused him to look at all philosophical matters, even those commonly deemed minor, *sub specie aeternitatis*, as it were. For this reason, too, there was a reverence in his manner when he talked on philosophical subjects. Herein lay the great secret of his philosophical influence. His pupils and others could not help feeling that philosophy is something supremely real and important. To this influence, which so few possess, he added other qualities of a teacher, not very often found in conjunction with it—or even in conjunction with each other—learning and the power of lucid exposition. Oxford, where personal influences count for so much, has lost one of her most considerable forces in Edwin Wallace. But those of us who, either as contemporaries or as pupils, have had the privilege of his friendship, will be unwilling to think that his personal influence has ended with his life. He leaves behind him in Oxford the example of a life devoted, with complete singleness of mind and heart, to the highest objects.

### I. EDITH.

Edith, the silent stars are coldly gleaming,  
The night-wind moans, the leafless trees are still.  
Edith, there is a life beyond this seeming,  
So sleeps the ice-clad lake beneath thy hill.

So silent beats the pulse of thy pure heart,  
So shines the thought of thy unquestioned eyes,  
O life! why wert thou helpless in thy art?  
O loveliness! why seem'st thou but surprise?

Edith, the streamlets laugh to leap again;  
There is a spring to which life's pulses fly;  
And hopes that are not all the sport of pain,  
Like lustres in the veil of that gray eye.

They say the thankless stars have answering vision,  
That courage sings from out the frost-bound ways;  
Edith, I grant that olden time's decision  
Thy beauty paints with gold the icy rays!

As in the summer's heat her promise lies,  
As in the autumn's seed his vintage hides,  
Thus might I shape my moral from those eyes,  
Glass of thy soul, where innocence abides.

Edith, thy nature breathes of answered praying,  
If thou dost live, then not my grief is vain;  
Beyond the nerves of woe, beyond delaying,  
Thy sweetness stills to rest the winter's pain.

### II. A DREAM—TO EDITH.

I dreamed the summer-wind blew cold,  
I dreamed that youth and age are vain,  
That I was young who now am old,  
When spring nor hope may bloom again.

I felt that death had drawn more near,  
 My youthful hopes all passed away ;  
 No heart to press to mine—now dead—  
 The fields were sere, the skies were gray.

In nature's lessons some are blest ;  
 From time stern duties might we learn ;  
 If old myself, there's joy imprest  
 On fresher hearts, to pulse and burn.

A few sad years and I shall be  
 Where all I love has sunk to sleep ;  
 In Nature's arms—fit company  
 For careless wons—buried deep.

*If those we trust desert their trust,  
 If those we love despise and wound ;—  
 To-morrow,—we are fleeting dust,  
 Swept,—like the dry leaves, from the ground !*

When death this palsied heart descries,  
 That sends this trembling scroll to thee,  
 Child, in whose hope and trust there lies,  
 Superior faith and purity ;

If, then, upon fate's coldest hour  
 Thy thought might warm my fading breath,  
 Life might not seem this hopeless dower,  
 But I could smile and bless my death.

W. E. CHANNING.

CONCORD, MASS.

#### SCHELLING ON ENGLAND.

There is referred to in the "Life of Schelling" (pp. 16-18) a remarkable little Latin poem on this subject. Schelling lived to an advanced age (he was nearly eighty when he died) ; nevertheless, he is a particularly well-marked example of conspicuous precocity in youth. And we do not refer in that regard to the early age at which he was now a university-prodigy, and again even an accepted philosophical authority with the public, but to his wonderful performances while but as yet a school-boy. He wrote admirable Greek and Latin when he was no more than ten years of age. The poem in question, in fact, is found among the class-exercises that belong to his twelfth year (1787). Written in elegiac verse, it is addressed "To England"—"ad Angliam"—and consists of some one hundred and sixty-two lines. It is described (with specimens) by his biographer pretty well as follows :

The poem begins its great theme with the fervid language of enthusi-

asm, and Liberty is invoked as the tutelar divinity of England. Reference to her great men follows. Shakespeare, Milton, Thomson, Hume, Cook are specially mentioned, and among them Franklin is included, as though he, too, were an Englishman, and very naturally. Franklin, of course, gives law to the thunderbolt, and brings fire itself to rule; while as for Cook,

Coccius immensum ter circum navigat orbem  
Et terras quaerit nave fugace novas.

Cook sails three times round the unmeasured globe,  
Discovering everywhere strange countries new.

And here the last line especially must be accounted, technically, a good one.

The greatness of England having thus, in a general manner, been exalted, the poem turns back to the birth of the island itself, and describes how, in mighty throes of nature, it was torn from the bosom of the continent. Thereupon, we are to understand, all the gods assembled, like so many godfathers and godmothers over a new-born child, each with appropriate gifts and promises or prophecies of some future excellence.

Neptune, as is but right, comes first and confers on the new island the empire of the sea. Jupiter himself follows next, to ratify the dower and pronounce England future Queen of the World. Mars then also adds his assurance of England's bravery and greatness. Apollo succeeds and promises his support, with special reference to the poets. And, lastly, it is the god Mercury descends to endow England with the world's commerce:

Mercatura tuis florebit me duce quondam;  
Tolle oculos! vobis pontus ubique patet.  
Nunquam non alio terras sub sole calentes  
Nave petas, fausto tramite cursus eat,  
Excedet portu portumque redibit onesta  
Argento navis divitiisque tibi, etc.

Commerce shall one day flourish for thy sons,  
Me guiding. Lo! to them ocean opes wide.  
And never shall they disembark on lands,  
Or lord o'er seas, that warm not to the suns  
Of other climes. Laden for thee with gold,  
The ship shall harbor leave, and harbor seek, etc.

When the gods have exhausted themselves in gifts and blessings, the goddesses, too, must have their turn of benefaction, with Juno to begin:

Sublimes vobis animos mentemque, Britanni,  
Reddam, ait, excelsam consimilemque meae,  
Nobilis ut vobis in corde superbia regnet,  
Et vera mentes ambitione regam.

Sublime I'll make your minds, Britons, she says,  
And give you souls high, haughty, like my own :  
So noble pride shall reign within, and fill  
Your manly hearts with true ambition's fire.

That is a strong testimony ; but even earlier in the piece the poet had expressed his sense of the proud and imperturbable spirit of the English in verses not unworthy of a poet at first hand :

Sublimis mens est Anglis, et conscia magnae  
Virtutis celso pectora corde ferunt.  
Sic quoque Massyliis subito deprensus in arvis  
Stat leo virtutis conscius ipse suae ;  
Undique se fundunt circum, genus acre, Molossi,  
Coelum latratu persona turba ferit.  
Ille manet rictumque fremens ostendit et unguis,  
Excussisque horrent aspera colla jugis.

Sublime the minds of Englishmen, who bear  
Still in their great breasts consciousness of worth :  
So stands the lion on Massylian plains,  
Whom, proud in himself, the fierce crew of dogs  
Molossian, sudden sweep round, with bark  
Vexing high heaven that echoes to the din.  
He fronts them firm ; growling, shows teeth, shows jaw,  
With bristling horror of his upraised mane.

Pallas follows Juno with the gifts of art and science. Pallas is succeeded by the goddess of love, to whom it belongs to promise England fair women for her brave men :

Magni vos estis—quoque foemina magna sit Angli,  
Ac eat in vestros pulcra puella sinus.

You are great, ye English ; be therefore great  
And beautiful the maiden in your breast.

Ceres comes last :

Tandem laeta Ceres spicis redimita capillos  
Tales purpureo mittit ab ore sonos.

At last glad Ceres came, with wheat-ears crowned,  
And smiled from roseate lips the self-same praise.

She promises England that her fields shall be fruitful and blest forever. So now the great close :

Sic Divi.—Exultans ter promit gaudia felix  
Insula, ter tumido se movet ipsa mari;  
Consonat omne fretum, vocem gratantia volvunt  
Litora, ter reboant saxa petraeque maris.

Thus they.—The happy island thrice sends forth  
Her joy; thrice leaps within the swelling sea;  
Each strait resounds; the shores shout gratitude,  
While rock and cliff thrice echo every note.

Even so much Latin praise of blushing England seems not to have been enough for the boy-poet of the Fatherland; he must needs follow it up by ever so many hexameters in Greek, too, to a like effect.

Perhaps one's fellow-countrymen—and certainly the countrymen of Emerson are one's fellow-countrymen—will find it at least curious that there should have been, just about a century ago, such a high ideal of English greatness existing anywhere in the minds of Germans; for the war in the Peninsula was not yet, nor Trafalgar, nor Waterloo. There is a little poem of Pfeffel's, too, which would seem to testify to the entertainment of a like ideal by another German, and Pfeffel was born some forty years before Schelling. The poem in reference is entitled "The Doctor and the Patient." The latter talks, naturally, of his sufferings; but he is answered only on the part of the physician with the politics of the day:

"Well! how's the health to-day?" "Ill, my dear doctor, ill;  
I feel so feeble that I scarce can move."  
"You'll see that Spain will win the glove,  
If England give her help." "My sleep, too, is not well."  
"Now, there again, England holds Portugal?" etc.

So Pfeffel, it would seem, must have nourished some such ideal of England as Schelling did after him. It is sufficiently curious, for even Shakespeare gives no grander ideal of England in his famous address:

This sceptred isle,  
This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars,  
This other Eden, demi-paradise;



This happy breed of men, this little world,  
 This precious stone set in the silver sea;  
 This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England.

One wonders what the great Julius would say to all that, could he but see it. What surprise were his did he but step ashore on Kent again, or sail through the *Pool*, or board our great ironclads, or take train from Dover to London, or send a message by telegraph from Paris to Rome, or converse by telephone! Would his entire generation of Latins, were it alive now, overloaded by our civilization, only sink beneath it, and fade before us, even as the Red Indians do?

Another notice of England on the part of Schelling occurs at page 277, vol. i, 2te Abth., of his collected works. As regards adoption of the principle of experience, he says thus: "England took the lead, France followed. We have seen since then, however, that, in the country of Descartes, a party consisting of bolder spirits demands again a metaphysics, though with proviso of the initiative in experience. Whether this time England will follow remains to be seen. To all calls in this direction, as yet, and such calls have not been wanting—I may remind of Coleridge, for example—the answer has been: 'I am rich and increased with goods, and have need of nothing.' The trade of the globe, the enormous development of the industrial arts, the never-stopping, though so far regular, action of its political life, in conjunction with an obscure, barbarous jurisprudence and a stationary Church, take in, on one side, so many interests, and, on another side, give so much fixedness to the various relations, that people there can find no inclination to subject themselves to the casualties which are unavoidably associated with the prosecution of the higher sciences, and contentedly bear the want of what the Germans, since so long a time, so highly esteem."

Faithful *Anglo-Israel*—that nowadays, of the two sons of Joseph so remarkably blessed by Jacob, considers Ephraim to refer to England and Manasseh to refer to America—will be rather interested, we should think, in these expressions (especially the former ones) of Schelling's!

J. HUTCHISON STIRLING.

#### LOVE.

Unconquerable and inviolate  
 Is Love: servant and sovereign of man's wit,  
 Though the light-winged Fancy changeful flit,  
 She rules unswervingly her fair estate,  
 O'erbears mischance and error, envy and hate,  
 High intellect, ambition, passion, pride;

Endowments that capricious fortune brings,  
 By her disfranchisements are set aside,  
 The mistress she alike of slaves and kings,  
 Empress of Earth's dominions, far and wide,  
 Eldest of Potentates, and latest born,  
 Of all in Heaven above, or Earth below!  
 No being so illustrious or forlorn,  
 That to Love's sceptre doth not gladly bow.

January, 1880.

A. BRONSON ALCOTT.

SENTENCES IN PROSE AND VERSE.

SELECTION BY W. E. CHANNING.

A man does not value the Creator so much here; he thinks of the created. Here falls the crown of humanity upon his head in its circle of beauty, suffering, and uncertainty. The speechless air, the deaf earth, the blindness of substance—what do they but render us back vagueness for vagueness? Why was Christ tempted on a mount? Not because he could see therefrom the kingdoms of the earth.—*Elizabeth Stoddard.*

In civilized epochs men write histories; in barbarous ages they act them.—*Michelet.*

With what thoughts in his own lofty, opaque mind; like a crowned mule, of such pace and carriage, who had unexpectedly stepped on galvanic wires.—*Carlyle.*

Darkness is the dead Earth's Shadow.—*Ibid.*

O for the spirit of that matchless man,  
 Whom nature led throughout her whole domain,  
 While he embodied breath'd ethereal air.—*Landor.*

His unshorn hair, grown soft in these abodes,  
 Waved back, and scattered thin and hoary light.—*Ibid.*

Whose hills  
 Touch the last cloud upon the level sky.—*Ibid.*

Fallen, unpitied, unbelieved, unloved,  
 I should have died long earlier.—*Ibid.*

Surely no air is stirring; every step  
 Tires me; the columns shake, the ceiling fleets,  
 The floor beneath me slopes, the altar rises.—*Ibid.*

What almanac can calculate fine weather  
 In those strange fickle regions where God plants  
 A man and woman, and sticks love between.—*Ibid*

What we love  
Is loveliest in departure.—*Ibid.*

The least syllable too long, or too slightly dwelt upon in a period, depreciates it to nothing, which very syllable, if rightly touched, shall, like the heightening stroke of light from a master's pencil, give life and spirit to the whole.—*Colley Cibber.*

The twentieth part of a tone lower or higher, and it sounds false. The actor had listened long for it, before he says, "Zaire, you weep," and it is because he listens when he seems agitated, and because his sole talent consists, not in feeling as you think, but to counterfeit thus scrupulously the external signs of feeling, that you are therein deceived.—*Diderot.*

I was the person himself, not the actor playing the part, as natural as if I had been acting alone. *L'optique du théâtre* is based on other laws.—*Molé.*

Acting should be absolutely art; all in it needs to be foreseen and calculated; the sudden seeming movement, the pang so involuntary, tone and gesture and look deemed all inspiration, have been rehearsed hundreds of times. Emotion spoils the effect, the voice hesitates, memory fails, gesture is false, and the end lost sight of.—*Talma.*

The stiffen-bodied gown would not add charms, I believe, to a beautiful woman, no more than Voltaire's laboured turns of expression add to his stile.—*Lady Luxboro* [1748].

Permit me to interrupt what I am saying with a curse against crow-pens. How much more friendly are the geese!—*Ibid.*

Pope would have died many years ago had he been obliged to refrain from satire, the sole delight of his peevish little temper.—*Ibid.*

A woman may be privileged to swerve from such rules as she may be supposed not to understand.—*Ibid.*

The great Handel has told me that the hints of his very best songs have several of them been owing to the sounds in his ears of cries in the streets.—*Ibid.*

Those persons who cannot find pleasure in trifles are generally wise in their own opinions, and fools in the opinions of the wise.—*Ibid.*

When my brother Bolingbroke built Dawley, which he chose to call a Farm, he had his hall painted in stone-colors with all the implements of husbandry, placed in the manner one sees or might see arms and trophies in some general's hall.—*Ibid.*

At last I am in the fashion, and have got a Pantin (jumping-Jaek). There is a party of ladies and gentlemen at Vauxhall. The ladies crow

like cocks, and if any of the gentlemen of the party are within hearing, they answer them by braying like an ass.—*Ibid.*

I cannot tell who wrote the verses in a Country Church-yard, but I like them well, and think all the first part of the Elegy very beautiful. I cannot see why it did not end at the most beautiful line in it.—*Ibid.*

"He was a worthy man and an open enemy" [the King on Sir Walkin's death].—*Ibid.*

Contrary to custom, I was not alone, having Mr. and Mrs. Holyoak eating a barrel of oysters with me; after which we supped.—*Ibid.*

My wife's name was Ensor, whose grandmother was a Shakespeare, descended from the brother of *everybody's* Shakespeare.—*Dyer* [the poet].

'Tis the general maxim of all our colleges to choose a man of management for their head rather than a man of letters.—*Legris* [in France].

The effect of distant waves breaking heavily was such as you could imagine the sound of a giant might be who, coming back from travel unto some smooth and level and still and solitary place with all his armor and all his spoils about him, casts himself slumberously down to rest.—*Landor.*

Par l'éclat d'une fardeau trop pesant à porter (Boileau). I never heard until now that a *fardeau* could have an éclat.—*Ibid.*

Those whose hearts possess the rarest and divinest faculty of retaining or forgetting at option what ought to be forgotten or retained.—*Ibid.*

It seems a part of the rock, it has such deep crevices and chinks in it, and so much gray moss, hard as itself, about it. With all its twistings and writhings it can not keep its ragged coat right around it; but one patch gapes here, another there, and much has fallen in tatters at its feet. Wonderful, then, it should have the prettiest leaves and branches in the world, with a motion as graceful as a peacock's.—*Ibid* [a birch-tree].

I always feel a kind of average between myself and any other person I am talking with—between us two I mean.—*Lady Ashburton.*

I have seen

A pine in Italy that casts its shadow  
Athwart a cataract; firm stood the pine,  
The cataract shook the shadow.—*Tennyson.*

O Saint of Aragon! with that sweet worn smile  
Among thy patient wrinkles.—*Ibid.*

There runs a shallow brook across our field  
 For twenty miles, where the black crow flies five,  
 And doth so bound and babble all the way  
 As if itself were happy.—*Ibid.*

Our altar is a mound of dead men's clay,  
 Dug from the grave that yawns for us beyond.—*Ibid.*

The serpent that hath slough'd will slough again.—*Ibid.*

They are not sweet,

The violence and the craft that do divide

The world of nature; what is weak must lie.—*Ibid.*

Thine is a half-voice and a lean assent.—*Ibid.*

I am nearly through Xenophon [a picture], but with not a shilling for the winter, and my children literally in want of stockings for the cold.—*Haydon.*

Completed Adam and Eve. Now for Satan on Monday, with only 1s. 6d. in my pocket, huzza!—*Ibid.*

To read Milton, Tasso, and Shakespeare in grassy nooks by the rippling sea, to unbind her hair and watch her fastening it with her ivory arms bent back over her head.—*Ibid.*

I saw it was only necessary for the Duke's system to come in contact with Napoleon's to split it.—*Ibid.*

Old Bone, the enamel painter, who has got a nervous twitch and a croaking voice, as if he was always watching a bit of ivory in a furnace for fear it should crack.—*Ibid.*

I was so long without speaking to a human creature that my gums became painfully sore from the clenched tightness of my teeth.—*Ibid.*

A star is always shining in my brain, which has always led me on, and ever will.—*Ibid.*

I read seventeen hours a day on *Clarissa Harlowe*, and held the book so long up, leaning on my elbows as an arm-chair, that I stopped the circulation and could not move.—*Ibid.*

I wrote a pamphlet directly which everybody praised and nobody bought.—*Ibid.*

A man who has a fixed purpose to which he devotes his power is invulnerable. Like the rock in the sea, it splits the troubles of life as they eddy around him in idle foam.—*Ibid.*

What is known comes not by its own power, but from the power of him who knows.—*Boethius.*

Here lies Sylvius, who never gave anything *gratis*; he is dead, yet will he weep that any one can read this *gratis*.—*Buchanan*.

Small matters amuse most in the country.—*Colley Cibber*.

I have sent you by *Vacandary* the Post, the French Bever, and Tweesers you writ for; Bever-hats have grown dearer of late, because the Jesuits have got the Monopoly of them from the King.—*Howell*.

My Lord Chancellor *Bacon* is lately dead of a long languishing weakness; he died so poor that he scarcely left money to bury him, which, tho' he had a great Wit, did argue no great Wisdom, it being one of the essential Properties of a wise Man to provide for the main chance.—*Ibid*.

I love not those *viscosa beneficia*, those bird-lim'd Kindnesses which Pliny speaks of; nor would I receive Money in a dirty Clout if possibly I could be without it.—*Ibid*.

I find it true now that one of the greatest tortures that can be in the negotiation of the World is to have to do with perverse, irrational, half-witted men, and to be worded to death by nonsense.—*Ibid*.

'Twas a brave, generous saying of a great Armenian Merchant, who, having understood how a Vessel of his was cast away wherein there was laden a rich Cargason on his sole Account, struck his hand on his breast and said, "My Heart, I thank God, is still afloat; my Spirits shall not sink with the Ship, nor go an Inch lower."—*Ibid*.

An actor's standing among the Romans was infamous, but honorable with the Greeks. How is it now? We think of them like Romans, and live with them like Greeks.—*La Bruyère*.<sup>1</sup>

It needs little depth of mind to form polite manners, but much to acquire right perceptions.—*Ibid*.

The rule of Descartes, that no one should try to answer the least question before clearly understanding what it is, may be wisely used in our judgment of persons.—*Ibid*.

Some men possess a degree of mental mediocrity which serves to make them appear wise.—*Ibid*.

One sign of mediocrity is to be always telling anecdotes.—*Ibid*.

Between good sense and good taste there is the same difference as between cause and effect.—*Ibid*.

We approve of others chiefly from the likeness they possess to ourselves, and if we wish greatly to esteem a person we need only to consider him our equal.—*Ibid*.

<sup>1</sup> Translation by W. E. C.

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IMMORTALITY?

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The question of man's immortality is answered by his nature. His nature is his destiny. The rock crumbles because it is dust, water evaporates because it is vapor. Wherein does man differ from rock and water and other perishing things that he should be imperishable?

The things that perish we call phenomena. They are, as their name indicates, mere appearances, dissolving views. Their being is a ceasing. They are and are not in the same moment. As you see it, the Norway spruce seems in repose, but its repose is really the sleep of a spinning top. It is a multiplying of cells, a running of sap, a spinning of fibriles, a sprouting and spreading of branches—all quiver and whirl from root to leaf; so Nature throbs throughout, an immense Ygdrasil whose leaves are worlds. The most immovable rocks are in molecular motion; the air is a perpetual vagrant; animal organisms are but shifting eddies of forces that pass in and out; the light on the landscape now was never there before, and is gone in a twinkling; the old earth is new every day.

<sup>1</sup> Read at the Concord School of Philosophy, July 31, 1884.

In this universal flow of things each has a bound where it ceases to be itself and becomes something else. The bound makes it what it is, and it continues to be itself only throughout such changes as take place within this bound. For in Nature naught stands alone. Everything exists in and by other things. The Norway spruce, in its quiver and whirl, is a transitory form of mingled earth, air, and sunshine, and when they part company the spruce is no more. But earth, air, and sunshine are also transitory forms—earth, perhaps, a curdled atmosphere, the atmosphere a fine mist from the sun, and the whole triad one and the same gas which burns yonder, crystallizes here, fluctuates between, and proves everywhere equally elusive. Now, this removal of limits, this “othering” of things, we call death. If, then, everything exists in another, and there be thus only dependent things, Nature is always dead. It has no true life, no life that abides throughout endless change. Stretch the chain of dependence back as far as you please, and you get no nearer true eternal life than you were at the start. In the gas of worlds the question is just as pertinent as it was under the spruce: what and whence is it? And if it be answered that the gas is a cloud of atoms, the question again arises: By what properties did the atoms make a cloud, and whence procured they space and time to make it in? If there had been an endless series of causes, each cause was an effect which merely transmitted a force not its own, and the entire series, therefore, one of effects without a cause—effects which were not effects. Thus death itself, unsupported by life that never dies, is swallowed up in contradiction. Life there must be, eternal life; otherwise there were no death, nothing to die. Where shall this life be found? Not in any chain of causes and effects where physical science searches—a chain which, though it lengthen forever, hangs on ultimate contradiction, but rather in such a form as may contain all changes, so that they shall be changes within it—a form that is its own substance, self-bounded, self-determined, whole, like the ocean which, while its waves lapse into each other, remains in each and all of its waves the same ocean still.

Evidently such a whole of self-relation and self-activity cannot die. It cannot die into nothing, since the sum of being can neither increase nor diminish. Substance remains always the same; force forever persists; the whole cannot become less than the



whole. Neither can this whole die by losing its total form in other forms than its own. No special form it may take can alter its form of wholeness. To think otherwise is to think that there is somewhat else than the All which the All may become. But this else than the All would reduce the Allness to a part which it would limit as another part. The true All must be the All of possible changes as well as of changing things and relations. For mere change cannot be the All. If change be All and the All changes, then change itself must change, and the changing of change would be permanence. Indeed, only the permanent can change. What ceases does not change. It was and is not; in so far as it is not it has no predicates; there is no *it* to talk about. It must *exist* in order to change. Change is change of existence which only by continuance from its past phase into the phase that now is, and the phase that is to come, renders them in any sense *its* successive phases. Thus the very change which is the cessation of the phases presupposes a permanence under and through all phases. Nature's finite forms cease, Nature's total form abides. As death is the law of external relation, so the law of self-relation is life everlasting.

If man, then, lives forever, it is because he is inherently self-relating—having as the form of his personality that wholeness which includes all possible changes, and hence may never change away from itself. Make him a mere phase or phenomenon and he must perish. His substance being outside of himself, he must vanish thither to realize it. The action of the All upon him will necessarily dissipate him. Lacking the form of the All, he can only become the All by losing his partial form, and losing it again and again so long as it remains partial. Immortality will never come to him from without. Only the All-form can hold unchanged the all of changes. *Conditional* immortality, immortality as a gift or reward, immortality by some sort of ethical or religious selection which man may or may not make, are contradictions in terms. They define man as a thing in order that he may have the destiny of that whole which denies to things permanent or substantial being. They give this human thing a freedom of choice which implies the very wholeness of self-determination that is essentially nuding. They violate the divine immortal principle in man by rendering its deepest and most demonstrative ne-

cessities contingent and conjectural. For reason, which is this divine immortal principle, deals only with the necessities of thought, and, when thought's necessities are loosened into contingent and conjectural play, reason abandons them to caprice, none the less caprice because compassionate, none the less a humor because good humor.

Immortality, then, is not a boon man has to acquire, but man's inherent, indefeasible, essential existence. He is immortal because he is not a thing, but man. He is immortal because his substance is his own and not the property that outside powers possess within him. He is immortal because the relations that constitute his being are the relations of his own thought which he can best realize by thinking them for himself, and which his thinking of them will make more and more his own, so that he must think on forever in order to be all that his thought may become, and thereby fulfil his destiny.

Has not Thought the All-form? Can it ever become other than thought? Can it think any other than the other which it thinks, and, by thinking, includes within Thought's totality? Are not all its changes changes of its own persistent activity which is never so active, and hence never so much itself, as when thinking them? How, then, shall Thought ever think itself dead or on the way to die? In every such conception it stands strong-limbed and open-eyed by its sick-bed, and dresses its own dead body for burial. And when physical science speaks of the indestructibility of substance and persistence of force, it means nothing else than thought's inability to think its own diminution or decease. No indestructibility or persistence can be conceived which is not the indestructibility and persistence of conception. If you try to imagine that force or substance may have existence outside and independent of your thought, you will discover upon reflection that this existence which you think them to have is but the existence of your thinking, and therefore itself but thought.

It is impossible to escape this totality of Mind. All distinctions are its distinctions, and remain within the mind that makes them. Fancy and fact, real and ideal, outside and inside, force and freedom, nature and spirit, relative and absolute, belong equally to the intelligence that thinks one side as well as the other and gives to both alike their validity. Thought is the test and measure of

all truth. The untrue is simply the unthinkable. Thought is All and the only All. And, since thought is All, in thinking All it thinks itself. Its All-form, accordingly, is self-thinking or self-consciousness. Self-consciousness, therefore, wherever it exists, must abide forever. It cannot deny its immortality. It has always to affirm its existence in order to deny it. It must say I in order to say I am not. The more this I declares its uncertainty of self, the more it vouches its certainty of a self that is uncertain. The chemist says, *I* know elements; the botanist, *I* know plants; the zoölogist, *I* know animals; the sociologist, *I* know society. And thus all their sciences are the science of one and the same "*I*," expressing its universal activity as their method and law. Everything perceived rises to its feet by command of perception to own this "*I*" as its creator and lord. If you look into a microscope you will say, "*I*" see what is seen there. If you gaze at far-away worlds you will still testify, "*I*" behold their distance and their immensity.

The universe exists but to echo and proclaim the same sovereign name, for the universe as known is the universe of knowledge, and all knowledge is the knowledge of an ego that knows. "*I, I, I*," you hear it everywhere, from everything. Back in the fog of formless worlds there is an "*I*" to know their formlessness. Forward, when worlds shall be dried up and desolate and solitary as moons, there will stand an "*I*" that knows their desolation and solitude. All ignorance knows an "*I*" that is ignorant; all agnosticism an "*I*" that is agnostic. The supreme inevitable, autoeratic fact from everlasting to everlasting is the fact of a self-conscious Ego.

Whose ego? Not yours and mine? Yes, yours and mine. Whatever belongs to any ego belongs to all egos. Indeed, there is but one in all. *I* means every *I*. It is the universal man in all particular men, the universal mind in all particular minds. Men and minds may differ in accidents of temperament, impression, habit, mood, but essentially they are the same. The truth of one must be the truth of all; the good of one, the good of all; otherwise one mind's truth would be another's error, and one man's good another's evil. But, when truth is error and error truth, there remains neither truth nor error; and, when good is evil and evil good, good and evil have vanished together.

Now, this one Reason in all reasons, which alone makes any goodness or truth possible, is that which in them all calls itself by the same name, "I." And in so far as any man is an *I* or ego he is absolute or God. If his objectivity were equal to this divine subject of his selfhood, he would be absolutely God. But his selfhood is out of balance. It has two contradictory sides. As subject he is one with God, as object he is one with Nature; as subject he is essential, as object he is phenomenal; as subject he is permanent, as object he is under the law of time and change. This contradiction is manifest throughout his consciousness. He thinks God, and can think no God who is not his thought; and yet, at the same time, he thinks himself as brought into being by the God who is his thought. He knows the universe as existing only for knowledge, but knows as well that the universe existed ages and ages before his individual knowledge had found out so much as the use of an India-rubber rattle. He is perfectly aware of his unity with all men as expressed in language significant of universal thoughts, and in social laws provident for universal needs, and in ethics whose mutual exactions come from universal ideals; nevertheless, he has a sense of separation and privacy unshared by any other individual. Conscious of permanent identity as the condition of all his knowledge, relating as it does successive sensations into ideas and ideas into experience, he, notwithstanding, laughs or weeps over his life as a creature of birth and death, filled with freaks that seem breathed into it by the wind that blows now from the south and now from the east, turning by the slightest veer pleasure into pain or pain into pleasure. Take away the permanent, the unitive, the divine, and you have an animal. Cut off the freaks and privacies and sensations, and you have God. Both must be present to constitute man. Man thus is God manifest in the flesh—God the permanent, unitive, eternally knowing subject come by his own self-begetting thought into this objectivity of sense, privacy, and accident, and by such relation constituting another self which can only be a self by being not subject merely, nor merely object, but subject *and* object in a unity of consciousness that maintains itself in and by their distinction. The pre-existence of the subject of this consciousness does not prove the individual man pre-existent any more than the phenomenality of its object proves him moribund. Man does not begin to

exist as individual until the eternal subject and the temporal object are united as a distinct individual consciousness which shall forever keep its two sides—temporal and eternal, earthly and heavenly—but keep them in a unity which is neither because it is both, the heavenly in the earthly making the human, the eternal in the temporal making the immortal. For in this unity the constitutive type must come from the subject which knows and contains its distinctions of knowledge within itself as knowing them. The object changes but the subject abides. The object is partial and under the law of death; the subject is whole and cannot die. The object is phenomenal and has no substance in itself; the subject is noumenal, and hence its own substance and the substance of the object as well. And, as the passing is ever ruled by the permanent, the seeming by the substantial, the part by the whole, the man will take his character from his permanent substantial and whole self which has the All-form, the form that never alters nor perishes, the form of immortality. Hence every man must call himself *I* as his everlasting patronymic, whatever baptismal names of nature he may find it convenient to assume. As he grows out of nature into spirit, he will rise by blood-right of consciousness into gradual inheritance of all the powers of the absolute Ego whose name he bears. His post-existence will become pre-existent in its ability to restore the past by a creative thought more divine than reminiscence. He will ever live backward in living forward, and grow eternal with the growth of immortality. "Mind," said Hermes Trismegistus, "is not cut off from the essentiality of the Godhead, but united to it just as light is to the sun. The mind in men, indeed, is God. Wherefore also some men are gods and their humanity is nigh to Deity."

Does this involve an absorption into the Absolute or God, and loss of personality? No. Man already has in his self-consciousness the form of God which more of God's essence would not destroy but fill. God's fulness can never break God's form. Not by lessening but by increasing self-consciousness will man become like the self-conscious All. His absorption into the infinite will render his self-consciousness infinite. The more he is lost in God, the more he will find God in himself. Only when God dies can the God-man die. Man's death were God's imbecility. For the human mind is no arbitrary creation that can be created or

cancelled by omnipotent caprice. God is Reason, and bound, by the necessity of his own perfection, to be rational. Man is this reason in its perfect form of selfhood. Thus man's very selfhood expresses the divine necessity for his continuance. Consciousness, divine as well as human, exists only as a unity of distinctions. God must know himself as object to himself, and, since his self is the self of knowing, he must be object in order to be subject—eternally other in order to be eternally the same. And this principle of otherness or alteration constitutive of his objectivity generates the antithesis of nature with nature's antithetic divisions, changes polarities, through a process of becoming which completes its circle and finds again its total form as a self in man—still other to God and yet God's other self—opposing its multiplicity of otherness to God's subjective unity, a self of many selves, natural as well as spiritual—human because divine. It belongs, therefore, to the divine reason that man, having its total form, should inherit all its consequences. His distinction from God is as much a consequence of this total form as his identity with God. If God is man's self, man is no less essentially God's other self. As man cannot know himself without knowing God, so God cannot know himself without knowing man. Hence, I say, when man becomes unconscious God will have lost his wits.

And this I believe to be the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. The union of God and man in Christ did not produce an exceptional and hybrid personality, but existed before the foundation of the world. Christ was the divine Reason, or Word, as Reason's utterance, utterance, or objectivity. As such He is that source and archetype of nature and of man, by whom "all things consist" and in whom "all fulness dwells." In revealing God to man as human, He has revealed men to themselves as divine. It is for the Ego in them he speaks when he says, "Before Abraham was I am," and "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father." His prayer is that by knowing themselves in Him they may be one with Him in conscious purpose as they already are one with Him in the divine idea. The glory God had given Him before the world was, He would give to them as rightly theirs. Because He lived, they should live also. And the life they should live would be knowledge—knowledge in its perfect form of an absolute Self, objectivated in Christ, the unbeginning ME of God, the everlast-

ing I of men. "This is eternal life—to know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou has sent"—Jesus the individual of Galilee and of Herod's reign, in order to show that, as individuals and not as a mere abstraction of race, all men in their several places and times had his Christhood and might attain to its utmost divinity. All men might come to the fulness of the stature of a perfect man in Christ Jesus. The Christ in all men was their hope of glory. All men could ascend to heaven and sit down on God's throne. All men were heirs of God and joint heirs with Jesus Christ. All men were God-men.

Immortality, then, as the inherent destiny of self-consciousness by virtue of its All-form, is the highest thought of philosophy and religion concerning man.

Try, however, any theory of man you please, and, unless you ignore or warp the facts, you will be driven to the same conclusion. Suppose man as mind or the self of knowledge to be only a name for a series of sensations. It is evident these sensations cannot be like those described by Hume or Huxley—mere momentary and fleeting impressions. Such sensations might exist in succession, but could never form a series. A series implies unity and permanence. It is one as a series, and, though each sensation ceases, the series must continue. Some sort of knowing must be present throughout the whole series to recognize it as a unity of many impressions and the continuance of their successive ceasings. But, if there be no distinct mind to know this, it must be known by one of the sensations which shall gather all the others into its consciousness. And this consciousness will be a consciousness of sensation's self as the totality of all knowledge. For the sensation must know itself to be sensation and not substance. Nay, if knowledge be sensation, sensation cannot know that there is any other substance, or reality, or certitude than its own. How can the knowledge which is all sensation know anything that is not sensation? Sensation, then, is absolute. Sensation, consequently, cannot change. Change itself is only sensation, and that which knows all change cannot itself change, for its changing would involve a change of all knowledge, whose only alternative is ignorance, and thus leave one and the greatest change unknown by the knowledge of all changes. Sensation, therefore, as absolute, is eternal, and man's self as sensation is as certain and whole and true

a copy of the eternal absolute as if it were the self of transcendental thought.

No possible definition of sensation can destroy or diminish this selfhood. Let the feeling be but one of succession, it must still know itself as following and preceding other feelings in order to know that it is one of a succession, and such knowledge involves the relation of time which can never result from a sensation that presupposes it. Moreover, to know that aught went before it requires memory, even as the anticipation that aught is to follow it requires the principle of cause and effect as the ground of its belief. For impression cannot compare itself with impression; one is over and gone before the other comes, and only the idea of it in recollection would remain for comparison. Whence this idea? Did the sensation sense the sensation that preceded it? Then it must have acted before it began to exist. Or, if two could co-exist for communication, they would have to know each other in this relation of co-existence which is Space, and recognize themselves as two and not one by a relation of Quantity, and, when thus put on speaking terms, invent or recall a common language in which to communicate; else how could the old sensation tell its experience to the new and so transmit the knowledge of the past to the present and future? But language is composed of abstract terms. Words are universals. "This" is every "this," now is every now, and everywhere is here. Each sensation, then, must be more than a particular momentary feeling. It must distinguish, abstract, generalize, and so form the universal concepts of speech for the traditions that impart its wisdom to its successors. Marvellous sensations these that can each sense time, sense space, sense quantity, sense cause and effect, sense identity and difference, and all the abstract universal ideas of language. But, if these are contained in the sensation, it cannot cause or explain them. It *possesses* the mind it was to *produce*.

Do you say that I misrepresent the sensationalist's theory in declaring that the sensation is a sensation of nothing but itself, whereas he insists that it is a sensation or feeling in and by the brain? I answer, How can he know that he has a brain except by that sensation which he asserts includes all knowledge? And if the brain be only a sensation, how can the sensation be the sensation of a brain without being the sensation of what is only a sen-



sation—*i. e.*, self-sensation or self-consciousness by sensation—still absolute and retaining in its absolute form the right of immortality? For man and God and God's relation to man will be the same in consciousness whether you call the consciousness sensation or thought. The immortality deduced from them will be just as immortal to a sensation that can think as if it belonged to thought's exclusive domain. You will never get rid of thought by thinking, even if you think it into sensation. Thought's royalty will still be there and reign with its utmost logic of implication, deifying and immortalizing the very mob of crudities and evanescences that were assembled to mock and spit upon and slay it.

Suppose, however, you try to think Mind, independently of any sensational theories, as a function of brain, and brain as a compound of chemical elements, and chemical elements as partnerships of thoughtless, senseless, lifeless, irreducible, ultimate, utterly uncompounded and simple atoms. What will you have then? Examine your atoms and see. They have no color, for color is a mode of motion; nor temperature, this also being a mode of motion; nor weight, which (as attraction by some outside object and tendency to move toward it) is likewise a mode of motion; nor any extension, since extension implies resistance, and resistance that mode of motion which is known as force; nor power of chemical affinity, which requires difference of density in the atoms for different equivalents of combination, whereas density is nothing but the distance between atoms in a molecule or mass, and, in order that atoms might contain such differences of density, they would have to become masses composed of other more or less distant atoms—in a word, must cease to be indivisible, simple atoms altogether.

Your atoms, then, are dissolved. They have no color, temperature, weight, shape of their own. The only marks they can be known by are modes of motion. Motion is their entire matter. But what is motion? A succession of positions which are themselves the relations of a point to space. Space, however, and this succession, which is time, are the very thoughts that, if there were any such entity as mind in contrast with matter, would be most abstract and immaterial. Thus matter presupposes, as the condition and cause of its existence in knowledge, the very thought or mind it was to evolve. Its promise of concrete, hard particularity melts into the most vacant of all metaphysical abstractions.

Suppose, then, without regard to the atomic or other theories of Matter, you consider Mind as a result of material evolution. Your material man, however, knows that he is material, and that Matter is all. But such knowledge by a man who is only Matter would be Matter's knowing itself, and itself as the All, and hence an absolute self-knowing with Man for its totality or absolute form.

In Man, and Man alone, Matter remembers its prior existences—gas, globe, sea, swamp, lichen, moss, fern, flower, fruit, sponge, fish, reptile, bird, four-footed beast, and anthropoid ape. In Man, and in Man alone, Matter says: "I am Matter, and conscious of myself, of my whole being as Matter. Nothing beneath Man knows either Man, or Matter, or itself. But Man knows what is beneath him, and himself, and Me as the all, and as the all of himself. Man, then, is my total form and my adequate explanation. I am Man."

Would you explain a bird by calling it an egg? The egg is the secret and mystery which the bird opens and reveals by brown plumage, and swift wings, and beak that tells its story to the woods. And, should you doubt its revelation, you have but to search its nest to behold the proof. For it reproduces there the form of its origin, and so proves itself to be both bird and egg—mystery and mystery's glad disclosure. And such is lower nature's relation to man—nature the egg, man the thrush, whose nest of knowledge contains both thrush and egg, both secret and explanation. The less can never explain the greater, the part the whole, identity the differences which it merely leaves out of sight as it narrows and contracts down into a shell of dead, indistinguishable sameness. Such identity is addled. It cannot evolve what it does not involve, nor grow to a universe by the external change of decay. Man must be in it to come out of it, and only comes out of it because it is its nature to be man. Nor could man have been in nature if his divine Ego had not been before it and above it, even as the eggs that fill the nest of the thrush year after year prove hers to be the abiding power that creates them and broods over their development into plumage and song.

Now, any Matter that knows itself—as Matter does in man, who, as its self-consciousness, represents its total form and definition—ought not to be confounded with the old stuff of mass and motion, of inertia and death. The old title defames it, allows it no credit

for its highest and most characteristic qualities. Give it a truer, worthier name—a name that will tell its whole career of parentage and growth and adult completion. I know of but one such name—Mind—the mind which is the same in nature and man, which was called by the old Greek philosophers *Nous*; by the son of Sirach, *Wisdom*; by St. Paul, *Doxa*; and by Hegel, the *Absolute Idea*.

And this is what the latest theory of physical evolution means by such phrases as "adaptation to environment" and "survival of the fittest," but fails to say because it does not well define "fittest" and "environment." For the environment of every life is nothing less than all nature. Every tropic jungle, vernal park, or arctic snow-field is what it is by reason of its relation to the size and shape of the earth, and the earth's motion about the sun and distance from the sun's fire. And this motion of the earth about the sun changes, at certain great geologic intervals, frigid climates to torrid, and torrid to frigid, as is indicated by ice-bound skeletons of mammoths, and the track of glaciers on mountain-sides where now rhododendrons grow. Moreover, the sun is what it is by like relations to some larger sun that fixes its place, and density, and movement, and fructifying heat; and so on from sun to sun in that choral dance of spheres which all join hands as they whirl and chant the creative strain that gives one and the same measure to their varied movements. Accordingly, the power of the farthest sphere, and of all the spheres between, is applied to Earth in the making of its air, water, and soil, alike as they exist apart; or as they take the shape of plants that feed animal life, and of animals that seek their food in plants or in each other's flesh.

It is the whole universe, then, that determines what plant or animal shall survive, and fashions its survival to greater fitness with a universal environment. But the universe, as a whole, we have seen to be Intelligence, self-conscious Intelligence, and hence it is universal self-conscious Intelligence that in nature's phenomena environs every life, and either annuls it or preserves it by increasing its correspondence with an intelligent environment. The intelligence is in the life as well as in the environment. Its process of adaptation, therefore, can be no other than a fitting of its own particular form as life to its own universal form as environment;

and such fitness will increase in proportion as the particular form proves able to receive and contain the universal form that is acting upon it.

If, then, this universal form of intelligence be self-consciousness, its action upon things will be such as to annul those that cannot be raised to self-consciousness, and preserve those that can be so raised, while at the same time it elevates them by preservation.

Survival of the fittest, then, must mean survival of those that are fittest to be self-conscious, just as self-consciousness means the form which—because it is the form of the environment within the life, as a whole of both life and environment, their self-related unity—cannot perish, and, consequently, must survive forever. The rock is almost entirely distinct from its environment, and hence perishes under every touch. The plant has more of the environment within its nature, and hence to a degree is preserved by the very changes which the outside world causes within it. The animal contains still more of the environment in his ability to change its particular influence by locomotion within a certain habitat; and in that sense of unity with it as the unity of his own nature, however incomplete, which he has in instinct and feeling. But all limits which the environment sets to man, man removes by thinking them, and so finding them, the appointments of his own reason. The environment is henceforth as much his thought as is the self it environs. In so far as he is the unity of his thought, he is on both sides of the distinction, which remains a distinction of his thinking, and hence within his thought, whose unity it preserves while seeming to break it. He has thus a universal nature that includes his environment, and this universal nature cannot change. Its action upon his particular nature will be to make it more and more universal in its forms. As the particular nature is one of flesh, and the universal, one of spirit, the tendency of the environment will be to spiritualize the flesh. As the particular nature is one of appetite and passion, while the universal is one of reason, the tendency of the environment will be to make appetite and passion rational. As the particular nature is selfish and narrow and exclusive, the tendency of the environment will be to expand its sympathies and principles to the tribe, the nation, the race whose essential humanity is one in thought and desire with the reason and will of God. So the breach existing in man between

a local, temporal, natural self and a self that has God's image will be gradually healed by the pressures and encroachments of the latter on life and experience—pressures and encroachments which will be felt less in physical forces than in the forces of that world of civilization which man has created, and whose industries, habits, customs, laws, and letters are his closest and mightiest environment, because most manifestly an environment of his reason by Reason which he now recognizes as his own in its outward aid as well as in its inward effort, and grows eager for the joint progress that is to transfigure nature, by science and art, into man, and man, by philosophy and religion, into God. As St. Paul expresses it, "The earnest expectation of the creature waiteth also for the manifestation of the sons of God. . . . Because the creature also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God." And true development, which is nothing but the process of manifesting the whole in the parts, gives the creature just such deliverance from its bondage of partiality or corruption. The creature corrupts and dies because it is but a part, and in order to become the Whole which is its only life. The Whole is free because its life is all its own. No vaster whole is beyond the Whole to be realized in its ceasing, or to constrain its transition to a different correspondence. All its realities are realizations of its self, self-prompted and self-performed. Its liberty is absolute, and consequently glorious. And wherever this form of wholeness exists, to be not altered but fulfilled by its changes, there exults and reigns the same glorious liberty. God's children have the freedom of God. And as all else is bondage of corruption, Nature's sole hope waits for this manifestation of the divine purpose of Sonship as the final cause of her pains. She is only that she may bring forth. Her voices all are groans of travail, her energies throes of birth. Man born, she is content to die, because she dies into his life, and becomes conscious, with his consciousness, alike of her past bondage and present liberty. Only with his mind does she hear the cries of her awful parturition. Hence she is never so thoroughly alive as when she *knows* herself dead, or free, as when she feels herself "subject to vanity." As the mineral does not cease to be mineral in becoming plant, which adds to crystallization life; as the plant does not cease to be plant in becoming animal, which adds to life feeling—so all Nature's

corruption in mineral, plant, and animal is Nature's quickening into a highest form that shall contain these lower forms and prove their divine redemption. She dies as nature to rise again as man, the manifest son of God.

But is not man, this man who redeems nature and carries on her ascent through his own progress of civilization, the whole race rather than any one individual? Does not the individual die while nations survive, and nations perish while mankind alone endures? Mankind alone continues the process of evolution, which goes but a little way in the individual's life and ends with his decease—ought we not to say, then, with Comte, that mankind alone is immortal?

Mankind alone! Mankind, that has entity outside of its individuals, ought to possess some traits by which it may be recognized. Has this "mankind alone" such traits? Can it say with any but *individual* lips that it is alone and that it alone lives? Has it any memory, hope, or reason that does not exist in *individual* minds? Does it know except with *individual* knowledge that it was, or shall be, or even now is? Is not any adequate intelligence it has concerning its own course the acquisition of some intellect like Comte's, who held and carried it and its universe in his own cosmic head? For, however much may be known of humanity by different minds with their special studies, the sum of these special studies can only be known as *one* knowledge, and one knowledge must be ever the knowing of *one* mind. Intelligences cannot be collected like so many separate hickory-nuts in a bag. Their collection must be the act and property of one intelligence which has to comprehend them, severally and together, in order to know that there is any increase by collection, and that each does not merely repeat the stock of the others, possessing thus while only one the wit of all. In either case the intelligence of the race must be individual. It must be one as a sum in order to know that it is not one merely as a unit; and, whether known as unit or sum, it will remain an individual knowledge. However much ancient humanity knew of itself, it could reckon its amount of knowledge only with the individual thought of an Aristotle. However much modern humanity knows of itself, it can calculate its lore only by the individual learning of a Humboldt or a Herbert Spencer. Nay, did Humanity, Comte's Great Being, who

treats individuals as mere ciphers, having no value except as factors in its own infinite equation—did this great humanity ever find out its greatness before seeing itself mirrored in the mind of Comte?

In Comte's mind it recognized itself as more than great, as even divine—the only God. Comte knew all about it. Comte knew all those former incorrect ideas of it, theological and metaphysical, which had come to it in millions of broken reflections from millions of intellects added together, so far as intellects could be outwardly added, into empires and eras and whole civilizations. And not only did he know these reflections as broken and false, but his own as total and true. He was the zodiac of all their stars. His knowledge was not theological nor metaphysical, but *positive*. In him humanity had become completely conscious of itself, and conscious of itself as divine. His mind was its total form and he its avatar. Yet Comte was an *individual*. And this individual Comte wrote books that other individuals might know humanity with his omniscience of it, and so multiply its divinely self-conscious forms and avatars. Nor did he select the individuals who were to read his books. They were issued to men as men. They presumed that men as men possessed that reason to which their argument appealed; and, consequently, that it was the very essence of their rational nature to be able to understand and adopt his system, making its omniscience their own. All men, therefore, by the confession of Comte's propagandism, are possible Comtes and avatars of humanity's self-knowing godhead.

What, then, is the conclusion? Is it not that, if the individual be an abstraction when taken aloof from the race, the race is equally an abstraction when kept outside the individual; that the race lives in the individual as essentially as the individual lives in it; that, if it supplies the whole content of knowledge, his knowledge gives that content its alone self-intelligent, immortal form? Let all individuals die, and what becomes of the immortality of the race? Does it not die their death? Is not the humanity of past generations, already dead, the humanity of future generations yet unborn, and the sole humanity that exists, our own generation? One generation, then, measures humanity's entire life. The only knowledge had by Humanity of its past career is the knowledge this one generation possesses; the only hope of its future glory is the hope this



one generation holds. As well say that it is dead forever because generations are always dying, as that it lives forever because generations are always coming into life. No, its only conscious existence—past, future, or present—is the existence it has in the individual mind, which, consequently, is mankind's sole form of conscious immortality.

And, but for its implication of this personal immortality, the ethics of positivism would soon putrefy. Its doctrine of self-sacrifice would be the sacrifice of all virtue. For there is no virtue but the virtue of persons. *Nobody's* virtue is nothing. The motives and relations and consequences that make actions or qualities right and good are personal. All right is personal right, all goodness personal goodness. When the person ends, his ethical quality ends. Virtue dies in the death of the virtuous person. Sacrifice of the person, therefore, is sacrifice of the very virtue that prompts the sacrificial act. Why should the hero kill his own heroism? Martyrdom, if the martyr ends, were not only folly, but vice, and the wickedest of vices, murdering Virtue's self. And how horrible the murder of martyrdom becomes when it slays the noble for the sake of the base, and the brave for the sake of cowards, leaving the cowardly and base as fittest to survive for the propagation and progress of a divine humanity! Divine humanity indeed! whose supreme virtue requires that it should forever expurgate itself of its most virtuous lives! Surely such universal suicide of goodness cannot be rational ethics. The one thing that every good man has to preserve is the good self, without which there can be no goodness.

It is the craven, the vile, the mean self that is to be sacrificed, and sacrificed by the dictate of that better self which only by such renunciation can be maintained. The true aim of self-sacrifice is self-preservation. And when the sacrifice is unto death it is to preserve and realize that whole man which must break the passions and habits that would cramp it, as the Victoria Regia bursts its narrow sheath for broadest splendor of bloom. And this whole man is the self every man has in common with other men who likewise are egos, possessing that indivisible subject-form of egohood which is the same in them as in him, and which in all alike is one and divine. When he lives for it, he lives for a self that is theirs as well as his, and most wholly his because theirs.



For, if they are less than he, why should he die for them? Why should the whole be sacrificed for a fragment, the whole man for a fragmentary man? What is there in the temporal life of a savage or sot so much worthier than the temporal life of a philanthropist as to deserve the philanthropist's extinction? Take an entire generation, and can you find in it, as a generation, any character higher than that of its highest sages, statesmen, saints? Your present generation is a mixture of the good and bad, wise and unwise, in which the unwise and bad vastly predominate. Most of its peoples are uncivilized, and, among the civilized, most of the persons have low, narrow, selfish aims. If the quality of your generation, then, be an average of its individual characters, that average will strike far below wisdom, far below virtue, far below commonest decency of civilization? Ought a man to die for a dog? No more should the man who is meanest die for the man who is most like a dog. Sacrifice is unreasonable waste unless its object be at least equal to its victim. The duty of sacrificing a better temporal life for a worse implies that the worse temporal life conceals a possibility of character that is to be fulfilled in some life beyond and by the very process of sacrifice that has been its example in order to become its law, constraining love with love. In the gardens of Louisiana you may see a species of large Yucca, known as the Spanish Bayonet, on account of its hard, stiff, keen-edged, and pointed leaves, bristling with an ugliness that repels sight as well as touch. No plant is more ruffian-like, and yet it is allowed to keep company with crape-myrtles and magnolias, because, when the right season comes, its malign trunk will put on a panicle of glorious white flowers and wear them as a triple crown that outranks all other decorations of the garden. So the ethics of self-sacrifice prizes its human Yuccas for the celestial purity that may crown their growth in some other season of life. Seeking man's whole self in other selves as likewise whole, it dies to live, and, in dying, lives a life that is as immortal in every impulse and act, as it is in duration. For mere length of being were neither ethical nor desirable. An immortality of existence that is not consciously immortal in its aims and principles would be an everlasting sense of contradiction, an everlasting ache of arrest, frustration, failure, an everlasting Hell. Immortality, to be immortal throughout, an immortality of immortal

moments, must have the universal self, which is its cause, for its constant motive. Then its altruism would be alter-egoism, even as absolute egoism were universal love. When it said I it would mean all men and God, its thought being the truth which is God's thinking in all men, its desire the good, which, in all men's willing, is the will of God; its joy the beauty, which, however seen or where, is God's face, making all beautiful visions beatific. Now and forever the refrain of its life-psalm would be:

“My wealth is common; I possess  
 No petty province but the whole;  
 What's mine alone is mine far less  
 Than treasure shared by every soul.  
 Talk not of store,  
 Millions or more—  
 Of values which the purse may hold—  
 But this divine!  
 I own the mine  
 Whose grains outweigh a planet's gold.

“I have a stake in every star,  
 In every beam that fills the day;  
 All hearts of men my coffers are,  
 My ores arterial tides convey;  
 The fields, the skies,  
 And sweet replies  
 Of thought to thought are my gold-dust,  
 The oaks, the brooks,  
 And speaking looks  
 Of lovers' faith and Friendship's trust.

“‘All mine is thine,’ the Sky-Soul saith.  
 ‘The wealth I am must thou become,  
 Richer and richer, breath by breath,  
 Immortal gain, immortal room.’  
 And since all His  
 Mine also is,  
 Life's gift outruns my fancies far,  
 And drowns the dream  
 In larger stream  
 As Morning drinks the morning star.”

## THE CHARACTER OF THE JAPANESE.

*A Study of Human Nature.*

BY BENJAMIN SMITH LYMAN.

In describing the Japanese, or any other people, of course we must not fail to distinguish between those features that depend on the fundamental character and those that are only the result of a certain stage of civilization or enlightenment. In regard to civilization and enlightenment, too, we should not forget that, quite the same as in every other part of the world, all the inhabitants of the country are not equally civilized, and that, while some are highly enlightened, others are still essentially in a state of barbarism. We may also at the outset take it for granted that no nation (except our own, of course!) possesses at once all the admirable qualities of human character, however inconsistent one with another. It is plain, moreover, that a just discriminating account of the Japanese people as a whole will not apply to my excellent friends among them, nor, doubtless, to numerous others who are far more enlightened than the average, or of exceptionally well-balanced natural qualities.

Perhaps the most striking feature of the character of the Japanese is their socialness; for, in comparison with the average of men, they have somewhat less of the instinct of self-preservation or self-help and more of the instinct of association—the two instincts, the self-regarding and the social, as they might be called, that are clearly the two most indispensable for the perpetuation of mankind. Of course, the instinct for association is based on ultimate reasons or secret, and often unconscious, motives that are in one sense selfish, such as the want of aid or protection, and the wish to advance one's own race; yet it leads to looking to others not only for help, but to render assistance in order to preserve one's actual or possible aider or protector, and not one's self alone. Probably no man is wholly destitute of either of the two instincts, and probably in no two individuals or nations are they balanced in exactly like manner. The establishment and continuance of various modes of balancing the two instincts as shown in whole

tribes or races, though in part due merely to inheritance, may be greatly favored by peculiarities of climate or other external circumstances, making one instinct or the other more particularly essential; as, for example, a cold Northern climate may demand more of the self-regarding instinct, a greater eagerness in trying to gain one's own food and shelter, while a warm Southern climate may give freer play to the social instinct. However that may be, the differences in degree of one instinct or the other are not on the whole so very great if you compare one country with another; yet they are with their effects noticeable enough to make two easily distinguished sets of races, in which the Japanese stand unmistakably on the side marked by a greater share of the social instinct. The trait is a complex result of other simpler ones, and has certain necessary concomitants and consequences, as we shall find by a detailed examination.

The mental functions of the Japanese, like those of other men or of any living being, of any animal or even plant, consist of perceiving (either things or words—both in one sense external objects), of suffering (pain or pleasure—both strictly subjective), and of willing or action (external to the brain or internal, and conscious or unconscious); and to these simple operations strict analysis can reduce the highest flights of the intellect, of the sensibility or of the will, with the loftiest conceptions of the true, the beautiful, and the good. Moral goodness is acting according to our instinct of what is beneficial to the race—often, to be sure, a debased or unenlightened or incorrectly interpreted instinct—and that instinct is, through long inheritance or transmitted unconscious memory, the combined result of countless objective perceptions and subjective experiences (of pain or pleasure) in regard to human conduct, causing some actions to be associated with a feeling of annoyance or disgust, and others with one of satisfaction or delight. We have, then, to consider the intellectual, æsthetic, and moral character of the Japanese, or their intelligence, their taste, and their behavior.

I. Their intelligence seems very great because they are remarkably quick in perception. Moreover, one and the same nimbleness of nerve and brain, by conscious or unconscious methods, makes possible both the swift transfer of sensations from the surface to the centre and the rapid view of their interpretation ac-

ording to previous experience or of any other more or less closely allied former impressions; so that the same agility that enables quickness of external perception or of action gives the capacity of readily calling up associated former ideas, or a good memory, which is a striking characteristic of the Japanese. Their very quickness of habit makes them impatient, however, at the careful, close observation of internal processes or reflection that is required for reasoning or invention, at deduction, induction, analysis, synthesis; and in these directions they seldom go beyond the simplest, most obvious steps. Reflection is rather favored by a certain slowness and by a dulness of perception that both lessens the distraction of outside sensations and enables the operations of the mind and a single train of thought to be followed up more surely. As the Japanese are ready, then, at outward observation, and therefore inclined to it (and for that reason social rather than self-regarding), and are of excellent memory, they are necessarily at the same time unreflective and not deep in reasoning and originality. The effect will be seen in their knowledge and belief, or the combination of their perceptions, memory, reasoning, and invention.

1. Their perception is so quick as to make them seem at times remarkably acute and brilliant. It enables them also to become very quick in action, and adroit and deft in movements of the hands or body; and such manual dexterity and ready precision are highly useful to them in many occupations and trades, and make them, for example, conspicuous for excellence as acrobats and jugglers. The quickness, too, in some favorite games, where a certain number of fingers or the position of the hands must be instantly seen and replied to, is marvellous, especially with the daily practice of the professional singing girls and their frequent companions.

2. The memory of the Japanese often enables them, in spite of many obvious drawbacks, to distinguish themselves greatly by their proficiency in study at foreign schools or universities; and at home they are, whether in college or in the primary school, likewise extraordinarily successful.

3. As their quickness makes them impatient of the slow processes of reasoning, they often seem, from that cause as well as sometimes for want of enlightenment and training, to be deficient

in reasoning power, or in the logical faculty so called (more properly speaking, a mode of action or habit).

*a.* In deduction, then, they are apt to be hasty and careless about a thorough examination of the premises' correctness and true relation to one another. Yet, as far as they do reason, they do it so rapidly as to seem often to arrive at the result rather by intuition or instinctive perception. They are themselves frequently unconscious of the process, and unable or unwilling to explain it in full, and so seem at times arbitrary and unreasonable. In urging a request, too, a favorite (and among themselves often the most efficient) final argument is practically nothing deeper or more rational than a mere appeal to personal regard or deference: "Do it to please me." Or a disputed point is sometimes yielded at last on the same ground of mere complaisance, and then a wish not to be outdone in courtesy may bring about the desired concession from the other party, either side disregarding or overlooking really weighty reasons.

*b.* The Japanese are also quite capable of induction, and quick at it, but in cases of the least complication are apt to err in not examining the circumstances with sufficient care and thoroughness, and in overlooking many of the less noticeable ones. They therefore make broad, hasty generalizations and inflexible rules and laws, and cannot willingly tolerate any exceptions; and are consequently apt to be extremists, to go from one extreme to another, and to "run any idea into the ground." They will, for example, not easily comprehend how you can say things in praise of a man or people and at the same time mention any drawbacks; a man or a people must be altogether good or altogether bad. They will be impatient at the idea of balancing the good and bad qualities, or at doubtfulness even in cases where doubt is necessary; and especially dissatisfied with any result that is not clearly and simply sweeping and decisive, however far beyond human powers it may be to form such a judgment correctly. They do not like half-way statements. Everything must be said sharply, definitely, precisely; it is less matter whether it be exactly and truthfully said. They are prone, therefore, to round assertions, and to avoiding every appearance of doubt or imperfect knowledge on any point they are expected to answer about; and are more or less annoyed at such conscientious carefulness on the part of others.

c. The careful, minute reflection required for analysis and synthesis is likewise irksome to their rapid minds, and they are consequently lacking in deep originality. Nevertheless, they are quick enough to make discoveries or inventions, though almost or quite invariably none but those of a kind that needs little deep thinking; and we may confidently expect that a profound discovery will rarely at any future time be made by the present race of Japanese. In their past history it has always been so; their learning and their arts have all apparently come from abroad, formerly from Corea and China, and now from America and Europe. Doubtless, in the course of many centuries, improvements or changes have been made in their own agriculture, architecture, textile, fictile, or metallic manufactures, dress, mode of writing, medicine, or other arts according to the requirements of novel circumstances; but such changes would seem to have been very slight at any one time and not to have been altogether of very great difficulty, though certainly in some cases of a good deal of importance.

Their readiness, however, not only to learn new things, but to devise novelties of method slightly difficult except for the quickness of their invention, compensates well in many respects for the lack of deeper pondering discovery. That universal readiness of the race was amusingly illustrated by the inexperienced steamer-engineer or captain who, having inside the harbor started his engine, did not know how to stop it, but yet in the sudden emergency had the wit to set the helm so that the vessel kept turning safely in a circle until the boiler-fire had been extinguished and the steam used up. Such readiness in the adoption or device of methods is particularly important in certain occupations, where it is more necessary to do at once what seems best at the moment than to take the chance of finding out some better way by reflection that would cause very harmful delay; and probably in more than half the cases no better way would, after all, be found out. The Japanese are, therefore, peculiarly fitted to excel, for instance, in military surgery, and with European training do so. The same readiness makes them clear-headed and never muddled, and enables them to be witty, bright, and clear in talk with definite, precise statements, and quick at composing verses with their easy rules, though, even in the more deliberate productions of the pen, original traces of profound wit or wisdom are looked for almost in

vain. Indeed, a deep, hidden meaning in a composition is not aimed at, and is considered, on the contrary, tiresome, until at least it has become familiar. It may, therefore, be expected that Japanese literature will not be found rich in masterpieces, and that the most successful of its works will be of a light, comic character.

The want of deep originality, with their quickness to learn, inclination to outward observation and consequent respectfulness, leads the Japanese to copy after others and imitate them, a habit that is thought by some Americans and Europeans to be carried to an extreme, but one that is really very useful and almost universal in other countries too, and one that is based on excellent reasons, and is a necessary consequence or concomitant of the qualities that make the people so attractive and amiable. They have for ages adopted the civilization of others without any important additions of their own, and now, seeing the superiority of Western enlightenment to what they have so long received from China, they are actively adopting our modern ways. It is but natural, too, that they should begin mostly with superficial matters and, what strikes them at first sight, dress, furniture, and house-building.

Yet, partly led by their great love of knowledge, they have hit upon the imitation of one most important and radical thing, and that is the universal introduction of public almost free schools, so that already every village child has no great distance to go to school; and the result within a single generation will be far greater than was probably estimated at first, and will go on increasing still much further as well-educated and well-trained teachers become more numerous than has hitherto been made possible by the more imperfect and more expensive and, therefore, less frequented schools of the old fashion, in which a very good complete education was scarcely equal to that of our boys of twelve or thirteen.

4. *a.* For the Japanese, with their quickness of wit, are necessarily fond of its consequently easy exercise, and therefore inquisitive and eager to learn, and so prize most highly the privilege of going to school or college, especially as they have a strong belief that even the material rewards of scholarship are very valuable. Their inquisitiveness or curiosity, as might be supposed, extends, in the less enlightened state, even to the most trivial and unimportant matters. With their quickness and readiness, and their ease of



learning or excellence of memory, they are spurred on by an insatiable thirst for knowledge, a most valuable trait, however annoying it may sometimes be in its smaller manifestations.

*b.* In science they may be expected to become very proficient, without, however, inventing profoundly original methods, yet to work out important results in ways discovered by others; but it is of course still too soon to look for many such results, for it is obvious that an exclusion for several centuries from nearly all communication with the outside world and only a brief intercourse with Europe previously have hindered the country from obtaining much enlightenment, so that the people generally, excepting a fortunate few, have the defects that must arise thereby, and are still very backward in the enlightenment of modern times. Now, however, they take up our Western studies with great zeal, and work with especial success in those branches that require the observation of external facts, such as meteorology and surveying, and are well capable of ordinary generalization from the observed facts; but will doubtless always be found deficient in the power to make more profound generalizations—that is, to recognize general laws or principles deeply underlying what seems at first a mass of more or less discordant facts. In very doubtful affairs they must, therefore, seem lacking in judgment, or the more or less distinct and conscious perception of such less obvious underlying guiding principles, though remarkably clear-sighted and practical in simpler matters.

*c.* The respect for others and the habit of not looking below the surface make the Japanese give ready credence to what is told them, and to appear even credulous in the less enlightened state. They have therefore, in times past, become converts on a large scale to the foreign Buddhist religion, and now with comparative readiness accept the Christian. But their understanding and belief of the tenets would seem to many outsiders superficial and slight. The priests of the Buddhist and of the earlier adopted religion each modified their doctrines to some extent so as to smooth the way for conversion, or for retaining believers; and to foreigners it would seem now as if there were little contention between the two, so far as the laity is concerned, and as if every one followed the forms of both. Indeed, the forms of the older religion are regarded as a political or State ceremonial, while the

Buddhist ones are more private and domestic. The popular idea of the gods is a very low one, and they are supposed to be appeased by very external forms—by walking repeatedly round the outside of a temple; by pilgrimages to holy spots, like famous temples or the tops of unusually high mountains; by vain repetitions of prayers with loud utterance (to be heard by the god, not so much by men, for such piety gains no special admiration in Japan); by turning prayer-wheels and the like methods, and at the time of prayer a god's attention is called by sounding a gong or bell; and the outward observance is apparently not supposed to be affected by any consideration, whether the heart be near or far from it. Even a priest will laugh heartily at a foreigner's imitating their bell-tapping and prayers, quite untouched by any feeling that the god may be offended or that the act is done in a scoffing or contemptuous spirit. The priests are so little oppressed by any superstitious regard for the sacredness of their utensils of worship that they have been known, for instance at a gay convivial occasion in a small temple used also as a dwelling, not to scruple to seize a wooden bell, or "fish," as it is called, and its hammer, used properly for calling the god's attention, and to dance about with them, beating time as they went. The Buddhists use idols in their worship, but, doubtless, without any greater belief in the god's special presence in the wood or stone than the Roman Catholics have in regard to their images and pictures. The unreflecting simplicity of the uneducated is also shown in the custom near some Buddhist temples of selling small eels or fishes, to be resued by the purchaser from the death to which the seller says he would otherwise have to consign them for his own food. But the clear-headedness of the Japanese makes them little inclined to superstition compared with any other race in the like stage of enlightenment, and so-called religious dogmas sit lightly upon them; and education, with their quick wit, almost invariably gives a perception of the falsity of superstitions and leads them to a rational faith like Confucianism.

II. In matters of taste, whether in studied art of various kinds, both pure and decorative, such as landscape gardening, architecture, carving, painting, drawing, calligraphy, lacquer-ware, bronzes, pottery, cloisonné, dress, theatrical acting, dancing, music, fine literature, and poetry, or in unstudied trifles and common speech and manners, we find in Japan the same remarkable readiness

with its consequent grace and exuberance in the lighter details, the same love of outward observation, and the same lack of the profound that is essential to high art. Their aim is, then, the picturesque rather than the thoroughly beautiful, and (as only complete beauty will bear repetition) difference rather than symmetry, disjointed diversity rather than unity; indeed, endless variety, variety above everything else, and color rather than form. They excel, then, in decorative art, in the painting of flowers and birds, and especially in landscape gardening.

In landscapes unity is well-nigh impossible, and is therefore little missed, and symmetry would look unnatural, whereas variety is extremely essential. The superficial beauties of color and fragrance make flowers and plants particularly attractive to the Japanese, and no taste is more widespread among them than that for ornamental gardening. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that every house, however humble, has something to represent an ornamental garden, be it no more than a single carefully trained pine or a couple of shrubs in a bit of ground hardly six feet square, or, at least in the summer-time, a box a foot or two long with miniature streams, ponds, islands, bridges, houses, temples, and with dolls for men and women. By a country roadside an urchin may be found amusing himself with arranging flowers or twigs on a bank to represent a garden, as our children of the same age make sand-pies in the path or diminutive mill-ponds in the gutter. A cook's wife, with a plentiful supply of earth, stones, plants, and toys, can, in three or four hours, make a miniature landscape of five square yards that would do credit to any of our landscape artists. Indeed, you may say broadly that a day laborer in Japan has more artistic feeling in gardening than some of our professional landscape gardeners. In the course of centuries certain rules about garden ornamentation have become established that are now accepted without question or investigation and followed blindly. It is probable that the art was first brought from China to Japan; but it seems to be practiced much more universally, and in general more successfully, here than on the Continent.

Japanese architecture also is copied from the Chinese, but with much more exclusive use of wood as the building material, and in proportion to its strength, perhaps, with somewhat greater lightness and picturesqueness in form. In regard to ornament,

the principle is followed that "beauty is only skin deep," and the main effort is to make the surface look well with plaster, papering, and lacquer, though paint is seldom used, owing to ignorance of oil-colors. The interior of dwelling-houses is commonly almost bare of ornament, but in the best rooms there may be a post or cross-piece of handsome or gnarled wood, and perhaps a small piece of fine lattice-work or open-work carving made to represent a landscape, or possibly three or four water-color pictures pasted upon sliding doors.

Some of the temples are very richly adorned with most elaborate, light and graceful carvings of birds, flowers, monkeys, dragons and other natural or fabulous animals, brilliantly painted and gilded, and sometimes comic as well as grotesque. There are many wooden images of gods, too, likewise painted and grotesque rather than majestic in appearance, whatever the intention of the artist may have been. There are also near temples bronze images of Buddha, many of them of enormous size, but, however interesting as specimens of foundry-work and ingenuity, have no great merit as sculptures. Indeed, the human form and face are too difficult for the national disposition and powers, at least as hitherto cultivated. There are, however, a few wood carvers who copy the human face very closely in colored images used especially by the florists in their autumnal chrysanthemum exhibitions, where the dresses of the groups of figures are most tastefully made up of different-colored flowers and green leaves. The faces of some large dolls, too, have a childlike look extremely well done; and, on a small scale in ivory carvings, much expression is sometimes given to the face. Other ivory carvings, of more commonplace objects, many of them comic, are very numerous and often remarkably well done, though still nothing that could be called high art.

It is the same with pictures, whether in colors or in black and white. Very frequently most delicate touches and grace, an endless variety of admirably skilful trifles (comparatively speaking), but never a combination into anything grand or thoroughly and consistently beautiful. Their better pictorial art, too, is mainly copied from the Chinese and from former pictures, not from nature. The artists' work has the graceful freedom that comes from remarkable rapidity, sureness, and delicacy of hand.

Every Japanese of any education has, in fact, a very excellent training for his hand and eye in the ten years needed to learn to write more or less handsomely the Chinese characters used for his own language. The art of forming with some elegance those graceful, beautiful characters is the real difficulty of that mode of writing, not the vastly easier task of memorizing their construction and meaning; but not one moment of all the time spent in learning to write well is lost, for it is learning the art of drawing and gaining a sure and delicate touch. The Japanese are very successful in calligraphy, an art highly esteemed by them, and excite the admiration of the Chinese even in a style that is wholly illegible on the Continent, for the Japanese incline particularly to use the lighter and more flowing and consequently more graceful contracted forms at the expense of easy legibility to their own countrymen, quite a secondary consideration apparently.

In their lacquer-ware, bronzes, pottery, and cloisonné they show the same tendency to lightness, variety, pleasing colors, and graceful decoration; but the more difficult merit of fine form is often lacking. The form of many of their bronzes, indeed, is not merely fantastic but frightful, though the surface be adorned with exquisite decorative sculpture. The shape of much of their pottery, too, is a little heavy and graceless in comparison with ancient and modern Western forms. The lacquer-ware is somewhat slighter and more fragile than the Chinese. The decorative skill of the Japanese is extremely well adapted to all such articles, as it is also to woven fabrics.

In dress, too, they show admirable taste in the use of colors and in the modes that have, with occasional slight variation, been in vogue several hundred years since their adoption from China, where they long ago fell into disuse in favor of a much less graceful and hardly more convenient or comfortable costume. The dress of Japanese men is becoming to their bodily figure, and sober in color according to their age and occupation, with no trinketry, save perhaps a knob or large button, often of ivory, finely carved, but comic or grotesque, to hang their tobacco pouch to their girdle; and the women, though more gayly dressed, especially when very young, are not less exacting in soberness as age increases. The colors are both well combined and in themselves beautifully dyed of bright and in many cases very delicate

tints. The special ornament of the ladies' costume (aside from the pins, combs, and other trifles of endless variety worn on the head in their stiffly pomaded, fantastically dressed hair) is the enormous knot of their broad girdle behind, and it often has beautiful patterns woven or dyed into it. In such dress and personal ornaments we naturally expect and really find, more constantly than anywhere else, the love of variety and lack of serious meaning and thoroughness. Fine dresses are of course particularly to be seen at any holiday gathering, or at a musical or dancing entertainment; but the best opportunity to see their magnificence is on the stage, where the display is really gorgeous, and at the same time tasteful in the highest degree.

The theatrical acting, as might be expected from the close attention of the Japanese to superficial matters, however minute, is in comedy very natural indeed; but in more serious pieces there is a large mixture of conventionality, particularly in the mode of utterance, yet with much of the same naturalness of action. It is indeed so realistic that what would in a Western piece be condensed into ten minutes may be spread through a whole hour; so that the Japanese theatre becomes downright tedious to an American who is able just to see the drift of what is going on, and feels but slight interest in the long periods of commonplace between the few exciting points. The loud conventional utterance in dismembered syllables, so as to be heard distinctly by the remoter spectators, is accompanied, too, by a conventional treatment of the actor's face, so as to exaggerate some of its features according to the popular taste and make them more easily visible at a distance, but very ugly to a foreign eye. Fighting battles is partly changed into acrobatic feats with somersaults and the like, so as decidedly to relieve the gravity and seriousness of the situation. The rearrangement of the stage furniture, and the special lighting up of the actors' poses after dark, is done by noiseless imps covered with black dresses and masks, and supposed to be invisible, a simple and shallow device worthy of the *Midsummer Night's Interlude*, yet, on the whole, a very undisturbing and satisfactory way of getting over or evading certain impossibilities.

Dancing is rare upon the stage, but as a spectacle is very frequent in more private places, and is also the occasion of displaying tasteful dresses, all the gayer as the dancers are mostly very young.

The dance is a pantomime representation of the action of a song sung at the same time by the musicians, and (unlike what is customary in some Oriental countries) is almost always of the most proper character. To some unhabituated foreigners Japanese dancing has seemed nothing but insipid, languid movement; but the taste for it and appreciation seem to grow with better acquaintance, and it gets to be greatly admired for its grace and meaning as well as for the pleasing and constantly varying combinations of brilliant colors and the bright, fair faces and lithe, comely forms of some of the dancers. But the grace and meaning are not very deeply studied.

Japanese music is copied from the Chinese, and, as given by the ordinary singing girls, with their three-stringed banjo and imperfect training, is considered abominable by foreigners; but, as rendered with the twelve-stringed koto or cithern by skilful performers, is pleasing, even to good foreign musicians. Yet here too there is nothing of Japanese origin that is at all profound, and the merit is not that of composers but of performers, and consists in deftness of hand and acuteness of ear; and there appear to be no remarkable original Japanese musical pieces.

In fine literature and poetry we may be sure that, even when better known than at present to the Western World, there will prove to be (as so far already appears) no very great masterpieces, and that such as there are will be of a lighter or even comic kind, or, as in dialogue or epistles, approaching talk with the living voice.

It is in talk rather than in the studied use of the pen that the Japanese excel, owing to their precision and clearness of expression, their quickness of wit and humor, and their cheerful gayety, touching lightly upon everything, instantly comprehending anything whatever (or thinking so), and finding the least thoroughness of discussion a bore.

In a thousand little things of daily occurrence the same light grace and tastiness are constantly and invariably displayed by almost every Japanese, in even the veriest trifles, in manners, the movements of the body, in salutation or in conversation, the patching of slightly torn paper doors with bits cut to the shape of a butterfly, the pasting a double, half-broken pine leaf into the pull-space of a paper window, the placing of cake slices in overthrown-



step-form on a plate—in everything, everywhere, a certain jauntiness, neatness, and airiness that are most taking to the observer. Some of those trifles have become with them customary conventionalities, and are repeated from generation to generation. Yet there are always the insatiable thirst for novelty, the love of change, and ignorance of underlying principles; so that there is often of late years a most inconsiderate imitation of foreigners both in small matters and in great, but especially in those obvious on the surface, in manners, dress, furniture, and architecture, overlooking from admiration at novelty the inherent ugliness of many features and the necessary incongruity of some with the climatic and other conditions of the country. Indeed, mere oddity of looks goes very far in pleasing the Japanese, and seems to be the principal criterion of their appreciation of natural landscapes and of all natural objects, as well as to a great degree of all works of art.

III. In behavior and action the Japanese—either (1) by themselves in general; or (2) specially towards superiors in authority, power, or social rank, such as parents, masters, patrons, the government, and priests; or (3) in more equal relations toward men and women; or (4) towards admitted inferiors—with the utmost inclination to sociality, show the same readiness and quickness, the same promptness of action as of decision, but a want of careful reflection as to motives and reasons, the same love of variety and change, and the same lack of depth and thoroughness.

1. The ruling principle throughout, the ultimate source of nearly all their activity, is regard for others rather than self-respect, an “external conscience” or mentor rather than an internal one, a tendency to conform to others’ ideas of right and wrong rather than to any of their own, to consider it right to do a questionable thing if “others do so,” and yet commonly without any more serious dread of consequences than that of ridicule. Indeed, their word for bad (apparently allied to our own and still more like our word worse) has evidently the same root as the word for laugh; and another quite distinct word that means ridiculous is to-day constantly used also in the sense of bad. And yet when ridicule does come they are much less deeply sensitive to it and annoyed by it than a more reflective people. Owing to the social habits and customs that have arisen from their disposition, they are almost every moment of their lives under the observation of others, and,



consequently, under the influence of the incentive to good conduct that is most potent with them, and the one that produces, too, a much more pleasing effect in the eyes of others than conscientiousness and self-respect, which lead almost invariably and necessarily to goody-goodness, if not to pride and real selfishness. In fact, goody-goodness, so offensive to everybody, even to the goody-good, is nothing but conscientiousness without regard to the opinion of others; the goody-good wish to be self-denying, but are bent upon doing what they think is right rather than what you think is, and try to be indifferent to your lack of appreciation of their behavior. Nothing is farther than goody-goodness from the character of the Japanese.

It must not be imagined, either, that the feelings indicated by their amiable language or actions are so deep as would be shown in the same way by a slower, more reflective, less demonstrative people. As the feelings are not so deep, the disappointment of wishes and bereavement are easily borne, and the people are, consequently, light-hearted and gay. Just before beaching a vessel in a storm the only one of the ship's company who could not swim has been found to join merrily in the joking of the others at the almost certain prospect of his drowning; and you may see a young woman of education and good character watching with slight and idle curiosity some trivial circumstance at one side while her much-beloved mother's body is lowering into the grave close by.

Both the lack of great depth of feeling and the desire to please others encourage cheerfulness and gayety of manner and joking habits; so that social gatherings, whether small or large, are apt to be very merry, and even in business consultations there is always a great deal of fun and laughter (and every question is by preference decided through deliberation by discussion with others rather than by private reflection). At feasts and on holiday parties or excursions "to see the flowers" of the cherry or plum and the like, the Japanese are as far as possible from "taking their pleasure sadly"; and their rollicking jollity and wholly careless abandonment to mirthful delight, with the greatest readiness of wit and humor, yet with the utmost respect for others, are extremely interesting and pleasing.

Their cheerful, light-hearted disposition makes them, of course, very sanguine and hopeful, ready to look on the bright side of

every circumstance, and to believe encouraging language about any dubious matter. If you say two words, they will risk a million dollars on the most doubtful of mines.

Owing to their lack of depth of feeling, the Japanese are in general very temperate in the indulgence of their selfish likings, and are not greatly addicted to alcoholic drinks, nor to tobacco, and only very exceptionally use opium at all. They smoke tobacco, to be sure, frequently—even the women—but only take a whiff or two at a time. Tea they drink often too, but in small quantities and very weak.

From their want of depth of attachment to anything and their cheerful contentment, they are very frugal, and, in their admirable climate, able to be comfortable bodily with a very small outlay.

With such easy comfort, exertion for anything further seems superfluous; they are too well satisfied with their present condition to feel any very great eagerness about improving it when they see or foresee no special occasion; and they are very ready to "let well alone" and not to borrow trouble from the future, to let the morrow take care of itself, and to be improvident. They are, consequently, apt to exaggerate the difficulty of any change from the present condition of affairs and to make mountains out of mole-hills in the way of future work to be done, particularly any that disturbs present comfort, however serious a careful consideration might show the probable future importance of the step to be. They seem, therefore, dilatory, whereas they are in fact very prompt and ready when they are fully aware of the need of being so, and especially when no long, tedious, persistent effort is required. In spite, then, of their great natural quickness, they often seem, nevertheless, to be very slow to accomplish anything. It is the old story of the race between the hare and the tortoise; the quick ones waste their opportunity to win easily, because they are inconstant and seek diversion from the steady, plodding pursuit of one single aim.

Their gay and happy disposition makes them careless and heedless, and apparently forgetful of duties, notwithstanding the real excellence of their memory; but it is unmindfulness, or not keeping constantly in mind, rather than true forgetfulness or poor memory. Their attention is taken up with what is at the moment before them, and they have no thought for anything else. If

they are reading they appear remarkably abstracted and unconscious of the whole world besides; but that is quite different from abstraction through occupation with one's own thoughts, something altogether foreign to Japan.

Constant observation of what is before them rather than of their own thoughts gives them such high respect for outside opinion and great regard for superficial matters as to make them apt to be vain, humble though they really are in forming a low estimate of themselves; and consequently they are much pleased and, at least for the time being, impressed with any evidence of the esteem of others. They are fond of bearing and displaying any badge or mark of such good opinion, say a decoration of any order of knighthood, or a military medal, or, in the case of servants and laborers, the initial or mark of their employer. They are also very liable to have their vanity encouraged and played upon by interested parties, publicly by ambitious politicians and demagogues, peaceful or warlike, and privately by flatterers.

Such high respect for others' opinion makes the Japanese very conservative of ancestral customs, both in more important matters and in dress, from fear of ridicule at any decided divergence from what is usual. Yet, when once convinced of the superiority of Western enlightenment to their own and to the Chinese, which they have followed so long, they are pleased to adopt with the utmost speed our modern fashions, so far as known to them, and think thereby to gain additional respect from the more enlightened classes, who have a like admiration of the West. Only the women and the more secluded provincials, owing to the inferior education and information of their class and their consequent general adherence to former opinions, are less quick to adopt outlandish customs. It is to be hoped that better enlightenment and good sense will eventually save the handsome, becoming, convenient, national costume. Though the dress seems to a foreigner at first sight very uniform, it appears that there is within certain limits change of fashion from time to time, just as with us.

The great regard of the Japanese for appearances and their tastefulness lead them to be cleanly and neat, at least to outward seeming; and their common word for pretty is used also for clean, and dirty is used for ugly. Not merely love of cleanliness, but agreeableness of bodily sensations makes them so fond of hot baths

as to take one daily, or at hot springs several times a day. Yet the cleanliness is too apt to be but superficial, and balanced by uncleanness of clothes that are little seen, such as under-clothes and night-clothes. They keep the more visible part of their houses and dooryards and gardens comparatively very tidy indeed, but are apt to shock you by their carelessness about the appearance of the less frequented portions. It is, indeed, the same lack of thoroughness in neatness as in everything else; and it is particularly noticeable wherever the circumstances are new to them, so that they have not as a guide the old customs and traditions of many centuries, and do not for themselves think out the proper methods, and are led astray by their scanty superficial observation of foreigners. For example, in their newly acquired steam mercantile marine, where the custom of removing the shoes or sandals on entering, as is done in their houses and junks, applies no longer, and where the arrangements are in several respects different and less simple than they used to be on junks, the greatest want of neatness is very often found. Lack of thorough cleanliness, too, is very striking in the management of the newly adopted Western clothing by the neglect often to wear its under-clothing, or to change it frequently, and the like; and especially in the care of the dress of the soldiers in modern uniform.

The want of depth of feeling and lightness of attachment to objects and pleasures loved, and the seldom looking thoughtfully far ahead, make it comparatively easy to part with life itself; so that under excitement, or in a conspicuous position, soldiers of the old military class show bravery enough, and in civil life suicide long ago became a highly respected means, not of injuring an opponent, but of establishing one's own innocence. The utmost regard for appearances and decorum is shown, even in all the details of the best approved and prescribed methods of committing suicide. In spite of such a readiness to die in a becoming manner under certain circumstances, in cases where there is less vainglorious excitement or less pressure of outside opinion, the inclination is decidedly to yield and submit rather than to resist danger; in other words, to be timid, except out of regard to the opinion of others. In exposure to danger they have the utmost self-confidence, and are not oppressed by any deep imagining of the extent of the risk. Therefore they do not easily lose their presence of mind, are not

troubled with giddiness in high places, are ready to undertake boldly almost any duty that is laid upon them, and do not shrink from taking up any office, no matter how complicated and serious its responsibilities and duties may be. For, in general, notwithstanding their modesty in claiming little of the consideration or esteem of others, they often appear too self-confident and never diffident. Yet, for the very reason that they are not hindered by any secondary reflections about the difficulties of a position from having full command of their faculties, they work comparatively at their ease, and consequently to great advantage, and so, to some degree, can justify what seems their over-confidence in themselves. But in cases that require unseen fortitude, the inconspicuous endurance of evils that are appreciated, there is no self-respecting firmness, only the desire to escape. Inevitable troubles, however, are less deeply felt than they would be by a more reflective people, and are borne, especially in the sight of men, with becoming equanimity, or even gayety.

The Japanese are proud that centuries ago, with the help of the weather, they valorously repelled invasion attempted by the Chinese; but it would probably have been much more fortunate for themselves if they had had the wisdom to submit at once, as they would have done most quietly and cheerfully after defeat. Their country would have enjoyed ever since greater peace and prosperity, and have made far greater progress in enlightenment, and an intermixture of Chinese blood would have done no harm to the race, however regrettable such a mixture of types might have been to the student of human nature or of philology.

The persecution of the Christians a couple of centuries ago was borne, too, with the most remarkable tenacity and fortitude, out of fidelity to a chosen master and in the belief of gaining thereby everlasting happiness in another world. Burning at the stake was therefore readily undergone; but slow torture was more effective, though in a number of cases the most atrocious, diabolical torments were endured until the release of death at the end of many days. For the fear to lose somewhat of the approbation or respect of the circle, or set, or individuals whose opinion they particularly value, makes them seem at times extremely obstinate in tenacious adherence to a leader or sect.

2. As for their behavior towards admitted superiors, it is natural

that, with the plasticity and dependence of childhood, they should acquire the highest respect of all for their parents, to whom, consequently, they acknowledge the duty of faithful obedience and cherishing throughout life, and the greatest posthumous honors. Indeed, filial duty is reckoned the first and foremost of all virtues. Obedience is likewise due, after the father's death, to his eldest son as head of the family. Girls and women, from their greater dependence, especially, owe such submissive fidelity to the head of the family, to the father, to the husband, or, in the case of a widow, theoretically at least, to her own son, who, however, retains necessarily his early acquired respect for his mother. It is instinctively conceded that, in any association of human beings, one must lead and the others be led, and dutiful obedience to the acknowledged head is reckoned a virtue and an honor instead of a weakness or disgrace, and is considered, as far as it goes, a mark of superiority; so that a child filial and obedient to a cruel, vicious father would be held in great honor, though the parent would be despised. Girls are highly esteemed for giving up even chastity in order to support their parents, no matter how idle and worthless these may be.

At an early age (say from twenty to twenty-five for young men and sixteen to twenty for girls) a wife or husband is selected. It is done by the parents on either side through go-betweens (recognizing in so important and delicate a matter that he who pleads his own cause has a fool for his client), the final decision, however, being generally made with the young couple's consent; though a previous particular acquaintance is not thought specially desirable, and objection to the parents' choice is not very often made, especially not by girls. But affection and love, as well as respect, are none the less maintained between consorts, for it would be thought as monstrous not to love one's spouse as not to love a brother or sister, equally little or still less self-chosen. Japanese ladies judge by outward appearance that foreign ones do not love their husbands in any way comparable to what is customary in Japan. Women there do not dream of its being in any way derogatory, or disgraceful, or unfit that they should be wholly subject to the guidance of their husbands, almost invariably their elders and better informed.

A wife there may be divorced simply by the husband's writing

“three lines and a half,” and until a few years ago she had in such a case no right of appeal to the Government. It may be suspected that such thorough subjection of woman to man might have a very pernicious effect upon the man’s character (as it would more surely have in countries with less of counteracting influences), but, beyond a doubt, its effect upon the woman’s character is extremely beneficial, and the result is most enchanting. Nowhere else can be found such entire, sincere, unquestioning, cheerful, seemingly unforced, submissive humility and meekness—most excellent virtues, well worthy of the first place among the beatitudes at the foundation of a religion, yet too apt to be deliberately and openly neglected and despised by its professors of either sex in Western “civilized” countries. These and other Christian virtues are found so thoroughly woven into the Japanese character, and inherited for ages, as to appear completely natural and to be practiced without effort; and are for that very reason the more admirable and meritorious.

In the relations of servant and master, client and patron, *protégé* and protector, pupil and teacher, there are on either side in great measure the same motives, acknowledged or secret, conscious or unconscious, as in the case of child and parent; and, next to filial duty and faithful wifehood, fidelity of service in those relations is reckoned the highest virtue in Japan. Even foreigners have had some opportunity of knowing the fact by experience when they have had Japanese assistants or pupils, and must, without exception, admit that nothing could be more charming than the respectful attention and submission almost invariably accorded in such subordinate positions, in spite, too, of its being in Japan nearly always a position in which submission is likewise still more due in the same matters to Japanese officials, at least nominally in charge, who may not be thoroughly agreed with the foreigners. Japanese servants of foreigners are less enlightened than students, and therefore more subject to the old belief in the inferiority of foreigners to natives, and, by the comparative ignorance on either side of any common language, are led into many errors and temptations, and have in very many cases been corrupted by the bad practices that early grew up among those who were, so to speak, outcasts and disreputable for the very reason that they were willing to serve foreigners; yet



the uncontaminated ones are generally very faithful to the interests of their masters, especially of those who have a passable knowledge of the language of the country, whereby many misunderstandings are prevented.

Much annoyance is sometimes caused to a master by the very anxiety to anticipate his wishes and by hastily jumping at wrong conclusions or going off at half-cock in regard to his desires, and so appearing thick-headed and stupid, where not intelligence but thorough carefulness in inquiries was lacking. Where, too, they think they know a master's interests better than he does himself, and less often in selfish affairs, they will sometimes simply take the bit between their teeth and carry out their own views in spite of orders, arguments, or remonstrance, apparently under a spell of deafness and of wilfulness. But it is from confidence in their own judgment and a short-sighted belief in their skill to smooth matters over after the end is once attained. That confidence in their own opinion makes it almost absolutely necessary to explain fully the reasons of orders or instructions that are unusual or not very easily comprehended. They seem never to think, even when soldiers, that it is not theirs to question why, and that an order may have some excellent reason that does not lie on the surface. In military matters they are apt, therefore, to appear insubordinate and undisciplined; to insist upon campaigns that to the better informed Government above them are clearly unwise; and, in the excitement of battle, to refuse, for example, to draw back from a pursuit that seems to them most successful, so that they may fall into an ambuscade; and in other like ways to cause trouble.

The Japanese have such high respect for others and submissiveness toward superiors in authority, with selfish resistance, if at all, only in secret ways for the most part, that they are ready to be subjects of despotic power, and their Government has ever been "an absolute despotism tempered by assassination," with all its advantages as well as disadvantages. Local oppression has sometimes been so severe that even the easily contented, meek, unwarlike country people have burst out in rebellion and fought with sharpened bamboos for spears. Yet one of the greatest of their rebellions has been against a more enlightened Government, but in obedience to leaders that were almost worshipped by their fol-



lowers and that were influenced by an exaggerated opinion of the importance of their own views to their country and ruler, as opposed to the opinions of former comrades in the Government. Disloyalty to the acknowledged head of the State has never been flatly avowed; he may be captured and made to issue favorable decrees, or, in cases of doubtful succession, a rival may be maintained to have rightfully the authority, or it may be argued that the supreme mandates are not authentic or given with free will. It is evident that such a people are very apt to become the willing subjects and followers of any more selfish able man who seeks the power, and would likewise submit, with comparative ease and readiness, to any strong foreign power that should subdue them and that should not seriously oppress them nor constantly annoy and irritate them by the cold, haughty, unsympathetic, and uncompanionable ways of its officials. A voluntary union with such a power would of course be more satisfactory, but wisdom for a government move of that kind could hardly be expected. The only probability of any such voluntary union would be at some future time under a republican government with another of like kind, say as part of the "federation of the world." Republican forms are perhaps not necessarily incompatible with a character that has been so submissive to despotism, for they give those who have the most of natural inclination and capacity a peaceable opportunity to take the lead, and to every citizen the chance, by vote or argument, or more indirectly by educational or other rational and peaceful means, to indulge that inclination in his own degree, and so oppose oppression, injustice, and maladministration or forward good management of state affairs.

Not merely do the Japanese look up with the highest respect to the head of their Government, regarding him only lately as scarcely less than a god, but they accord generally the readiest obedience and humble submission even to his lowest official. Indeed, they know that with the secret, underhand methods not uncongenial to the character of their countrymen, nor ever unusual under a despotism, almost any official can, if he desire it, do a great deal of harm to a personal enemy. They must therefore regard him with as much respect and fear (if the illustration may be pardoned) as you may often see intelligent, well-informed Americans have or a "member of the press," because he has a giant's power and

may use it like a giant, according to circumstances of disposition or digestion that cannot be known in advance.

3. Not only is fidelity yielded in the formal position of a subordinate before a superior or protector, but the instinctive disposition toward association causes the same relationship, as it were, to be constantly assumed for the time being during intercourse with any equal, and to some degree even with an inferior. There is complaisance, a genuine readiness to comply with the will of others, and to further their interest. In short, constant consideration for others, the secret of true politeness, is among the Japanese of all classes, more probably than in any other country, the prevailing rule of conduct; and, indeed, they are as a people already very justly celebrated for their urbanity. They not only make great use of forms of civility, marks of respect and affection befitting a dependent condition that is real or assumed, but, both by nature and by the second nature that comes from the habitual use of such forms, have an unusually large share of the underlying feelings of kindness and humility, a lack of which is too apt to be concealed by the forms in the opinion of ruder nations. Even intimate friendship or close relationship is not considered excuse enough for omitting the outward signs of respect and affection, so that familiarity does not, as in some countries, breed rudeness; and merely ordinary and conventional forms do not suffice, but more unusual methods of showing kindness must frequently be contrived expressly. Moreover, aside from actions directly toward others, approbation is sought and deserved by the avoidance of what is annoying, by cheerfulness of looks and language, by not worrying or fretting at the behavior of others or at unavoidable circumstances, by quietness and gentleness of demeanor, by the absence of disagreeable personal habits, by the exercise as far as may be of tastefulness in personal appearance and dress. Still it is not to be supposed that every particle of selfishness, ill-will, and discontent in a whole nation has been altogether suppressed. In particular, an only son is apt to grow up selfish from having been petted and spoiled while a child.

As they are polite out of regard for others' opinion and not out of self-respect, so in cases where they do not have any particular respect for a man or woman of apparently subordinate position, or who can never do them any harm, they may be extremely rude and

overbearing, especially when they think they seem thereby to be of greater importance and power. Indeed, although foreigners as a class are in the beginning highly admired and looked up to both as novelties and as evidently more enlightened, it is a very common thing for small officials, after becoming slightly accustomed to dealing with them, to show their own consequence and dignity by small annoyances, such as keeping them waiting at a public office, for example, or in many other trifling ways. To be able to show a little power over the foreigner so highly respected is an especial delight to such officials, for instance, as have the right to demand the inspection of travelling passes. Real or apparent cases of rudeness also occur sometimes through a desire to imitate foreign manners and imperfect enlightenment in regard to them, or through ignorance how to behave in novel circumstances; or through using towards foreigners certain behavior that is customary among natives for reasons that do not apply to foreigners or are not understood by them.

Worse than mere rudeness, their acting so much with reference to the opinion of the men they respect and consequent lack of honor when without that stimulus make them treacherous toward an enemy or one they do not respect, notwithstanding their great and characteristic faithfulness to a master. Where open enmity cannot be practiced on a large scale there seems at times to be no limit to their small spitefulness.

From lack of enlightenment, and consequently of knowledge how ridiculous their behavior is, or from a belief that it will not become known to those whose opinion they especially regard, not being conscientious or caring for their own respect, they are often guilty of extremely petty meanness that is laughable but vexations to any foreigner it may affect. In mercantile and other business they are excessively annoying to a foreigner, partly from their not being well aware of the binding importance of good faith and steady unchangeableness in such matters. As any affair of that kind is transacted more or less privately, there is the less room for the effect of ridicule or outside opinion generally so potent, and they consider that all others whose opinion they particularly respect act under like circumstances in the same way, using every means, however contemptible, for gaining the upper hand in the open struggle for money or other advantages. In general, the

selfish ones, in order to carry out their ends, are very ready to use secret, underhand, sly, deceitful methods, if there be no great risk of ridiculous exposure, and are willing to gain their point without having seemed to command it.

But, though they are much inclined to practice dissimulation and to use secret underhand methods for the purpose of accomplishing their ends peacefully, their deception is not of the elaborate, deeply contrived kind that is found, for example, in India; and, though they are skilful enough at maintaining secrecy when they try, they are apt to overlook its importance unless in very superficially evident cases. Indeed, insincerity is not in general a Japanese fault, and frankness is one of their characteristics, because, in fact, they do not commonly reflect and think deeply enough to plan any ingenious deception, and so come out with the plain truth. Nevertheless, their truth-telling is not from any self-respecting, conscientious love of it, be the consequences what they may; and, in case of temptation, they are apt (at least the less enlightened are) to deceive or tell an untruth without any compunction or shame if not found out, yet generally an untruth of a very shallow kind and easily seen through, and often of a well-known or traditional sort adapted to certain circumstances. Since the ruling motive is to please others and to look well externally, there is great willingness to make use of shams, many of them customary ones; and as in dress the sleeves of an under-garment may be tipped with richer material to give the appearance that the whole is of the same costly stuff, so in more serious matters untrue statements or expressions, false names, false dates, and the like inexactitude are freely used, especially if there be no obvious direct harm therefrom and no important contravention of what is essential. Unselfish lies for politeness' sake are of course extremely common, yet not of such a kind as to make their politeness insincere. As we have seen, they are cheerful and gay in the most serious predicaments, and it is no wonder that in unimportant matters the real feeling should sometimes be less profound than outward demonstrations had led less polite and more literal foreigners to suppose, causing them to accuse the Japanese of insincerity and to long for the rude but at bottom kind-hearted ways of a more phlegmatic Western people.

The Japanese are sometimes blamed for ingratitude, but, how-

ever just the charge may possibly be against their Government (for "communities are proverbially ungrateful," because a large body of men comes with difficulty to full agreement on any one point) as regards the people individually, the opinion arises generally from exaggerated expectations, in consequence either of the very demonstrations of polite thanks at first, or of a self-regarding overestimate of the benefit conferred and of the occasion for gratitude, or from an underestimate of the gratitude the receiver of a kindness really feels without, in his absence, any convenient way of displaying it. Nevertheless, the gratitude must in reality not commonly be expected to be so very deep, for other more selfish feelings are not; and it is natural for the Japanese not to be profoundly moved by kindness that they would themselves perform as a matter of course without expecting any unusual return.

However unkind, changeable, and in numberless petty ways annoying they may seem when their favor or fairness of treatment is desired or demanded by one who is not very obviously in want of their help, or who appears independent of them, or in any degree opposed to them or without their respect, they are very kind to those whose dependence or need is acknowledged or manifest, particularly so to the sick, and more especially where relative position or other circumstances occasion more than usual respect for the invalid. More than one foreigner in Japan has experienced, with surprise even, as well as heartfelt gratitude, the extreme kindness and faithful, unwearied attention shown at times of illness by his servants or employed men, and by the pupils, assistants, or officials with whom he may have been connected. The instinctive kindness to the sick has its root, perhaps, in a more or less conscious fear of losing a protector, defender, or aider.

The regard for others' esteem and slightness of attachment to their own selfish indulgence lead to free-handed, generous, and even lavish ways, according to the conspicuousness of the occasion or the admitted importance of the individuals or body of men whose good opinion is desired. The Japanese are very good, too, about helping a relative in distress, expecting in time of their own need a like return, and, in fact, seem sometimes to have, as it were, a common purse for the whole family connection.

They are remarkably free from envy at another's good fortune that they cannot share, and will thank you heartily for any special

kindness toward a relative or comrade; but they are none the less eager to vindicate the claims of their own master.

None know better than they do how to turn away wrath by a soft answer, or to avoid by silence further irritating one who is already annoyed, or are more ready to try deceit for the same purpose. When defeated in their wishes they, better than any others, can cheerfully "accept the situation." When they have received an injury they do not feel it so deeply but that they can with comparative readiness forgive and forget it, so that they sometimes seem to outsiders of different disposition and training (albeit Christians so called), to be like a dog who will good-humoredly bring back the cudgel that has been thrown at him. Yet an injury to a parent or master is never forgiven nor forgotten, and revenge for it has been considered a most important point of honor; and incidents of that kind are the favorite ones in their history. They are, then, on the whole, remarkably forgiving of injuries to themselves, yet at the same time vindictive and unforgetting as to injuries to a parent or master.

In spite of the humble, faithful devotion to superiors in authority, and the constant respect for equals and kindness toward subordinates, it may be questioned whether friendship exists at all in Japan in the lofty sense the word has in the Western world; and in the thousands of years of their history, exact, traditional, or mythical, there appears to be no single incident resembling that of Damon and Pythias, and no evidence that it would have been appreciated as anything but ridiculous if there had been. They have, however, the custom of adoptive brotherhood between friends, by which the survivor in troublous times becomes responsible for the care of the deceased one's children.

The readiness to overlook injuries, large or small, and the habit of looking merely at the surface and not reflecting or brooding, combined with the general friendliness of their countrymen, give rise to striking confidence in others, and a comparative absence of suspicion and jealousy. What you say or do towards another, however bunglingly and ambiguously, is taken in a good sense, and there is a complete absence of the sensitive readiness to take offence that is seen in some other countries even when no offence is meant or can properly be inferred. The Japanese, then, have comity, and get along together without disagreeable friction; and

when associated, for instance, on a piece of work, though previously strangers, they "pull together" well. If the word civilization as distinguished from enlightenment means natural or trained adaptation and skill for human association, then the Japanese are among the most highly civilized races in the world, and they have less than almost any other the rude independence and segregating selfishness of savages.

While in reality of a confiding disposition, inclined to put trust in others, yet they naturally suppose anybody else to be influenced as exclusively as themselves by outside opinion, and therefore capable of acting, when without such influence, in a most crooked manner. They seem, consequently, to be very suspicious and doubtful of a man's steadfast honor when unwatched, and for that reason they appear to foreigners to be much given to secret or underhand observation and setting of spies.

Nevertheless, the general confidence in others and absence of jealousy are noticeable in domestic affairs and in the lack of seclusion even of women, a strong contrast particularly to what is found almost everywhere else in Asia, and resulting in as great freedom for women as they enjoy, for example, in France. A gentleman's friendly visitor is made acquainted with the ladies of the house, even the younger ones, and it is not thought strange or improper that a married lady should visit a gentleman in his house. An official has been known to send his concubine, in his absence, to make his house ready for temporary occupation by a foreign gentleman she had never seen, and to receive him. In some other respects there is still far greater freedom than there would be in France; for even well-born ladies, old and young, are accustomed to go daily without special attendance to the public bath. There both sexes bathe quite naked with the utmost decorum and politeness, though not always with straight-faced seriousness, it is such a mirth-loving race; while they indulge at the same time by the hour together their natural talkativeness and gather all the news and gossip of the day.

It is easy, then, to understand that there should be the utmost freedom of speech between the sexes, especially as the keenness of their wit prevents the continuance of any barrier of superstitiously maintained ignorance or pretence of ignorance of certain matters; and that with the national love of joking there should be a fre-



quent occurrence, even in ladies' presence, of what might be considered obscenity in prudish Western countries, but which in Japan raises only a childlike, innocent laugh. The Japanese, not looking below the surface, are not ready to perceive improper double meanings nor prurient, on the lookout for immoral suggestions; nor do they infer the encouragement of unchastity (the essential harm of obscenity) from the mere mention of certain subjects or from joking about them.

The "social evil," as the name suggests, is the most serious form of indulgence in Japan, and has been especially rife both on account of the sociable, amiable disposition and lack of conscientiousness of the people, and of some favoring circumstances of their political organization under the late Government; such as the great numbers of military retainers of the princes who had to live at times in the capital, and at times in the country, and the fact that the retainers were maintained by rations that descended from the father to the eldest son only, so that the other sons, if not adopted elsewhere, could have no family of their own. These customs of the gentry led to the corruption of the morals of the people of the town and country—farmers, merchants, tradesmen, and the like. Through lack of enlightenment, too, polygamy or concubinage, as in the most of Asia, has until lately been legal, and is still allowed to a certain extent to officials and to the Emperor, and the keeping of a mistress in addition to a wife is not uncommon among those who can afford it, especially Government officials, even some of the highest, though not considered at present very reputable. But, of course, poverty, as well as habits of self-control and shallowness of feeling, makes monogamy and comparative chastity to be the most general rule throughout the whole population.

Love between the sexes has been glorified by a very few extreme cases that are celebrated, where the lovers have even found life insupportable in separation and have killed themselves—cases apparently famous for the very reason that they are far rarer than in Western countries. It is true the double suicide of loving couples is not a very infrequent occurrence; nor is the suicide of women who find themselves neglected by their lords. But the impelling cause of the double suicides, as sometimes no doubt in the case of these women, is generally pecuniary distress, difficulty about get-



ting a living, not the cruelty of parents or of laws and customs that stand in the way of the lovers' union. As marriages take place rather early and without the previous choice of the parties themselves, the few celebrated cases of strong unmarried love have been with inmates of brothels, where indeed is the scene of the most of Japanese romance. It sometimes happens that even officials of good position are so attracted by women there as to make them legal wives, though it probably does not happen so often as some foreigners suppose. Among the married there is perhaps somewhat seldom very deep ardent love on either side according to Western notions, though faithful attachment and respect for a lord and master and, to some extent, fondness for dependents and desire for association, especially or primarily, of the sexes be guiding principles of the Japanese character.

4. As regards the treatment of inferiors, parents, with their admitted complete sway and with their own life-long training of self-control in favor of others, and looking for so great a return from their children, are in general not harsh toward them, but very gentle and kind. In fact, fondness of children is a most striking characteristic of the whole people; and in the streets you may see common laborers petting little children and babies of others. The rod is spared, and at present is forbidden in the public schools, without apparently spoiling the child, for the absence of such exceptional severity is made up for by quickness and constancy of admonition, that are sufficient with children who, by inheritance from many generations, have such a submissive, gentle disposition. Japanese children are really the admiration and envy of foreigners.

Any Japanese husband takes, it is true, for granted and as altogether natural his absolute power over his wife, and her complete submission to his authority; but is not therefore unkind, and is not, especially among the better educated classes, very ready to divorce her.

A master or superior, though arbitrary and changeable, expecting full respect and submission, is commonly not unkind, nor even coldly distant and rough towards those confessedly in his power, and treats them in a not harsh, though arbitrary, variable, uncertain way that is not annoying to his countrymen with their disposition, however much it is so to foreigners of another kind, as

all such have experienced who have served the Japanese Government.

Owing to their love of the good opinion of others, the Japanese are especially fond of holding any position or office that gives authority or commands respect. Yet, once holding such a place, they are not very desirous of exercising the authority themselves, but readily delegate it to subordinates, retaining only the name. For that reason their princes and emperors for many centuries have been, with few exceptions, mere men of straw or figure-heads, whose power was really wielded by their men of business and officials, who were pleased and satisfied with their own influential position, and often kept themselves in it by causing the princely line to be perpetuated by the adoption of unusually tractable or unintelligent children. The name and appearance of authority and power are desired, then, rather than the substance.

As with the people, so with the Government, much attention is given to matters of superficial importance, while more serious ones are neglected. For example, laws have been promulgated about the mode of cutting and dressing men's hair, and about their dress, and about the dimensions of wooden door-plates, while the subjects of the inheritance of property, and the treatment of wives by their husbands, and the regulation of marriage formalities have been almost wholly neglected and left to unsupported custom.

With such a light regard for religious theories, there is on the part of the Government great toleration for all sects that have no unsafe direct political tendency (as the Christian religion was supposed to have in the time of the early Roman Catholic missionaries). The priests, too, have no special hold upon the people except by persuasion, and have, consequently, little temptation or opportunity to be overbearing. So far from that, the Buddhist priests profess to be servants (like the Christian ministers), and call their parishioners masters. The required celibacy of the Buddhist priests seems to be taken so lightly as commonly to result in having practically a single wife, who goes by the name of "the needle," or seamstress. They appear much more intelligent and decent than the brutish, stupid-looking priests of the same sect in some countries, for example, at Canton, in China.

Owing to unreflective, thoughtless habits and little imagination of what is unseen, there is not very much nor deep sympathy with

the pain of others, and, consequently, in many cases there is great cruelty, especially in the treatment of convicted or suspected criminals and enemies, or the helpless and friendless. Outside of certain villages crosses were still standing as late at least as 1879, that had been set up, not as holy symbols, but for practical use, and built, too, with the upper end long, so as to serve for crucifixion with the head down. Regard, however, for the enlightened opinion of modern times in Western countries, combined with native kindness, has, under the present Government, very greatly mitigated the treatment of convicts, and has, even within a few years, brought about the public prohibition of the torture of suspected criminals which was practiced in compliance with the Chinese principle that a sentence should not be carried out without first having a confession of guilt, and which was applied only after the guilt was already pretty well ascertained. The custom, too, has been abolished of leaving a drowning man to drown without making any effort to save him—a custom that formerly did not seem so unhandsome as greater enlightenment has shown it to be.

Greater enlightenment would remove many of the deplorable and annoying consequences of the natural tendency to shallowness, and, by showing the importance of many an act that would otherwise be neglected, would cause it to be performed, and would in a great measure take the place of a deep reflective habit by making it possible to take advantage of the reflection and thought of others. It is impossible, of course, for a careless and gay and superficial disposition to be at the same time careful and anxious and thorough; but it may learn to see the importance of numerous careful or thorough actions, and to perform them, and, with an excellent memory and power of association of ideas, to cultivate a habit of watchfulness in regard to the occasion for doing them. The further enlightenment and training of the Japanese would, therefore, usefully be in the line of correcting indirectly, if not directly, what may be considered the defects of their character (as any such defect lessens their adaptation to surrounding circumstances and their fitness for life in the world as it is), and, further, should tend to develop or turn to advantage more particularly the good faculties and qualities they naturally possess. For instance, their taste might be still further improved and might be made more and more useful by cultivation; their observing habits, al-

ready so universal that they little need any special cultivation by object lessons in early childhood, might be turned to account in natural science; their reasoning powers, hitherto from want of reflectiveness apparently deficient, might be increased and disciplined by mathematical and logical studies and exercises; their "external conscience" might be perfected by the elevation of the whole people and by bringing to bear upon each individual the opinion of the most enlightened men, showing what it is and its merits.

It has often been pointed out that very many Japanese customs are exactly the reverse of ours, and it is sometimes taken for granted that they are consequently inferior or foolish, and evidence of stupidity. But in many cases the two opposite ways of doing a thing are equally satisfactory, and one way or the other might have been adopted by chance or indifferently. In other cases, circumstances that are commonly overlooked by a foreigner make the Japanese method more rational. For example, they put the south edge of a map uppermost, evidently because, sitting as they do on the floor and using the floor as a table to spread the map out, the edge farthest from the eye would generally be toward their large paper-covered sashes that serve both as windows and doors, and are mostly toward the south, especially in good rooms, whereas with us, reading as we are apt to with the back toward a high window without our bodies in the way of its light, the top of the map would in the majority of instances be toward the north, though at the present day a much smaller majority in our case than in theirs. Again, it seems irrational to us to mount a horse from the right side, and well-nigh impossible to do so with a sword on; but the two Japanese swords are worn in such a way as to be no obstruction to mounting on the right, whereby, too, the swords are less in the way between the rider and the horse's head, and the freer right hand is in a position to be of better service than it could be on the other side.

Foreigners in Japan, however, not only speak of the Japanese as doing everything in the reverse method to ours, but severally, or at different times singly, describe their character in diametrically opposite ways, and ascribe to them qualities that are completely or apparently contradictory, as we can now readily understand. Many such strangers have somewhat of the native

disposition to make hasty, sweeping generalizations that may be optimistic or pessimistic, and to be blind thereafter to the exceptions or qualifications; and many know the men among whom they have lived for years almost as imperfectly as they do the inhabitants of Timbuctoo. The first impression is nearly always an extremely pleasing one, but is apt to be entirely reversed by annoyances that occur in a longer stay. It is not altogether wonderful, then, that the various accounts of hasty or careless or prejudiced new-comers or old sojourners, optimists or pessimists, are so widely unlike, considering that we have found the people to be not only quick in movement, but slow to accomplish; quick witted, but shallow; of excellent memory, but unmindful; capable of reasoning, but impatient of it or unwilling to unravel it, and so seeming arbitrary and unreasonable; very clear-sighted and practical in ordinary, comparatively simple affairs, but lacking judgment in more seriously complicated, doubtful ones; bright, but apparently thick-headed from jumping too hastily and superficially at conclusions; ingenious in numerous small ways, but imitative and without profound originality; ready at expedients, though without radical contrivance or thoroughness; fond of knowledge and schooling, but hitherto ignorant and curious about trifles; keen-witted, but, from ignorance and respect for others, and habitual neglect of looking beneath the surface, credulous; remarkably tasteful in decorative, picturesque, superficial, or trivial ways, but not reaching to high art; excelling in rapid execution of art, say in painting, music, dancing, talking, but incapable of grand composition, either with the brush or in music or in words; guided in actions by the fear of ridicule, yet insensitive in not feeling it so very seriously after all; demonstrative of their feelings so far as decorum permits, but not in reality feeling very deeply; frugal as to their own private pleasure, but extravagant for the sake of gaining the admiration of others; lavish in behalf of those whose good-will they desire, but stingy toward anybody else; even self-denying and temperate, out of respect to others, and because not deeply desiring indulgence, yet fond of pleasure and ease; prompt when once in action, but dilatory about rousing from quiet ease or about carrying through a work that requires steady, tedious exertion; active when in movement, but apparently lazy from indifference to many ordinary yet more or less far-seeing incen-

tives for activity ; absorbed in observation of what is before them, even in reading, but never abstracted in thought nor reflective ; thoughtless of cares or discouragement, hopeful and gay, yet so lightly attached to selfish enjoyment, even to life itself, as to be comparatively ready for suicide ; therefore brave under excitement or under the influence of others' opinion, and especially in behalf of a master, but otherwise generally appearing timid, because they prefer to yield what they prize so slightly to the will of another rather than undergo much pain or trouble for it ; modest in their claims upon others' esteem, yet self-confident from absence of embarrassing second thoughts or reflection on the serious difficulties to be met ; humble in self-estimation, but vain of any token of others' approbation ; from fear of ridicule at attempted originality, conservative of certain ancestral customs, yet extremely changeable in everything else, and even in them, after finding their source, Chinese civilization, inferior to Western enlightenment ; from regard for others, cleanly to outward appearance, but unneat where not in plain view ; obedient to one in authority over them, but insubordinate when they think they know his interest better than he does ; respectful and submissive to superiors, but insolent or overbearing to an unrespected, apparently weak and unimportant stranger ; always hitherto living under an absolute despotism, yet perhaps quite capable of maintaining republican forms ; extremely polite even to equals or inferiors that they hold in some respect, but very rude when they think safely to appear superior thereby, or to conform to foreign customs, on the whole so much admired ; remarkably faithful to a master, but treacherous and spiteful in dealing with enemies or those whose opinion they think lightly of ; honorable toward equals when in the sight practically of those they respect, but mean when without any such restraint ; honest in trade when they readily perceive the good policy of being so, but not averse to cheating in any other case ; usually truthful, however, from lack of deep calculation, but, under temptation, hastily and inelaborately lying from not foreseeing the trouble it will bring them ; ordinarily frank, but many times given to the use of falsehoods and shams that seem harmless and unimportant, or to secret underhand ways of carrying a point peacefully ; well capable of secrecy, but often indiscreet from not seeing its importance ; sincere, but, out of politeness, telling unselfish lies, if

you look at the literal meaning ; profuse in acknowledgments of gratitude, and unjustly accused of insincerely lacking it, though perhaps not having the feeling so deeply as the demonstrations would imply in the case of a more phlegmatic, literal people ; most attentive and kind to the sick and distressed whom they respect, however annoying may be their demands upon the same individuals at other times ; remarkably free from envy, yet zealous in vindicating the claims of a patron ; forgiving of injuries to themselves, but vindictive for a parent or master ; very kind in general, but at times extremely cruel from not realizing by reflection and imagination the pain they inflict and from not respecting the sufferer ; faithful to superiors and friendly to equals and inferiors, but probably never friends in the highest sense ; well civilized in associating together easily without friction, though poorly enlightened ; generally confiding in others, but suspicious, or doubtful of their good behavior when wholly out of sight, from not expecting any great feeling of honor except under observation ; not much inclined to jealousy, and allowing great freedom to women, yet regarding them practically as servants or even slaves ; virtuous as wives—that is, as faithful subordinates—but licentious as men with the means to be so ; perfectly decorous in spite of nakedness that would seem indecent to some Americans ; harmlessly laughing with childlike innocence at jokes and sights that to the same Americans would appear grossly obscene ; particularly inclined to love between the sexes, yet very rarely carrying it to extreme infatuation ; in general, kindly toward inferiors, though arbitrary and uncertain ; fond of rule for the respect it brings, but becoming mere puppets and figure-heads as rulers, content with that respect ; making laws about trifling details, but leaving weighty matters to custom without Government support ; on the whole, above all things social and extremely agreeable as subordinates or companions or in time of sickness, but as superiors or in business, from arbitrariness, fickleness, not feeling bound by promises to an inferior or opponent, and, from imperfect knowledge or training as to the best modern methods, nearly unendurable to men of different disposition ; so that, once knowing them well in the various relations, you find “ there is no getting along either with them or without them,” according to the poor or good discipline they may have had. In a word, as, in spite of mature years?



they are children in enlightenment, so, though they be men in body, they are—not in a bad sense—women in character.

For you will already have remarked that we have been characterizing not only the Japanese, and in great measure some other peoples, but have essentially described at the same time the “better half,” the more particularly social half, of the whole human race. The comparison is not by any means made, I repeat, in a bad sense, as implied sometimes in the words womanish, effeminate, feminine; and far be it from me to be so ungallant as to admit that the resemblance is at all derogatory or uncomplimentary to the Japanese, or that they or anybody else should be in the least justified in thinking so. It must be borne in mind that it is particularly in the unenlightened state that the less agreeable features are found, and that the fundamental character is a most amiable and admirable one. But it is a peculiarity of such a character as theirs in that state, while holding themselves in little respect, to be sure, to feel somewhat annoyed at any intimation that in the opinion of others they do not possess every good quality, however impossible and contradictory its possession along with certain other good qualities may be. No one can be both shallow and deep at the same time; yet both qualities have great merits as well as defects. The quick and shallow and gay will themselves laugh at the clumsy, pondering slowness of the rest of the world; and let them be content, then, just as the more reflective and self-respecting will on the whole feel satisfied with their own lot in spite of their dulness, poor memory, and sensitiveness, and the possible gibes and taunts of others.

It is true the Japanese have a quick, prompt, brisk, decided, easy, self-confident, well-spoken manner, that women sometimes superficially mistake for evidence of “manliness” and for the strong, unyielding, commanding, at times haughty and domineering, really masculine qualities that are more likely to be found behind a quiet, dull, heavy, slow-moving, inarticulate, awkward, diffident, unpretending, or humble-seeming exterior.

As to which of the two dispositions or temperaments, masculine or feminine, self-regarding or social, is on the whole or absolutely the best, discussion might be endless and final decision impossible. It might be urged that even bodily the feminine comparative absence of beard and hairiness noticeable in the Japanese is obvious



proof of greater departure from the lower animal type ; but, on the other hand, their smallness of stature might be argued as indicating an inferior stage of development, which would agree too with the fact that male children in some important respects have more the character of women than men have. It is, however, perhaps the most reasonable to conclude that for every climate there is a human character best suited to it, though unlike what is best balanced for an average of the whole world, the happiest general mean of careless enjoyment of life and careful maintenance of it ; and that, if a people be essentially undisturbed for many generations from external contact and admixture, those who are less fitted for the climate, or with a gross excess of either peculiarity of temperament, will gradually die out and leave few or no inheritors of their disposition, while the better fitted ones will by degrees take their place and fill up the whole land. In cases of numerous invasion and armed settlement the same result would finally take place if the subsequent seclusion should last long enough ; peaceful immigration might even hasten the process, as the climate would especially attract those best fitted for it. It is striking how uniform in character the whole Japanese people is, probably from its having been so long shut out from the rest of the world and subject to the natural process of adaptation to the climate and other surrounding circumstances—a process hastened by the innate love of conforming to the general standard of character. It is not as in America, where we may sometimes see two sisters with the most opposite temperament, one very masculine and the other very feminine, though both with feminine training ; and two brothers may differ in the same way ; and a wife may be really of a more masculine turn of mind than her husband. In some of our communities of prevalent masculine disposition, but where women strongly preponderate in numbers, the men seem apt to become womanish and petty, and the women mannish and self-asserting. But in general we have not yet seen the full effect on our transplanted race of the new climate and institutions, the abundance of good land, the ease of getting a living, the numerous women teachers, and other circumstances ; and the tendency seems on the whole to be very decidedly toward the feminine cast (evidently to the great satisfaction of the people itself), departing far from the serious, stern, rugged, ultra-masculine character of our Pilgrim

fathers. The exquisite climate of Japan may in like manner have occasioned the bright, careless, happy disposition of the Japanese.

But perhaps you are impatient at such discussion about the probable natural origin of different temperaments, and prefer some "old-aunt-of-the-universe" theory by which every people simply has its inborn character given to it from time to time, and that's all. Yet I will say, the fact that these and kindred speculations have excited acrimonious pietistic opposition and frequent accusation of gross materialism is remarkable, considering that in reality they not only lead to the finest spiritual views and create new incentives and guides to the highest morality, but even give grounds for a literal and rational belief in many or all of the principal religious dogmas, which must otherwise be mysteries to the devout and stumbling-blocks or superstitions to skeptics and infidels.

## GOESCHEL ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF CARL FRIEDRICH GOESCHEL, BY SUSAN E. BLOW.

### CHAPTER III.

#### *On the Triplicity of the Proofs of Immortality in the Light of Speculation.*

Casting another backward glance at the path over which we have travelled, we discover that, from the immanent movement of Thought from Being to the Notion and the unfolding of finite Spirit out of Soul into Personality, there falls a light which illuminates and transfigures the three original external proofs of immortality. These proofs rest upon discursive thought, which tries vainly to organize its scattered stores; therefore, in themselves, they bring no conviction of truth. The successive is never the inclusive and penetrative. This discursive Thought first attains organic unity in the immanent development of the Notion; hence it arises that these same proofs, seen in the light of speculative philosophy, really produce Conviction. This speculative light radiates from the elevation of Being (in whose sphere the three

dogmatic proofs darkly struggle) into Thought. This done, the Categories of Being and Essence are transfigured into their Truth contained in the Categories of the Notion.

It is evident to the most superficial observation that the simplicity which is the basis of the metaphysical proof corresponds to the Individuality of the soul whence proceeds its immanent movement; that the capacity for infinite development and the destiny to infinite ends, of which the soul, according to the moral proof, is conscious, corresponds to the consciousness of the subject into which the soul awakes; and that the thought of persistence, which is the basis of the ontological proof, finds its analogy in the Spirit, in whose participative Personality the Soul realizes its notion. It is true that in the first proof consciousness is presupposed, for only from consciousness can simplicity be deduced; it is, however, *only* presupposed, and not developed. In the series of proofs, as in the immanent movement of the notion, this development falls within the second sphere, and consists in that diremption of consciousness wherein self and its other fall apart, and yet both are known as content of consciousness. This is the transition to the third sphere. Thus far the speculative movement of the idea offers nothing new, either in its content or in its successive phases; it places us, however, upon a new standpoint, whence we look at, and into, and through the heretofore scattered and isolated proofs.

Another difference lies in the fact that, whereas each proof in its dogmatic form is exclusive and self-sufficient from the speculative standpoint, it is seen to go over into the succeeding proof. The content of each proof sinks, therefore, into an organic phase of truth, and, if taken alone out of this organic unity, proves nothing. The movement is dialectical; the discovered proof contradicts and annuls itself. In the immediate form in which it is posited it is not true, and in its development it exhibits its own insufficiency. This dialectic must now be more attentively considered, for it is the intrinsic though unrecognized cause of the doubt which the separate proofs have left behind them. The negation involved in the isolated proof is felt, but the positive truth, veiled in the inadequate form, is ignored.

Therefore it becomes our duty to notice how the several conceptions which underlie the dogmatic proofs of immortality are transformed when received in the light of the speculative method

and how the dialectic movement of these proofs brings out their relationship to each other.

The first point to be noted is, that the simplicity of the soul, which is the basis of the first proof, is not able to maintain itself when confronted with the thought to which it nevertheless belongs, and is therefore really negated in the second proof.

Though the soul, being simple, is indivisible, and consequently can neither separate itself from itself nor go out of itself, its essential destiny is to go over into that which is not itself; for, be its end knowledge or activity, each equally necessitates the alienation of the soul from itself.

In the first proof the soul, as simple, is dry and arid; in the second it becomes fluid in its forward movements. In the same manner the content of the second proof is negated in the third, in that therein the diremption into Subject and Object, Thought and Being, is cancelled. The Subject becomes conscious of the Object as well as of itself, whence results the content of the third proof, according to which each is in the other, and to Thought (which is Persistence) is ascribed Being (which is Persistence). Stated differently: According to the first proof the soul persists in itself, and all its movement is from and within itself; yet, according to the second, having become self-conscious, it lives and has its Being in God, and its movement is not from itself, but from God; finally, in the third proof God and the Soul are mediated in the Spirit, and the estrangement between them forever cancelled.

But though in this transition negation has declared itself, there must be recognized simultaneously the positive moment, *i. e.*, the form in which the Content of the negated proofs is still preserved. Thus, the underlying truth of simplicity is revealed in Individuality; for Individuality is that Unity which in its diremption maintains its integrity. Similarly, the implicit truth of destination (*i. e.*, the soul's capacity for and destiny to high ends) becomes explicit in Consciousness, which, knowing both itself and its other, feels itself to be active and passive, subjective and objective. Finally, the presupposed immediate Unity of Thought and Being is mediated in the Personality of the Spirit.

After these general statements we shall venture to dwell freely upon the isolated proofs. Ultimately we shall doubtless find a point toward which our scattered thoughts will converge.

The first crude representation of simplicity is so barren, so unproductive, so unthinkable that no man can persevere in holding it. That the soul, being simple, cannot die we willingly concede, for the simple is dead, and what is dead cannot die. The characteristic of life is self-alienation. The truth of simplicity is therefore the unity of its varied determinations. The unity really underlies the dogmatic conception of simplicity. Wolf defines simplicity as *vis* or primary force. This force, according to him, is the Representative Activity which manifests itself in different faculties (facultates), and, without detriment to its unity, exerts itself in different directions.

Again, when the soul, in virtue of its simplicity, is characterized as immaterial, the first conscious meaning is that the soul is dispossessed of the body and its independence of the body is declared. But without a body the soul cannot exist; the truth is that the soul has its real body in itself, that body and soul are one in the Spirit because both are of the Spirit.

In predicating immateriality of the soul, we therefore really declare only that the soul is not subject to matter. This predication, moreover, is wholly negative; we have neither explained what the soul is, if it is not material, nor have we defined matter itself. When Idealism says, The soul is spirit, *animus est spiritus*, it understands by spirit only that it is not matter. Spirit is the opposite of matter, but the validity of matter is as little contested by Idealism as by Materialism—the difference between the two schools of thought being that Materialism ascribes the sole supremacy to matter, while Idealism confesses a belief in dualism. But in dualism thought can find no rest; moreover, it demands to know what matter is. Thought struggles to free itself from matter; this is the deep internal significance of the conception of immateriality. Thought first contests the *supremacy* of matter, then its *validity*. In the course of this contest it falls upon many different conceptions which are far more than fancies of the imagination.

Matter is the limit temporarily allotted in thought to the finite spirit—therefore darkness is its nature. This more adequate definition of matter has also the great significance that it finds in matter the negation which was ascribed to the soul when the latter was characterized as immaterial. With this definition, in fact, the whole battle is won if its meaning is really apprehended and de-

veloped. The forms of representation will, however, vary until they culminate in the adequate concept.

In the development of this definition, matter is first characterized as the difference between the infinite and finite spirits, for the former includes its limit and the latter does not. This impenetrable limit of the finite spirit is what we call matter.

Again, in the variation of views which have not ripened into insight, matter is defined as the illusory image conjured up by the understanding in lieu of the "thing-in-itself"; this latter it can never find, as it lies beyond the subjective sphere.

Finally, matter is characterized as soul in the process of becoming; this dead soul during its slow self-transfiguration serves the living soul, through whose reaction it is quickened into conscious life.

In all these representations the body is negatively but not positively cancelled. They are forms which, though developed from the presupposed immateriality of the soul, yet seek to rise above the dogmatic dualistic standpoint upon which the conception of immateriality immediately rests. They contest that validity and authority of matter which idealism left unimpeached; they ascribe reality exclusively to the soul, and thus reduce matter to negation. Their inadequacy results from the fact that they apprehend this negation only in its alienation from positive reality.

Ultimately the truth grows clear which is hinted in all these representations. This truth is the monism of the spirit, according to which the spirit is seized, not as the synthesis of body and soul, but as the unity of these two moments. Thus the abstract negative conception of immateriality leads ultimately to the concrete notion of the spirit.

It is a most instructive and noteworthy fact that even those systems of thought which move not from Thought or the Subject, but from Substance or Being, are forced involuntarily to admit this immateriality. Under this head must be classed the well-known proposition of Spinoza in the *Ethics*: "*Mens humana non potest cum corpore absolute destrui sed ejus aliquid remanet quod aeternum est.*" Under this proposition stands its mathematical demonstration, together with a scholium, according to which indeed the *existentia mentis* ceases with the body, but the *essentia mentis*, as an "*intellectus in Deo conceptus*," persists in God to all eternity.

It must be admitted that with the *existentia mentis* perish *Representation* (*imaginatio*) and *Re-collection* (*recordatio rerum praeteritarum*), both of which are apprehended as dependent upon the body. Consciousness, on the contrary, is somewhat illogically preserved.

This loss of existence and recollection is the logical result of a system which apprehends God as Being or Substance, and therein ceedes to Being the supremacy and priority over Thought. With such a presupposition it is forced to concede that the starting-point of the finite spirit is also its goal—to declare that nothing is accomplished by existence in time, and to assert that the soul shall return to God in the same form of *essentia mentis* in which it was originally in God. This is the radical insufficiency of this stage of thought; the consciousness retained in God its radical inconsistency—an inconsistency, however, which is unavoidable, because the spirit, in virtue of its absolute freedom, as often as it is renounced, instinctively asserts anew its own validity. It is worthy of remark that Spinoza seizes Thought as simple because he opposes it to Extension, and that he grasps both Thought and Extension as attributes of substance, whereas the thinking Being and the extended object are, in his view, only modes or affections of these attributes.

When Spinoza attempts to explain the difference between the *esse essentiae* and the *esse existentiae* he involuntarily substitutes Thought for substance as the ground of the *esse essentiae*, but while so doing still holds Thought apart from the subject demanded by and inseparable from Thought. With him, too, existence is externality, or extension and essence, simplicity or thought. The *esse existentiae* to him is *ipsa rerum existentia extra Deum et in se considerata quae tribuitur rebus postquam a Deo creatae sunt*. All finite beings without distinction are therein apprehended as external, *i. e.*, as Things; simultaneously the idea of emanation is substituted for that of creation, the *esse essentia* signifying the thought in God which is eternal, *modus quo res creatae in Deo concipiuntur*. Thus even this original and highest Being of the "*essentia*" falls within the range of Speculative Knowing, which is "*tertium genus cognitionis sub specie aeternitatis*."

In illustration of the difference between the *esse essentia* and the *esse existentia* Spinoza instances the work of art whose es-



sence is vitally persistent in the mind of the artist, whereas its existence is projected and disjoined from thought, and is thus purely external. In this separation from the creative thought it may easily be destroyed while the essence survives in the imagination of the artist. This illustration ignores the fact that God is thought as the subject who thinks the creature, or, to express it passively, as the subject by whom the creature is thought. From this insight follows the eternity of created personality—that is to say, when the creature is thought by the creator as thinking, the creature must also think, because it is not only thought by God, but, by the Thinker, thought as thinking. For this same reason the creature thinks God, or (expressing it passively to make it more clear) God, the Thinking Being, is reciprocally thought by the creature who is thought as thinking. Thus thought and thinking the creature endures in eternity because it is once and for all thought by God. Moreover, it endures *as* it is thought, viz., as thinking; and it thinks God, *i. e.*, the Eternal Personality God is thought by the creature because it is thought by God. Thus Spinoza's own illustration, logically completed, leads to personal persistence, though, in the view of Spinoza himself, personal persistence, together with all representation and recollection, dissolves in infinite substance.

It would seem that even Dante fears to lose recollection as he plunges his soul into the depths of the glory of God.

“Because in drawing near to its desire  
Our intellect engulfs itself so far  
That after it the memory cannot go.”

But the great poet of Christianity recovers the memory, both of things human and of things divine, and reproduces for us in the thirty-three Cantos of the “Paradiso” the content of recollection. Lethe blots out only the nugatory, vain, and unreal memory of Sin, while Eunoë, upon the soul's entrance into Paradise, restores to consciousness “all good deeds done,” and renews and vivifies the power of memory. Thereafter, as it advances through the realm of light, the Spirit is increasingly illuminated until, penetrated by the vision of God in the glory of his threefold Being, it knows itself as God's eternal image.

Returning to the immateriality of the soul, let us say once more that its outcome is the finite spirit, and this finite spirit is the



identity of the soul with its body. The body is immanent in the soul; it is not bestowed upon the soul from without; it is the externalization of the soul, and it has to be *in* the soul in order to come forth out of the soul. Hence it is indestructible. This is the outcome of the metaphysical proof.

It may be said that the soul is its own body, its own organ, and again that its body is itself. The external body of the soul is its *ἄλη*, the internal body its *ὑποκείμενον*. Plato says in the "Phædrus": "The soul resembles the united power of the chariot and of the driver who sits thereon and guides it." The chariot is the inner body of the soul, the driver is the soul of the soul; the union of the two is not to be grasped as a synthesis but as one force, hence as unity.

The soul, as spirit, is consequently indivisibly one with its inward body, *i. e.*, the soul has its individual form though it separate from its outward body, as our eyes see it do. As far as we can trust our eyes, this separation is not to be denied, but we can trust our eyes only in so far as that which transpires in death is visible, *Ὁρᾶται δὲ οὐδ' αὐτὴ ψυχὴ*.—(Xenoph. "Memorab.," iv, 3, 14.) *Animus autem solus, nec quum adest, nec quum discedit apparet.*—Cicero, "De Senect.," c. 22. Visibility is limited, however, to the outward body—hence the soul separates itself from its body only in so far as the body is purely external, only in so far as the body being visible is already different from the soul; or, in other words, only in so far as the body is the other of the soul. Death actualizes what is already ideally contained in the distinction between body and soul. As all nature is the other of soul, so is the body which pertains to nature its other. Death is the consummation of this thought, for death consists only in the soul's separation from its other, that through separation this other may be identified with soul. Upon this identification rests the conception of resurrection; the body which, as external and only external, is deserted by the soul, shall be again united with the soul, or, in other words, its externality shall be dissolved in the soul.

It is not and should not be said that the body leaves the soul, but that the soul leaves the body; *ἡ ψυχὴ καταλείπει το σῶμα*.—Xenoph. "Cyp.," viii, 7. Therefore it is in the soul that the body finds itself. This is the resurrection, and its presupposition is the immortality of the soul. Its first phase is that the soul, being

independent of its external body, being indeed its own body, is victorious over death; its second phase is the resurrection and transfiguration of the outward body into reunion with the soul. As Psyche is the soul and Eros the spirit, so the nymph Calypso is the soul, the earthly man Ulysses the body, and the island of Ogygia the earthly dwelling-place. The separation of the lovers is death; death consists in the dissolution of their union, but does not imply that the separated lovers cease to exist. Rather, after the separation, Eros watches and protects, Psyche labors and serves, Calypso waits and weeps, and Ulysses is tossed upon strange seas and wanders through strange lands, just as the body after death is scattered in its atoms and transmuted into varying forms. Reunion is resurrection in the Spirit. Therefore the resurrection is only understood when it is apprehended as the transfiguration and penetration of the body by the soul in the spirit.

The truth of this conception may be more definitely developed from the genetic idea of externality. Externality is nothing else than the isolation and mutual exclusion of the particular moments of the notion, the unity and totality of which is the Spirit. Outward phenomena are thus the dismembered elements of the internal, self-active, and poetic. The body represents the isolated moments of the individual soul, as nature represents the isolated moments of humanity. These moments are, however, still external to the soul. This externality, which is visibility, in death ceases as appearance *for* the soul; the visible is that which is only a fleeting show; death is *for the soul* the dissolution, or rather the transfiguration, of the external. But even after death the realm of appearance endures; *for itself* and for those who remain behind the external body is still external. Its real transformation falls, therefore, in the future, and is conceived as resurrection and glorification of the flesh. Through this resurrection the verification becomes complete of the unity of the soul as spirit with its so-called body, according to the ground and final end of time, and of its distinctness from the body only in so far as the latter is appearance—*i. e.*, semblance which alone has visibility. The external separation of death takes place in the same moment in which the soul as spirit internalizes its body. This internalization is itself the cessation of externality.

In this development of simplicity and of difference the origi-

nally abstract and barren conception of simplicity realizes a rich and pregnant content. The richer any given thought, the less will it at first be comprehended; the fuller its content, the more difficult for it to gain complete self-mastery. Therefore, with minds illuminated by this insight into unity and distinction, it is interesting to look back upon precedent conceptions, and particularly is it delightful to glance into that crystalline mirror of scholastic thought which we inherit from Dante, even though we may not pause adequately to develop its content. In the "Purgatorio," canto xviii, 49, Virgil teaches as follows :

" Every substantial form that segregate  
From matter is and with it is united,  
Specific power has in itself collected,  
Which without act is not perceptible."

Still more definitely Statius ("Purgatorio," xxv, 37-108) develops, in speaking of the creation of the soul (from which later developed Occasionalism and Preformationism), the inseparability of the divine and the human as united in the spirit, and also (Traducianismus Corporis, from which later arose the system of Epigenesis) the separability of the external body until its transfiguration. The generation and birth of each man is an act of divine creation. He who has advanced so far in thought that he finds the dogmatic—*i. e.*, external and sensible demonstration of Statius—inadequate, may ascend through the simile of the mirror into which the argument rises in lines 22-27, and the simile of the shadow with which it culminates in lines 100-108, into that speculative reflection of the external in the internal through which philosophy in these modern days has renewed its youth. This speculative insight consists in the apprehension of what seems to happen externally—*i. e.*, to pass before the observing subject as the inner self-movement of the subject itself, which herein becomes visible to the subject in the object as in a mirror.

" And wouldst thou think how at each tremulous motion  
Trembles within a mirror thine own image;  
That which seems hard would mellow seem to thee."

Simplicity, Unity, Internality, are different grades of one quality. Language has one word for  $\epsilon\nu$  and  $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ .

Herewith the metaphysical or theoretical, which may also be

called the objective, proof realizes more and more its implicit truth; this truth is the moral or practical, more adequately the subjective proof; besides these two proofs there can be but one other which shall include them both. *We*, however, are still occupied with the first proof, which culminates in the immediate unity of the soul and the body. This unity involves the unity of life; there is not *another* life beyond the grave, but it is this life which continues, just as it is this ego which endures and not another. Herewith otherness, both in the individual and external to the individual, is completely cancelled, and thus *personality is realized*, externality dissolved, and limit annulled, both in the positive and negative sense. Thus it happens that each finds place in the other, as Dante too experiences with astonishment ("Purgatorio," ii, 34 *et seq.*), for the one thing necessary is not place, but the unity of space and time, of the body and the soul. Through this *aperçu*, Æneas of Gaza was able to refute the doubt where place could be found for so many millions of souls. "In those dwelling-places of intelligible essences (*i. e.*, of souls) there is no scantiness of room, but a perfect abundance of it, for all are one. Each one fills the entire space and at the same time admits into itself all the others (*i. e.*, interpenetrates each and is interpenetrated by all), and no one excludes any other or in any way impedes it as material bodies are wont to do."—(Æn. Gaza, "Theophrastus.")

According to the metaphysical proof, the soul is further as monad, in itself and through itself, self-active and self-determining; thus it completes itself into a circle. Hence is deduced its imperishability. This self-determination is, however, negated in the moral proof, according to which the soul in its immediacy is determined, and this determination is not through itself. We find the soul, as created, determined *by* God and determined *to* ends; though this prescribed destiny in relation to which the soul is passive is nothing else than that the soul shall actively develop itself. In other words, the soul is determined to be self-determining. The moral proof thus deduces from determination the same result which the metaphysical proof deduced from simplicity, *i. e.*, from the opposite of determination. The solution of this contradiction is as follows: The soul is determined by God, hence has not its ground in itself, yet the soul is self-determining, and de-

rives its essence from no other essence. These seemingly clashing statements contain in reality no contradiction, for God is not an Essence alien to the soul, but the Absolute Spirit, which, as personal or penetrative and self-communicative, creates and preserves the finite spirit, which latter, penetrated and penetrating, manifests itself also as personal. Persistence itself is nothing but continuous creation, whose presupposition is the personality of the absolute spirit and whose result is the personality of the finite spirit. The creature continuously creates its existence and its thought out of the Creator, the spirit out of the Spirit; or, as Spinoza says, "The *Creatio Dei* demands the *Concursus Dei*." To this he clearly and truly adds: "Nullam rem creatam suâ naturâ ne momento quidem posse existere, sed continuo a Deo procreari."

The first proof affirms as Aristotle also teaches: *Anima per se vitam habet*. The second affirms as the Greek fathers of the Church particularly taught: *Anima non per se vitam habet, sed percipit ex conjunctione cum spiritu, fonte vitæ æternæ*. Thus, too, the Scriptures teach (1 Tim. vi, 16) that only God has immortality in Himself with Christ, who as one with the Father in the Holy Spirit is Himself the Resurrection and the Life (John xi, 25). Man receives immortality. He that believeth in me, says Christ, though he die yet shall he live, as the branch lives if it abide in the vine, but withers if it is torn from the vine. He who is called to communion with God in Christ can never die, for as personal he participates in the imperishable personality of the Absolute Spirit.

Thus from the creation of God results its progressive continuance as *concursus Dei continuus*. This continuous activity of the Absolute Spirit is the source of the continuous activity and development of the finite Spirit; the activity of the latter is only possible as result of the activity of the former, and is mediated in the notion personality. The unity of the two is the immortality of the soul, the finite spirit progressively developing itself in itself through a constant influx from the everlasting fountain of the divine life and thought. This is the content of the second proof which herewith has taken up the first proof into itself, or rather this is the outcome of the second proof which transcends itself as it consciously unites the content of the first proof with its own.

The first point is that the soul exists, consequently that the soul

is created. Its creation presupposes the intellectus in Deo conceptus, and this demands as consequence the concursus Dei continuus. That is to say: "The thought of God is creation, and the creation of God is eternal." "He spake and it was done," writes the Psalmist, and the Preacher adds: "I know that whatsoever God doeth it shall be forever." The Absolute Spirit thinks the finite spirit, or rather finite spirits (for finitude implies plurality), and this thought is their creation: the Absolute Spirit remembers the hosts of finite spirits who, during the long course of history, have vanished from this earthly scene, and this remembrance is their preservation. God's creation never ceases; He who creates upholds his creation; He preserves each object in the mode corresponding to its nature, maintains each species in its appropriate category, and yet transfigures all the separate moments through organic membership in the totality.

The remembrance and preservation of departed spirits in the Absolute Spirit could not be if these spirits themselves were not. As the thought of God, being itself living, creates life, so the perpetual remembrance of God maintains life. The vital concept of the Absolute is a reciprocal concept, and implies that, inasmuch as God remembers finite spirits, these finite spirits must remember him, and in him remember themselves. The *outward* manifestation of the spirits of men *outwardly* vanishes, but the spirits themselves, upheld and transfigured in the Absolute Spirit, live in the life of God. If, then, the Absolute Life consists in consciousness, all that is maintained in this life must be also conscious. On its external side the history of what has been closes in the graveyard, but history comprehended opens our ears to the cry of the prophet, "O ye dry bones, hear the voice of the Lord!" Resurrected humanity is the actuality, the truth, and the surety of God's throne; without it God would be lifeless isolation. For all who can truly re-think this thought the meaning is this: that the Absolute Idea preserves itself in its actuality, certainty, and truth only in so far as finite spirits are preserved and perfected in their self-consciousness in this absolute life of God. The truth and majesty of God's throne demand the assembling of the children of men for his footstool. He who is sure of God is sure of his own life in God. The certainty of the conviction of immortality tests the depth of insight into the nature of Absolute Spirit.

Such is the ultimate development of the second proof in its transition into the third. This is the profound truth in which Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit" finds its infinite culmination.<sup>1</sup> Because man is created to be spirit he is created to be immortal. "*Hinc clare sequitur*," says Spinoza himself, "*animam immortalem esse*." "Consequently," he adds, "none but God can destroy the soul." This can only mean that God has the physical power to enter into contradiction with his own creation, in which his expressed will is the persistence of the Spirit. This, again, is only saying that God can contradict and retract his own will. Such an ascription of simple physical power to the Godhead is an unthinking and unthinkable contradiction. Most significant is it that this has been recognized by that great thinker who moves from the being of substance in that he claims to recognize the Will of God as natural reason in nature itself. Here, again, the Spirit shows itself under the inadequate presupposition; it is not in nature but in the creation of the human spirit, or in thought itself, that Spinoza reads the Word of God.

"Leges autem illae naturae sunt Decreta Dei lumine naturali revelata. Decreta deinde Dei immutabilia esse jam demonstravimus. Ex quibus omnibus clare concludimus, Deum suam immutabilem voluntatem circa durationem animarum hominibus non tantum revelatione sed etiam lumine naturali patefecisse."

The lumen naturale is in this sense, as creation itself, the first revelation.

"Nec obstat," he continues, "si aliquis objiciat, Deum leges illas naturales aliquando destruere ad efficienda miracula: nam plerique ex prudentioribus Theologis concedunt, Deum nihil contra naturam agere [for Creation is his Will] sed supra naturam, hoc est, ut ego explico, Deum multas etiam leges operandi habere, quas humano intellectui non communicavit, quae si humano intellectui communicatae essent, acque naturales essent, quam caeterae. Unde liquidissime constat, mentes esse immortales."

We have now arrived at a point where we may touch more definitely a question which runs secretly through the whole history of the doctrine of immortality, and which throughout is met

<sup>1</sup> Nothing is more misunderstood in the much misunderstood philosophy than the sublime conclusion of that vast cathedral structure which Hegel built for our age in his "Phenomenology of Spirit."



by an unexpressed answer. This question is whether the immortality of man can be recognized immediately by the light of nature or only in the light of the special divine revelation through the Word of God. We are pointed toward the answer by the second proof of immortality, which goes back to God and reads the Will of God in the nature of the finite spirit. Our whole present explanation is, in fact, nothing more than an answer to the question concerning the source of our knowledge. The first necessity is that we should make the question itself clear to our minds. This done, the answer is ready. The question is whether the immortality of man can be recognized in the creation of man alone. This question contains the presupposition that creation is something once done and finished, and that man once created is emancipated. In other words, creation is conceived as an accomplished fact and not as a continuing process. With such a creation and such a nature—a creation which has ceased to be, and a nature which, having lost its source, has lost its life—not only the demonstration of immortality but immortality itself is impossible. If, however, we apprehend creation as progressively continuous, and in this continuous creation recognize the persistence of the finite spirit, we do not get this knowledge from nature, but from the source of nature—viz., from the Spirit of God, which is progressively revealed in creation. The concept of a progressively continuous creation includes the revelation of the Absolute Spirit in the finite: this *creatio continua* manifests itself as Providence, and after the fall (*i. e.*, the actual abstraction from the continuous creation) as Redemption, which is therefore apprehended as a second creation. A perpetually flowing stream of water is manifestly unthinkable without a perpetual source; the stream may be cut off from its source, but, by as much of flowing water as it contains, it is nevertheless united with it. In the same way, by as much light as remains in fallen man, his reason is united with the Spirit of God and his nature still in relation with its supernatural origin. We must therefore affirm that the personal immortality of man can only be recognized in its participation with the personality of the Absolute Spirit; this participation is recognized only in the progressively continuous creation and revelation of God, and this revelation after man's alienation from God is recognized only in Redemption, God's second act of condescend-



ing grace. Herein is cancelled the confusing difference between an *immortalitas naturâ* taught by the first proof, and the *immortalitas gratiâ* upon which the second proof essentially rests. So far as the natural creation still endures it endures through the continuity of its relationship with God—*i. e.*, through the grace of God.

With this continuous creation and revelation is given the concept of immortality from which the third proof deduces the being of immortality. In the light of speculation, however, it has become clear that the Notion or Thought as Spirit is itself the highest, the eternal and indestructible. It therefore needs not the imputation of Being as something external to itself in order to be. It is merely a proof of the power which natural Being has usurped over the natural man, and herewith over the naturalized reason of Thought. When fettered by sensuous modes of thinking, we still desire something fixed and tangible to which Thought or Consciousness may attach itself. All such sensuous thinking implies that thought in itself is not—that only in the *ὕλη* can it find its *ὑποκείμενον*, and that it needs matter for its support just as the Hebraic Vocal, which Spinoza compares with the soul, demanded a fulcrum external to itself as its body.

Thought, however, is really so little dependent upon Being that the truth rather is that eternal persistence belongs essentially to and is immanent in Thought. This is the distinctive content of the third proof. Spinoza touches this third proof when he teaches that the idea of persistency as well as that of progressive development, under varying modifications of the form of existence, is immediately necessary to the soul, while the idea of its destruction is wholly alien to and contradictory of its substance. He expresses this proof negatively when he says: *Nullam nos ideam habere, quâ concipiamus substantiam destrui*. To deny to Thought its persistence is nothing more nor less than to deny persistence to the persistent. Therefore the positive statement is as follows: *Homo, cum se sub aeternitatis specie contempletur, se aeternum esse scit*. The *scientia aeternitatis* is herewith also *essentia aeterna*. It is most remarkable that Spinoza again and again ascribes the eternity which he finds as idea in consciousness not to consciousness itself, but to Being. Throughout his system is manifest with reciprocal overthrow and destruction the conflict of Being and

Thought. The truth is that the being of persistence is not something external added to the notion of persistence, but, just as being is contained in consciousness, it dwells within the concept of persistence as its determination.

The explicit content of the third proof is that in Consciousness is contained all Being—that all that is is preserved in Thought and included in the Notion. As the Subject is preserved in Personality, so the Natural Individual is preserved in the Species, for in the Notion nothing is lost. Augustine says: “Si nulla essentia, in quantum essentia est, aliquid habet contrarium, multo minus habet contrarium prima illa essentia, quae dicitur veritas, in quantum essentia est. Primum autem verum est. Omnis essentia non ob aliud essentia est, nisi quia est. Esse autem non habet contrarium, nisi non esse: unde nihil est essentiae contrarium. Nullo modo igitur res ulla esse potest contraria illi substantiae, quae maxime ac primitus est.”—(Augustine, “De immort. animae,”<sup>1</sup> liber unus, c. 12.)

Relatively to the third proof there is still one observation to be made. It would be wonderful if it had not been urged against the triplicity of the proofs of immortality that the essential content of the third proof falls into the much-articulated sphere of the second proof. The essential basis of the second proof is that the soul, in its most specific determination, is stamped with the seal of immortality, or, in a word, is itself the embodied concept of immortality. Upon this concept also rests the third proof. In so far the two proofs agree; their difference lies in the fact that in the second proof the concept as concept is not explicit, but the capacity for infinite development is grasped as objective quality of the existent soul; or, again, reminiscence is apprehended as the inborn knowledge of an eternal past, and from this eternal past is inferred an endless future. The process here moves from past to future being; in other words, from the nature of being is deduced its future. In the third proof, on the contrary, the concept of per-

<sup>1</sup> Besides this book—which contains an entire series of proofs of immortality, although in fact they are all contained substantially in the above-discussed triplicity of proofs—should be mentioned the dialogue *De Quantitate animae*, as of importance in the history of the doctrine of immortality. It mentions seven grades or stations through which the soul is developed before it comes to God and dwells with him. The last station is the mansion of “*contemplatio Dei apud Deum*.” See also the writing of Augustine “*De spiritu et anima*.”

sistence is comprehended as Thought, and from this transition is made to the Being of persistence or to the actuality of the concept; the movement, therefore, is from subjective thought to its objective reality. A similar difference is found between the teleological and ontological proofs of the existence of God: the former finds God as subject in the objective world, in that from the reality of the object, apprehended as creation, it deduces the reality of the subject apprehended as Creator; the latter thinks God and moves from the thought to its actualization, from that which is necessary to Thought to that which necessarily exists. The outcome of this proof is the concept of Thought which includes Being, and does not have to seek it elsewhere. Thus, too, the first proof coincides with the third in that both rest upon unity: their difference lies in the fact that the immediate unity of the first proof is mediated in the third.

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## IMMORTALITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL.<sup>1</sup>

BY W. T. HARRIS.

### I. *Introduction.*

1. Our argument for immortality will be based chiefly on psychology. The proofs on which most men rely for their conviction that they will continue their individual existence after death we therefore pass over.

The proofs that we omit from our discussion are—

*a.* The return to life of those who have died—a resurrection in the body—notably the example which the Christian Church teaches as the basis of its faith and as the symbol of the resurrection of the individual man.

*b.* The physical manifestation of individuality after death by the exertion of power to control matter, or to materialize in temporary bodies as in cases of reported modern and ancient spiritualism.

<sup>1</sup> Read at the Concord School of Philosophy, August 1, 1884.

<sup>2</sup> As, for example, Tertullian, "De Anima," Cap. ix; I Sam. xxviii, 15.

*c.* General belief in the existence of the soul after death, and the probability that such general beliefs of mankind are well founded.

*d.* General desire of man to live forever, and his horror at annihilation; probability that a desire imparted to his nature has a reality correspondent to it.

*e.* The infinite perfectibility of the human mind; its full capacity never realized in this life; each new growth in knowledge or insight, or power of will, or in love for the race, being always a means of greater growth in the same and other directions; contrary to the course of nature, or to the divine character to endow a being with capacities never to be developed.

*f.* A special phase of proof that belongs to the foregoing is, since Kant and Fichte, the favorite ground for the philosophic doctrine of immortality. The moral proof (or the "proof of the practical reason") asserts that, according to Kant, "a holy will can be realized only in the thinking of an infinite progress, which is possible only under the presupposition of an infinitely continuing existence and personality of the same rational being." Fichte says: "If this obedience to the law of duty is to be recognized as a reasonable service. . . . and not a mere fanciful enthusiasm . . . . this obedience must have some consequences, must serve some end. It is evident that it does not serve the purpose of the world of sense; therefore there must be a supersensual world whose purpose it does promote." And, again: "The bond with which this law of duty binds me is a bond for living spirits only . . . . it addresses its decrees only to living and free beings. . . . In the eternal world, will alone, as it lies concealed from mortal eye in the secret obscurities of the soul, is the first link in the chain of consequences that stretches through the invisible realms of spirit, just as in the physical world action—a certain movement of matter—is the first link in a material chain that runs through the whole system of nature."

*g.* Besides these there is the proof from the standpoint of Evolution. The world is so made that the principle of the survival of the fittest causes intellectual and moral beings to come to the top. Spiritual beings gain the mastery inevitably and subordinate all others—reverse, in fact, the laws of survival in the lower orders. Preserve delicate plants and delicate animals and eradicate nox-

ions ones. Such trend of the universe toward spiritual being points out, unmistakably, that being as the highest and best and most persistent. The spiritual principle alone is loved by the universe, and this points to its origin in a spiritual principle which thus loves its own. A God of Reason who creates the world in order to bring into being independent realizations of himself is thus presupposed by the doctrine of evolution as propounded by its most consistent advocate (Mr. John Fiske).

2. It is to be pointed out that the question of immortality hinges on the question of first principle of the world—or the nature of God. When the highest principle is regarded as something indeterminate—as something above all form—even as above consciousness or reason—it is obvious that there can be no permanent form at all—not even of conscious being. When the highest principle is regarded as personal and conscious, conscious and personal being would have the form of the abiding—and the interest of the first principle would favor that which possessed its own image or likeness.

3. I do not find that the studies in physiological psychology, now become so prevalent, have thrown any light on the question of individuality after death, although they are of great value in education, criminal jurisprudence, and therapeutics—especially so in that which concerns the treatment of the insane.

The most important facts in physiological psychology are patent always: (*a*) an energy acting as cause (1) formative of aggregates and organisms, (2) attacking other aggregates and organisms; (*b*) assimilating others into its own organism; (*c*) feeling, specified into five special senses; (*d*) general ideas or thoughts (1) expressed in language, (2) the basis of institutions, which in the aggregate form civilization (3) systematized in science.

It is a mere fancy that new discoveries in cerebral physiology have changed our attitude toward these important facts.

Man has known for thousands of years of the interaction between soul and body. Such interaction can never be explained except by a combination of introspection with observation of physiologic facts—for the elements of the problem are of two orders: (1) inner facts of feeling and thought, and (2) outer facts of material organism. There is no possible method of observing facts of feeling and thought except that of introspection. There

is no possible method for observing changes of matter or body, including nerves, brain, and such, except by sense-perception.

## II. *Immortality of the Species.*

4. The demonstration of the indestructibility of force, matter, or mind may have great scientific value in itself, but it does not establish our thesis. Inasmuch as the abiding force is that which outlasts particular forces and the abiding matter retains its identity at the expense of infinite particular forms of individual things, the argument for the existence of a general mind that does not die may seem to make the loss of individuality in the case of the particular man all the more certain. Thus the phrase "Immortality of the soul" may refer only to the species or to the mental principle in nature, and not to the special example.

Just as the life-process of the animal or plant migrates from individual to individual and the species lives, though the individuals all die, so, too, the human race abides on the earth while countless particular human beings have disappeared through death and, perhaps, like the plant, perished altogether as individuals.

5. There may be a sort of persistence of the individual in his effects and influences. His deeds continue to act long after he has passed away. A specially favored plant has been permitted, by external conditions, to develop great size and strength. Its seed will continue to manifest for a long time greater power to react on the environment. An animal has been stimulated to exert his energies and has become exceptionally strong through the discipline. He transmits to offspring habits or tendencies that develop in the same way. Man also transmits personal influence by hereditary descent, and also far more potently through intellectual and moral ideas and usages preserved and transmitted by the aid of language. The effort of the individual may be exerted to reach points of view regarding the world, or regarding the social conduct of life, or the management of the State, that will exist as influence down through all ages—Confucius, Zoroaster, Moses, have this permanence to their influence. This is much like the Karma of the Hindu, the transmission of the deeds of a former life.

6. The immortality that is attained through hereditary transmission or through the educative influence of moral and intel-

lectual principles is an immortality of the species only. It is not the goal of our inquiry, but a necessary phase of it, inasmuch as the persistence of personal identity involves the same generic activity that we find in the species, but with the additional modification that it is the particular individual who realizes within himself the entire species. For to be immortal signifies that the individual is recipient of the effects of his own deeds, and that he grows or develops through this means, so that his changes are only stages of self-realization, and not his dissolution.

When all change in an individual is progressive self-realization the individual preserves his identity. If the change is caused from without and represents external influences, the change is loss of identity.

The exertion of personal force or power to change or modify one's self is the realization of that power and the preservation of identity even under change. In so far as the plant is modified through its own forces, each new phase is a revelation of its individuality, but, in so far as its modifications are the product of external forces, they are destructive of the plant. Self-modification is self-preservation. Suicide happens not through self-modification, but through invoking deadly external influences.

### III. *Agnosticism.*

7. We have explained the nature of our problem without alluding to the doctrine, very prevalent in our day, which holds that questions touching the essentials of human nature, or the nature of first principles in the world, are insoluble. It is necessary here to make only a passing notice of the alleged limits of human knowledge. A sacred college of agnostics that should undertake to place on its Index Prohibitory any or all questions relating to God, Freedom, or Immortality, must base its action either on the fact that its limited investigation has hitherto been unsuccessful in finding a solution, or on the fact that its investigation has discovered necessary limits in the nature of human knowledge. The mere fact of such a want of success on the part of the agnostic does not justify him in pronouncing anything either unknown or unknowable. It warrants only the modest attitude of the skeptic who affirms his own present ignorance. What man has a right to affirm besides his own ignorance the ignorance of all men? Au



affirmation of necessary ignorance is still more unwarranted. Modern agnosticism rests chiefly on metaphysical grounds which profess to have discovered the inherent incommensurableness of the infinite or absolute with human capacity for cognition. Such discovery implies acquirements in ontology, a knowledge of the nature of the infinite and absolute, for purposes of comparison, that are utterly destructive of the agnostic hypothesis. The worst possible basis for agnosticism is the metaphysical one. But, if the metaphysical basis is removed, there is left only the simple individual fact that such and such gentlemen have not succeeded thus far with the efforts that they have chosen to make in reaching certitude regarding freedom, immortality, etc.

To individual cases of doubt and uncertainty it is possible to oppose other individual cases of knowledge and certainty. Doubt and knowledge, however, are alike uninformative to the one who does not investigate the occasion of the [doubt] or verify the supposed knowledge for himself.

8. One of the most distinguished writers of our time, a high authority among agnostics, says:<sup>1</sup> "Self-existence necessarily means existence without a beginning, and to form a conception of self-existence is to form a conception of existence without a beginning. Now, by no mental effort can we do this. To conceive existence through infinite past time implies the conception of infinite past time, which is an impossibility." In another place the same author claims the persistence of force as an "ultimate truth of which no inductive proof is possible," and explains that "asserting the persistence of force is but another mode of asserting an unconditioned reality, without beginning or end." But he asserts the indestructibility of matter and the persistence of force. "The annihilation of matter is unthinkable for the same reason that the creation of matter is unthinkable; and its indestructibility thus becomes an *a priori* cognition of the highest order—not one that results from a long-continued registry of experiences gradually organized into an irreversible mode of thought, but one that is given in the form of all experience whatever." The inconceivability of self-existence by reason of its involving infinite past time is evidently shared by all such ideas as the indestructibility of

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<sup>1</sup> Herbert Spencer, "First Principles," pp. 31, 241, 254.



matter and the persistence of force, for they require the thought of infinite time, past or future, quite as much as self-existence. Thus inconceivability is no bar to "a priori cognition of the highest order," and when it is used for agnostic purposes it is misused. The term "inconceivable" is here used in the sense Hamilton and Mansel gave it, namely: it signifies *not picturable by the imagination*. It does not mean *unthinkable*. Whatever will not make a picture is "inconceivable" in the agnostic sense, and whatever is essentially connected with an "inconceivable" or *unpicturable* is, or ought to be, "*unknown and unknowable*." In fact, however, only a few of the unpicturable notions are placed on the Prohibitory Index by general consent, but caprice or convenience strikes now at this and now at that.

9. Thus Space is one of the favorite "inconceivables." One cannot conceive or picture it as finite, because he would then picture it as located within itself; nor can he picture it as infinite, because a picture must have bounds, limits, or external form in order to be a picture. The thought of Space is a very different matter. "Space is of such a nature," says thought, "that any finite space requires space beyond it, for the limits require space to exist in. Hence Space is infinite, because all its boundaries affirm instead of negate it; they continue it rather than limit it." On the other hand, the concepts of matter and force, although pronounced inconceivable and unknowable, are everywhere used freely by agnostics as subjects of such predicates as "indestructible and persistent" —predicates that are always noted as "inconceivable" because involving unpicturable infinite time.

#### IV. *Conceivability of the Infinite.*

10. Because of the subtle intrusion of this notion of the "inconceivable" as a test of the knowable, it has been necessary to make this reference to the doctrine here. Immortality involves infinite future time, but individuality after death does not necessarily do so. Only as we prove such survival of death by an appeal to the nature of the conscious being do we imply infinity. That whose nature involves imperishability would thus be called unknowable, because imperishability involves the thought of infinite future time. The triviality of this objection may be seen by applying it to mathematical truth. Two and two make four; this is neces-

sary and imperishable truth; the shortest distance between two points is a straight line; this, too, will be true through infinite future time, and hence is inconceivable by the same test that holds self-existence to be inconceivable.

11. Space is known to be infinite because all limits of it would continue it; so, too, time is infinite for the same reason. Every object of experience is necessarily an object in time and space, and hence it presupposes or implies those two infinite correlatives of its existence. Every effect, too, presupposes as its correlative an energy producing it, and the energy which produces is either self-produced or derived from a self-produced or spontaneous source of energy. When we undertake to count the links or steps between an effect or phenomenon before our eyes and the spontaneous self-cause that is implied as its ultimate correlative, we may well find that relation altogether inconceivable, because the number of links is indefinite, being as many as one chooses to make. It is a matter of subdivision, and the effect is capable of being divided to infinity, making an infinite series of effects, each one of which may be regarded as effect of the previous link and as cause of the subsequent.

12. The old fallacy of Achilles and the Tortoise is similar to this one of the infinite regress of causes which Kant has used in his third antinomy. One foot is divisible to infinity; so too is a space of ten feet; you can never accomplish the infinite division of the smallest distance in your imagination, and hence Achilles can never overtake the tortoise (if he has to wait for you to picture infinite divisibility). Everything in our experience can be subdivided by analysis into component things indefinitely, and every phenomenon is in like manner divisible without limit into links of a series of causality.

13. We do not, however, find any difficulty in thinking a thing or a phenomenon, or a distance or a duration. The picturing or conceiving is altogether an indifferent affair, and gives us no concern. We grasp together in a synthesis the phenomenon as an effect by thinking it with its correlative—*i. e.*, with the energy from which it has proceeded. So, too, if we subdivide the phenomenon and make one part the effect of the other, then the effect is made a correlative of its antecedent phenomenon, which, as cause, includes the energy that acts to produce the effect. Whether one analyzes

the complex phenomenon into parts or combines the parts and thinks the series as one phenomenon, it is all the same, for the thought of effect, great or small, involves the thought of an efficient cause, whether near or remote, it does not matter. If there was no cause, this phenomenon is not an effect but a self-existent, or, if it really undergoes change, it changes itself and is *causa sui*. If we deny the concept of true cause or of spontaneous energy by placing it at infinite distance, as Kant does, or as the agnostic does, then, too, we deny the concept of phenomenon or effect and come at once on self-cause as the alternative,<sup>1</sup> and thus are compelled to accept what we tried to elude.

14. This thought of self-cause, or spontaneous energy, is not to be repudiated by the agnostic on the ground that it cannot be pictured. He might as well repudiate the idea of ten feet because it can be subdivided indefinitely and he cannot picture its parts.

15. Every object of experience, then, involves as correlatives infinite space, infinite time, and self-cause, or spontaneous energy. These correlatives are necessarily thought as the conditions which render the existence of the object of experience possible. If the object of experience possesses reality, those conditions possess reality because it is their reality that this object manifests. The concept of efficient cause is essential, as we shall see further on, to the concept of individuality or self-identity, and hence it has been mentioned in this connection with other unpicturable notions that underlie all knowledge.

16. That which is originating cause or spontaneous energy cannot be pictured in the mind, because the same self is both cause and effect. But the idea of such a cause is implied in all thought of causality. No effect without a real cause of it, and no matter how long the series, down which the energy has descended to reach this particular effect—the number of links in the series is indefinite, depending on the analytic discrimination of the beholder. The walking-stick with which I push open the gate is conceivable as an infinite number of pieces of cane, each an infinitesimal in length, down which is transmitted from my hand the energy that pushes the gate; this play of imagination does not help, but hin-

<sup>1</sup> Because, if the fact is not phenomenal, *i. e.*, an effect of an underlying cause, then it must be self-existent or *causa sui*.

ders the true thought, which is this: my hand pushes the gate and cane together, and their motion is the effect; or, still more accurately, my hand and arm and the cane and the gate are all moved by the cause, which is my will, a pure energy. The effect may be subdivided to infinity, but such subdivision does not alter the conception of cause and effect, but is something altogether impertinent to it.

#### *V. Empirical Proofs of Immortality.*

17. Let us now inquire into the data given us by experience for the solution of this problem of individuality after death. A strictly empirical proof would adduce instances in which a human being had given unmistakable evidence of his survival after the dissolution of his body. It must not be the reanimation of the same body, for that would be rather a return to life in the body than a survival of the body.

18. To be satisfactory, physical tests, or tests through physical phenomena, must be such as (a) prove individuality, and not a mere general force or combination of forces; (b) prove an individuality distinct from the individuality of the observer, and not caused by his own energy consciously or unconsciously ("unconscious cerebration" for example); (c) prove that the identity of the individuality that is manifesting itself through the physical phenomena is identical with some individuality that has existed in the flesh. This would establish the possibility of individuality after death. To become complete, the proof must establish enough cases to show what races of men, what degrees of mental and physical development, what circumstances, are requisite to insure survival after death of the body.

19. The most difficult part of the empirical proof would be found in the requirement to prove the identity of the disembodied individuality with any special one formerly inhabiting a body, possibility of deception being infinite at this point.

20. It is clear that physiology can throw no light on this question of the survival of the individual except indirectly. The body exhibits the traces of the organizing energy that built it, and of the inorganic forces that act to decompose it.

If it is said that physiology has discovered or will discover that the organizing energy is simply a transmuted form of physical

force, and that the physiologist can trace it, when it leaves the body, into another form, say a new organism, or into inorganic equivalents, a discussion of the nature of such experience, and its possibility of establishing such facts or principles, will furnish an answer. The individuality or personal identity must be of such a character that the physiologist can perceive it as a physiological phenomenon, or at least recognize it in physical effects if he is ever to discover its survival in other organisms, or its dissolution into inorganic forces. If we shall find that we have to deal with an individuality known essentially through introspection, it will be clear that physiology cannot deal with the essential point under investigation, for introspection does not belong to physiology, but to psychology. Even physiological psychology must look within to find the feelings, thoughts, or volitions that correspond to motions or physiological changes. The difference between a feeling or thought and a physiological change perceptible by the eye is so great that no amount of evidence could prove their identity, but only their sequence in time. The question of causal action between the body and consciousness must be carefully considered before we can be in a condition to answer this question of physiological psychology.

21. The perception of the evidence of conscious individuality in other beings is, of course, conditioned entirely by the perception of such conscious individuality within ourselves. We note in other beings such actions as express conscious individuality, because those actions are such as we use or might use to manifest it in ourselves. The manifestations are not the thing itself—they are not conscious individuality, for that is itself an energy that is manifested or that manifests itself, and is not exhausted in the manifestation, but remains in its entirety behind the manifestation invisible. All investigation of sentient phenomena (not vital phenomena simply, but phenomena of feeling, perception, and thought) involves the act of introspection, as already shown, and it is impossible for me to perceive the feeling of another, or his thought, except as I refer his external manifestations to my own experience and interpret them through it.

22. We cannot dispense with introspection in the solution of our problem, therefore, unless we can disconnect personal identity from consciousness. We see by this that it is necessary to consider

more carefully just what "individuality" may mean, and what varieties of being may be included under it.

### VI. *Types of Individuality.*

23. Human experience has distinguished, from time immemorial, four classes of individualities—(a) men, (b) animals, (c) plants, (d) inorganic things. Three classes can be made by including men with animals, or two can be made by uniting men, animals, and plants as the organic or living class of beings, and opposing to it the class of inorganic beings or conditions. Science inherits this distinction into four great classes from the unscientific experience of the race, but it progresses toward a clearer definition of the boundary lines and the laws of transition and development. It re-classifies what had been wrongfully classified. While the savage or ancient man includes many inorganic beings in the class of organic, and peoples nature with good and evil spirits, science is disposed to find much in organic (or life) processes to be purely inorganic and mechanical.

24. Inorganic being does not possess individuality for itself. A mountain is not an individual in the sense that a tree is. It is an aggregate of substances, but not an organic unity. The unity of place gives certain peculiarities and idiosyncrasies, but the mountain is an aggregate of materials, and its conditions are an aggregate of widely differing temperatures, degrees of illumination, moisture, etc., etc.

25. Atoms, if atoms exist as they are conceived in the atomic theory, cannot be true individuals, for they possess attraction and repulsion, and by either of these forces express their dependence on others, and thus submerge their individuality in the mass with which they are connected by attraction or sundered by repulsion. Distance in space changes the properties of the atom—its attraction and repulsion are conceived as depending on distance from other atoms, and its union with other atoms develops new qualities and conceals or changes the old qualities. Hence the environment is essential to the atomic individuality—and this means the denial of its individuality. If the environment is a factor, then the individuality is joint product, and the atom is not an individual, but only a constituent.

26. In an organism each part is reciprocally means and end to all the other parts—all parts are mediated through each.

Mere aggregates are not individuals, but aggregates wherein the parts are at all times in mutual reaction with the other parts through and by means of the whole are individuals. The individual stands in relation to other individuals and to the inorganic world. It is the manifestation of energy acting as conservative of its own individuality, and destructive of other individualities or of inorganic aggregates that form its environment. It assimilates other beings to itself and digests them, or imposes its own form on them and makes them organic parts of itself—or, on the other hand, it eliminates portions from itself, returning to the inorganic what has been a part of itself.

27. Individuality, therefore, is not a mere thing, but an energy manifesting itself in things. In the case of the plant there is this unity of energy, but the unity does not exist for itself in the form of feeling. The animal feels, and, in feeling, the organic energy exists for itself, all parts coming to a unity in this feeling, and realizing an individuality vastly superior to the individuality manifested in the plant.

### VII. *The Individuality of Plants and Animals.*

28. The plant grows and realizes by its form or shape some phase or phases of the organic energy that constitutes the individuality of the plant. Roots, twigs, buds, blossoms, fruits, and seeds, all together manifest or express that organic energy, but they lack thorough mutual dependence, as compared with the animal who feels his unity in each part or limb. The individuality of the plant is comparatively an aggregate of individualities, while the animal is a real unity in each part through feeling, and hence there is no such independence in the parts of the animal as in the plant.

29. Feeling, sense-perception, and locomotion characterize the individuality of the animal, although he retains the special powers which made the plant an organic being. The plant could assimilate or digest; that is to say, it could react on its environment and impress it with its own form, making the inorganic into vegetable cells and adding them to its own structure. Feeling, especially in



the form of sense-perception, is the process of reproducing the environment within the organism in an ideal form.

30. Sense-perception thus stands in contrast to the vegetative power of assimilation or nutrition, which is the highest form of energy in the plant. Nutrition is a subordinate energy in the animal, while it is the supreme energy of the plant. Nutrition relates to its environment only negatively and destructively in the act of assimilating it, or else it adds mechanically to the environment by separating and excreting from itself what has become inorganic. But feeling, even as it exists in the most elementary forms of sense-perception, can reproduce the environment ideally; it can form for itself, within, a modification corresponding to the energy of the objects that make up its environment.

31. Sentient being stands in reciprocal action with its environment, but it seizes the impression received from without and adds to it by its own activity, so as to reconstruct for itself the external object. It receives an impression, and is so far passive to the action of its environment; but it reacts on this by forming within itself a counterpart to the impression out of its own energy. The animal individuality is an energy that can form limits within itself. On receiving an impression from the environment it forms limits to its own energy commensurate with the impression it receives, and thus frames for itself a perception, or an internal copy of the object. It is not a copy so much as an estimate or measure effected by producing a limitation within itself similar to the impression it has received. Its own state, as thus limited to reproduce the impression, is its idea or perception of the external environment as acting upon it.

32. The plant receives impressions from without, but its power of reaction is extremely limited, and does not rise to feeling. The beginnings of such reaction in plants as develops into feeling in animals are studied by intelligent biologists with the liveliest interest, for in this reaction we see the ascent of individuality through a discrete degree—the ascent from nutrition to feeling.

33. Nutrition is a process of destruction of the individuality of the foreign substance taken up from the environment, and likewise a process of impressing on it a new individuality, that of the vegetative form, or the nutritive soul, as Aristotle calls it. Feeling is a process of reproducing within the individuality, by self-limitation



or self-determination, a form that is like the external energy that has produced an impression upon it. The sentient being shapes itself into the impression, or reproduces the impression, and thus perceives the character of the external energy by the nature of its own effort required to reproduce the impression.

34. The difference between a nutritive process and a perceptive or sentient process is one of degree, but a discrete degree. Both processes are reactions on what is foreign; but the nutritive is a real process, destructive of the foreign object, while the sentient is an ideal or reproductive process that does not affect the foreign object. The nutritive is thus the opposite of the sentient; it destroys and assimilates, the latter reproduces. Perception is objective, a self-determination in the form of the object—it transforms the subject into the object; nutrition is subjective in that it transmutes the object into the subject and leaves no object. Perception preserves its own individuality while reproducing the individuality of the external, for it limits itself by its own energy in reproducing the form of the object.

35. For the reason that feeling or perception measures off, as it were, on its own organic energy—which exists for it in the feeling of self—the amount and kind of energy required to produce the impression made on it from without, it follows that sense-perception is not only a reception of impressions, but also an act of introspection. By introspection it interprets the cause or occasion of the impression that is felt. Feeling arises only when the impression made on the organism is reproduced again within the self—only when it recognizes the external cause by seeing in and through its own energy the energy that has limited it. The degree of objectivity (or the ability to perceive the reality of the external power) is measured by the degree of introspection or the degree of clearness in which it perceives the amount and limit of the internal energy required to reproduce the impression.

#### VIII. *Human Individuality.*

36. On this scale of degrees we rise from plant to animal, and from animal to man. The individuality of each lies in its energy. The energy of the plant is expended in assimilating the external; that of the animal in assimilating and reproducing; that of man in assimilating, reproducing, and self-producing or creating. The

discrete degree that separates the plant from the animal is measured by the distance between destroying and reconstructing; the difference between the animal and the man is measured by the distance between reproducing and self-producing, or, in another form of statement, it is the difference in two kinds of perception—the perception of object as particular and the perception of object as universal.

37. It is comparatively easy to recognize the difference between nutrition and perception; indeed, one would say that the difficult part is the recognition of the essential identity of their energies. On the contrary, the identity of sense-perception and thought is readily acknowledged, but their profound difference is not seen without careful attention. Inasmuch as the difference between sense-perception and thought characterizes the difference between individuality that can survive death of the body and that which cannot survive death of the body, our subject justifies a careful discussion of this distinction.

38. The majority of thinkers who have advanced or defended the doctrine of immortality of the human soul have drawn the line of individual survival between the activity of sense-perception and the activity of reflection and reason, the former activity being understood as that which perceives particular objects, while the latter perceives general or universal objects. These general or universal objects are not mere classes or abstractions, fictions of the mind for genera and species, but they stand for generic processes in the world—such processes in the world as abide while their products come into being and pass away. The oak before me is the product of a power that manifests itself in successive stages as acorn, sapling, tree, and crop of acorns, etc., these stages being successive and partial, while the energy is the unity whence proceed all of these phases through its action on the environment. The energy is a generic process, and whatever reality the particular existence may get from it is borrowed from its reality. The reality of this acorn is derived from the reality of organic energy of the oak on which it grew. The reality of that organic energy is at least equal to all the reality that has proceeded from it.

39. In the two forms of the reaction of energy, or individuality, which have been discussed as nutrition and feeling, the former draws the object within itself and destroys its objective form,

while in feeling the individuality recoils from the attack made on the organism and reproduces its symbolic equivalent. Both of these forms find the occasion of action in the contact with the external. Without conjunction, without limitation of the individuality by the object, there arises neither nutrition nor feeling. This mutual limitation is the reduction of the two, the subject and object, to mutual dependence, and hence it is the destruction of individuality so far as this dependence exists. By the act of assimilation the vegetative energy reasserts its own independence and individuality by annulling the individuality of the object. The sentient process, on the other hand, reasserts its independence by escaping from the continuance of the impression from without, and by reproducing for itself a similar limitation through its own freedom or spontaneity. It elevates the real limit, by which it is made dependent on an external object, into an ideal limit that depends on its own free act. Thus both nutrition and feeling are manifestations of self-identity in which the energy acts for the preservation of its individuality against submersion in another.

40. These attempts to preserve individuality which we see in nutrition and feeling do not succeed in obtaining perfect independence. Both these activities, as reactions upon the environment, depend on the continuance of the action of the environment. When the assimilation is complete the reaction ceases, and there must be new interaction with the environment before the process begins again, hence its individuality requires a permanent interaction with external conditions, and the plant and vegetative process is not a complete or perfect individuality. It is not entirely independent. Its process involves a correlative existence, an inorganic world for its food.

41. The activity of mere feeling or sense perception, too, is aroused by external impressions, and is conditioned by them. If there is no object, then there is no act of perception. Every occasion given for the self-activity involved in perception is an occasion for the manifestation of self-activity, but a self-activity that acts only on external incitation is not yet separable from the body.

42. The reproduction of impressions that we have described as the essential function of feeling or sense-perception is not the reproduction known under the name of recollection or memory.

Recollection is a reproduction of the perception, while perception is a reproduction of the impression. The so-called faculties of the mind rise in a scale, beginning with feeling. Each higher activity is distinguished from the one below it by the circumstance that it sees not only the *object* which was seen by the lower faculty, but also the *form* of the activity of that faculty. Each new faculty, therefore, is a new stage of self-consciousness.

43. The human characteristic is the knowing by universals. Man recognizes or sees all objects as specimens of classes. He sees the particular in the universal. Hence his act of cognition is more complex than that of mere sense-perception, which he shares with the animal. The seeming dogmatism and assumption of this statement will disappear when we can see what results follow from knowing by universals, and what is presupposed in the mental energy that possesses such knowledge.

44. The energy presupposed in the act of feeling and sense-perception is a self-activity, but one that manifests itself in reproducing its environment ideally. It presupposes an organic energy of nutrition in which it has assimilated portions of the environment and constructed for itself a body. In the body it has organized stages of feeling, constituting the ascending scale of sense-perception.

*a.* First there is the sense of touch—containing all higher senses in potentiality. When the higher senses have not developed, or after they have been destroyed by accident, the sense of touch may become sufficiently delicate to perceive not only contact with bodies, but also the slighter modifications involved in the effects of taste and smell, and even in the vibrations of sound and light.

*b.* The lowest form of special sense is taste, which is closely allied to nutrition. Taste perceives the phase of assimilation of the object which is commencing within the mouth. The individuality of the object is attacked and it gives way, its organic product or inorganic aggregate suffering dissolution—taste perceives the dissolution. Substances that do not yield to the attack have no taste. Glass and gold have little taste compared with salt and sugar. The sense of taste differs from the process of nutrition in the fact that it does not assimilate the body tasted, but reproduces ideally the energy that makes the impression on the sense-organ of taste. Even taste is an ideal activity, although it is pres-

ent only when the nutritive energy is assimilating—it perceives the object in a state of dissolution.

c. Smell is another specialization which perceives dissolution of objects in a more general form than taste. Both smell and taste perceive chemical changes that involve dissolution of the object.

d. Hearing is a far more ideal sense, and notes a manifestation of resistance to dissolution. The cohesion of a body is attacked and it resists, the attack and resistance take the form of vibration, and this vibration is perceived by the special sense of hearing. Taste and smell perceive the dissolution of the object, while hearing perceives the defence or successful reaction of an object in presence of an attack. Without reaction of cohesion there would be no vibration and no sound.

e. The sense of sight perceives the individuality of the object not in a state of dissolution before an attack, as in the case of taste and smell, or as engaged in active resistance to attack, as in case of hearing, but in its independence. Sight is, therefore, the most ideal sense, inasmuch as it is farthest removed from perception by means of the real process of assimilation, in which one energy destroys the product of another energy and extends its sway over it.

45. Nutrition implies foreign objects on which to exercise its energy. It manifests itself as a destruction of its environment and the extension of its power by conquest. If it could conquer all its environment it would become a totality; but then its activity would cease for want of food.

Sense-perception implies impressions from foreign objects as the occasion of its activity of ideal reproduction. It cannot perceive without objects; hence its energy is always conditioned by energies independent of it.

Representation is reproduction without the presence of the sense-object; recollection and memory are forms of this. In the form of recollection the individual energy reproduces the activity of a past perception. The impression on the sense-organ is absent, and the freedom of the individual is manifested in this reproduction without the occasion which is furnished by the impression on the organism from without. The freedom to reproduce the image of an object that has been once perceived leads by easy steps to the perception of general notions; for, when the mind notices its mode of activity by which the former perception is re-

produced or represented, it perceives, of course, its power of repeating the process, and notes that the same energy can produce an indefinite series of different images resembling one another. It is by this action of representation that the idea of the universal arises. It is a reflection on the conditions of recalling a former perception. The energy that can produce within itself the conditions of a former perception at pleasure, without the presence of the original object of perception, is an energy that is generic—that is, an energy that can produce the particular and repeat it to any extent. The universal or generic power can produce a class.

46. With this consciousness of a generic energy manifested in the power of representation arises the recognition of generic energy manifested in the external world as the producer of the particular objects perceived, and each object is seen in its producing energy as one of an indefinite number produced by the continued existence of that energy. The consciousness of freedom of the Ego in this restricted form of freedom of representing or recalling former sense-perceptions lies thus at the basis of the perception of objects as specimens of classes; hence representation or recollection, which is special and individual, leads to the act of reflection by which the energy is perceived and its generic character, and with it the perception of the necessary generic character of the energy at the foundation of every impression upon our senses or at the foundation of every object perceived.

47. At this point the activity of perception becomes Conception, or the perception of the general in the particular. The "this oak" is perceived as "an oak," or a specimen of the class oak. The class oak is conceived as an indefinite number of individual oaks, all produced by an energy which manifests itself in an organic process of assimilation and elimination, in which appear the stadia of acorn, sapling, tree, and crop of acorns—a continuous circle of reproduction of the species oak, a transformation of the one into the many—the one acorn becoming a crop of acorns, and then a forest of oaks.

48. The rise of self-consciousness, or the perception of self-activity, and the perception of the general object in the external world, are thus contemporaneous. With the perception of the general energy the psychological activity has outgrown *representation* and become *conception*. With conception the energy or soul

begins to be an individuality for itself—a conscious individuality. It recognizes itself as a free energy. The stage of mere perception does not recognize itself, but merely sees its own energy as the objective energy, because it acts wholly as occasioned by the external object. In the recognition of the object as an individual of a class the soul recognizes its own freedom and independent activity. Recollection (*Erinnerung*) relates to individuals, recalling the special presentation or impression and representing the object as it was before perceived. Memory (like the German word *Gedächtniss*) may be distinguished as the activity which reproduces the object as one of a class, and therefore as the form of representation that perceives universals. With memory arises language.

49. Language fixes the knowledge of objects in universals. Each word represents an indefinite number of particular objects, actions, or relations. The word *oak* stands for all oaks—present, past, or future. No being can use language, much less create language, unless it has learned to conceive as well as perceive—learned to see all objects as individuals belonging to classes, and incidentally recognized its own individuality. All human beings possess language. Even deaf and dumb human beings invent and use gestures with as definite meaning as words, each gesture denoting a class with a possible infinite number of special applications.

50. These distinctions of self-activity or of spontaneous energy which have been pointed out in the stages of nutrition, feeling, sense-perception, and recollection are often overlooked, or are accounted as the direct product of the environment, and not admitted as the reactions of individual energy. The science that ignores the manifestation of energy in the reaction of the individual is unreasonable, for it assumes that all the energy is in the environment, although the obvious fact is that there is energy on each side—on that of the individual and on that of the environment.

51. In these lower stages of the activity of individual energy we have individuality that cannot recognize itself because it cannot recognize the universal, and therefore cannot conceive of pure causal activity, but identifies it with special manifestation. Hence the permanence of such individuality would not be the continuance of individuality in the sense of immortality any more than a perpetual sleep would continue it.



Even memory and the phenomena of language are not recognized by psychologists generally as being the first manifestation of the self-conscious individuality.

52. Psychology, however, in the activity of reflection readily recognizes the advent of universal ideas, and notes the self-activity of mind in forming them and thinking with them. It is usual, however, to account for the production of these universal ideas by supposing that the mind first collects many individuals and then abstracts so as to omit the differences and preserve the likeness or resemblance, and thus forms the conception of class. It therefore makes reflection responsible, not only for the recognition of the universal, but for its creation. But the act of reflection only discovers what had already been elaborated in the lower faculty of the mind. Self-consciousness is not the cause of universal ideas, but the universal rises with it as its condition (the perception of the universal being perception of the self). Both appear at the same time as essential phases of the same act. The soul uses universals in language long before it recognizes the same as universal (its first recognition of the universal being only self-recognition). Reflection discovers that these ideas are general—but it has used them ever since human beings became human. After reflection has dawned, however, a new series of universal terms begin to come into use, which denote not merely universal classes or generic energies, but the pure energy in its self-activity as producing inward distinctions which do not reach external particular things as results. Here begins conscious independence of the world of sense-perception.

53. The higher stages of thinking which perceive these more universal phases of the activity of energy—which deal with the universals of universals—the genera of classes, are perceptions of the necessary primordial conditions of the world—the most general conditions of its existence.

54. The idea of evolution as a cosmical principle is of this order. According to it, all individualization shall move from simple forms to complex forms that are simple—the higher individual shall be more of a totality within itself—and the highest individuality shall be one that realizes the cosmos within itself and is the Microcosm.

55. The highest principle of the universe is thus conceived by



evolution as a principle of grace—a giving and imparting of the perfection of the whole to the part or particular individual.

### IX. Human Individuality Immortal.

56. Why will one make individual immortality to begin with the perception of universals and of self-identity rather than with individual reaction in the plant, or in that of self-feeling in the animal? or, still more, with that of free self-activity in recollection?

57. Undoubtedly there is individuality wherever there is reaction. But mere reaction is not sufficient to constitute personal identity. The activity in reaction arises on account of the activity of another being, and hence is not entirely of itself in the case of the plant or the nutritive form of life, or in that of the mere animal or the feeling and locomotive being. Were such individuality to be imperishable it would be unconscious imperishability and devoid of memory that recognizes its own being in the present and in the past. Mere recollection is not the recognition of the being of the self. A self must be universal, and can in no wise be a mere particular thing or act such as can be recollected. The self is the principle of the process of reaction against the environment and of the activity of reproduction and synthesis.

58. The individual, therefore, is not only a self—a universal—but also an entire sphere of particularity. The self can generate by the reproductive activity all that it has seen and heard, all that it has experienced—reproducing it as often as it pleases and entirely free from the presence of the objects perceived, and it can generate from itself the ideas of the general processes in which originated the special facts of sense-perception. Hence its particulars are also general. Such a stage we call Memory, in the special and higher sense of the word, as corresponding to, not *ἀνάμνησις*, but *μνημοσύνη* or *μνήμη*—not *Erinnerung*, but *Gedächtniss*—not the memory that recollects, but the memory that recalls by the aid of universal ideas. (Such memory is creative as it goes from the general to the particular.) These general ideas are mnemonic aids—pigeon-holes, as it were, in the mind—whereby the soul conquers the endless multiplicity of details in the world. It refers each to its species and saves the species under a name—then is able to recall by the name a vast number of special instances.

59. Language is the sign by which we can recognize the arrival of the soul at this stage of development into complete self-activity. Hence language is the criterion of immortal individuality. In order to use language, it must be able not only to act for itself, but to act wholly upon itself. It must not only perceive things by the senses, but accompany its perceiving by an inner perception of the act of perceiving (and thus be its own environment). This perception of the act and process of perceiving is the recognition of classes, species, and genera—the universal processes underlying the existence of the particular.

60. Language in this sense involves conventional signs, and is not an immediate expression of feeling like the cries of animals. The immediate expression of feeling (which is only a reaction) does not become language, even when it accompanies recollection or the free reproduction—nor until it accompanies memory or the seeing of the particular in the general. When it can be shown that a species of animals use conventional signs in communication with each other, we shall be able to infer their immortality, because we shall have evidence of their freedom from sense-perception and environment sufficient to create for themselves their own occasion for activity. They would then be shown to react not merely against their environment, but against their own action—hence they would involve both action and reaction, self and environment. They would, in that case, have selves, and their selves exist for themselves, and hence they would have self-identity.

61. Take away self-identity, and still there may be persistence of self-activity; but it is only generic—that of the species and not of the individual. The species lives, the individual dies in such cases.

#### X. *What Faculties survive Death.*

62. Having found the criterion of immortality, let us look at some of the ideas and capacities which come with its endowment.

The ascent above sense-perception and recollection indicates to us the subordinate place of those faculties, and also their moribund character. As Aristotle hinted, in his profound treatise on the Soul, these lower faculties are not immortal in their nature (although they will long outlast this earthly life).

63. In thinking of such faculties in the lives of great men of science—like Agassiz, Cuvier, Lyell, von Humboldt, Darwin, and

Goethe—we see what this means. It is the first and crudest stage of mental culture that depends chiefly on sense-perception and recollection. After the general has been discovered, the mind uses it more and more, and the information of the senses becomes a smaller and smaller part of the knowledge. Agassiz in a single scale saw the whole fish—so that the scale was all that was required to suggest the whole. Lyell could see the whole history of its origin in a pebble, Cuvier could see the entire animal-skeleton in one of its bones. The Memory, which holds types, processes, and universals, the condensed form of all human experience, the total aggregate of all sense-perception of the universe and all reflection on it—this constitutes the chief faculty of the scientific man, and sense-perception and mere recollection play the most insignificant part.

64. This points to the complete independence of the soul as a far-off idea. When the soul can think the creative thought, the theoretic vision of the world—*ἡ θεωρία*, as Aristotle calls it—then it comes to perfect insight, for it sees the whole in each part, and does not require any longer the mechanical memory, because it has a higher form of intellect that sees immediately in the individual thing its history, just as Lyell or Agassiz saw the history of a pebble or a fish, or Asa Gray sees all botany in a single plant. Mechanical memory is thus taken up into a higher “faculty,” and, its function being absorbed, it gradually perishes. But it never perishes until its function is provided for in a more complete manner.

#### XI. *Ethical Culture presupposes Immortality.*

65. Man is born an animal, but must become a spiritual being. He is limited to the present moment and to the present place, but he must conquer all places and all times. Man, therefore, has an ideal of culture which it is his destiny or vocation to achieve.

66. He must lift himself above his mere particular existence toward universal existence. All peoples, no matter how degraded, recognize this duty. The South Sea Islander commences with his infant child and teaches him habits that conform to that phase of civilization—an ethical code fitting him to live in that community—and, above all, the mother-tongue, so that he may receive the results of the perceptions and reflections of his fellow-beings

and communicate his own to them. The experience of the tribe, a slow accretion through years and ages, shall be preserved and communicated to each new-born child, vicariously saving him from endless labor and suffering. Through culture the individual shall acquire the experience of the species—shall live the life of the race, and be lifted above himself. Such a process as culture thus puts man above the accidents of time and place in so far as the tribe or race has accomplished this.

67. Whatever lifts man above immediate existence, the wants and impulses of the present moment, and gives him self-control, is called ethical. The ethical grounds itself, therefore, in man's existence in the species and in the possibility of the realization of the species in the individual. Hence, too, the ethical points toward immortality as its presupposition. Death comes through the inadequacy of the individual organism to adjust itself to the environment; the conditions are too general, and the individual gets lost in the changes that come to it. Were the individual capable of adapting himself to all changes, there could be no death; the individual would be perfectly universal. This process of culture that distinguishes man from all other animals points toward the formation of an immortal individual distinct from the body within which it dwells—an individual who has the capacity to realize within himself the entire species.

68. Immortality thus complements the ethical idea. In an infinite universe the process of realizing the experience of all beings by each being must itself be of infinite duration. The doctrine of immortality, therefore, places man's life under the form of eternity and ennobles mortal life to its highest potency.

69. Since ethics rests on the idea of a social whole as the totality of man, and on the idea of an immortal life as the condition of realizing in each man the life of the whole, it lays great stress on the attitude of renunciation on the part of the individual. The special man must deny himself, sacrifice the present moment in order to attain the higher form of eternity. To act indifferently toward the present moment is to "act disinterestedly," as it is called. It is the preference of reflected good for immediate good—my good reflected from all humanity, my good after their good and through their good, and not my good before their good and instead of their good.

70. This doctrine of disinterestedness has been perverted into a doctrine of annihilation of all interest by a school of ascetic moralists in our time—the school of the Positivists. According to them, it were a higher form of disinterestedness to forswear all interest, and to waive all return of good upon ourselves from others. In fact, the *ne plus ultra* of this disinterestedness is the renunciation, not only of mortal life, but of immortal life—the renunciation of selfhood itself.

71. Such supreme renunciation is the irony of renunciation. It would renounce not only the pleasures of the flesh, but the blessedness of virtue and sainthood. It would renounce eternity as well as the present moment.

72. The dialectic of such a position would force it into the next extreme of pure wickedness. For, see, is it not more disinterested to renounce eternal blessedness than the mere pleasure of the present moment? The more renunciation, the more ethical. Hence the denizens of the Inferno—those plunged into all manner of mortal sins—are more virtuous than the saints in paradise. For the sinners—do they not renounce blessedness—the form of eternity—the infinite happiness, and in their self-denial take up with mere temporal pleasures that are sure to leave stings of pain? What nobleness to prefer hell with its darkness and fire and ice to paradise with its serenity and light and love! Is it not a step in advance even over such abstract ethical culture as rejects immortality from disinterestedness to plunge into positive pain, and thereby exhibit one's abstract freedom from all lures to happiness?

73. But such "ethical culture" is not true morality. Disinterestedness is only a relative matter in it—it is incidental, and not the essential element in virtue. It is of no use whatever except to eliminate the immediateness from life. The individual should become the species, and, instead of receiving good directly, should receive it as reflected from his fellow-men. Not to receive it as reflected from his fellow-men would paralyze the circulation which is necessary to the realization of the species, and man's ideal would vanish utterly. The principle of altruism implies receiving as well as giving. No giving can remain where no receiving is. Hence ethics vanish altogether with the paralysis of the return of good upon the individual from the whole of society. The individual is cut off from the species by absolute renunciation, and

cannot ascend into it by substituting mediated good for immediate, as all codes of morals demand. Humanity lapses into bestiality. Civilization is impossible without this ideal of the race as the goal of the individual. It is the object of language, literature, science, religion, and all human institutions.

74. Thus, too, immortality is presupposed by all the instrumentalities of civilization. The completion of spiritual life in the communion of all souls is the final cause or purpose of immortal life.

## XII. *The Being of God presupposed by Immortality.*

75. Our final consideration in this discussion is due to the question of the absolute First Principle presupposed in this view of the world—a world in which the process of genesis of immortal beings goes on as the supreme object of all.

76. The senses perceive particular things and events. These are divisible and again divisible as we look more and more closely into them. Each seems to be in some way different from all others. Infinite particularity seems to reign.

77. But to the eye of reflection all particularity is based on unity as logical presupposition. *A priori* conditions of experience are seen which make experience possible. There can be no world of experience without time and space. The mathematical laws of time and space condition all things and all changes in the world. Space and time, in fact, are pure unities, and all that is in time and all that is in space must exist relatively to all else in time and space, thus making a vast unity that we call the world:

“A subtle chain of countless rings  
The next unto the farthest brings.”

78. It is the law of Space that all that is conditioned by it possesses externality and exclusion, and is conditioned from without. Each body has external conditions, and thus forms an aggregate with its environment. Each aggregate is a part of a larger aggregate, and there is no end to this ascent from aggregate to aggregate, from unity to unity. All that is in space—to wit, the world—is included in a unity. This unity, too, is transcendent—it is the constitutive form of space itself, and hence above all that is included in space.

79. Time, too, is a form that gives unity to all change and succession, and hence to all events. The world of events transcends the individual event, but is transcended by that which gives unity to all events.

80. The basis of the idea of causality is the idea of self-separation—the detaching of influence from an active being, and its transference to another which thus becomes effect. Self-separation—*Causa sui*—self-determination is the idea underlying not only all change and movement, but even the static form of existence; it underlies not only events, but things.

81. All dependent being is necessarily explained through that on which it depends. The independent must be originator of its own determinations or qualities—else these are through others, and the being is dependent and not independent. Or, if these qualities of its being are supposed to be eternal and not eternally produced, they must lack unity and fall asunder into independent things. But the same necessity recurs for self-determination in these isolated qualities.

82. Self-determined being, that which exists in pure activity, is the only possible form of independence. It is the logical presupposition of the world of time and space. The world, as an aggregate of things and events, certainly has a Supreme Unity who is self-active and the Creator of things and events.

83. But it is possible to accept the unity of the world as a creator of things and events and yet deny it as a creator of man. Man, according to this doctrine, is immortal, and therefore transcends space and time, and is not conditioned by the unity of the world; but each man is a transcendent unity himself.

To be consistent, this view must deny all genesis to man. Each man is from all eternity individual and a transcendent unity.

84. But, then, what has an eternal individual to do with a world of time and space? There seems to be history. There seem to be change of fortune and especially growth, progressive development, and education in regard to man. All this can be only seeming, however, according to a theory which makes man eternally pre exist.

85. If there is genesis, if there is education and progressive development, then there is presupposed a separation of ideal from real. The being is not what it ought to be, and is therefore de-



pendent on the side of time upon development. If there is genesis, it presupposes a real being with potentialities existing within a higher unity.

86. Human education is of the nature of a realization of the race in each individual. Each man, therefore, presupposes a time and space-unity with other men, making up a unity of History. Society, social existence, presupposes this form of unity.

87. Hence the unity of the world is the logical condition also of men as historic existences. To make them to pre-exist out of time and space is a piece of purely gratuitous assumption, and not only does not explain what is the fact, but it actually renders the fact itself utterly impossible.

88. The same Power which creates the world in the constitutive unities of time and space, and causes the development from lower to upper orders which we behold in Nature, also has in view the erection of humanity on the summit of creation as His divine image. He will impart his blessedness to others, and will therefore create intelligent beings "to know Him and enjoy Him forever."

89. Thus we have the Divine in two forms—first, the Creator absolute, self-existent, all-good and all-wise, who desires to share his Blessedness, and therefore creates men, causes them to begin—raising them up through Nature—a benignant and tender process of nurture of individuality into freedom and self-knowledge.

90. Then there is a second form of the Divine—as it results from the solidarity of the human race and of all intelligent beings throughout the universe—an eternal stream of creation—especially after death has removed the dividing limits that separate souls of one planet from those of another.

91. The ideal of the individual—that he must realize in himself the species, and that he must receive only such good as comes to him from all humanity—this ideal presupposes and necessitates the social union of the world of intelligences. Each shall help all—a finite act; all shall help each—an infinite act. Each one thus participating in the infinite, invisible communion of souls shall thus be made infinite and divine. Hence the Invisible Church of all immortal spirits becomes the Institution whose eternity is as divine as the Creator's.

92. An institution eliminates from itself the defects of the in-



dividuals composing it, and in turn helps the individuals to free themselves of defect through it.

93. An infinite community of souls, including the inhabitants of all worlds that have evolved human beings since the beginning, is an institution become perfect and divine.

94. An institution is a unity of persons, and endowed by them with personality. The Absolute institution is the archetype of all other institutions, and a Divine Personality dwells in its midst, and is God the Holy Spirit.

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## NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

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### IN MEMORIAM,

J. F. B.

*Non omnis moriar.*

Upon thy soul lay not a fading hint  
 How dark fatality enwrapt thee round,  
 Tho' deathlike was thy cheek, nor least the tint  
 Of the heart's roseate parlance 'neath it found.

I was the *last*, within thy native vale,  
 Who heard that gay, delightful cadence fall  
 From tender, quivering lips—that gentle tale  
 Cheered like a godsend from some angel's call.

Nor thrill of instant loss opprest thy heart ;  
 Like columns strong in fate thy Future stood,  
 And hope shone swift to guide thy steps to Art,  
 And Age, like softest verse, spake silvery good.

A shattered hearth—a chill o'erburdened sky,  
 A question at the gate that opes in heaven.  
 Thou restest calm, in love's tranquillity,  
 Hast thou not *all for which in life thou'st striven* ?

Were torturing shafts, were pale sepulchral rhymes,  
 Were structures reared by Fame's enduring song,  
 More fitting to thy right than Nature's chimes  
 That to the simple and the good belong ?

For many an eye shall weep Fate's hurrying call,  
 For many a hand must empty fade away—  
 And should our grief like desolation fall,  
 The things untaught that higher Laws obey?

Dear soul, whose pitying glance affection knew,  
 Whose voice, like mercy from a heart of love,  
 Rose welling bright, O friend! *our* loves renew,  
 Make us like *thee* with thy pure thoughts above!

W. E. CHANNING.

CONCORD, MASS., February, 1885.

### THE CONCORD SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY.

The Concord Summer School will open for a seventh term on Thursday, July 16, 1885, at 7.30 P. M., and may continue three weeks. The lectures in each week will be eleven; they will be given morning and evening, except Saturday evenings, on the six secular days (in the morning at 9.30 o'clock, and in the evening at 7.30), at the Hillside Chapel, near the Orchard House.

The terms will be \$5 for each full week; for all the lectures, \$10. Single tickets, at 50 cents each, may be bought at the shop of H. L. Whitcomb, in Concord, after July 10th, in packages of ten for \$4.50, and of three \$1.40. Any one to whom this circular is sent can now engage course tickets by making application, and sending \$5 as a guaranty. For those who make this deposit, tickets will be reserved till the tenth day of July, and can then be obtained by payment of the balance due. They entitle the holder to reserved seats. Students coming and going daily during the term may reach Concord from Boston by the Fitchburg Railroad, or the Middlesex Central; from Lowell, Andover, etc., by the Lowell and Framingham Railroad; from Southern Middlesex and Worcester Counties by the same road. The Orchard House stands on the Lexington road, east of Concord village, adjoining the Wayside estate, formerly the residence of Mr. Hawthorne. For fuller information concerning the town and the school, we would refer applicants and visitors to the "Concord Guide-Book" of Mr. George B. Bartlett.<sup>1</sup>

Lodgings with board may be obtained at the following houses in Concord village:

Miss E. BARRETT, Monument Street.

Mrs. KENT, Main Street.

Mrs. O'BRIEN, Monument Square.

Mrs. GOODNOW, Main Street.

Mrs. CUTTER, Sudbury Street.

Mrs. HOW, Hubbard Street.

Mrs. B. F. WHEELER, Belknap Street.

Lodgings without board can be obtained in the neighborhood of each of the above-named houses. Students and visitors will make their own arrangements without consulting the undersigned.

A. BRONSON ALCOTT, *Dean*.

S. H. EMERY, Jr., *Director*.

F. B. SANBORN, *Secretary*.

CONCORD, June 23, 1885.

#### PROGRAMME OF LECTURES.

JULY, 1885:

16th, 7.30 P. M., Mr. Albee.

17th, 9.30 A. M., Mrs. Cheney.

7.30 P. M., Mr. Snider.

18th, 9.30 A. M., Dr. Bartol and Dr. Hedge.

20th, 9.30 A. M., Prof. Harris.

7.30 P. M., Mr. Sanborn.

21st, 9.30 A. M., Mrs. Sherman.

7.30 P. M., Prof. White.

JULY, 1885:

22d, 9.30 A. M., Mr. Emery.

7.30 P. M., Mr. Snider.

23d, 9.30 A. M., Prof. Hewett.

7.30 P. M., Prof. Harris.

24th, 9.30 A. M., Mr. Blake.

7.30 P. M., Dr. Soldan.

25th, 9.30 A. M., Mrs. Howe.

27th, 9.30 A. M., Mr. Partridge.

<sup>1</sup> Published by D. Lothrop & Co., Boston, and containing an account of the origin of the School.

27th, 7.30 P. M., Prof. Harris.  
 28th, 9.30 A. M., Mr. Snider.  
 7.30 P. M., Mr. Davidson.  
 29th, 9.30 A. M., Mr. Ernst.

29th, 7.30 P. M., Mr. Fiske.  
 30th, 9.30 A. M., Dr. Abbott.  
 7.30 P. M., Prof. Harris.  
 31st, 9.30 A. M., Dr. Peabody.

## LECTURES AND SUBJECTS, 1885.

THE GENERAL SUBJECTS FOR THIS YEAR WILL BE

*I. Goethe's Genius and Work.**II. Is Pantheism the Legitimate Outcome of Modern Science?*

## I. GOETHE'S GENIUS AND WORK.

Under this head will come lectures on:

1. "Goethe's Self-Culture," by Mr. JOHN ALDER.
2. "Goethe and his 'Mährchen,'" by Rev. Dr. F. H. HEDGE.
3. "Goethe's Relation to Kant and Spinoza in Philosophy," by Dr. F. L. SOLDAN.
4. "Goethe's Faust," by Prof. HARRIS.
5. "Goethe's Youth," by Prof. H. S. WHITE, of Cornell University.
6. "The 'Ewig-Weibliche,'" by Mrs. E. D. CHENEY.
7. "Goethe's Faust," by Mr. D. J. SNIDER.
8. "Goethe's Relation to English Literature," by Mr. F. B. SANBORN.
9. A Lecture by Mr. JULIAN HAWTHORNE.
10. "The Novellees in 'Wilhelm Meister,'" by Prof. HARRIS.
11. "'Wilhelm Meister' as a Whole," by Mr. D. J. SNIDER.
12. "Goethe and Schiller," by Rev. Dr. BARTOL.
13. "The Women of Goethe," by Mrs. JULIA WARD HOWE.
14. "The Elective Affinities," by Mr. S. H. EMERY, Jr.
15. "Goethe's Titanism," by Prof. THOMAS DAVIDSON.
16. "Goethe at Weimar," by Prof. HEWETT, of Cornell University.
17. "Child-Life as Portrayed in Goethe's Works," by Mrs. CAROLINE K. SHERMAN, of Chicago.
18. "Goethe as Playwright," by Mr. WILLIAM O. PARTRIDGE.
19. "The Style of Goethe," by Mr. C. W. ERNST.

## II. A SYMPOSIUM: IS PANTHEISM THE LEGITIMATE OUTCOME OF MODERN SCIENCE?

Papers by Rev. Dr. PEABODY, Mr. JOHN FISKE, Prof. HARRIS, Dr. G. H. HOWISON, and Dr. F. E. ABBOTT.

"Readings from Thoreau," by Mr. H. G. O. BLAKE; and "Readings from Mr. Alcott's Diaries" may also be given.

*IMMORTALITY.<sup>1</sup>*

Welcome the tribute sometimes Fortune steals  
 From youth's exchequer to enrich old age!  
 What ample pension freely forth she deals  
 To gild with glory his gray equipage,

<sup>1</sup> This sonnet was written the day before Mr. Alcott received the paralytic shock which has since confined him to his room.—EDITOR.

Whilst o'er Time's track slow roll his chariot-wheels,  
 Then Heaven's gate enters! He, his heritage  
 Of life receiving, breaks the sacred seals,  
 High privilege sole given to saint and sage.  
 Life were but ashes, and one holocaust,  
 If no fair Future welcomed from its goal,  
 No gate swung open to admit us—lost  
 Were all companionship and blank the soul.—  
 Ah, dead to all life holds and knows its own,  
 If youth survive not and uphold its throne.

A. BRONSON ALCOTT.

CONCORD, MASS., October 23, 1882.

## SENTENCES IN PROSE AND VERSE.

SELECTION BY W. E. CHANNING.

Physiognomy is not a rule to judge people by, even if it may serve to make a guess at them.—*La Bruyère*.

Men have three experiences—birth, life, and death; they know not when they are born, they suffer when they die, and they forget they are alive.—*Ibid.*

Children are vain, disdainful, cross, envious, curious, self-interested, lazy, volatile, timid, unrestrained, untruthful, and cheats; they easily laugh and cry, little things delight or annoy them, they prefer not to suffer pain but to cause it; they are miniature men.—*Ibid.*

Two opposite facts equally surprise—habit and novelty.—*Ibid.*

Crimes come from a bad heart, vices from the faults of temperament follies from a lack of perception.—*Ibid.*

Men appreciate others with difficulty, and have but a feeble style of praising each other; action, conduct, thought, expression, nothing delights nor contents them. They put themselves in the place of the writer or speaker, and narrate similar experiences on their own part, and are so full of themselves they lack room for anybody else.—*Ibid.*

“Do like the rest,” a suspicious maxim, which usually signifies, follow evil.—*Ibid.*

By dying we may obtain the praise of the survivors, when our only virtue consists in having died. Cato and Piso may use the same eulogy.—*Ibid.*

We should not feel disagreeably because men evince hardness, ingratitude, injustice, pride, self-love, and forgetfulness of others; so are they

made; this is after human nature. To make much account of similar displays is like worrying because stones fall or fire burns.—*Ibid.*

Failure is so common, and good things are purchased by such extraordinary pains, that what is easily done grows suspicious. We may readily believe that we deserve to succeed, but we should not positively rely on success before it arrives.—*Ibid.*

There is nothing men wish so much to keep, and which they husband so ill, as their own lives.—*Ibid.*

Death can happen but once, and so we think about it all our lives; it is possibly worse in apprehension than in reality.—*Ibid.*

The certainty of death is a little mitigated by the uncertainty as to its coming; it is an indefinite element in time, which has something infinite, or what we call eternal.—*Ibid.*

We forever dread that old age we can never be at all sure of reaching.—*Ibid.*

Children have neither past nor future, and, what we can never hope for, they delight in the present.—*Ibid.*

We may shorten or omit a host of discussions by concluding that certain persons can never speak justly, and condemning at once what they may say, past, present, and future.—*Ibid.*

Between genius and talent there exists the same proportion as between the whole and a part.—*Ibid.*

Children seize at the first glance upon latent and patent bodily defects, and describe them truthfully in the finest words, that no one can better.—*Ibid.*

Hate is so lasting and dogmatic, it is a sure sign of dissolution, in a sick man, when he begins to forgive his enemies.—*Ibid.*

The judgment of men on each other's actions is efficacious; soon or late specific results flow from it.—*Guizot.*

Ce monde, chère Agnes, est une étrange chose.—*Molière.*

I remember a rare experiment that a Nobleman of much sincerity, and a singular friend of mine, told me he had seen: which was, That, by means of glasses made in a very particular manner, and artificially placed by one another, he had seen the sunbeams gathered together and precipitated down into a brownish or purplish red powder.—*Sir Kenelm Digby.*

One would think it a folly to talk of washing hands in a well-polished Silver Bason wherein there is not a drop of water, yet this may be done

by the reflexion of the *Moon* beams only . . . and this is an infallible way to take away Warts from the hands, if it be often tried.—*Ibid.*

The Farey is a venomous and contagious humor within the body of a Horse; hang a Toad about the neck of the Horse in a little bag, and he will be cured infallibly; the Toad, which is the stronger poyson, drawing to it the venome which was within the Horse.—*Ibid.*

And where he speaketh of *Cupid*, and of *Beauty*, it is in such a phrase, as putteth me in mind of the Learned *Greeke Reader* in *Cambridge*, his courting his *Mistris* out of *Stephens* his Thesaurus [of Sir Thos. Browne].—*Ibid.*

This world was made to be inhabited by Beasts, but studied and contemplated by Man.—*Sir Thomas Browne.*

The severe schooles shall never laugh me out of the opinion of *Hermes*, that this visible world is but the picture of the invisible.—*Ibid.*

There are no *Grotesques* in nature; not anything formed to fill up empty cantous and unnecessary spaces; . . . indeed, what reason may not go to schoole to the wisdom of Bees, Aunts, and Spiders?—*Ibid.*

So I could enjoy my Saviour at the last, I could with patience be nothing almost unto eternity.—*Ibid.*

#### I. TWO STATEMENTS OF A THOUGHT.

When *consciousness* has been bereft  
Of all that *can* be from it rent,  
That which, alone, behind is left,  
Is *self*, in form and in content.

When all which can excluded be  
Is from the self excluded all,  
That which then by itself we see  
Is what self-consciousness we call.

#### II. THE "MILK OF THE WORD."

The tongue, a shepherd soft as silk,  
His wealth of speech leads forth in herds;  
Who speech can milk to him its milk,  
It yields in meanings of the words.

So Paul his readers once entreats  
Of his epistolary herd  
To strip the texts, as they were teats,  
For "the sincere milk of the word!"

W. R. ALGER.

THE JOURNAL  
OF  
SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

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[No. 3.

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“THE DIAL”:

AN HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION, WITH A LIST OF  
THE CONTRIBUTORS.

BY GEORGE WILLIS COOKE.

When the present essay was projected (in November, 1881), little had been written about “The Dial.” Since that time the Carlyle and Emerson Correspondence has been published, Froude’s “Life of Carlyle,” and biographies of Margaret Fuller, Thoreau, and Ripley in the “American Men of Letters” series. Each of these works has added considerable to our knowledge of that unique periodical; but there is yet much left which can be said of it. All that it was to the persons who wrote for it cannot be told even now; but it is possible to give a continuous narrative of its origin and its influence. As the organ of the transcendental movement it deserves all the recognition it has received. It also did a service not to be forgotten in bringing before the public several young persons who have since gained distinction in literature. It was almost the first means of expression for all the writers who contributed to its pages. Emerson and Alcott had printed something before, and so had Ripley. In its pages Thoreau, W. E.

Channing, Dwight, Cranch, Curtis, Dana, and several others, appeared for the first time in print. Nearly all the other writers have in some way contributed to the literature of the time, or offer something of interest to the student of that period. I have been able to add much that seems to me of interest concerning these lesser contributors to "The Dial," and to rescue some names from the oblivion into which they had fallen. Some of the names presented in these pages will recall pleasant memories to those of "The Dial" writers now living.

Through the kindness of Mr. James Elliot Cabot I am able to give several letters about "The Dial" from Emerson, Margaret Fuller, and Miss Elizabeth Peabody, as well as two or three extracts from Emerson's diary. In compiling a list of the contributors I have had generous aid from Mr. F. B. Sanborn, Col. T. W. Higginson, and Rev. J. F. Clarke. To Dr. E. W. Emerson I am indebted for the use of his father's copy of "The Dial," in which some of the names of the writers had been written by his hand. With the aid obtained from these most friendly contributors to my enterprise, and that received from many other persons, I have been enabled to make a nearly complete list of "The Dial" writers. Only a few of the shorter and less important pieces are left without the author's name.

At the time when Emerson began to lecture in Boston, and the transcendental movement was taking shape, there was talk of a periodical to represent the new thought. As early as March, 1835, Emerson wrote of a projected "organ of a spiritual philosophy" which several young men among his friends were discussing. This journal was to have been called "'The Transcendentalist,' 'The Spiritual Inquirer,' or the like," and it was proposed that Rev. F. H. Hedge should be the editor. When Mr. Hedge went to Bangor, in 1835, Emerson wrote to Carlyle, in April of that year, suggesting that he become the editor of the proposed periodical. At this time his American admirers were urging Carlyle to come to this country and settle among them. He was to write books, lecture, and edit "The Transcendentalist." "We feel some confidence," wrote Emerson, "that it could be made to secure him a support."



Hedge being too far away, and Carlyle not coming to America, much difficulty was found in securing an editor. The subject was frequently debated in the gatherings of the transcendentalists, as they came together at the houses of one or another of the believers. The discussion of the proposed periodical went on until the autumn of 1836, when the bi-centennial of Harvard College brought together four young Unitarian preachers, R. W. Emerson, George Ripley, F. H. Hedge, and George Putnam, who debated the need of a better theology, and the advantage to be gained from an organ of that form of thought which they held in common. The following week another meeting was held at the house of George Ripley, and, in the same month of September, one with Emerson at Concord. Out of these meetings grew an informal gathering of friends, which has been known as the Symposium, the Transcendental Club, and by other names. It seldom included more than a dozen persons—all idealists and readers of German philosophy. There was no formal organization or any distinct object set forth on the part of those who constituted the membership. They were drawn together by a common desire for a more spiritual interpretation of religion than that to which they had been accustomed.

As opportunity offered these friends met at each other's houses, and, though a periodical was often discussed, their plans did not get shaped into action for some time. In 1839 the talk finally grew more definite, and the correspondence of Emerson, Margaret Fuller, and Alcott, at this period, frequently refers to the speedy appearance of the new journal. The friends of the proposed periodical were moved to commence their undertaking in earnest by "*The Monthly Magazine*" of London, which, in January, 1839, passed under the editorship of John A. Herand, a disciple of Coleridge and a fifth-rate poet. He gave that periodical a new tone and character, and it was read with delight by Ripley, Alcott, Francis, and others, on this side the Atlantic. Its character was much more distinctively literary than "*The Dial*" became, but it had also much of the idealistic spirit of the time, and it was saturated with the philosophic thought imbibed from Coleridge and from Germany. The writings of Emerson and Alcott were hailed with delight in its pages, "*Nature*" being attributed to the latter. In April, 1840, it published a master's oration by

Robert Bartlett, which contained the essence of the thought which was stirring so many minds in America.

Margaret Fuller attended the club September 18, 1839, and expressed her ideas about the projected periodical; and on that occasion the name "Dial" was used, it probably having been suggested by Alcott. She was selected for the editor, and she began at once to marshal the forces necessary to its appearance. It was proposed to issue the first number in April, and she wrote to W. H. Channing, Hedge, and others, urging them to contribute to its pages. It was arranged that George Ripley should be the associate editor; and he acted in that capacity so long as Margaret Fuller was the editor. A plan was suggested for selling "The Dial" by merit, not by subscription, which met with the approval of Margaret Fuller; but it probably met with no favor from her assistant, who had charge of the publishing, and it was abandoned. At the end of May only thirty subscribers had been received in Boston; but the work of preparation went on, and the new literary bantling made its appearance in July. After years of talk and hopeful anticipation, the organ of the new life was a fact. Too much had been desired; and all who took part in its preparation were disappointed. Margaret Fuller wrote to Emerson, immediately after its appearance, of its failure to reach her own ideal. "I am glad," she says to him, "you are not quite dissatisfied with the first number. I feel myself how far it is from the eaglet motion I wanted. I suffer in looking over it now." Alcott found little in it to please him; and he wrote of it to Herand in words of ambitious hope for the future. "It satisfies me not," was his complaint, "nor Emerson. It measures not the meridian but the morning ray; the nations wait for the gnomon that shall mark the broad noon." His wish that it become a more outspoken organ of the subjective philosophy seems not to have been shared in by Emerson, for he made this record of his hopes in his diary:

"And now I think our 'Dial' ought not to be a mere literary journal, but that the times demand of us all a more earnest aim. It ought to contain the best advice on the topics of government, temperance, abolition, trade, and domestic life. It might well add to such compositions such poetry and sentiment as now will constitute its best merit. Yet it ought to go straight into life with the devoted wisdom of the best men in the land. It should—should it not?—

be a degree nearer to the hodiernal facts than my writings are. I wish to write pure mathematics, and not a culinary almanac or application of science to the arts."

On the fourth day of August he wrote to Margaret Fuller of his desire to make "The Dial" an organ of the higher life in the daily affairs of men rather than a literary journal.

"I begin to wish to see a different 'Dial' from that which I first imagined. I would not have it too purely literary. I wish that we might make a journal so broad and great in its survey that it should lead the opinion of this generation on every great interest, and read the law on property, government, education, as well as on art, letters, and religion. A great journal people must read, and it does not seem worth our while to work with any other than sovereign aims. So I wish we might court some of the good fanatics and publish chapters on every head in the whole art of living."

Before the first number appeared he wrote to Carlyle: "It is not much; indeed, though no copy has come to me, I know it is far short of what it should be, for they have suffered puffs and dulness to creep in for the sake of the complement of pages; but it is better than anything we had." After it appeared he wrote that it contained "scarcely anything considerable or even visible." When the second number was published, the satisfaction it gave to some of its readers seems to have encouraged the editors, for Margaret Fuller wrote in these words to Emerson, under date of November 7th:

"I begin to be much interested in 'The Dial,' finding it brings meat and drink to sundry famishing men and women at a distance from these tables. Meseems you ought to know with what delight the 'Woodnotes' have been heard."

The publication of "The Dial" was not well managed, and it suffered many things from those who had it in charge. Its subscription-list did not at any time reach three hundred names. It was proposed to pay Margaret Fuller two hundred dollars for her work as the editor, but nothing could be paid, and her own interests pressed. In November, 1841, she wrote: "'The Dial' is likely to fall through entirely."

Its first publishers were Weeks, Jordan & Co., who were very sanguine of its success, and with high anticipations published a

large number of copies of the earlier numbers. During the second year they failed, and the copies on hand were distributed among the contributors. With some effort the subscription-list was secured by the editors, and the continued use of the name was only retained with difficulty. Miss Elizabeth P. Peabody, a Boston bookseller at that time, then undertook the laborious task of publication. She and her aged father even wrapped the numbers for mailing, and gave to its service a great amount of gratuitous labor. An appeal was made to the public to sustain the magazine better. Those interested in the fate of "The Dial" were requested to pay promptly, and to become subscribers, instead of buying the single numbers as they were published.

After Miss Peabody took its publication in charge she wrote to Emerson that, having paid the printer's bills, she would pay Margaret Fuller first before taking out any commission for her own services, until the editor had received three hundred dollars a year. Then she would take the usual commission for her services, after which the editor and contributors should receive further compensation. Alas, for so good a plan, so nicely laid out on paper, that it should have failed utterly to remunerate either editor or contributors! Miss Peabody wrote of the former publishers as "that rascally firm"; but the list of subscribers fell off. Having made an examination of the accounts of "The Dial," with the aid of a friend, she found that they did not warrant any pay to the editor, if even so much as the continuance of the journal. In March, 1842, immediately after this examination, Miss Peabody wrote to Emerson that not more than three hundred subscribers could be counted on. She said that if seven hundred and fifty copies were printed the expenses could not be met, after allowing twenty per cent discount to agents; but if only five hundred copies were printed the expenses could be reduced within the receipts. She also wrote: "Margaret, after knowing these items, decides she cannot give her time to it any more. It is a great care and responsibility, and she is not able to give gratuitous labor. She has gone on in the hope that it might afford her a sufficient compensation to enable her to give up her laborious teaching; but the two labors are altogether too much for her."

Margaret Fuller had already found her health giving way, and the worry of the editorship was more than she could endure. She

wrote the following note to Emerson at the same time Miss Peabody sent the above letter :

"I grieve to disappoint you after all the trouble you have taken. I am also sorry myself, for if I could have received a maintenance from this 'Dial' I could have done my duties to it well, which I never have all this time, and my time might have been given to my pen ; while now, for more than three months, I have been able to write no line except letters. But it cannot be helped. It has been a sad business."

Had "The Dial" been made a financial success, so that Margaret Fuller could have given her whole thought and time to literature, free from all distractions, the gain of it would have been great to American letters. As it was, it was often a burden to those who had charge of it, and, while laughed at for what they produced, they were quite crippled against doing that which they most of all desired to accomplish.

Margaret Fuller wrote a brief note announcing the suspension of "The Dial"; but she sent it to Emerson, suggesting that he or Parker might wish to continue the work. In writing to him about the withdrawal of the editor, Miss Peabody offered to act herself as the assistant editor rather than have "The Dial" suspended, and added: "Miss Fuller thinks you and Mr. Parker may think it best to go on, in order to have an organ whereby the Free may speak. If you think that you shall go on, that last notice—about the suspension—you can cross out." The effect of this announcement on Emerson may be seen from a record in his Diary :

"'The Dial' is to be sustained or ended, and I must settle the question, it seems, of its life or death. I wish it to live, but I do not wish to be its life. Neither do I like to put it into the hands of the Humanity and Reform Men, because they trample on letters and poetry ; nor in the hands of the scholars, for they are dead and dry."

To Margaret Fuller he wrote this letter :

"MONDAY MORNING, 20 March, 1842.

"DEAR MARGARET: After thinking a little concerning this matter of 'The Dial,' I incline to undertake it for a time rather than have it stop and go into the hands that know not Joseph. I had rather it should not be suspended. Your friends are my friends, and will give me such aid as they would have given you, and my main resource is to adopt the ex-

pedient of selection from old or from foreign books almost with the liberality to which Alcott would carry it, certainly to make Synesius, or Lucian, or Chaucer speak whenever a dull article is offered and rejected. Perhaps I shall rue this day of accepting such an intruder on my peace, such a consumer of my time, as a 'Dial.' Perhaps, then, I shall find some friend of Hercules who will lend a shoulder to uphold the little world. At all events, you have played martyr a little too long alone; let there be rotation in martyrdom. Yet shall you not forget to help. I think also I had rather undertake it alone than with any partnership or oversight such as Mr. Parker or Mr. Ripley, for example. So little skill have I in partnership that I am sure that we should make each other mutually unhappy. Now I will ask of them their whole aid and furtherance. So I think you shall withhold your notice to subscribers, and I will immediately consult 'Fabricius on Authors' for solid continent to fill up July withal. You will see at once what folios of information on details and good advice for my first adventure I need. Send me word that your head aches less with such prospect of present relief, and we will hope that our 'Dial' will one day grow so rich as to pay its old debts.

Yours,

WALDO."

In writing to Carlyle a week later Emerson relates the history of "The Dial," and specifies the reasons for deciding to continue it.

"I had not the cruelty to kill it, and so must answer with my own proper care and nursing for its life. Perhaps it is a great folly in me, who have little adroitness in turning off work, to assume this sure vexation, but 'The Dial' has certain charms to me as an opportunity, which I grudge to destroy. Lately, at New York, I found it to be to a certain class of men and women, though few, an object of tenderness and religion. You cannot believe it?"

It would seem by these letters that Emerson did not at all misunderstand the task he had assumed, how much of drudgery it would be sure to involve, and the probability that it would not pay him even the smallest compensation for his work. For the sake, however, of what "The Dial" stood for, and with the purpose of having in this country an organ for all free minds, he took up this unpromising task. He took it up, too, perhaps, with the hope of making it answer a higher purpose than hitherto. Writing to him in April about securing an honest and reliable publisher, Margaret Fuller alludes to his making of "The Dial" a different periodical from what it had been, and her regret at having been obliged to give it up.

"The only way," she writes, "in which this will affect me is, that I think you will sometimes reject pieces that I should not. For you have always had in view to make a good periodical and represent your own tastes, while I have had in view to let all kinds of people have freedom to say their say for better, for worse."

Emerson's method of conducting a periodical was altogether the better one. He made "The Dial" more to his own mind, kept it open to the best writing he could secure, but made it also the organ of those reforms with which he had sympathy in some greater or less degree. His name now appeared at the top of the third page of the cover as the editor, his editorship having been announced by the publisher with the number for July, 1842. But the subscription-list did not grow. Charles Lane and Henry Thoreau spent some time in canvassing for subscribers, and Greeley freely advertised "The Dial" in his "Tribune." In June Miss Peabody wrote to the new editor that not one half the copies printed went to regular subscribers; and Emerson mentions the exact number as two hundred and twenty. In February Miss Peabody wrote: "Little as 'The Dial' is subscribed for, it is very extra lively read"; but she also announced that the list was falling off. In a few circles here and there "The Dial" was read with much of interest and satisfaction. At Brook Farm its appearance was watched for with eagerness, and all its pages were devoured with delight. The young people found in it an expression of their aspirations and hopes, and they eagerly discussed its better articles. The fact was, however, that only a very small number of persons really cared for "The Dial" and its idealisms.

Emerson not only acted as the editor, but also as the banker of "The Dial." He was obliged to endorse Miss Peabody's notes for the current expenses, and when the publication went into the hands of James Monroe & Co., at the end of the third year, she notified him that she might require him to pay \$120 due on its account. Monroe led Emerson to believe that with a more careful business management, and in connection with his own publishing business, "The Dial" could be made to succeed. It was therefore put into his hands; but the subscription-list did not increase, while the expenses did. Monroe charged one third of the selling price for its management, and the result was the abandonment of



the enterprise at the end of the first year under his control. Emerson took two years of the "martyrdom," and then "The Dial" came to its end. It probably cost him some hundreds of dollars, besides the time he gave to it. In September, 1854, Miss Peabody wrote him that a large number of copies of "The Dial" were lying in her brother's store, and asked him what should be done with them. He carried many of them to his own house, stored them in his attic, and distributed them where he thought they were desired or would do good. The last of them were burned or sold to the ragman in 1872.

Though so poorly sustained, "The Dial" served an admirable purpose. It enabled the transcendentalists to speak to each other, it brought their philosophy more distinctly before the public, it enabled them to give their thoughts a clearer utterance than they otherwise would have done, and it helped them to realize what their own cause meant. It gave them courage to appeal to the public with what they regarded as a larger and truer conception of life. It was not their aim to write fine essays and learned books; their movement was not purely literary in its nature. It was religious as well as intellectual, moral rather than literary; and it had in it the prophetic spirit. It was not a new form of inquiry about life and its problems, but it was a regenerating and inspiring impulse, leading men toward "plain living and high thinking." Transcendentalism came like a gospel to those who accepted it. None of "The Dial" writers wrote merely as literary artists. First of all, they had a word to utter, and they were anxious to reform the world. In any age such aims, in connection with literature, meet with little appreciation and favor. The highest service which was done by "The Dial" was to move a large number of persons to express their thoughts on the printed page. In itself this was nothing, but the persons who were influenced proved to have something to say that the world needed to hear. It is probable that Margaret Fuller, Thoreau, and Ellery Channing would have found another way to give their essays and poems to the public, but it is not to be forgotten that "The Dial" first did this for them.

The support which "The Dial" received indicates that the transcendental movement was not popular, that only a small number of persons were genuinely in sympathy with its thought



and spirit. The tendency of the time was largely in the direction of practical reform, while those who were favorable to the spiritual philosophy were only interested in it as it came from the pulpit or the lecture-platform. The more iconoclastic Theodore Parker could win hearers and readers, but the greater number of "The Dial" writers were too indefinite in thought and too noble in sentiment to attract the readers they hoped for in the beginning.

Small as was the success of "The Dial," from a financial point of view, it was hailed with delight by many of its readers. Among those who listened to Emerson, and with scattered readers in New and Old England alike, it was received with the deepest satisfaction, and all its pages read with the closest attention. The numbers were loaned from house to house, and its essays were discussed wherever the transcendentalists met. The fervor of its writers, the air of having something to say which outsiders could not appreciate, and the unconcern for facts and literary laws, made "The Dial" a source of ridicule to those not in sympathy with its high purpose and its earnest spiritual conviction. Even its friends could but smile at the extravagances of some of the writers, for the period was one of excess and *nüveté*. To those who did not receive the gospel of freedom and newness there was occasion in its pages for much of ridicule and sarcasm. Carlyle thought "The Dial" had too little body, that it was too ethereal and speculative. The same criticism was made nearer home, for the "Boston Quarterly" said: "It is full of rich thought, though somewhat injured by its puerile conceits and childish expressions. Its authors seem to have caught some partial glimpses and to have felt the moving of a richer, a higher life, which carries them away, and which as yet they have not been able to master. To our taste, they want manliness and practical aims. They are too vague, evanescent, ærial; but, nevertheless, there is a sad sincerity about many of them. On many sides they expose themselves to ridicule, but at bottom they seem to have a serious, solemn purpose." No better or truer word about "The Dial" could now be said for it than this by Orestes Brownson, himself a believer in the transcendental philosophy and a member of the club which originated "The Dial." He had invited the members of that club to write for his journal instead of starting one of their own. Another

friendly critic was found in the editor of the "Western Messenger," who praised it for the great truths it stood for; but its faults were pointed out: "Thus far, to speak frankly, we do not think they (the editors) have shown the power they possess. The articles in the number before us, if we except two or three, will, we think, do little good. However, we know that among the writers for this work are some dozen of the purest, clearest, and truest minds in the land, and such as will be felt, and felt deeply." To the unfriendly critics nothing too severe could be said against a journal so opposed to custom in literature as was "The Dial." The editor of the "Boston Times" quite exhausted his ingenuity in laughing at it. "It is, to us, humble, uninitiated sinners, yet ignorant of the sublime 'mysteries,' one of the most transcendently (we like big words) ridiculous productions." The "Boston Post" spoke of its "dreamy, silly, Carlyle-imitating style of writing," and said it was "rich in the profoundly allegorical and hopelessly obscure." Yet this newspaper praised some of the numbers for their freshness, high-toned sentiment, and truly American spirit.

The "orphic sayings" of Alcott, and the prose rhapsody called "Dolon," occasioned great merriment and much ridicule among the critics. In Louisville, Rev. J. F. Clarke and Rev. C. P. Cranch, the latter then preaching in that city as a minister-at-large, amused themselves by drawing caricatures of "The Dial" writers and sayings. One of these represents a man lying on a bed sipping wine, a copy of "The Dial" having fallen to the floor, while his wife sits at the foot of the bed blacking his boots. This was called "The Moral Influence of 'The Dial,'" and it had this legend from the poem on "Life":

"Why for work art thou striving,  
 Why seek'st thou for aught?  
 To the soul that is living  
 All things shall be brought."

The same poem led to another sketch, representing an immense man, with a copy of "The Dial" sticking from his coat-tail pocket, watching two companions of like dimensions dancing near him. All utter the following sentiment to a lean and cadaverous man gazing on them with amazement expressed on his features:

“Greatly to be  
Is enough for me,  
Is enough for thee.”

In one of the cleverest of these sketches Clarke represents Margaret as driving a carriage, and Emerson as riding behind her. The editors say :

“Our ‘Dial’ shows the march of light  
O’er forests, hills, and meadows.”

To this a critic, trudging by, replies :

“Not so, and yet you name it right ;  
It marks the flight of shadows.”

These witty persons, laughing at “*The Dial*” in their lonely outpost to keep their courage up, and all the time sighing for Boston and the *Dial* circle, shot their shafts at higher game as well, and did not spare Emerson. A bare-footed rustic, with a great eyeball for a head and gazing over valleys and hills, illustrated Emerson’s saying in “*Nature*” : “Standing on the bare ground, I become a transparent eyeball.” A man with an immense melon-body, sitting among melons and corn in a field, is a caricature of this sentence in the same work : “I expand and live in the warm day, like corn and melons.” Other sketches they made, but a few of the sentences which excited their mirth will show the drift of them all : “The great man angles with himself ; he needs no other bait.” “They are contented to be brushed like flies from the path of the great man.” “The man has never lived who can feed us ever.” “We are lined with eyes. We see with our feet.” These sketches were never published, but Rev. J. F. Clarke possesses a large number of them arranged in a volume which bears the title, “*Illustrations of the New Philosophy*, 1835. By C. P. Craneh.”<sup>1</sup>

The work on “*The Dial*” of an editorial kind being done gratuitously, the proof-reading was not so well cared for as it might have been. Writing of the first number, Margaret Fuller said : “The errors are most unhappy. I will not go away again when it is in press.” This was written of Thoreau’s “*Persius*,” but there were errors throughout. In Dwight’s essay on “*The*

<sup>1</sup> This date must represent the beginning of the sketches.

Religion of Beauty," the "grass *studded* with golden points" got *painted* instead, while *duty* appeared instead of *beauty* at the end of the third paragraph, and *makes* took the place of *wakes* near the bottom of the fourth page. Printed slips appeared with some of the numbers giving a list of corrections.

It is an indication of the literary condition of the country in 1840 that Emerson should have been willing to contribute so much of his best writing to "The Dial" without remuneration. Many of his best essays and poems were given to it for publication, even when other and more widely circulated journals were open to him. It had his heartiest interest from the beginning, and he gave to it much of time and money for the sake of what it represented. In July, 1842, he wrote to Carlyle that he submitted to what seemed a necessity of literary patriotism, and took charge of the thankless little "Dial," giving as a reason for so doing that "it serves as a sort of portfolio to carry about a few poems or sentences." He adds, in a strain of sadness over the thought of the hours it had cost him: "But I took it, as I said, and it took me, and a good deal of good time, to a small purpose."

A most interesting feature of Emerson's connection with "The Dial" was his drawing to it so many bright and promising young persons to become its contributors. It was at his suggestion and request that Thoreau, W. E. Channing, Mrs. Hooper, Stearns Wheeler, Charles Newcomb, Miss Clapp, and others, wrote for it or sent to it what they had previously written. All these persons were his friends and disciples, attracted to him personally and enamored of his thought. Many of the contributors were also Margaret Fuller's personal friends. Clarke, Hedge, Ripley, Caroline Sturgis, and Mrs. Hooper were her intimates, and they were drawn to the pages of "The Dial" through her efforts.

A remarkable feature of "The Dial," after Emerson became the editor, was its selections from the Oriental Scriptures. He anticipated the interest of later years, which has drawn so many persons to the exploration of these "old flower-fields of the soul;" and he equally anticipated the more recent doctrine of "the sympathy of religions." He eagerly read such translations as had then been made of the Buddhistic and other Asiatic sacred writings, and he brought into the pages of "The Dial" what his fine taste showed was best in these writings. He had the aid of other per-

sons in preparing these "Ethnical Scriptures," that being the title which he adopted for these selections. Thoreau gave his aid, as did several others. The first series of selections, in the first number of "The Dial" Emerson edited, was taken from the "Hitopadesa." His purpose in making these extracts he stated in an introductory note, which shows that he clearly appreciated what could be said for these divine utterances of the far East:

"We commence in the present number the printing of a series of selections from the oldest ethical and religious writings of men, exclusive of the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures. Each nation has its Bible more or less pure; none has yet been willing or able in a wise and devout spirit to collate its own with those of other nations, and sinking the civil-historical and the ritual portions to bring together the grand expressions of the moral sentiment in different ages and races, the rules for the guidance of life, the bursts of piety and of abandonment to the Invisible and Eternal—a work inevitable sooner or later, and which we hope is to be done by religion and not by literature."

Mr. Higginson is quite right in regarding her connection with "The Dial" as the most notable event in the literary career of Margaret Fuller, and he has given it that proportion in his "Life" of her which it deserves. Her best essays and sketches were printed in it. Her later work was written for immediate publication, but what she gave to "The Dial" was the slowly matured result of her years of leisure and deliberate thought. Some of it was hurried through to fill the pages, but all of it was the product of quiet years of reading and thinking. Her papers on Goethe and on "The Great Lawsuit" are the best she wrote. These are the best monument of her literary labors. All else she wrote was hurried, brief, and desultory in character. Her aim was high, as the editor of "The Dial," and she would have made a far better periodical could she have carried out her own ideal into reality. It was a great undertaking to conduct such a periodical without financial support, and without a literary constituency which could be relied on to provide suitable contributions. Under the circumstances "The Dial" shows an amount of merit which was not to have been expected.

George Ripley had much to do in establishing "The Dial," and he was the resident editor until he went to Brook Farm, in 1841.

He furnished the resolute purpose, the business sagacity, and the skill for critical drudgery, which were necessary to its management. An honored Unitarian preacher in Boston, he entered heartily into the spirit of the new philosophy, planned and established Brook Farm, made it a noble school for a large number of men and women, and afterward gave many years of patient critical labor to the "Tribune" and the "American Cyclopædia." As a critic of fine judgment he did much to make our literature worthy of our hopes. His library of "Specimens of Foreign Literature," begun in Boston in 1838, did excellent service in the quickening of thought. Jouffroy, De Wette, Goethe, Cousin, Schiller, and other German and French authors were thus made known in this country in good translations. Margaret Fuller, J. S. Dwight, J. F. Clarke, W. H. Channing, and C. T. Brooks, all "Dial" contributors, were among the translators. Several essays were also written for "The Dial" by Mrs. Ripley. As a maiden she was Sophia Willard Dana, born in Cambridge, a woman of culture and of great energy. She stood faithfully by her husband's side in his labors as a minister in Boston, and at Brook Farm she was one of the leaders in all its social and educational enterprises. Not sparing herself in any manner, she put her whole soul into that undertaking. Finding all that she hoped to realize fail, she joined the Catholic Church, being almost alone of "The Dial" writers to forsake the ideas and purposes of that hour of youthful enthusiasm.

The "Harbinger," begun at Brook Farm in June, 1845, was to some extent a successor to "The Dial." The same persons wrote for it, and the same spirit guided it. Ripley, Dwight, and Dana were the editors; and among the contributors were W. H. Channing, C. P. Cranch, G. W. Curtis, and J. F. Clarke. It was ably edited, was strongly literary in tone, and it was conducted with greater skill and judgment than "The Dial" had been. The drift of the hour toward reform found full expression in it, while the transcendental philosophy animated its pages.

Elizabeth Palmer Peabody was born in Billerica, Mass., in 1804, her father being a physician in that town. Her earlier years were spent mainly in Salem, where she received her education. In 1822 she went to Boston to engage in teaching. She became acquainted with Dr. Channing, read to him, and acted as

his literary assistant. This connection she has described in her "Recollections of Dr. Channing," published in 1880. When Alcott began his school in Boston she became one of his assistants, and she made a daily record of his teaching. As a result of this connection she published, in 1835, the "Record of a School: Exemplifying the General Principles of Spiritual Culture," in which she fully explained his theories and methods of teaching. Before this she had published several school-books, among them an "Introduction to Grammar," "First Steps in History," "Key to the History of the Hebrews," "Key to Grecian History," and a "Chronological History of the United States." Several tracts on educational topics were also written by her at this time. She early became interested in the methods of Pestalozzi, and in 1830 published lessons on Grammar after his plan. She did much to introduce his teaching and to commend it to educators. About 1840 she opened a foreign book-store on West Street in Boston, and with it she connected a small publishing business. In 1849 she began the publication of a magazine called "The *Æsthetic Papers*," which was to have been issued whenever enough matter of a valuable character had accumulated to make a volume of two hundred and fifty-six pages. No subscriptions were asked for beyond one number in advance. The introduction to the first and only number was by the editor, in which she discussed the meaning of the word *æsthetic*, which she said was "the watchword of a whole revolution in culture." The articles which followed made up a remarkable table of contents, and came in the following order: "Criticism," S. G. Ward; "Music," J. S. Dwight; "War," R. Waldo Emerson; "Organization," Parke Godwin; "Genius," Sampson Reed; "The Dorian Measure, with a Modern Application," the Editor; "Correspondence," J. J. G. Wilkinson; "Mainstreet," N. Hawthorne; "Abuse of Representative Government," Stephen H. Perkins; "Resistance to Civil Government," a lecture delivered in 1847, H. D. Thoreau; "Language," the Editor; "Vegetation about Salem, Mass.," An English Resident; and there were half a dozen poems—one by T. W. Higginson, one by his sister, Louisa S. Higginson, and one of them probably by Mrs. Hooper. Only fifty subscriptions were received, and a second number was not published. During the last twenty years Miss Peabody has been an



earnest advocate of the kindergarten, has written largely on the subject, lectured in its advocacy in many parts of the country, and published several lectures, tracts, and books in its exposition. Her zeal in behalf of the kindergarten has been effective in awakening a deep interest in the subject wherever she has been heard. Her life has been given to all good works, to culture and the higher education. She has known many of the most notable people of her time, and numbered not a few of them among her personal friends. Her conversation is full of profit and delight. Her paper on "Christ's Idea of Society" was at first sent as a letter to Harriet Martineau, at the request of George Ripley. With characteristic energy and self-forgetfulness she acted for a year and a half as the publisher of "The Dial," devoting to it many hours of drudgery.

Henry David Thoreau was born in Concord, Mass., July 12, 1817. His name appears on the Harvard College catalogue as "David Henry," and his contributions to "The Dial" were often signed "D. H. T.," and it was not until later that he came to write Henry first in his name. In August, 1839, Emerson wrote to Carlyle: "I have a young poet in this village named Thoreau, who writes the truest verses." The first thing by Thoreau to be printed was his poem entitled "Sympathy," which appeared in the first number of "The Dial." In the same number was printed a prose essay on "Aulus Persius Flaccus," which showed his genius in full activity. To the first volume he contributed one other poem, and two to the second. When Emerson took charge of "The Dial" Thoreau's pen was drawn on freely, and in the third volume he appeared no less than fifteen times—with twelve poems, his essay on the "Natural History of Massachusetts," a translation of "Prometheus Bound," a brief essay on "Anacreon," and a translation of eleven poems. To the last volume he gave his "Winter Walk" and the long essay on "Homer, Ossian, and Chaucer," and a number of translations from "Pindar," as well as a paper on the "Herald of Freedom." Many of these pieces were taken from his diary, as they were demanded by the editor. Nor was this all the work he did for "The Dial," for several of the Ethnical Scriptures were selected by him or with his aid. He also gave Emerson substantial help in the work of proof-reading. For all this work he received nothing whatever in the way of remuneration.



neration, though the magazine included some of the best of his essays and poems. During this period Thoreau lived in Emerson's house and worked with him in his garden; and the two pursued their literary tasks together. In May, 1841, Emerson wrote of Thoreau, that he "dwells now in my house, and, as I hope, for a twelvemonth to come," and describes him as "a noble, manly youth, full of melodies and inventions."

"The Dial" was greatly indebted to Theodore Parker for the numerous sermons, essays, and book notices that he contributed, and which gave it a point and purpose which it would not otherwise have had. His papers were more popular than anything which appeared in it, and two or three of them, especially that on the Hollis Street Council, helped to sell the whole edition. He contributed to all but one number while Margaret Fuller was the editor, and three long papers from his pen appeared while Emerson conducted the magazine. He sent the editor two love poems, with a note of apology, which is published in Weiss's "Life."

To Amos Bronson Alcott "The Dial" was indebted for its name, but it was not sufficiently the organ of the spiritual philosophy to suit him. He made some selections for its pages from his favorite authors, and he gave to it two series of extracts from his diary. In the last number edited by Margaret Fuller was published a collection of his thoughts, quotations, and correspondence, under the heading, "Days from a Diary." It not having appeared at the time promised, he sent a note to the editor requesting the return of the manuscript, which was published in the next number in introduction to the paper itself. In this note he described his attitude toward "The Dial":

"'The Dial' prefers a style of thought and diction not mine; nor can I add to its popularity with its chosen readers. A fit organ for such as myself is not yet, but is to be. The times require a full speech, a wise, humane, and brave sincerity, unlike all examples in literature, of which 'The Dial' is but the precursor. A few years more will give us all we desire—the people all they ask."

James Freeman Clarke, since so well known as a theologian and preacher, was one of those on whom Margaret Fuller relied to fill the pages of "The Dial." He had been the pastor of the Unitarian Church in Louisville from 1833 to 1840, and from 1836 to

1839 had edited the "Western Messenger," to which both Margaret Fuller and Emerson contributed. In 1840 he returned to Boston, and in 1841 he established the free church where he has preached so long. In 1841 he translated De Wette's "Theodore" for Ripley's "Specimens." He took an active part in the anti-slavery agitation, and he has been a leader in whatever good work his time has afforded. His contributions to "The Dial" were mostly poetical, showing the tendency of transcendentalism to make even the theologian a poet. His most valuable prose contribution was his tribute to the memory of George Keats, brother of the poet, which he has republished in his "Memorial and Biographical Sketches." The little poem on Dante in the first number was written by his sister, Sarah Freeman Clarke. She has long been an ardent student of Dante, as a series of papers in the "Century" for 1884 will testify. She was a pupil of Washington Allston in art, and she has published an account of him in the "Atlantic Monthly." She has lived for several years in Italy, devoting at least a part of her time to painting; she has since been a resident of Newport, and now lives at Marietta, Georgia.

William Ellery Channing, a nephew of his great namesake, and a son of Dr. Walter Channing, was born in Boston, June 10, 1818. He pursued his preparatory studies at Northampton and at the Boston Latin School, then entered Harvard College, but did not graduate. Going to Illinois in 1839, he spent a year and a half in a log cabin built by himself, and in 1840 he was an editor in Cincinnati. On the editorial staff of the "New York Tribune" in 1844, he went to Europe in 1846, and was an editor in New Bedford in 1855. In 1842 he married the younger sister of Margaret Fuller, went to live in Concord to devote himself to literature, and has since given himself to a recluse life of study and authorship. He early wrote verses for the "Boston Journal," and, when he was only twenty-two, Emerson made a collection of his poetry for "The Dial," prefacing it with the heartiest praise. His contributions to the last two volumes were numerous, and included a prose romance, which he left uncompleted. He published a volume of poems in Boston in 1843, and a second series in 1847. In the latter year was published his "Conversations in Rome," a prose work devoted to art and religion. "The Woodman and other Poems" came out in 1849, and "Near Home" in 1858.

He then remained silent until 1871, when he published "The Wanderer," with an introduction by Emerson. His next work was a biography of Thoreau, with memorial verses, published in 1873. In many respects this is the best account of Thoreau, as Channing knew him intimately; but it lacks in literary skill, and it is too fragmentary in its character. His poems have never been widely read, though they are highly appreciated by a few admirers. Emerson praised them; but they are too rough and uneven to become popular. In his "Walden" and "Week" Thoreau described him as "the poet," and Mr. Sanborn has written of him with admiration in his biography of Thoreau. To "The Dial" Channing was a frequent contributor of poetry, and some of his best pieces appeared in its pages.

Christopher Pearse Cranch, a son of William Cranch, an eminent jurist and a justice of the United States Supreme Court, was born at Alexandria, March 8, 1813. He graduated at Columbia College in 1831, then at the Harvard Divinity School, and spent two or three years in Louisville as the assistant of Rev. J. F. Clarke. In 1842 he took up art as a profession, and devoted himself to landscape painting. He has spent many years in Europe, but when in this country has lived mostly in New York and its vicinity. At present he resides in Cambridge. He spent a brief period at Brook Farm, and was a contributor to the "Harbinger." In 1844 he published a volume of poetry in Philadelphia, which contained many of the poems first published in "The Dial." It was dedicated to Emerson "as an imperfect testimony of regard and grateful admiration." In 1856 he published a children's book, illustrated by himself, and called "The Last of the Huggermuggers." It was followed the next year by "Kobboltozo," a sequel. In 1872 appeared his translation of the "Æneid" of Virgil, in blank verse. He aimed to make a literal and concise version, and it has been received with much favor by the public. A little later appeared a volume of fine poetry under the title of "The Bird and the Bell," and in 1874 a short poem called "Satan, a Libretto." He has been a frequent contributor to "Putnam's Magazine," the "Galaxy," "Harper's Monthly," the "Atlantic Monthly," and other magazines. His poems and sketches have shown marked ability, but they have not been collected into any permanent form. Cranch has a great variety of talent, and he is possessed of a de-

aided genius both for art and poetry. He was one of the most frequent contributors of verse to the first two volumes of "The Dial," and he also wrote in prose.

The settlement of Rev. Frederic H. Hedge in Bangor, in 1835, as pastor of the Unitarian Church there, prevented his becoming the editor of "The Dial," and it also kept him from making frequent contributions to its pages. His fine poem called "Questionings" was reprinted in Emerson's "Parnassus," and his one prose article deserves to be remembered. Born in Cambridge, December 12, 1805, he was the son of a professor in Harvard College. He went to Germany with George Bancroft in 1818, and studied there. Returning home, he graduated at Harvard College in 1825, and was the poet of his class. Graduating at the Theological School, he was settled at Arlington, Mass., in 1829. Subsequently he was settled over churches in Bangor, Providence, and Brookline. In 1857 he became the Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the Cambridge Theological School, and in 1872 Professor of German Literature in Harvard College. He has been a frequent contributor to the "Christian Examiner," "Putnam's Monthly," the "Atlantic Monthly," and other periodicals, and his addresses and orations on special occasions have attracted much attention. In 1848 he published a large work on the "Prose Writers of Germany," containing biographical and critical sketches of twenty-eight authors, with extended extracts from their writings, translated mostly by himself. His translations from the German poets, especially Goethe and Schiller, have been marked by skill and beauty. His "Reason in Religion," published in 1865, "Ways of the Spirit," 1877, and "Atheism in Philosophy," 1884, show the vigor and high range of his thinking on theological and philosophical subjects.

John Sullivan Dwight was born in Boston, May 13, 1813. Graduating at Harvard in 1832, he spent the usual time in the Theological School, and was settled at Northampton in 1840, but remained there only a few years. In 1838 he translated the minor poems of Goethe and Schiller, with notes, and they were published as the third volume of Ripley's "Specimens of Foreign Literature." For a short time, at this period, he edited the "Christian Register," in Boston. He was one of the founders of the Brook Farm Community, where he was the instructor in Italian and mu-

sic. He was also one of the editors of the "Harbinger," writing largely on music and in review of books. In 1844 he published a pamphlet on association in connection with education. In 1852 he began the publication in Boston of "Dwight's Journal of Music," which did much to develop a taste for the better kinds of music in this country. Through his efforts the great German composers were familiarized here, and the classical music carefully studied. He has published several essays, addresses and review articles on musical subjects. He has also written on literary subjects in the "Christian Examiner," "Harbinger," the "Æsthetic Papers," and his own journal. To the first volume of "The Dial" he contributed four papers, those on the "Ideals of Everyday Life" having probably been first used as sermons. To his first paper, on the religion of beauty, a poem was appended, which had previously been published in the "Christian Register." It contained these lines :

" Rest is not quitting  
The busy career :  
Rest is the fitting  
Of self to its sphere.

" 'Tis the brook's motion  
Clear without strife,  
Fleeting to ocean  
After its life.

" 'Tis loving and serving  
The highest and best ;  
'Tis onwards, unswerving—  
And that is true rest."

This little poem has become one of the household gems of treasured thought in many a home, and it is often quoted in essay, sermon, and conversation. It has been attributed to Goethe, and stanzas from it may often be found in the poetical corners of newspapers so credited. It was written by Mr. Dwight ; and, though a few other short poems from his pen have been published, he has written no other equal to this. He is now the president of the Harvard Musical Association of Boston, and his home is in the rooms of that society.

George William Curtis contributed only one poem to the pages of "The Dial." Born in Providence, he was privately educated, and in 1842 went for one year and a half to Brook Farm, where he continued his studies. Then he spent two years in Concord, devoting himself equally to study and to farm labor. He saw something of Emerson and the other Concord authors; but his account of them in the "Homes of American Authors" contains as much romance as fact. After his return from Egypt, in 1850, he became the New York correspondent of the "Harbinger," writing mostly on musical topics. The poem published in "The Dial" was sent to the editor anonymously.

Charles Anderson Dana was born, August 8, 1819, at Hinsdale, N. H. He entered Harvard College in 1839, but he did not complete the course, owing to a disease of the eyes, although he afterward received his degree. He was one of the founders of the Brook Farm Community, its secretary throughout, the instructor in Greek and German, and the managing editor of the "Harbinger." After leaving Brook Farm he edited the "Boston Chronotype" for a short time. In 1847 he became connected with the "Tribune," and in 1848 one of the proprietors and the managing editor. Subsequently he founded "The Sun," which has attained to a very wide circulation. He edited a "Household Book of Poetry" in 1855. In connection with Ripley, he projected the "New American Cyclopædia," which appeared from 1858 to 1863, and the later edition called the "American Cyclopædia," which was published from 1873 to 1876.

William Henry Channing was born in Boston, May 25, 1810, graduated at Harvard College and the Theological School, and was settled over the Unitarian Church in Cincinnati in 1835. He became one of the most enthusiastic of the transcendentalists, and a zealous believer in Christian socialism. At the same time he was led to look for a union of all Christians on a higher plane of faith and practice. To work out this idea he took charge of an independent congregation or Christian Union in New York. He also published there a weekly journal called "The Present," devoted to his form of socialism. In 1857 he went to England, and became the successor of Dr. James Martineau in Liverpool. Returning to America in 1861, he took charge of the Unitarian Church in Washington. His literary work has been mainly done

in the intervals of his professional labors, but it has been of considerable importance. In 1840 he translated Jouffroy's "Introduction to Ethics" for Ripley's "Specimens." In 1851 he published a two-volume memoir of Rev. James H. Perkins, his predecessor in Cincinnati, and his cousin. After the death of his uncle, Dr. Channing, he wrote his biography in three volumes, a work of much discernment and ability. He was also one of the authors of the "Memoirs of Margaret Fuller." Giving much time and sympathy to the Oriental religions, he embodied the results of his studies in a course of lectures delivered before the Lowell Institute in 1870. He lived in London for many years without pastoral relations, though often heard with delight in the pulpits of both this country and England. His prose contributions to "The Dial" indicate the rhapsody and spiritual fervor of his thought. No one retained so much as he of what was most characteristic of transcendentalism in the "Dial" period. He died in December, 1884, and his biography is being written by Mr. O. B. Frothingham.

James Russell Lowell was just entering on his career as an author when "The Dial" was begun. He published "A Year's Life" in 1841. In January, 1843, with Robert Carter, he began the publication of "The Pioneer," but it failed in a short time. Among the contributors were Poe, Neal, Hawthorne, Parsons, and Dwight. He sent several sonnets to "The Dial," and among those not appearing with his name there may possibly be a few which he wrote. To the "Harbinger" he contributed one or two poems. In a general way he was in sympathy with both enterprises.

Mrs. Ellen H. Hooper was the daughter of William Sturgis, a wealthy Boston merchant, and the wife of Dr. Robert W. Hooper, a Boston physician. She gave promise of much literary capacity; but she died at about the age of forty, and not long after "The Dial" was discontinued. Her contributions in verse were among the best which it gave to the public. A few of her pieces have gained a high reputation among those in sympathy with the form of thought which "The Dial" represented. In the first number was printed the little poem beginning with the line,

"I slept and dreamed that life was beauty,"

which was translated into Italian and attributed to Kant. Another well-known poem was written by her :

“She stood outside the gate of Heaven and saw them entering in.”

Emerson encouraged her to write, and he had much hope for her poetic genius. To him she addressed one of the finest of her poems. Her son, the present treasurer of Harvard University, collected her poems, had them privately printed, and presented copies to her friends. Her poems are so suffused with private feeling that her family has been very reluctant to have anything written about her, and this has had the effect to keep her from the reputation which she deserves. In the “Disciples’ Hymn-Book,” compiled by Rev. J. F. Clarke, the hymns numbered from 528 to 537, inclusive, were written by her. In “An Old Scrap-Book,” compiled by John M. Forbes, several of her poems are printed, her initials only being given in the index. Half a dozen of her poems are likely to live, and to hold a high place among those pieces which delight a few in each generation. Col. T. W. Higginson speaks of her as “a woman of genius,” and Margaret Fuller wrote of her from Rome: “I have seen in Europe no woman more gifted by nature than she.”

A sister of Mrs. Hooper’s, over the signature of “Z,” was a frequent contributor of poems to the earlier numbers of “The Dial.” This was Caroline Sturgis, afterward the wife of William A. Tappan, who found in Margaret Fuller an intimate friend, and who has published “Rainbows for Children,” “The Magician’s Show-Box,” and other children’s books. She now resides in Boston. Several of the best of Ellery Channing’s early poems were addressed to her. Her husband, William A. Tappan, had a poem in the last volume.

The poem in the first number of the second volume, entitled “The Future is Better than the Past,” has often been credited to Emerson. It first appeared over his name in “Hymns for the Church,” compiled by Rev. F. H. Hedge and Rev. F. D. Huntington, in 1853. Then it was so printed in the “Hymns of the Spirit” by Rev. Samuel Longfellow and Rev. Samuel Johnson, and in Dr. James Martineau’s “Hymns of Praise and Prayer.” It was contributed to “The Dial,” at Emerson’s request, by one of his most ardent disciples, Eliza Thayer Clapp. Miss Clapp



was born in Dorchester, Mass., and has always lived a quiet home-life in that suburb of Boston. The transcendental movement brought new life to her Unitarian faith, and she entered into its spirit with zeal. As a Sunday-school teacher, having charge of a class of girls from ten to fifteen years of age, she prepared her own lessons for their instruction. These were published as "Words in a Sunday-School." A little later, in 1845, another book, prepared in the same manner, was published as "Studies in Religion." These little books were received with much favor by a small circle of readers, such as the Rev. W. H. Furness, who long kept a copy lying on his study-table for constant reference. Miss Clapp has been an occasional contributor of poetry to the "Christian Register," but she has published only a few pieces. The five poems of hers printed in "The Dial" of July, 1841, all appeared there because Emerson solicited their publication, The one which has been so often credited to him is worthy of his genius, and it embodies, as no other poem of the period does, the very heart and spirit of the transcendental movement.

A brief essay was printed in "The Dial" from the pen of Lydia Maria Child, and with her name signed to it. She was an ardent transcendentalist, but she had little connection with "The Dial" and those by whom it was managed.

William Batchelder Greene was born in Boston in 1829, the son of an editor. He graduated at West Point, and did good service during the Seminole War. Leaving the army, he seems to have entered a Baptist theological school, but, becoming more liberal in his theology, entered the Cambridge school, though always claiming to be a Baptist. He was settled for several years over the Unitarian Church in West Brookfield, Mass. He was a zealous believer in social reform. At Brookfield he opened a co-operative store, and he made the pulpit a means of propagating his social theories. Finally abandoning the pulpit he removed to the vicinity of Boston, and there devoted himself to literary work. He had always been a zealous student of theology and metaphysics, mainly through the French language, with which he was very familiar; gave some attention to Oriental literature, translated Job, and published various essays on metaphysical subjects. Being in Paris when the Civil War broke out, he hastened home and was made the colonel of the Fourteenth Massachusetts Volun-

teers. He was stationed during a greater part of the war in the forts about Washington, and under Butler at Bermuda Hundreds. He was zealous, eccentric, arbitrary, and mystical, and very entertaining in conversation. In his later years he became a communist in theory, and a labor-reformer of an extreme type. He was in 1873 an officer of the Boston Labor Reform League, a member of the Boston section of the Internationalists, and the associate of Benjamin R. Tucker and E. H. Heywood. He published a book on national banking, and in 1875 appeared his "Socialistic, Communistic, and Financial Fragments," consisting of his contributions to "The Word" and other radical journals. His earlier publications were an essay called "The Doctrine of Life," a theory which he claimed to have discovered, and essays on Edwards's theory of the will, transcendentalism, the science of history, the doctrine of the Trinity, the incarnation, consciousness as revealing the existence of God, and various cognate topics. In 1871 he published an essay on the "Facts of Consciousness and the Philosophy of Herbert Spencer," and in 1874 an essay in reply to Dr. Clarke's "Sex in Education." He also wrote on mathematical and Masonic subjects. He died at Weston-Super-Mare, England, May 30, 1878. Greene was well known to most of the transcendentalists, though his extreme views were not acceptable to many of them. In November, 1841, Margaret Fuller wrote to Emerson: "How did you like the military-spiritual-heroic-vivacious phoenix of the day?" This was in reference to Greene's essay in "The Dial" discoursing of first principles.

Among those who furnished "The Dial" with only a single contribution was Charles Newcomb, for many years a resident of Providence, and who afterward found a home in England and in Paris. He was early a member of Brook Farm, a solitary, self-involved person, preferring to associate with children rather than with older persons. He read a good deal in the literature of the mystics, and was laughingly said to prefer paganism to Christianity. He had a feminine temperament, full of sensibility, and an independent turn of mind. Emerson was attracted to him, and at one time had great expectations concerning his genius. His paper, called "The Two Dolons," was much discussed and admired by "The Dial" set when it appeared; and it is referred to by Hawthorne in his "Hall of Phantasy." On the 9th of June,

1842, Emerson wrote to Margaret Fuller: "I wish you to know that I have 'Dolon' in black and white, and that I account Charles N. a true genius; his writing fills me with joy, so simple, so subtle, and so strong is it. There are sentences in 'Dolon' worth the printing of 'The Dial' that they may go forth." This paper was given to "The Dial" at Emerson's request, and it is not known that Newcomb has published anything else. In 1850 Emerson said that he had come to doubt Newcomb's genius, having found that he did not care for an audience.

The author of the account of a voyage to Jamaica, in the first and second numbers of the last volume, was Benjamin Peter Hunt. He was a pupil of Emerson's when he taught a district school in Chelmsford, Mass., entered the Theological School in 1832, but did not graduate. He spent some time in the West Indies, and he resided for many years in Philadelphia. He was an earnest friend and disciple of Emerson's.

The article in the first number, on Channing's translation of Jouffroy, and that in the fourth number, on the Unitarian movement in New England, were written by William Dexter Wilson, who was born at Stoddard, N. H., February 28, 1816, and graduated at the Harvard Divinity School in 1838. He preached in Unitarian churches for two or three years, but was not settled, taking orders in the Episcopal Church in 1842. Settled at Sherburne, N. Y., he wrote a work on the Church. In 1850 he was called to the professorship of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy in Geneva College, and in 1868 he was appointed to the same professorship in Cornell University. He holds that position at the present time, as well as being the Registrar. Dr. Wilson has been a contributor to "The Christian Examiner" and other periodicals, to Appleton's "Cyclopædia," and he wrote the article on logic in Johnson's "Cyclopædia." He has also written much on mathematics and logic. Since he has been at Cornell he has published several works of considerable importance. These are, in 1871, "Lectures on Psychology, Comparative and Human"; in 1872, "Introduction to the Study of Metaphysics and the History of Philosophy"; in 1877, "Live Questions in Psychology and Metaphysics," and in the same year a volume on the "First Principles of Political Economy"; in 1883, "Foundations of Religious Belief." His work in philosophy is original and suggestive. In

the organization and management of Cornell University he has borne a leading part.

The author of the essay on Shelley, in the first volume, was John Milton Mackie, who was born in Wareham, Mass., in 1813. He graduated at Brown University in 1832, where he was a tutor from 1834 to 1838. He subsequently resided in Providence, and devoted himself to authorship, but now lives at Great Barrington, Mass. In 1845 he published a life of Leibnitz, in 1848 a life of Samuel Gorton in Sparks's biographies, in 1855 a volume of Spanish travel, in 1856 a life of Schamyl, in 1857 an account of the Chinese insurrection, and in 1864 a volume of Southern travel.

Another of the writers introduced to "The Dial" by Emerson was Charles Stearns Wheeler, a native of Lincoln, Mass., where his father was a farmer, and his grandfather the minister for fifty years. He was a schoolmate with Thoreau in Concord, and they graduated at Harvard together in 1837. Wheeler then pursued a partial course of study at the Theological School. From 1838 to 1842 he was a tutor in Greek and instructor in history in Harvard College. He edited the first American edition of Herodotus, with notes, corresponded with Tennyson and edited his poems, suggested to Emerson the first edition of his poems, and helped him to edit the four volumes of Carlyle's writings which he brought out in this country as his "Miscellanies." In 1842 Emerson described him to Carlyle as "a man whose too facile and good-natured manners do some injustice to his virtues, to his great industry and real knowledge"—a wonderfully felicitous description. Wheeler often gave in his rooms in Cambridge what he called an "æsthetic tea," where Curtis, Newcomb, Samuel Longfellow, and others came together for literary conversation. He was greatly admired by a considerable circle of friends for his studious habits, as a very good fellow, and for his high-minded devotion to the very best things. As a college disciplinarian he was not successful, and became very unpopular with the students. In 1842 he went to Germany to spend two years in study at Heidelberg, but died there in 1843. Many high expectations were doomed to disappointment in his early death. One or two of his letters from Germany to Emerson were published in "The Dial."

A frequent contributor to the last two volumes was Charles Lane, the friend of Heraud and Greaves, of whom Emerson gave

an extended account. When Alcott went to England Lane was publishing the London "Mercantile Price Current," and lived at Alcott House. He was a writer for Herand's "Monthly Magazine," had published several reformatory pamphlets, and translated a French work on Fourier's socialism, to which he prefixed an introductory essay. He was also one of the editors of the "Healthian," a journal of radical hygiene. He was a believer in socialism of the Brook Farm type. The manager of Alcott House was Henry G. Wright, a young man of some ability, and the author of several pamphlets on moral and social subjects. Alcott House failing through the death of Greaves, Alcott persuaded Lane and Wright to return with him to America. Lane spent several months in Concord with Alcott, writing for "The Liberator," "The Tribune," and "The Dial." Then the two proceeded to the town of Harvard, about a dozen miles west of Concord, where they bought a farm of one hundred acres. In June, 1843, they began their effort to establish a new form of social existence; but in less than a year it was abandoned. The members of this new paradise, whom the Rev. W. D. Channing called "the Essenes of New England," were A. Bronson Alcott; Mrs. Abigail Alcott; their daughters, Anna Bronson, Louisa May, Elizabeth Sewall, and Abby May; Charles Lane and his son William; Samuel T. Larned; Christopher Greene; Abram Everett; Isaac T. Hecker; Joseph Palmer; Charles Bower; and Anna Page. It is interesting to know that one of the members of this community was afterward widely known in the Roman Catholic Church as "Father Hecker." While at Fruitlands, as this new paradise was called, he wrote an account of it for "The Tribune." At the end of the first number of the fourth volume of "The Dial" a description of this farm was given to its readers, being written either by Alcott or Lane:

"We have made an arrangement with the proprietor of an estate of about a hundred acres, which liberates this tract from human ownership. For picturesque beauty, both in the near and distant landscape, the spot has few rivals. . . .

"Here we prosecute our effort to initiate a Family in harmony with the primitive instincts in man. . . . It is intended to adorn the pastures with orchards, and to supersede ultimately the labor of the plough and cattle by the spade and the pruning-knife. . . .

“Ordinary secular farming is not our object. Fruit, grain, pulse, garden plants and herbs, flax and other vegetable products for food, raiment, and domestic uses, receiving assiduous attention, afford at once ample manual occupation, and chaste supplies for the bodily needs. Consecrated to human freedom, the land awaits the sober culture of devout men. . . .

“The inner nature of every member of the Family is at no time neglected. A constant leaning on the living spirit within the soul should consecrate every talent to holy uses, cherishing the widest charities. The choice library (of which a partial catalogue was given in ‘Dial’ No. XII) is accessible to all who are desirous of perusing these records of piety and wisdom. Our plan contemplates all such disciplines, cultures, and habits as evidently conduce to the purifying and edifying of the inmates. Pledged to the spirit alone, the founders can anticipate no hasty or numerous accession to their number. The kingdom of peace is entered only through the gates of self-denial and abandonment; and felicity is the test and the reward of obedience to the unswerving law of love.”

In his “Life of Thoreau,” Mr. F. B. Sanborn prints a letter from Lane, in which the Fruitlands experiment is described. The serious and pathetic side of the experiment has been portrayed by Louisa May Alcott in one of her shorter stories. After leaving Fruitlands, Lane spent some time with the Harvard Shakers, who were only two or three miles distant; he then joined a community in New Jersey, and finally returned to England, where he resumed his “Price Current,” publishing it until his death. Emerson described Lane in “The Dial” article on the English Reformers as “a man of fine intellectual nature, inspired and hallowed by a profound faith.” He had many attractive qualities, but he was an extremist in his theories, and was inclined to the most radical forms of individualism. He refused to pay taxes, and he lived on a diet of fruits and grains. He strongly urged that the body must be kept down in order to build up the soul. The review of an essay on transcendentalism in the third volume of “The Dial” was by Lane, the author of the little book discussed being Charles M. Ellis, a Roxbury lawyer.

The article on the English Reformers, written by Emerson, indicates his interest in the theories to better the world which

were so numerous at that period. Carlyle would have laughed or growled at most of them, but Emerson saw the good purpose in such men as Heraud, Greaves, Lane, and Wright. His account of them is indicative of his willingness to listen to all sincere men, however fanatical they might seem to be to others.

Thomas Treadwell Stone was born at Waterford, Maine, February 9, 1801. He fitted for college at Hebron Academy, and graduated from Bowdoin in 1820. He was settled over the Orthodox Church in Andover, Maine, in 1823. He became acquainted with Mary Moody Emerson, and a letter written to her was partly printed in a short paper on transcendentalism, written by Emerson, which appeared in the second volume of "The Dial." It is there attributed to a Calvinist; but Mr. Stone had gradually outgrown that faith, and not long after he connected himself with the Unitarians, being settled over the First Church in Salem in July, 1846, where he remained until 1852. Then he became the pastor of the Unitarian Church in Bolton, Mass., and afterward of that in Brooklyn, Conn. He always preached without notes, a thing then quite unusual in New England. In 1854 he published a volume of sermons, which is saturated with the spirit of transcendentalism. In 1856 he wrote for the Unitarian Association a devotional work called "The Rod and the Staff," full of the highest spirit of faith and worship. He has also printed several sermons and addresses. He was an earnest advocate of the antislavery cause. Since withdrawing from the ministry on account of age, his residence has been successively at Bolton and West Newton, Mass. He was made a doctor of divinity by Bowdoin College.

Emerson gave to "The Dial" several selections from the writings of members of his own family. In the first volume appeared two poems by his first wife, Ellen Louisa Tucker, a native of Boston, to whom he was married in September, 1829. She was a woman of many charms of person and mind, and her verses show that she had the gift of poetic expression. She died in February, 1832. The "Last Farewell," of the first number, he selected from the papers of his next younger brother, Edward Bliss Emerson, who studied law with Daniel Webster, broke down in health, went to the West Indies, and died there in the autumn of 1834. In the same number the "Notes from the Journal of a Scholar"



were from the papers of Charles Chauncey Emerson, another brother, who graduated at Harvard in 1828, began the practice of law in Concord, but died May 9, 1836. Writing to Carlyle in October, 1835, Emerson said: "Charles Chauncey Emerson is a lawyer now settled in this town, and, as I believe, no better Lord Hamlet was ever. He is our Doctor on all questions of taste, manners, or action. And one of the pure pleasures I promise myself in the months to come is to make you two gentlemen know each other." Holmes described him as the "calm, chaste scholar" in his "Poetry: a Metrical Essay," while Emerson wrote of both brothers in "In Memoriam" and other poems. Both are held in loving memory by those who knew them, and great promise died with them. The betrothed of Charles Emerson was Elizabeth Hoar, much beloved of all who knew her, a woman of a bright and active mind. She wrote but little, though her memoir of Mrs. Samuel Ripley, in the "Worthy Women of our First Century," shows that she might have done excellent work. Only as a translator did she appear in "The Dial."

Samuel Gray Ward was born in Boston, the son of Thomas W. Ward, a banker there. He also began life in Boston as a banker, and he has since been a member of a well-known banking firm in New York, the agents of the great London banking house of Baring Brothers. His life has been that of a man of business, and he has given little attention to literature. He found in Emerson and Margaret Fuller life-long friends, and it was owing to this fact that he became a contributor to "The Dial." Two of his "Dial" poems—those entitled "The Shield" and "The Consolers"—were printed by Emerson in his "Parnassus," but without the author's name. About 1840 he translated from Goethe a volume of "Essays on Art," which was published in Boston. It was at one time proposed that he should prepare a part of the memoirs of Margaret Fuller, which were finally written by Emerson, Clarke, and W. H. Channing. In one of his letters to Carlyle, Emerson describes Ward as "my friend and the best man in the city, and, besides all his personal merits, a master of the office of hospitality."

Jones Very was born in Salem, August 28, 1813. He graduated at Harvard College in 1836, was for two years tutor in Greek there, and at the same time studied theology. In 1843 he



was licensed to preach, but he was never settled. In 1839 he published "Essays and Poems," with the advice and through the aid of Emerson. He occasionally wrote for newspapers in Salem and for the Unitarian periodicals. Many of his poems have been used as hymns in the Unitarian collections. All his writings are marked by a mystic piety and an exalted religious devotion. His poems were reprinted, with a memoir, in 1883.

Charles T. Brooks was born in Salem, June 20, 1813, graduated at Harvard College in 1832, and at the Theological School in 1835. He was settled over the Unitarian Church in Newport, R. I., in 1837, and remained there until 1871, after which he continued to reside in the same city. He translated a volume of miscellaneous poems for Ripley's "Specimens," and he also translated Schiller's "William Tell" and "Homage of the Arts," Goethe's "Faust" (the first part), Richter's "Titan" and "Hesperus," Schefer's "Layman's Breviary" and "World Priest," and a volume of German lyrics. He also published an essay on the old stone mill; "Aquidneck and other Poems" in 1848; a volume of sermons in 1859, and many poems and romances. He died at Newport in 1883. He was a prolific literary worker, and all his work was delicately and truly accomplished. A memoir of Brooks, with selections from his poems, has been published by his successor, Rev. C. W. Wendt .

James Elliot Cabot was graduated at Harvard in 1840, and spent several years in Germany. He lives in Brookline, Mass., and has spent much time in literary and philosophical studies, being also associated for a time with his brother, Edward C. Cabot, well known as an architect. To the "North American Review" he has contributed a few valuable papers, and he has also written one or two papers for the Massachusetts Historical Society. For Agassiz's work on Lake Superior he wrote the narrative of the tour. Before his death Emerson made Mr. Cabot his literary executor, entrusting to his care all his papers, his diary, and his correspondence. With the aid of Dr. E. W. Emerson he has published two new volumes of Emerson's essays and miscellanies, as well as a new and enlarged edition of his poems. At present he is engaged in preparing an extended biography of Emerson.

Jonathan A. Saxton was born in Deerfield, Mass., January 12,

1795. Early a zealous student, he spent two years at Yale, but graduated at Harvard in 1822. He entered the profession of the law, but did not find it to his taste. He edited local journals in Troy, Greenfield, and Northampton. For many years he was a farmer in Deerfield, where he died in September, 1874. He was deeply interested in all the reforms of the day, being one of the earliest of the abolitionists. He wrote much on slavery, temperance, co-operation, and social reforms generally. In the days of the lyceum he had something of a local reputation as a lecturer. It was a great satisfaction to him when his son, Gen. Rufus Saxton, was made the military governor of South Carolina during the Civil War, to be appointed his private secretary, and to do what he could toward the elevation of the freedmen, for whose emancipation he had worked so long in a different way.

John Francis Tuckerman graduated at Harvard College in 1837, and received the degree of M. D. in 1841. He practised his profession for a time, but he was for the greater part of his life a business man, residing in Salem, but having an office in Boston. He died in Salem, in May, 1885.

Benjamin Franklin Presbury was for many years editor of the "Taunton Gazette," to which he contributed literary criticisms of an unusually high order. He also wrote two papers in the "Atlantic Monthly."

In the first number of "The Dial" edited by him, Emerson gave an account of the Chardon Street Bible Conventions, held in Boston in the winter of 1840-41; and he published in full "the best speech made on that occasion," that of Nathaniel H. Whiting, of South Marshfield, Mass. He described Mr. Whiting in these words: "Himself a plain unlettered man, leaving for the day a mechanical employment to address his fellows, he possesses eminent gifts for success in assemblies so constituted. He has fluency, self-command, an easy, natural method, and a very considerable power of statement. No one had more entirely the ear of his audience." A shoemaker, and devoted to his calling, Mr. Whiting improved his intellectual gifts by reading and such means of culture as came in his way. He has been a prominent citizen of Marshfield, a member of the State Legislature, and for some years connected with the Boston Custom-House. He has been a radical in religion, but greatly interested in theological questions.

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<sup>1</sup> On authority of Thoreau.

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<sup>1</sup> On authority of Thoreau.

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245. Sweep Ho! Ellen Hooper.  
246. The Sail. William A. Tappan.  
247. The Comic. R. W. Emerson.  
257. Ode to Beauty. R. W. Emerson.  
259. Allston's Funeral. W. E. Channing.  
260. To the Muse. W. E. Channing.  
251. William Tell's Song. W. E. Channing.  
262. A Letter. R. W. Emerson.  
270. New Books.  
270. The Huguenots.  
270. Longfellow's Spanish Student. R. W. Emerson (?).  
271. Perceval's Poems. R. W. Emerson.  
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273. The Youth of the Poet and Painter. (Continued.) W. E. Channing.  
285. Translation of Dante. Samuel G. Ward.  
290. Homer, Ossian, Chaucer. H. D. Thoreau.  
306. Lines. Ellen Hooper.  
307. The Modern Drama. Margaret Fuller.

349. To R. B. [Robert Bartlett]. Charles A. Dana.  
350. Autumn Woods. W. E. Channing.  
351. Brook Farm. Charles Lane.  
357. Tantalus. R. W. Emerson.  
364. The Fatal Passion.—A Dramatic Sketch. W. E. Channing.

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NOTE.—I am desirous of completing and perfecting the list of contributors to "The Dial," and shall be thankful for any help to that end. Those who can furnish information may address me at West Dedham, Mass. I also desire further information about the lesser-known contributors and any errors into which I have fallen I wish to correct. G. W. C.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF G. W. F. HEGEL, BY F. LOUIS SOLDAN.

III.

*The Relation of the Philosophy of Religion to the Present Principle of Religious Consciousness.*

If in our own days philosophy is attacked on account of its inquiry into religion, it will not cause us any astonishment if we consider the general characteristic of the times. Whoever tries to occupy himself with the recognition of God and to comprehend his nature through thinking must expect either to be ignored or to be subjected to individual or joint attacks.

The more the cognition of finite things has spread on account of the almost unbounded growth of science through which all departments of knowledge have been expanded beyond the individual horizon, the more has the circle of the science of God been narrowed. There was a time when all knowledge was a knowledge of God. The characteristic of our own time, on the contrary, is that it knows each and every thing, that it knows a mul-



titude of facts, but knows nothing of God. Formerly intelligence [der Geist] found its highest interest in its knowledge of God, and in fathoming his nature. In this occupation alone it found rest; it felt unhappy when it could not satisfy this craving. The spiritual struggles which the cognition of God calls forth within us were the highest that our spirit knew and experienced within itself; all other kinds of interest and knowledge were held in light esteem. Our time has appeased this need, these endeavors and struggles; we have done with them, they are disposed of. What Tacitus said of the ancient Germans, that they were *securi adversus deos*, we also have become in regard to cognition—*securi adversus deum*.

Our age no longer grieves that it lacks [philosophic] cognition of God; on the contrary, it is considered the highest wisdom to hold that no such knowledge is possible. What the Christian religion declares to be the highest, absolute commandment—"Ye shall know God"—is looked upon as folly. Christ says: "Be ye perfect even as your father which is in heaven is perfect." This high injunction is a word devoid of meaning for the wisdom of the present day. It has made of God an infinite spectre, dwelling in the distance; and it has likewise made human cognition a vain spectre of finitude by considering it a kind of mirror which reflects naught but unreal shades or phenomena. How, then, is it possible that we should honor and understand the command, "Be ye perfect even as your father in heaven," if we have no cognition of the Perfect, if our knowledge and will are therefore strictly limited to [the] phenomena [of experience], and if truth is made absolutely transcendent, a something which belongs to the [unattainable] world beyond? We should like to ask what there is that is worth while to understand if God is unintelligible?

If this standpoint is judged by its content, it must be looked upon as the lowest level of man's degradation, notwithstanding that he seems to take pride in occupying it because he imagines that he has proved that it is the highest point [of knowledge] that is attainable for him, and is therefore his true position. Although such a standpoint is diametrically opposed to the grand nature of Christian religion, which commands us to know God, his nature and essence, and to hold such knowledge in the highest esteem (the distinction whether this knowledge is the result of faith, au-



thority, revelation, or reason is here irrelevant), and although this standpoint has done with the content of the divine nature which is conveyed by revelation, as well as with [the claims of] reason, its blind presumption is such that it does not hesitate to turn in every one of its lower ramifications against philosophy, notwithstanding the fact that the latter is the means of freeing the spirit from that disgraceful degradation and of extricating religion from the position which that standpoint assigned to it and in which it has suffered greatly. And yet this class of theologians, who feel at home in that standpoint of vanity only, have ventured to arraign philosophy and charge it with destructive tendencies—theologians who no longer possess in themselves any content which could be destroyed. In order to refute these objections—which are not only groundless, but also frivolous and unscrupulous—we need but look at what [this class of] theologians have done to dissolve what is [real and] definite (*das Bestimmte*) in religion: (1) either by placing the dogmas in the background or by speaking of them as indifferent matters, and (2) by looking upon them as categories made and used by somebody else, and as transitory events in a history that is past. And after having thus contemplated the content, and having found that it is restored by philosophy and rendered safe from the devastation of theology, we shall (3) reflect upon the form of that standpoint and discover that the view which attacks philosophy in regard to form knows so little about itself as to ignore that it contains within itself, potentially and implicitly, the very principle of philosophy.

#### 1. PHILOSOPHY AND THE INDIFFERENCE WITH WHICH CONCRETE DOGMAS ARE LOOKED UPON AT PRESENT.

If philosophy in its relation to religion is charged with lowering the content of religion, and more particularly of Christian religion, and with destroying and corrupting the dogmas of the latter, these objections have been removed by modern theology itself. There are but few dogmas of the former system of Christian creeds left in the position of importance which was formerly conceded to them, and no other dogma has taken their place. Anybody can convince himself easily of this by considering the actual esteem paid to dogmas of the Church at present, and by remembering that in the religious world an almost universal indifference pre-

vails in regard to doctrines of faith which were formerly held to be essential. Some examples will show this. Christ is still made a centre of faith in his quality as mediator and redeemer; yet what was formerly called the work of redemption has assumed a very prosaic, merely psychological signification, and the essential part of the old church doctrine has been obliterated, although the edifying words are retained.

“Great energy of character, steadfastness in the conviction, for which he would willingly give his life”—these are the general categories through which Christ is dragged down to the general level of human action (although not of common every-day action); he is placed within the sphere of such actions as even heathens like Socrates were capable of. There is no doubt that, with many who hold this view, Christ remains the centre of faith and worship in a deeper sense, but it is nevertheless true that on the whole this [special] view limits Christianity to this direction of worship, and neglects or fails to attach the proper importance to the dogmas of the Trinity, of the Resurrection of the body, and to the miracles in the Old and New Testaments. The divinity of Christ, the dogmatic factor, that which is the distinguishing and peculiar characteristic of the Christian religion, is put aside or reduced to a generalization. Not only rationalism does this, but even the more pious theologians. The latter agree with the former in saying that the Trinity is an innovation introduced into Christian doctrine by the Alexandrian school, by the Neo-Platonists. Even if it must be admitted that the fathers of the Church studied Greek philosophy, it is nevertheless irrelevant here whence this doctrine has come. The question is simply whether it is true in and for itself; but this is not inquired into, although the dogma is the basis and principle of Christian religion.

If a majority of these theologians were compelled to state truthfully whether they consider the belief in the Trinity indispensably necessary for salvation, and whether they believe that its lack would lead to damnation, their answer cannot be doubtful.

Eternal salvation and eternal perdition, however, are words which are not to be used in polite society; they are considered *ἀρρήτα*, expressions which one would hesitate to use. There may be a disinclination to deny the fact, but it would be embarrassing [for those persons] to be compelled to give a plain affirma-

tive answer. It will be found that the dogmas have become very much attenuated and shrunk in the doctrines of these theologians, even when there is an abundance of verbiage otherwise.

If we were to take for examination a large number of prayer-books, books of worship, or collections of sermons, in which it might be presumed that the principles of Christian religion are set forth, and if we were called upon to express judgment on the majority and to state whether in many of them the principles of Christianity find orthodox expression, without ambiguity and reserve, our answer could not be in the least doubtful.

The importance which the principal doctrines of positive Christianity otherwise possessed when they were still considered principal doctrines is never attached to them by the theologians (such as their general culture is) except when these doctrines appear in a mist of uncertainty and indefiniteness. Should philosophy ever have been considered an opponent of the dogmas of the Church, it can be an opponent no longer when in public opinion those dogmas to which it seemed pernicious are no longer valid. It should seem, therefore, as if there could no longer be any apprehension of danger in this direction from philosophy in its attempt to arrive at a comprehension of these dogmas through contemplation, and as if it might now approach them without fear since they have lost so much as objects of interest for the theologians.

## 2. THE HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF THE DOGMAS.

The most decided indication of the diminished importance of these dogmas may be found in the fact that we see them treated historically chiefly, and thereby represented as if they were convictions belonging to somebody else, as stories which do not represent events within the mind, and answer to none of its needs.

The whole interest seems to spend itself in studying the attitude of others toward these dogmas, and [in showing] how they came to assume it; those theologians study the contingent origin and form, but they marvel when they are asked the question what conviction they entertain themselves in regard to these dogmas.

This historical treatment slights the absolute origin which these dogmas have in the depths of our own mind, and thus disregards their necessity and truth for ourselves; it devotes much zeal and learning, not to the study of their content, but to that of the ex-

ternal features of the controversies which they called forth, and of the passions arising in connection with their growth. Theology assigns to itself a low enough place thereby. If there is to be no other but the historical conception of religion, those theologians who have not risen above that standpoint appear to us necessarily like clerks of some mercantile house, who keep account only of somebody else's wealth without having any property of their own; it is true that they receive a salary; but their sole merit is, that they serve others as recorders of their wealth. Such theology no longer stands on the ground of thought, it no longer occupies itself with the infinite thought in and for itself, but deals with it merely as a finite fact, an opinion or notion, etc. The truths with which history deals are those that *were*, that were for others, and not with truths which are the property of him who occupies himself with them. Those theologians do not attain to the true content, the cognition of God. They know as little of God as the blind man knows of the picture whose frame he has felt. All they know is how a certain dogma was framed by this or that council, what reasons the framers advanced, and how the one view or the other predominated. This is, indeed, connected with religion, but it is not an inquiry into religion itself. They give us ample information in regard to the history of the painter of a certain painting, in regard to the fate of the picture, in regard to the price it brought at various times, in regard to the hands through which it has passed, but they never afford us a look at the painting itself.

The main point in philosophy and religion is that the mind (*der Geist*) should enter into a direct communion with the highest interests; that it should not deal with them as if they were things alien to itself, but that it should discover in their essence its own content and hold itself worthy of attaining their cognition. Then only man will feel that his task is the cognition of the worth of his own spirit, and that he need not stand humbly outside and slyly sneak away [from this inquiry].

### 3. PHILOSOPHY AND IMMEDIATE COGNITION.

On account of the lack of content in the standpoint which we have been considering, it might appear that we have mentioned the objections which it raises against philosophy for the sole pur-

pose of stating in opposition to it our intention of seeking to cognize God, and thus of doing the opposite of that which it considers highest [wisdom]; but that standpoint has in its form a really rational interest for us. If we consider this form, we find that the recent position of theology is still more favorable to philosophy. For with the idea that all objective determinations converge and coalesce within the inwardness of subjectivity the conviction is connected that God reveals himself immediately in man, and that religion is man's immediate knowledge or cognition of God; this immediate cognition is called reason, or faith—using this word in another sense than that in which the Church uses it. This standpoint asserts that the basis of all conviction and piety is, that the consciousness of God is immediately present in the mind with the consciousness of itself.

*a.* This assertion, taking it in its direct sense and without attributing to it a polemic attitude toward philosophy, is looked upon as needing neither evidence nor proof. This general idea—which has at present become a prejudice—contains the quality or determination (*Bestimmung*) that the highest or religious content manifests itself in the spirit [of man], that Spirit manifests itself in spirit—namely, in my own spirit; and that this belief springs from my innermost individuality, of which it is the most inalienable part. It is therefore inseparable from the consciousness of pure spirit.

With the assertion that this knowledge is [not acquired but is present and] immediate in my soul, all external authority, all other or alien evidence is discarded. In order that anything should be valid for me, it must be credited and approved by my spirit; in order that I should believe, the evidence of my spirit is required. It may, for all that, originate externally, for the external origin means nothing in itself; but, if it is to be valid, such validity can rest on no other foundation except on that which is the basis of all truth—namely, on the testimony of spirit.

This principle is indeed the plain principle of philosophic cognition itself; and philosophy not only does not reject it, but considers it one of its own fundamental principles. Thus it may be considered a profit, a piece of good fortune that the fundamental principles of philosophy live in the general mind, and have become the general bias, in order that thereby the philosophic prin-

ciple may gain more easily the approbation of the educated and cultured in general. In this universal disposition of the times philosophy has gained not only external favor—it does not care for external advantages, and especially not where it and its teaching are institutions of the State—but it is favored intrinsically if its principle lives by its own force as a pre-supposition in the minds and hearts.

*b.* The principle of immediate cognition does not stop at this simple determinateness (*Bestimmtheit*), this unbiassed content; it does not confine itself to affirmation, but enters upon a polemic warfare against cognition, and, more particularly, against the cognition and comprehension of God. It is asserted not only that He must be believed in this manner and immediately known, nor is the proposition simply that our consciousness of God is connected with self-consciousness; but it is affirmed that our relation to God is such an immediate one only. The immediateness of [this] connection is taken in the sense of excluding the other determination, that of mediation, and, accordingly, it is asserted that philosophy, because it is mediated knowledge, is finite knowledge of the finite only.

Moreover, it is demanded that this immediateness of knowledge should rest satisfied with knowing that God exists, and refrain from seeking to know his nature. By this demand the content and substance of the idea of God is negated. The meaning of knowing or cognizing is not only that we know of an object that it exists, but also that we know its nature; and it means, further, that this knowledge of its nature consists of more than some simple information or certainty in regard to some qualities, but means that the cognition of its determinations, characteristics, and content is full and valid, so as to include the cognition of the necessity of the connection of these determinations.

A closer examination of the hypothesis of immediate cognition shows [that it implies] that consciousness is related in such a manner to its content that it and its content, [which is] God, are inseparable. It is this relation in general—namely, the knowledge of God and this inseparableness of consciousness from this content—that we call religion. This assertion involves, however, that we should stop at the contemplation of religion as such, or at the contemplation of the relation to God, and refrain from rising to

the cognition of God and of the divine content in its inherent essence.

In this sense it is asserted, further, we can know only our relation to God, but never God himself; our relation to God, alone, falls within the field of religion. This is the reason why so much is said at the present day about religion, and yet no one seeks to know what the nature of God is, or what God is in himself, and in what manner such nature should be determined. God, as such, is not made the [subject of] study; knowledge does not seek to grow and increase within this subject, and does not elucidate distinct determinations therein, so that God might be conceived as the relation of these determinations, and as self-relation. It is not God that is placed before us as the object of cognition, but solely our relation (*Beziehung*) to God, our connection (*Verhaeltniss*) with him; less and less is said about the nature of God, and only the demand remains that man should have religion, that he should be content with having it, and not proceed to the cognition of its divine content.

c. If we look at the gist of the theory of immediate cognition, at its direct meaning, [we shall find that] it expresses God in relation to consciousness, and maintains that this is an inseparable relation, or, in other words, that both must be considered together. This is, in the first place, an acknowledgment of the essential difference contained in the idea (*Begriff*) of religion, namely, subjective consciousness on one side, and God, as self-existing object (*Gegenstand an sich*), on the other. And it contains, in the second place, the assertion that there is an essential relation between the two, and that this inseparable relation of religion, and not our idea or opinion of God, is the main point of importance.

The true pith of this assertion is the philosophical idea itself, with this difference, that the latter is restricted, by the hypothesis of immediate cognition, to limits which philosophy removes, and whose one-sidedness and untruth it exposes. According to the philosophic conception, God is spirit and is concrete. If we now raise the question as to what Spirit is, [the answer must be given that] the fundamental principle of spirit is that of which the whole content of all religions doctrine is but the development and amplification. We may say for the present that [the characteristic of] spirit is to manifest itself, to exist for spirit. Spirit exists for



spirit, not in an external, contingent way, but it is spirit in so far only as it has existence for spirit; this constitutes the very idea of spirit. Or, to express it in a more theological form, God is essentially spirit when he is in his church. It has been said that the world, the sensuous universe, presupposes spectators and an existence for spirit; how much more must God exist for spirit.

For this reason our inquiry should not be a merely one-sided study of the subject, according to its finitude, or in its contingent life, but we should study it in as far as it has the infinite and absolute object for its content. For, when the subject is considered in itself, it is considered in finite knowledge, within the knowledge of the finite. It is likewise asserted that God, on the other side, should not be considered by himself, since God is known only in relation to consciousness. But the unity and inseparableness of both determinations, of the cognition of God and of self-consciousness, presuppose in themselves that which is meant by the word identity, and the assertion therefore implies in itself that identity which it dreads.

Thus we see that the fundamental principle of philosophy appears as a general element which permeates the culture of the times, and it is evident here also that philosophy, in its form, is not above the times by differing absolutely from their general determinateness [or character]. On the contrary, one spirit permeates reality as well as philosophic thinking, although the latter remains the true self-comprehension of reality. It is one and the same movement which underlies the times and their philosophy, the only difference being that the determinateness [or character] of the times seems to exist contingently merely, without [rational] justification, and that it may stand therefore in an irreconciled, hostile relation to its truly essential content, while philosophy, on the contrary, is a justification of the principle, and for this reason is general pacification and conciliation. Similar to the reduction by which the Protestant (lutherische = Lutheran) Reformation led faith back to the basis of the first centuries, the principle of immediate cognition has reduced Christian knowledge to first elements. At a first glance, the result of this reduction seems to be the dissipation of the essential content; but philosophy has stepped in, and, recognizing that this principle of immediate cog-



tion is itself the content, it proceeds to unfold it in its true development within itself.

The naïve simplicity of this opposition to philosophy is unlimited. Those very assertions which are put forth to militate against philosophy, and which seem to embody the most pointedly hostile argument, are found, upon a closer inspection of their content, to be in harmony with what they are intended to oppose. The result of an inspection and study of philosophy, on the other hand, renders those partition-walls, which have been reared in order to bring about absolute division, transparent, and, looking through them, we see harmony where we expected to find the greatest possible contrast.

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## LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE.

BEING A TRANSLATION FROM THE FRENCH OF LEIBNITZ BY ALFRED G. LANGLEY.

NEW ESSAYS ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

### INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

The text adopted as the basis of this translation is that of C. J. Gerhardt, in his "Die philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz," Berlin, 1875-'82, of which up to the present time Vols. I, II, IV, and V have appeared, Vol. V containing the "Nouveaux Essais." For the use of this edition I am indebted to the courtesy of Harvard College Library. The texts of Erdmann (J. E.), "Leibnizii Opera Philosophica," Berlin, 1839-'40, and of Jacques (M. A.), "Œuvres de Leibniz," Paris, 1842, have also been consulted. The edition of the philosophical writings by P. Janet, two vols., Paris, 1866, I have not seen. These, with that of Raspe (R. E.), Amsterdam and Leipsic, 1765, which has been used by the subsequent editors, are the only known editions of the philosophical works.

The three texts of which I have made use differ very little from one another in the chapter translated. The variations, so far as I have noticed them, are chiefly verbal, and do not essentially, if at all, modify the thought. The only important difference in the

text of this chapter between the edition of Gerhardt and those of Erdmann and Jacques consists of a transposition in G. of a certain portion of the text as given by E. and J. This transposition, which I suppose to be due to Gerhardt's fidelity to the original text of Leibnitz himself, is fully indicated in a note at the point in the translation where it occurs, so that those who have not Gerhardt's text can easily make it up, with the exception of the minor verbal differences above alluded to, from that of E. or J., by following the indications given in said note. These slight textual variations are ultimately due either to the autograph of Leibnitz—which Erdmann (Preface, p. xxii) says is "written in such small characters often, and so full of corrections, that it is very difficult to read it" (*tam parvis saepe literis conscriptum et correctionibus adeo abundans ut perdifficile sit lectu*)—or to certain changes made for the purpose of improving the literary style of the author, and of thus making his work more acceptable to his French readers. With regard to Gerhardt's edition in general, the "Encyclopædia Britannica," ninth edition, American reprint, vol. xiv, p. 423, b, says it "will, when finished, be the most complete." Merz (J. T.), in his "Leibniz" in the "Philosophical Classics for English Readers," published by William Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh, 1884, calls it (Preface, p. vii) "the most important edition," and adds, "it contains valuable introductions, and gives the correspondence with eminent contemporaries. It is unfinished, and hence incomplete, like all the other editions of the philosophical works, but every student of Leibniz must eagerly look forward to its completion."

Volume V, "Leibniz and Locke," contains, besides the text of the "Nouveaux Essais," an excellent introduction by the editor, giving an outline of Locke's work, and an historical sketch of the growth and publication of Leibnitz's reply, together with valuable bibliographical and interesting historical notes throwing light upon the relations of the two great authors, and their estimate of each other's labors. Some new material appears, viz.: "two fragments of the year 1698, . . . here for the first time printed under the superscription: 'Echantillon de Reflexions sur le I. Livre de l'Essay de l'Entendement de l'homme.—Echantillon de Reflexions sur le II. Livre'" (Einleitung, S. 7); together with a sketch of Locke's work made by Leibnitz on the occasion of the appearance

of the French translation of M. Pierre Coste, 1700, for the "Monatliche Auszug" (September, 1700, p. 611-636), and the supplement of the following year, 1701. "In this sketch Leibnitz discusses two of the weightiest of Locke's additions, filling two separate chapters, viz.: Chapter 33 of the Second Book, wherein Locke treats of the Association of Ideas, and then Chapter 19 of the Fourth Book, in which he discourses of Enthusiasm" (Einleitung, S. 7). This sketch, as the "Review" in which it appeared would indicate, is in German.

Through this French translation of Coste, made from the fourth English edition and containing the additions which Locke had made to the preceding editions, Leibnitz first gained real access to Locke's work. In a letter to Thomas Burnett, 17th-27th July, 1696, Leibnitz says: "'I could wish I had the same knowledge of the English language' (as I have of the French); 'but, not having had the occasion for it, all I can do is to understand passably the books written in this language. And at the age at which I have arrived, I doubt if I could ever make myself better acquainted with it'" (Gerhardt's note, p. 7, Introduction). Leibnitz followed this version in the composition of his "Nouveaux Essais," as appears from his letter to Coste of June 16, 1701: "I have followed your French version, because I thought it proper to write my remarks in French, since nowadays this kind of investigation is but little in fashion in the Latin district" (part of Paris in the neighborhood of the Sorbonne.—Spiers and Surene's French Dictionary).

In conclusion, I translate the following paragraphs, together with the appended notes, or so much of them as is necessary to make clear or to substantiate the statements in the text, from the Introduction of Gerhardt, as the best method of making known the special merits of his edition, and the grounds upon which it is adopted as the most reliable text.

Leibnitz "recognized the importance of its contents" (Locke's work) "in its fullest extent; at the same time the extremely large circulation and the universal recognition, which expressed itself through the editions following each other in rapid succession, must have made upon him a deep impression. Evidently for these reasons Leibnitz conceived the plan of answering Locke's work with a more extensive writing. It grew out of the often hastily-thrown-off remarks which he occasionally put on paper in the years fol-

lowing that of 1700, in which he was not permitted to undertake any continuous work.<sup>1</sup> In order to obliterate the traces of this method of work, Leibnitz considered it advisable, before he published it, to submit his book, as to composition and style, to the judgment of a native Frenchman. This revision was protracted until the year 1705, as appears from a writing which has no signature.<sup>2</sup> Another delay occurred by reason of the fact that Leibnitz in the following year, 1706, entered into correspondence with Pierre Coste, the translator of Locke's work; he told him (April 20, 1707) that the translation of Locke itself would be examined and furnished with important improvements; he might give him (Leibnitz) the urgent advice to put off the publication of his work until he obtained a knowledge of these changes of Locke. This further consideration, that he learned of the dissenting opinions of Locke in his correspondence with Molyneux, as also Locke's death, which had already followed in the year 1704, altered Leibnitz's original plan.

"In order to obtain an easier entrance for his own ideas, and at the same time to make his reader familiar with those of Locke, Leibnitz had composed his work in the form of a dialogue. Two friends, Philalethes and Theophilus, converse together; the first states the views of Locke, the second joins thereto his own (Leib-

<sup>1</sup> "I have made these remarks in the leisure hours when I was travelling or at Herrenhausen, where I could not apply myself to researches which required more care" (*besoin* in sense of *soin*?).

<sup>2</sup> "The frequent diversions to which I have been exposed have prevented me from pushing forward my remarks. Besides, I have been obliged to divide my time between the reading of your work and the commissions with which I have been entrusted by the Count de Schwerin, of which I must give account to him. You will find few remarks upon this paper; but I have taken the liberty of changing in the work itself a large number of places in reference to which I did not at all hesitate when I saw that I could do this without disarranging the rest of the writing. I have not touched what is properly called the style; but the confidence with which you have honored me obliges me to say to you here that it greatly needs amendment, and that you seem too much to have neglected it. You know, sir, to what excess our French people have carried their well- or ill-founded delicacy. Too long periods are distasteful; an *And* (*Et*) or some other word too often repeated in the same period offends them; unusual constructions embarrass them; a trifle, so to speak, shocks them. However, it is proper to accommodate yourself to their taste if you wish to write in their language; and, in case you should decide to print your work, I believe you will do well to retouch it with a little more severity. I am certain that you will not be displeased at the freedom with which I speak to you, since it comes from a person devoted to your service."—February 2, 1705.

nitz's) remarks. This form of composition Leibnitz thought of abandoning. He writes to Thomas Burnett, May 26, 1706: 'The death of Locke has taken away my desire to publish my remarks upon his works. I prefer now to publish my thoughts independently of those of another.' On the other hand, he remarks, well-nigh it seems in the opposite sense, to the same, three years later, May 12, 1709: 'My remarks upon the excellent work of Locke are almost finished; although we are not of the same opinion, I do not cease to value it and to find it valuable.'

"Leibnitz's work remained, in form at least, unfinished; a magnificent torso, and unpublished. He turned to the composition of the 'Theodicy.' For the first time, fifty years after his death, it was sent to the press in 'Œuvres Philosophiques latines et françoises de feu Mr. de Leibnitz. Tirées de ses manuscrits qui se conservent dans la bibliothèque Royale à Hanovre, et publiées par Mr. Rud. Eric. Raspe. Avec une Préface de Mr. Kaestner, Professeur en Mathématiques à Göttingen. A Amsterdam et à Leipzig, 1765.' The present impression has been newly compared with the original, so far as it is still extant.<sup>1</sup> The corrections in reference to the style proposed by the native Frenchman are not taken into consideration, in order not to obliterate Leibnitz's style of expression; they relate, indeed, only to the first books."

One sentence from the letter of Leibnitz to Coste, June 16, 1707, as significant of his character and illustrative of his spirit, more truth-loving than polemical, shall bring this note, already too long, to an end. It is this: Mon but a esté plustost d'eclaircir les choses, que de refuter les sentimens d'autruy—*i. e.*, my purpose has been to throw light upon things rather than to refute the opinions of another.—TRANSLATOR.

## BOOK I.—INNATE IDEAS.

### CHAPTER I.

#### *Are there Innate Principles in the Mind of Man?*

*Philalethes.* Having recrossed the sea after having finished my business in England, I thought at once of paying you a visit, sir,

<sup>1</sup> In the original, Leibnitz has enclosed the words of Philalethes, who states the views of Locke, in [], perhaps as an indication that they are not his own. Raspe has omitted them.—GERHARDT'S NOTE. In this translation Gerhardt's use of [] has been strictly followed.—TR.

in order to cultivate our former friendship, and to converse upon matters which lie close to our hearts, and upon which I believe I have acquired some new light during my long stay in London. When we were living formerly quite near each other at Amsterdam we both took much pleasure in making researches into the principles and into the means of penetrating into the heart of things. Although our opinions often differed, this diversity increased our satisfaction, when, in our conference together, without the contrariety which has sometimes existed, there has mingled nothing disagreeable. You were for Descartes and for the opinions of the celebrated author of the "Search after Truth," and I found the opinions of Gassendi, cleared up by Bernier, easier and more natural. Now I feel myself greatly strengthened by the excellent work which an illustrious Englishman, with whom I have the honor of a particular acquaintance, has since published, and which has several times been reprinted in England, under the modest title of "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding." And I am delighted that it has appeared lately in Latin and in French, in order that it may be more generally useful. I have greatly profited by the reading of this work, and indeed from the conversation of the author, with whom I have talked often in London, and sometimes at Oates, at the house of my Lady Masham, worthy daughter of the celebrated Cudworth, a great English philosopher and theologian, author of the "Intellectual System," from whom she has inherited the spirit of meditation and the love for good learning, which appeared particularly in the friendship which she kept up with the author of the Essay. And, as he had been attacked by some clever Doctors, I took pleasure in reading also the defence which a very wise and very intelligent young lady made for him, besides those which he made for himself. This author writes in the spirit of the system of Gassendi, which is at bottom that of Democritus; he is for void and for atoms; he believes that matter could think; that there are no innate ideas, that our mind is a *tabula rasa*, and that we do not always think; and he appears disposed to approve the most of the objections which Gassendi has made to Descartes. He has enriched and strengthened this system by a thousand beautiful reflections; and I do not at all doubt that now our party triumphs boldly over its adversaries, the Peripatetics and the Cartesians. This is why, if you have not yet read

this book, I invite you to do so, and, if you have read it, I ask you to give me your opinion of it.

*Theophilus.* I rejoice to see you, on your return after a long absence, happy in the conclusion of your important business, full of health, steadfast in your friendship for me, and always transported with an ardor equal to the search for the most important truths. I no less have continued my meditations in the same spirit, and I believe I have profited as much as, and, not to flatter myself, perhaps more than yourself. Indeed, my need therein was greater than yours, for you were more advanced than I. You were more conversant with speculative philosophers, and I was more inclined toward ethics. But I have learned more and more how ethics receives strength from the solid principles of true philosophy; therefore I have lately studied these principles more diligently, and have begun meditations quite new. So that we shall have the means of giving ourselves a reciprocal pleasure of long duration in communicating the one to the other our solutions. But it is necessary for me to tell you anew that I am no longer a Cartesian, and that, nevertheless, I am farther removed than ever from your Gassendi, whose knowledge and merit I elsewhere recognize. I have been impressed with a new system, of which I have read something in the "Journaux des Savans" of Paris, Leipzig, and Holland, and in the marvellous Dictionary of Bayle, article "Rorarius"; and since then I believe I see a new aspect of the interior of things. This system appears to unite Plato and Democritus, Aristotle and Descartes, the scholastics with the moderns, theology and ethics with the reason. It seems to take the best from all sides, and then it goes much farther than any has yet gone. I find an intelligible explanation of the union of soul and body, of which I had before this despaired. I find the true principles of things in the Units of Substance, which this system introduces, and in their pre-established harmony in the primitive Substance. I find a simplicity and a wonderful uniformity, so that you can say that this substance is everywhere and always the same thing, by degrees approaching perfection. I see now what Plato meant when he assumed matter to be an existence imperfect and transitory; what Aristotle meant by his Entelechy; what that promise is of another life which Democritus even made at the house of Pliny; how far the Sceptics were right in declaiming against the senses; how



animals are in fact automatons following Descartes, and how they have, nevertheless, souls and feeling according to the opinion of mankind; how it is necessary to explain rationally those who have lodged life and perception in all things, as Cardan, Campanella, and, better than these, the late Madame the Countess de Conna-way, a Platonist, and our friend, the late Francis Mercure van Helmont (although elsewhere bristling with unintelligible paradoxes), with his friend the late Henry More. How the laws of nature (a good part of which were unknown before this system) have their origin in principles superior to matter, and which, nevertheless, play their part entirely mechanically in matter, in which the spiritualizing authors I just named have erred with their Archæi,<sup>1</sup> and even the Cartesians, in believing that immaterial substances altered if not the force at least the direction or determination of the movements of the body, instead of the soul and the body observing perfectly each its own laws, according to the new system, and that each, nevertheless, obeys the other as much as is necessary. In fine, it is since I have contemplated this system that I have found that the souls of beasts and their sensations are in no sense prejudicial to the immortality of human souls, or rather how nothing is more suited to establish our natural immortality than to conceive that all souls are imperishable (*mortæ earent animæ*), without, however, the fear of metempsychoses, since not only the souls, but, further, the animals endure and will endure living, feeling, acting; it is everywhere as here, and always and everywhere as with us, following what I have already said to you. If only the conditions of animals are more or less perfect and developed, without there ever being a need of souls

<sup>1</sup> "Archée. s. f. Terme de physiologie ancienne. Principe immatériel différent de l'âme intelligent et qu'on supposait présider à tous les phénomènes de la vie matérielle." Littré.

"Archæus, n. [L. l. archæus, fr. Gr. arché, beginning.] A term used especially by Paracelsus and Van Helmont, and signifying the vital principle which presides over the growth and continuation of living beings; the principle or power which presides over every particle of organized bodies, and to which it gives form; an immaterial principle existing in the seed prior to fecundation."

The Imperial Dictionary of the English Language, a Complete Encyclopædic Lexicon, Literary, Scientific, and Technological. By John Ogilvie, LL. D. New edition, carefully revised and greatly augmented, edited by Charles Annandale, M. A. London: Blackie & Son. The Century Company, New York. 4 vols. 1883.—Tr.



wholly separate, while we nevertheless have always spirits as pure as possible, the organs do not hinder us, which we should not be aware of as disturbing by any influence the laws of our spontaneity. I find void and atoms, though otherwise excluded by the sophistry of the Cartesians, grounded in the pretended coincidence of the idea of body and extension. I see all things determined and adorned beyond everything that one has hitherto conceived; organic matter everywhere, nothing void, sterile, slighted, nothing too uniform, everything varied, but with order; and, what passes imagination, the entire universe in epitome, but with a different aspect in each of its parts, and likewise in each one of its units of substance. Besides this new analysis of things, I have a better comprehension of that of notions or ideas, and of truths. I understand what idea is, true, clear, distinct, adequate, if I dare adopt this word. I understand what are the primitive truths, the true axioms, the distinction between necessary truths and truths of fact, the reasoning of men and the thought-consecutions of animals, which are a shadow as compared with that of man. Finally, you will be surprised to hear all that I say to you, and, above all, to understand how much the knowledge of the grandeur and of the perfections of God is therein exalted. For I should not know how to conceal from you, for whom I have had nothing concealed, how I have been thrilled now with admiration and (if we may dare to make use of the term) with love for this sovereign source of things and of beauty, having found that what this system discovers surpasses everything one has hitherto conceived. You know that I had gone a little too far elsewhere, and that I commenced to lean toward the side of the Spinozists, who allow God only an infinite power, without recognizing either perfection or wisdom in his case, and regarding with contempt the search for final causes, deriving everything from brute necessity. But these new lights have cured me of this; and since then I sometimes take the name of Theophilus. I have read the book of this celebrated Englishman of whom you have just spoken. I value it highly, and I have found in it some good things. But it seems to me necessary to go much farther, and necessary even to turn aside from his views, since he has made more of our limits than is necessary, and lowered a little not only the condition of man, but, besides, that of the universe.

*Ph.* You astonish me in fact with all the marvels which you

have recited to me in a manner a little too assuming for an easy credence of them on my part. However, I will hope that there will be something solid among so many novelties with which you desire to regale me. In this case you will find me very docile. You know that it was always my disposition to surrender myself to reason, and that I sometimes took the name of Philalethes. This is why, if you please, we will now make use of these two names which are so congruous with our mental constitution and methods. There are means of proceeding to the trial, for—since you have read the book of the celebrated Englishman, which gives me so much satisfaction and which treats a good part of the subjects of which you were just speaking, and, above all, the analysis of our ideas and knowledge—it will be the shortest way to follow the thread of this work, and to see what you will have to say.

*Th.* I approve your proposition. Here is the book.

§ 1. *Ph.* [I have read this book so well that I have retained some of it even to the expressions, which I shall be careful to follow. Thus I shall not need to recur to the book, as in some encounters where we shall judge it necessary. We shall speak first of the origin of ideas or notions (Book I), then of the different kinds of ideas (Book II), and of the words that serve to express them (Book III), lastly of the knowledge and truths which therein result (Book IV); and it is this last part which will occupy us the most. As for the origin of ideas, I believe, with this author and a multitude of clever persons, that there are no innate ideas nor innate principles.] And, in order to refute the error of those who admit them, it is sufficient to show, as it appears eventually, that there is no need of them, and that men can acquire all their knowledge without the aid of any innate impression.

*Th.* [You know, Philalethes, that I have been for a long time of another opinion; that I have always held, as I do still hold, to the innate idea of God, which Descartes has supported, and as a consequence to the other innate ideas, which could not come to us from the Senses. Now, I go still farther in conformity to the new system, and I believe even that all the thoughts and acts of our soul come from its own depths, without a possibility of their being given to it through the Senses, as you are going to see in the sequel. But at present I will put this investigation aside, and,

accommodating myself to received expressions, since in fact they are good and tenable, and one can say in a certain sense that the external Senses are in part causes of our thoughts, I will consider how one should say in my opinion, still according to the common system (speaking of the action of the body upon the soul, as the Copernicans speak with other men of the movement of the sun, and with cause), that there are some ideas and some principles which do not come to us from the Senses, and which we find in ourselves without forming them, although the Senses give us occasion to perceive them. I believe that your clever author has remarked that under the name of innate principles one often maintains his prejudices, wishes to free himself from the trouble of discussion, and that this abuse will have stirred up his zeal against this supposition. He will have chosen to combat the indolence and the superficial manner of thinking of those who, under the specious pretext of innate ideas and of truths naturally engraved upon the mind, to which we readily give our consent, care nothing about investigating or considering the sources, the relations, and the certainty of this knowledge. In that I am entirely agreed with him, and I go even farther. I would that our analysis should not be limited, that definitions should be given of all the terms which are capable of definition, and that one should demonstrate, or give the means of demonstrating, all the axioms which are not primitive, without distinguishing the opinions which men have of them, and without a care whether they give their consent or not. There would be more profit in this than one thinks. But it seems that the author has been carried too far on the other side by his zeal, otherwise very praiseworthy. He has not sufficiently distinguished, in my opinion, the origin of those necessary truths whose source is in the understanding from that of those truths of fact which one obtains from the experience of the Senses, and even those confused perceptions which are in us. You see, then, that I do not agree with what you lay down as fact—that we can acquire all our knowledge without the need of innate impressions. And the sequel will show which of us is right.]

§ 2. *P<sup>h</sup>*. We shall see it indeed. I grant you, my dear Theophilus, that there is no opinion more commonly received than that which establishes that there are certain principles of truth in which men generally agree; this is why they are called General

Notions, *κοινὰ ἔννοιαι*; whence one infers that those principles must be so many impressions which our minds receive with their existence. § 3. But though it should be certain that there are some principles with which the entire human race lives in accord, this universal consent would not prove that they are innate if one can show, as I believe he can, another way through which men have been able to reach this uniformity of opinion. § 4. But, what is much worse, this universal consent is nowhere found, not even with regard to these two celebrated speculative principles (for we shall speak about the practical ones later), that whatever is, is; and that it is impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the same time. For there is a large part of the human race to which these two propositions, which will pass doubtless for necessary truths and for axioms with you, are not even known.

*Th.* [I do not ground the certainty of innate principles upon universal consent, for I have already told you, Philalethes, that my opinion is that one ought to labor to be able to demonstrate all the axioms which are not primitive. I grant you also that a consent very general, but which may not be universal, can come from a tradition diffused through the whole human race, as the practice of smoking tobacco has been received by nearly all peoples in less than a century, although there have been found some islanders who, not being acquainted with fire even, were unable to smoke. It is thus that some clever people, even among theologians, but of the party of Arminius, have believed that knowledge of the Deity came from a very ancient or very general tradition; and I am willing to believe indeed that instruction has confirmed and rectified this knowledge. It appears, however, that nature has contributed aid to lead us thither without the doctrine; the marvels of the universe have made us think of a superior power. One has seen a child born deaf and dumb show veneration for the full moon, and one has found nations, that he did not see had learned anything of other peoples, fearing invisible powers. I grant you, my dear Philalethes, that this is not yet the idea of God that we have and ask for; but this idea even is not allowed to be in the depths of our souls without being put there, as we shall see, and the eternal laws of God are there in part engraved in a manner still more legible and through a species of instinct. But there are

practical principles of which we shall have also occasion to speak. It must be admitted, however, that the inclination we have to recognize the idea of God is in human nature. And, though one should attribute the first instruction therein to revelation, the readiness which men have always shown to receive this doctrine comes from the nature of their souls.<sup>1</sup> But we will suppose that these ideas which are innate comprehend incompatible notions.

§ 19. *Ph.* Although you maintain that these particular and self-evident propositions, whose truth is recognized as soon as one hears them stated (as that green is not red), are received as consequences of these other more general propositions, which are regarded as so many innate principles, it seems that you do not at all consider that these particular propositions are received as indubitable truths by those who have no knowledge of these more general maxims.

*Th.* I have already replied to that above. One builds on these general maxims as one builds upon the majors, which are suppressed when you reason through enthymemes; for, although very often one does not think distinctly of what he does in reasoning any more than of what he does in walking and leaping, it is always true that the force of the conclusion consists in part in that which is suppressed and could not come from any other place, which you will find whenever you are pleased to justify the statement.

§ 20. *Ph.* But it seems that general and abstract ideas are more

<sup>1</sup> From this point on Gerhardt, whose edition, it will be remembered, is the basis of the present translation, transposes the text as given by Erdmann and Jacques as follows: *Mais nous jugerons que ces idées qui sont innées, renferment des notions incompatibles*, the first three words of which will be found in Erdmann, p. 207, b., about two thirds down the page, Jacques, vol. i, p. 29, about two thirds down, the remainder in Erdmann, p. 211, a., at the middle of the page, Jacques, p. 36, first third, just preceding § 19 in each case, whence the three texts go on in agreement until § 26, G., p. 72, E., p. 212, b., J., p. 39. Here the Gerhardt text has the following: *S'il y a des vérités innées, ne faut il pas qu'il y ait dans la suite, que la doctrine externe ne fait qu'exciter icy ce que est en nous*: taking up with the words *dans la suite*, the text as given by E., p. 207, b., J., p. 29, where it previously left it, the three texts continuing again in agreement until the words *dès qu'on s'apperçoit*, G., p. 79, last third, E., 211, a., at the middle, J., 36, first third, whence G. completes his sentence with the last three words of the first sentence of § 26, as given by E., 212, b., J., 39, from which point again the three texts substantially agree to the end of Chapter I.—Tr.

foreign to our mind [than notions and particular truths; consequently particular truths will be more natural to the mind than the principle of contradiction, of which you admit they are only the application].

*Th.* It is true that we commence sooner to perceive particular truths when we commence with ideas more complex and more gross; but that does not prevent the order of nature from commencing with the most simple, and the proof of the more particular truths from depending upon the more general, of which they are only examples. And when one is willing to consider what is in us virtually and before all apperception, one has reason to commence with the most simple. For general principles enter into all our thoughts, of which they form the soul and the connective. They are as necessary as the muscles and sinews are for walking, although one does not at all think of them. The mind leans upon these principles every moment, but it does not come so easily to distinguish them and to represent them distinctly and separately, because that demands great attention to its acts, and the majority of people, little accustomed to think, has little of it. Have not the Chinese articulate sounds as we? and yet, being attached to another manner of writing, they have not yet thought of making an alphabet of these sounds. Thus it is that one possesses many things without knowing it.

§ 21. *Ph.* If the mind acquiesces so promptly in certain truths, cannot that acquiescence come from the consideration even of the nature of things, which does not allow it to judge of them otherwise, rather than from the consideration that these propositions are engraven by nature in the mind?

*Th.* Both are true. The nature of things and the nature of mind agree. And since you oppose the consideration of the thing to the apperception of that which is engraven in the mind, this objection even shows that those whose side you take do not understand by innate truths what one would approve naturally as by instinct, and even without knowing how confusedly he does it. There are some of this nature, and we shall have occasion to speak of them. But what is called the light of nature supposes a distinct knowledge, and very often the consideration of the nature of things is nothing else than the knowledge of the nature of our mind, and of these innate ideas which one has no need to

seek outside.<sup>1</sup> I have already replied (§ 5) to the objection (§ 22) which intended, when one says that innate notions are implicitly in the mind, that the statement should signify only that there is the ability to know them, for I have already remarked that besides that there is the power of finding them in itself, and the disposition to approve them whenever it thinks of them as necessary.

§ 23. *Ph.* It seems, then, that you suppose that those to whom one proposes these general maxims for the first time learn nothing which is entirely new to them. But it is clear that they learn first the names, then the truths, and even the ideas upon which these truths rest.

*Th.* The question here is not of names, which are in some sense arbitrary, while ideas and truths are natural. But, with respect to these ideas and truths, you attribute to us, sir, a doctrine which we have strongly repudiated; for I agree that we learn ideas and innate truths either in considering their source, or in verifying them through experience. Thus I do not make the supposition which you aver, as if, in the case of which you speak, we learned nothing new. And I would not admit this proposition: all that one learns is not innate. The truths of numbers are in us, and one is not left to learn them, either by drawing them from their source when one learns them through demonstrative proof (which shows that they are innate), or in testing them in examples, as is done by ordinary arithmeticians, who, in default of a knowledge of the proofs, learn their rules only by tradition, and, at most, before teaching them, justify them by experience, which they continue as far as they think expedient. And sometimes even a very skilful mathematician, not knowing the source of the discovery of another, is obliged to content himself with this method of induction in examining it; as did a celebrated writer at Paris, when I was there, who continued a tolerably long time the examination of my arithmetical tetragonism, comparing it with the numbers of Ludolphe, believing he had found there some error; and he had reason to doubt until some one communicated to him the

<sup>1</sup> Erlmann's and Jacques's text has the following additional sentence: *Ainsi j'appelle innées les vérités, qui n'ont besoin que de cette considération pour être vérifiées; i. e., thus I call innate the truths which have no need of this consideration for their verification.*—Tr.



demonstration, which dispenses for us with these tests, which could always continue without ever being perfectly certain. And it is the same thing to know the imperfection of inductions, which one can verify by instances of experience. For there are progressions in which one can go very far before noticing the changes and the laws that are found there.

*Ph.* But is it not possible that not only the terms or words which we use, but even the ideas, come to us from without?

*Th.* It would then be necessary that we should be ourselves even outside of ourselves, for the intellectual or reflective ideas are derived from our mind; and I should much like to know how we could have the idea of being if we were not beings ourselves, and did not thus find being in ourselves.

*Ph.* But what do you say to this challenge of one of my friends? If any one, says he, can find a proposition whose ideas are innate, that he can name to me, he would do me a very great favor.

*Th.* I would name the propositions of arithmetic and geometry, which are all of this nature; and, in point of necessary truths, one could not find others.

§ 25. *Ph.* That will appear strange to most people. Can you say that the most difficult and the most profound sciences are innate?

*Th.* Their actual knowledge is not, but much that you may call virtual knowledge, like the figure traced by the veins of the marble, is in the marble, before one discovers them in working.

*Ph.* But is it possible that children, while receiving notions that come to them from without, and giving them their consent, may have no knowledge of those which you suppose to be inborn with them, and to make, as it were, a part of their mind, in which they are, you say, imprinted in ineffaceable characters in order to serve as a foundation? If that were so, Nature would have taken trouble for nothing, or, at least, she would have badly engraved their characters, since they would not be perceived by the eyes which see very well other things.

*Th.* The apperception of that which is in us depends upon attention and order. Now, not only is it possible, but it is even proper, that children give more attention to the notions of sense, because the attention is regulated by the need. The outcome,



however, shows in the sequel that Nature has not given herself useless trouble to impress upon us innate knowledge, since without it there would be no means of coming to the actual knowledge of necessary truths in the demonstrative sciences, and to the reasons of facts; and we should not be above the beasts.

§ 26. *Ph.* If there are innate truths, does it not necessarily follow that the external doctrine only can stir up here what is in us? I conclude that a consent sufficiently general among men is an indication, and not a demonstration, of an innate principle; but that the exact and decisive proof of these principles consists in showing that their certitude comes only from what is in us. To reply further to what you say against the general approbation which is given to the two great speculative principles, which are, nevertheless, the best established, I can say to you that if they could not be known they would not be innate, because they are recognized as soon as heard; but I would add further that at bottom everybody knows them, and that you make use every moment of the principle of contradiction (for example) without considering it distinctly; and there is no barbarian who, in an affair of any moment, is not offended by the conduct of a liar who contradicts himself. Thus, these maxims are employed without an express consideration of them. And it is about the same as if you have virtually in the mind the propositions suppressed in enthymemes, which are laid aside not only outside, but further in our thought.

§ 5. *Ph.* [What you say of this virtual knowledge and of these internal suppressions surprises me]; for to say that there are truths imprinted upon the soul which it does not perceive is, it seems to me, a veritable contradiction.

*Th.* [If you are thus prejudiced, I am not astonished that you reject innate knowledge. But I am astonished that the thought has not occurred to you that we have an infinity of knowledge which we do not always perceive, not even when we need it. It is for the memory to guard this, and for the reminiscence to represent them to us, as it often, but not always, does at need. That is very well called remembrance (*subvenire*), for reminiscence needs some aid. And it is well that in this multitude of our knowledge we are determined by something to renew one rather than another,

since it is impossible to think distinctly all at once of everything we know.]

*Ph.* In that I believe you are right; and this too general affirmation, that we always perceive all the truths which are in our soul, escaped me without my having given it sufficient attention. But you will have a little more trouble in replying to what I am going to show you. That is, that if you can say of some particular proposition that it is innate, you could maintain by the same reasoning that all propositions which are reasonable, and which the mind could always regard as such, are already impressed upon the soul.

*Th.* I agree with you in regard to pure ideas, which I oppose to the phantoms of the senses, and in regard to necessary truths, or those of the reason, which I oppose to truths of fact. In this sense it should be said that all arithmetic and all geometry are innate, and are in us virtually, so that one can find them there in considering attentively and setting in order what he already has in the mind, without making use of any truth learned through experience or through the tradition of another, as Plato has shown in a dialogue in which he introduces Socrates leading a child to abstract truths by questions alone without giving him any information. One can then make for himself these sciences in his study, and even with closed eyes, without learning through sight or even through touch the truths which he needs; although it is true that he would not look upon the ideas in question if he had never seen or touched anything. For it is through an admirable economy of nature that we could not have abstract thoughts which have no need whatever of anything sensible, when that would only be of such a character as are the forms of the letters and the sounds, although there is no necessary connection between such arbitrary characters and such thoughts. And if the sensible outlines were not requisite, the pre-established harmony between soul and body, of which I shall have occasion to speak more fully, would have no place. But that does not prevent the mind from taking necessary ideas from itself. You see also sometimes how it can go far without any aid, by a logic and arithmetic purely natural, as this Swedish youth who, in cultivating his own (soul), went so far as to make great calculations immediately in his head without having learned the common method of computation, nor even to read and write, if I remember correctly what has been told me of him. It

is true that he cannot work out cross-grained problems, such as those which demand the extraction of roots. But that does not at all prevent him from being able still to draw them from its depths by some new turn of mind. Thus that proves only that there are degrees in the difficulty of perceiving what is in us. There are innate principles which are common and very easy to all; there are theorems which are discovered likewise at once, and which compose the natural sciences, which are more understood in one case than in another. Finally, in a larger sense, which it is well to employ in order to have notions more comprehensive and more determinate, all truths which can be drawn from primitive innate knowledge can still be called innate, because the mind can draw them from its own depths, although often it would not be an easy thing so to do. But, if any one gives another meaning to the terms, I do not wish to dispute about words.

*P<sup>h</sup>.* [I have agreed with you that you can have in the soul what you do not perceive there, for you do not always remember in the nick of time all that you know, but it must be always what one has learned or has known in former times expressly. Thus] if you can say that a thing is in the soul, although the soul has not yet known it, that can only be because it has the capacity or faculty of knowing it.

*T<sup>h</sup>.* [Why could not that have still another cause, such as the soul's being able to have this thing within it without its being perceived? for since an acquired knowledge can there be concealed by the memory, as you admit, why could not nature have also concealed there some original knowledge? Must everything that is natural to a substance which knows itself be known by it actually at once? Cannot and ought not this substance (such as our soul) to have many properties and affections which it is impossible to consider all at once and all together? It was the opinion of the Platonists that all our knowledge was reminiscence, and that thus the truths which the soul has brought with the birth of the man, and which are called innate, must be the remains of an express anterior knowledge. But this opinion has no foundation; and it is easy to believe that the soul should already have innate knowledge in the precedent state (if there were any pre-existence), some remote state in which it could exist, entirely as here: it should then also come from another precedent state, where it would be

finally innate, or at least concreate; or else it would be needful to go to infinity and to make souls eternal, in which case this knowledge would be innate in fact, because it would never have commenced in the soul; and if any one contends that each anterior state has had something from another more previous, which it has not left to the following, the reply will be made that it is manifest that certain evident truths must have been in all these states, and in such a manner that you may assume that it is always clear in all states of the soul that necessary truths are innate, and can prove by what is within that they cannot be established through experience, as you establish thereby truths of fact. Why should it be, also, that you could have no possession in the soul of which you might never be aware? And is it the same thing to have a thing without knowing it as to have only the faculty of acquiring it? If that were so, we should possess ever only those things which we enjoy; instead of which, you know that, besides the faculty and the object, some disposition in the faculty or in the object, and in both, is often necessary, that the faculty may exercise itself upon the object.]

*P/h.* Taking it in that way, one could say that there are truths written in the soul which the soul has, however, never known, and which, indeed, even it will never know. That appears to me strange.

*Th.* [I see there no absurdity, although in that case you could not be assured that there are such truths. For things more exalted than those which we can know in this present course of life can be developed some time in our souls, when they will be in another state.]

*P/h.* But suppose there are truths which could be imprinted upon the understanding without its perceiving them; I do not see how, in relation to their origin, they could differ from the truths which it is only capable of knowing.

*Th.* The mind is not only capable of knowing them, but further of finding them in itself; and, if it had only the simple capacity of receiving knowledge, or the passive power for that, as indeterminate as that which the wax has of receiving figures and the blank paper of receiving letters, it would not be the source of necessary truths, as I have just shown that it is; for it is incontestable that the senses do not suffice to show necessity, and that

thus the mind has a disposition (active as well as passive) to draw these for itself even from its own depths, although the senses would be necessary to give it the occasion and the attention for the same, and to carry it to the one rather than to the other. You see, then, sir, that these elsewhere very clever persons who are of another opinion appeared not to have thought enough upon the consequences of the difference which there is between necessary or eternal truths and between the truths of experience, as I have already observed, and as all our discussion shows. The original proof of necessary truths comes from the understanding alone, and the other truths come from experience or from the observation of the senses. Our mind is capable of knowing both; but it is the source of the former, and, whatever number of particular experiences you could have of a universal truth, you could not assure yourself of it forever by induction without knowing its necessity by reason.

*Ph.* But is it not true that if the words, to be in the understanding, involve something positive, they signify to be perceived and comprehended by the understanding?

*Th.* They signify to us wholly another thing. It is enough that what is in the understanding can be found there, and that the sources or original proofs of the truths which are in question are only in the understanding; the senses can hint at, justify, and confirm these truths, but cannot demonstrate their infallible and perpetual certainty.

§ 11. *Ph.* Nevertheless, all those who will take the trouble to reflect with a little attention upon the operations of the understanding will find that this consent, which the mind gives without difficulty to certain truths, depends upon the power of the human mind.

*Th.* Very well. But it is this particular relation of the human mind to these truths which renders the exercise of the power easy and natural in respect to them, and which causes them to be called innate. It is not, then, a naked faculty which consists in the single possibility of understanding them; it is a disposition, an aptitude, a preformation, which determines our soul and which makes it possible for them to be derived from it. Just as there is the difference between the figures which are given to the stone or to the marble indifferently, and between those which its veins already

indicate, or are disposed to indicate, if the workman profits by them.

*Ph.* But is it not true that the truths are subsequent to the ideas of which they are born? Now, the ideas come from the senses.

*Th.* Intellectual ideas, which are the source of necessary truths, do not come from the senses; and you admit that there are some ideas which are due to the reflection of the mind upon itself. Besides, it is true that the express knowledge of truths is subsequent (*tempore vel naturi*) to the express knowledge of ideas; as the nature of truths depends upon the nature of ideas, before both can be expressly formed, and the truths, into which enter ideas which come from the senses, depend upon the senses, at least in part. But the ideas which come from the senses are confused, and the truths which depend upon them are likewise confused, at least in part; while the intellectual ideas, and the truths dependent upon them, are distinct, and neither the one nor the other have their origin in the senses, although it may be true that we would never think of them without the senses.

*Ph.* But, in your view, numbers are intellectual ideas, and yet there is the difficulty depending upon the express formation of the ideas; for example, a man knows that 18 and 19 equal 37 with the same evidence that he knows that one and two equal three; but yet a child does not know the first proposition so soon as the second, which comes from the fact that he has not formed the ideas so soon as the words.

*Th.* I can agree with you that often the difficulty in the express formation of truths depends upon that in the express formation of ideas. Yet I believe that in your example the question concerns the use of ideas already formed. For those who have learned to count as far as 10, and the method of passing farther on by a certain repetition of tens, understand without difficulty what are 18, 19, 37; viz., one, two, or three times 10 with 8, or 9, or 7; but, in order to draw from it that 18 plus 19 make 37, more attention is necessary than to know that 2 plus 1 are 3, which at bottom is only the definition of 3.

§ 18. *Ph.* It is not a privilege attached to the numbers or to the ideas, which you call intellectual, of furnishing propositions in which you infallibly acquiesce as soon as you hear them. You meet these in physics and in all the other sciences, and the senses

even furnish them. For example, this proposition: two bodies cannot be in the same place at the same time, is a truth of which you are not otherwise convinced than of the following maxims: It is impossible for a thing to be and not to be in the same time; white is not red; the square is not a circle; yellowness is not sweetness.

*Th.* There is a difference between these propositions. The first, which declares the impenetrability of bodies, needs proof. All those who believe in true and strictly formed condensations and rarefactions, as the Peripatetics and the late Chevalier Digby, reject it, in fact; without speaking of the Christians, who believe, for the most part, that the contrary view—namely, the penetration of space—is possible to God. But the other propositions are identical, or very nearly so, and identical or immediate propositions do not admit of proof. Those who look upon the senses as furnishing them, as that one who says that yellowness is not sweetness, have not applied the general identical maxim to particular cases.

*Ph.* Every proposition which is composed of two different ideas, of which one is the denial of the other—for example, that the square is not a circle, that to be yellow is not to be sweet—will be as certainly received as indubitable, as soon as its terms are understood, as this general maxim: It is impossible for a thing to be and not to be in the same time.

*Th.* That is, the one (namely, the general maxim) is the principle, and the other (that is to say, the negation of one idea by another opposed to it) is its application.

*Ph.* It seems to me rather that the maxim depends upon this negation, which is its ground; and that it is, besides, much easier to understand that what is the same thing is not different: than the maxim which rejects the contradictions. Now, according to that statement, it will be necessary for you to admit as innate truths an infinite number of propositions of this kind which deny one idea by another without speaking of other truths. Add to that that a proposition cannot be innate unless the ideas of which it is composed are innate; it will be necessary to suppose that all the ideas which we have of colors, sounds, tastes, figures, etc., are innate.

*Th.* I do not well see how this: what is the same thing is not different, is the origin of the principle of contradiction, and

easier; for it appears to me that you give yourself more freedom in advancing that A is not B than in saying that A is not non-A. And the reason that prevents A from being B is that B involves non-A. Besides, this proposition: sweet is not bitter, is not innate, following the sense which we have given to this term innate truth. For the sensations of sweet and bitter come from the external senses. Thus it is a mixed conclusion (*hybrida conclusio*), where the axiom is applied to a sensible truth. But as regards this proposition: the square is not a circle, you can affirm that it is innate, for, in looking upon it, you make a subsumption or application of the principle of contradiction to what the understanding furnishes for itself as soon as you perceive innate thoughts.

*Th.* Not at all, for the thoughts are acts, and the knowledge or the truths, in so far as they are within us, when even we do not think of them, are habitudes or dispositions, and we are well acquainted with things of which we think but little.

*Ph.* It is very difficult to conceive that a truth may be in the mind if the mind has never thought of that truth.

*Th.* That is as if some one said it is difficult to conceive that there are veins in the marble before you have discovered them. It seems, also, that this objection resembles a little too much the begging of the question. All those who admit innate truths, without grounding them in the Platonic reminiscence, admit some of which they have not yet thought. Besides, this reasoning proves too much; for, if truths are thoughts, you will be deprived not only of the truths of which you have never thought, but, further, of those of which you have thought, and of which you no longer actually think; and if the truths are not thoughts, but habitudes and aptitudes, natural or acquired, nothing prevents there being in us some of which we have never thought, of which we will never think.

§ 27. *Ph.* If general maxims were innate, they would appear more vividly in the mind of certain persons where, however, we see no trace of them; I may mention children, idiots, savages, for of all men these are they who have the mind less altered and corrupted by custom and by the impress of extraneous opinions.

*Th.* I believe we must reason entirely otherwise here. Innate maxims appear only through the attention which is given to them; but these persons have little of it, or have it for quite an-



other thing. Their thoughts are mostly confined to the needs of the body: and it is reasonable that pure and spotless thoughts be the reward of cares more noble. It is true that children and savages have the mind less altered by customs, but they also have it nurtured by the teaching, which gives attention. It would be an inappropriate endowment that the brightest lights should better shine in the mind of those who less deserve them, and who are enveloped in thick clouds. I would not have you, then, glory too much in ignorance and barbarism, since you are as learned and as clever as you are, Philalethes, as well as your excellent author: that would be lowering the gifts of God. Some one will say that the more ignorant you are the more you approach the advantage of a block of marble or of a piece of wood, which are infallible and sinless. But, unfortunately, it is not by ignorance that you approach this advantage; and, as far as you are capable of knowledge, you sin in neglecting to acquire it, and you will err so much the more easily the less information you possess.

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## GOESCHEL ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF CARL FRIEDRICH GOESCHEL, BY SUSAN E. BLOW.

### CHAPTER III—(*Continued*).

#### *The Triplicity of the Proofs of Immortality in the Light of Speculation.*

We have seen how the current proofs of immortality are reflected and trans-figured in the light of speculation. The most significant feature of our investigation, however, is that we have found the threads of this development in the very system which seems most antagonistic to personal immortality. That Spinoza himself has forged for us the arms with which we combat pantheism is overwhelming testimony to the inextirpability of the concept of persistence.

It is also remarkable that while Leibnitz, like Epicurus, moves from atoms as his starting-point, he reaches a result diametrically opposed to that of the ancient philosopher in that he proves per-

sonal immortality from the indivisible internality of the Monad. Not less noteworthy is it that in the system of Leibnitz the three proofs develop out of and successively to each other. Leading first from the compound to the simple, Leibnitz begins the development of his system with the content of the first proof; he then leads us through the varied orders and series of monads to the rational Monad, and finally to the divine primitive Monad, in which all things live and move and have their being (the kernel of the second proof), wherefore throughout creation nothing can perish (and here we reach the third proof). Immediately there is attributed to each Monad certa quaedam *αὐτάρκεια*; then it is recognized that originally this autarky belongs only to the primitive Monad, and created monads exist as continual divinitatis fulgurationes, and are preserved through continuous creation. The consequence is that nothing perishes. *Nequeunt monades interire nisi per annihilationem.* But such annihilation would be annihilation of the divine will, and thus we reach the final result, viz., quodlibet animal, quamvis machina ipsius saepius ex parte pereat, animaque involuera organica vetera relinquat, vel nova capiat, esse indestructibile. It may be added that the Monad theory of Leibnitz which moves through the complete cycle of the proofs of immortality has recently taken on flesh and bone and appeared in concrete poetic form in the Conversations of Goethe with Falk.

An evident result of our investigation up to this point is that, on the one hand, the first proof of immortality, commonly called the metaphysical proof, is the basis of all the subsequent proofs, and that on the other it requires these subsequent proofs for its own development and completion. It is clear also that within its own sphere the content of the first proof has two apparently antagonistic sides. The one is that the soul as immaterial is exhibited in independence and separability from its external body, and is thus withdrawn from the power of death. But this very independence of a visible external and tangible body presupposes in the soul a separating and self-limiting moment, and this moment is the body which the soul has in itself. The second phase of the first proof is, therefore, that immanent unity and inseparability of the soul and the body which is indispensable if the soul after separation from its external body is to persist in its indi-

vidual form. The soul must be different from its external body, but indissolubly one with its internal body if after death it is to preserve its individuality and substantiality. When Philo, essaying to demonstrate immortality, rests the whole weight of his argument upon the separability of the reasonable God-conscious soul from the body which fetters and clogs it, he necessarily presupposes in the soul an immanent organ, and implies the inseparability of the soul from its inmost bond. The second moment leads immediately to immortality; the first mediately through its content to resurrection, which in its first phase is concerned with that external body which has been given over to death. The death of the body is nothing more than the continuance of the *dissectio membrorum*, the sensible completion of that schism in which the whole creation travails and groans. We may see also in the philosophy of Philo how the content of the first proof leads over to the second. He claims immortality only for the *ψυχὴ λογικῆ, διανοητικῆ*, because this is divine, and as divine free. The source of this divinity and freedom is the spirit of God breathed by God into man, whom he thus created in his own image. Therefore the destiny of man is to behold God. So, too, teaches Plotinus. According to this insight, on the one hand the separation of the soul from the body develops to reunion of soul and body by means of the resurrection; and, on the other hand, the indivisible Being-for-self or individuality of the soul in its internal body, in that it wakes and ascends into consciousness, leads in its progressive course to communion with God, and consequently to that personality of the spirit without which communion is unthinkable, and the vision of God, remaining external, contradicts itself.

As we trace the progressive movement of proof through its various phases, it is most important that we seize definitely and clearly its physiological aspect and significance. The development of the soul is essentially physiological; it is constituted, in fact, by the relationship of the soul to the body. The soul does not abstractly develop itself, but it develops, transforms, and penetrates its body and its relationship to the body. For this reason, the crown of physiological development is personality. We recognize the physiological principle in the second phase of the first proof which is the first mark of the advancing movement; the physiological principle emerges simultaneously with

the corporeality of the soul. Most significant in this connection is the procedure of the school of Wolf, which, in the sphere of the metaphysical proof, does not rest in an abstract and formal unity, but, moving forward at once to the corporeality of the soul, grounds the persistence of self-consciousness primarily in the soul's physiological development. The abstract simplicity of the soul is, of course, the starting-point. *Anima est ens simplex*: from this follows the incorruptibility of the soul. This incorruptibility of the soul is, however, no voucher for the persistence of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness rests upon the union of the soul with its inborn body; this inborn body Wolf indicates by a special word in order to distinguish it from the external body, which is merely its palpable manifestation, and he apprehends the soul in its marriage with this inborn body as person. The presupposition of this union is the creation which renews itself in each generation and birth, and accompanies each freshly begotten soul throughout life and beyond death; the incarnation of the soul is an act of creation, in whose uninterrupted continuance consists the physiological process. Immediately, *ex sua natura*, in virtue of its simplicity, the soul is imperishable; but its indissoluble union with its body follows, not from its nature, but from the concept of creation or from the nature of God, who must so perpetuate the soul as he has created the soul. The death of the body must therefore not be apprehended as the disembodying of the soul. The soul does not become bodiless when it leaves the body soulless. As consciousness rests upon the union of the soul with its organ, the body, the persistence of consciousness, or, more definitely, reminiscence (*recordatio*), may now be physiologically explained. Death is followed by ever deeper inter-penetration of body and soul; the result of this conformably with self-revealing physiological laws is that reminiscence, together with all its representations and images, grows ever clearer, more definite, and more luminous. Thus, in virtue of its perfectibility, the soul mounts from light to light. Herewith we are already in the sphere of the second proof, which completes itself in the third through the concept of personality.

The physiological principle of the process of proof moves from the connection of the psychic and somatic moments which conditions consciousness and culminates with the unity of these mo-

ments in the concept of personality. The phases of the movement are, first, pre-existence; or, better} still, essence; second, creation and generation, through which the divine and the human, the infinite and the finite, merge in one; third, perfectibility, which, and that too in the form of consciousness, is an indispensable stipulation of the union between the infinite and finite. Adequately apprehended, this perfectibility is the development of the created spirit through which it becomes what it is created to be. In this power of development is, however, necessarily included the possibility of lapse. The soul must develop itself by its own activity into the image of God; yet it can do this only by constantly drawing freely power from God. Obviously, in the course of its self-development, it may tear itself away from God and may persist in this fallen state of subjective isolation until divine power condescends to a second act of creative grace. The culmination is always personality, by means of which perfectibility completes itself without ceasing to be, and finds peace without sinking into sleep. With reference to these representations and conceptions, we have already referred to Dante, "*Purgatorio*," xviii, 49; xxv, 37.

In our own day the validity of this physiological consideration has been profoundly discussed on many sides. Finally Schubert has gone straight to the kernel of the whole matter and given us a history of the soul replete with suggestive reflections and profound insights. From the surface of appearance he finds a path into the hidden depths of existence; from abstract, colorless light he leads us into night and mystery, into the very essence of Being. Through the profound darkness Faith, with her torch, leads the way, and we emerge at last out of night into the morning, where the truth we have wrested from the gloom reflects itself in a thousand shining forms. Night is the mother of light, the body of translucent color. Without descending into the darkness we can never mount to the light. What is still necessary is that the rich material which Schubert has accumulated should be inwardly digested; that with a deeper plunge into the hidden world of miracles we may find a fairer morning and gaze with clearer eyes while the crimson glow of the sunrise grows into the perfect day.

We have already indicated how the triplicity of the proofs of

immortality is repeated and transfigured in the immanent development of the concept of the soul. This triplicity rests, first, upon the simplicity of the soul; second, upon its infinity; third, upon thought. So, in the development of the concept, the soul reveals itself first as individual, or the one in opposition to its other; second, as consciousness of itself and of its other; hence, consciousness of God; third, as spirit in its personality—*i. e.*, in the identity or mediation of self with its other *in* the individual.

This triplicity develops of itself from the position in which we find the soul. This position is the middle point between two extremes. As we find the soul, the soul already is; what the soul has been, lies, as essence, behind it; what the soul shall be, lies, as actuality, before it.

The question of the immortality of the soul is therefore immediately a question asked by the present of the future. Therefore in our investigation we first essayed to follow the forward movement of the soul toward its culmination in the finite spirit, starting with it from that middle point of time in which it is placed. And as the present asked the question, so in the present we found its answer; the present answered instead of the future by becoming itself the future it questioned. Upon this procedure rests in its final ground the so-called metaphysical proof of the personal persistence of the soul, for this proof seizes the soul in its immediacy and seeks for it in the future what it lacks in the present. A parallel to this process is found in the cosmological proof of the existence of God, which, seizing the world in its immediacy, seeks what it lacks in the highest essence. The nature of the world is to seek that which fulfils and explains it—that without which it is nothing. *The first longing aspiration after God seeks him in the future*, because it has not found him *now*, because it misses him *here*.

The path of the soul out of the present into the future is scarcely trodden ere it points from the future into the past, which is the background and ultimate presupposition of the soul. Thus, in its second phase, the question of immortality is addressed by the present to the past; the essential basis of the present and future is sought in what has been. Thus, the finite spirit, which was the actualization and unveiling of the soul, pointed us back to that Absolute Spirit which was prior to the finite Spirit and as Abso-

lute ever is and shall be. In the Absolute Spirit we found the origin or essence of the pre-existent internality of the soul, which, by means of externalization or existence, passes over to the future of the soul in God. The same path from the present into the past and through the past into the future may be detected in the moral proof of immortality, for this leads from the nature of the soul as determined to the determining essence, which is both the presupposition of the soul's existence and the guarantee of the soul's immortality. We find in the finite spirit power over all the dimensions of time. Memory guards the content of the past. Reminiscence makes this past content present. In reminiscence Plato finds the pledge of that self-conscious future to which it bears a content. Whence comes reminiscence unless from the Essence which has been? To what end is reminiscence given if not for the time which shall be? Similarly the physico theological proof of the existence of God leads not only from the conditioned to the prior unconditioned, but also from the contingent existence of the world to the essential nature of the world, and from this to its aboriginal determining principle. Thus, originating in reflection upon the nature of the world, the search for God in its second phase *looks for him in the past as the Absolute First*.

But the question with regard to the persistence of the human soul grows keener and more pressing in its forward movement. If in its importunity it turned first from the present to the future, or to that post-existence with which it was immediately concerned; if, next, it addressed the future mediately through the past, without which as essence it could have neither completion nor fulfilment, it turns finally to the totality of time, which is the mediation of the present; to the unity of the three dimensions of time penetrated by the concept of Spirit, *sub specie aeternitatis*: to the outcome of time, which reveals itself as eternity. It was thus that in our investigation of the soul's development we attained ultimately the concept of Absolute Personality, which, penetrating all time, was, is, and shall be, and from this insight pressed on to the nature of conditioned personality, which, according to its essence, includes in itself with the present both the future and the past. Crudely parallel with this movement was the process of the third proof of immortality, which found in Thought itself the pledge of its persistence, because it includes in the present all the



dimensions of time. So, too, the ontological proof of the existence of God found the existence of the Perfect Being included in the concept of the Perfect Being. Perfection implies that nothing is lacking—that all moments of the Totality are simultaneously present—hence eternity. The present is only complete when it includes the past and the future. “Where life feels the joy of living, the past endures, the future hastens, and the moment is eternity.”

The spirit is immortal because it is eternal, and it is eternal because it has the form of infinitude. Its so-called future is only the concrete realization of its infinite form. Just as the essence, *οὐσία*, was and is now *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*, so is it also present as future: the first is also the last, *τέλος*. The infinite first attains its truth and actuality through the fact that it is complete or totality, and has done with further growth. As complete it is not only past, but also present. Etelechy, or perfection, is essentially en-delechy, or persistence. This is the outcome of all demonstration.

The immortality of the soul must therefore not be conceived as something which shall be hereafter; it is the present quality of the soul. The spirit is eternal, therefore present; the spirit is present, therefore already eternal. This inherent eternity of the spirit in its first phase is the Individuality of the soul; its second phase is the unrealized ideal, which emerges from the discord of consciousness—*i. e.*, that the spirit should not remain in its first state of nature, but should become what by its essential nature it is destined to be; in the third phase it realizes its own image and becomes like unto itself. It is evident that the first of these phases corresponds to the metaphysical proof, the second to the moral proof, the third to the ontological proof, the concept of the spirit itself, which is mediated only through Personality.

It has therefore been said with truth that the determinations of time, through whose epochs moves the process of the soul's development, are themselves only the moments of the spirit which in its self-generation perpetuates its identity with itself through the unity of its content with its form. With this insight the triplicity of development receives additional confirmation.

In accordance with this attained result of our investigation, the immortality of the soul is grasped as the outcome and actuality of the soul, and the future as the concrete present. This outcome



develops itself first out of the being of the individual; second, out of the essence of the Subject; finally, out of thought itself, which alone is real, and as spirit is personality.

In its ultimate analysis the whole process of proof rests upon the three words: *Cogito, ergo sum*. The content of this statement is, however, developed through its various stages; the present tense of Being made fruitful by Thought has its development in itself. The first and obvious meaning of the statement is this: the soul thinks, therefore it is simple, and as simple it is unchangeable—the same to-morrow as to-day. Its deeper meaning is diremption; the soul thinks, therefore it is infinite; it thinks itself and that which is other than itself, hence God; the soul thinks and is thought—it is thought by the thinking subject as subject. *Cogito, ergo cogitor; cogitor, ergo sum*. The soul *is*, and the object of the soul *is*; both think and both are thought. The ultimate meaning is thought itself, which includes being; the reasonable is the actual; spirit is of and for the spirit.

It may be mentioned here that in dogmatic philosophy not only the existence, but also the essential nature of God is sought and indicated in three different ways. These ways are known as *via negationis*, *causalitatis*, and *eminentiæ*. There are implicit in them essentially the same categories which we have discovered in the proofs of the existence of God and of the actuality of the Soul. We find them also as Reality, Negation, and Limitation in the Kantian Table of categories under the head of Quality. The parallelism of these methods of ascent toward the nature of God with the theological proofs of existence and the psychological proofs of immortality needs only to be indicated.

In the cosmological proof, by the method of negation is deduced, from what the world is not and has not in itself, an existence outside of the world. The teleological proof, like the argument from Causality, deduces the presupposition of the world from the nature of the world. Finally, the ontological proof in accord with the method *eminentiæ* infers the reality of perfection from its concept.

The same correspondence may be traced in the psychological sphere. Analogically with the method of negation the metaphysical proof ascribes to the soul the future it lacks, deducing the reality of this future out of what the soul as yet is not but in ac-

cordance with the concept of simplicity should be. Moreover, we are really led to this simplicity or immateriality of the soul itself by the path of negation, for we find the soul immediately immersed in matter, and we reason from the contradiction between this condition of the soul and its essential nature to its immateriality, inferring its internality from its externality and deducing the imperishability of the internal from the transcendence of the external. The moral proof, on the contrary, infers from the potentiality of the soul its realization, and therein accords with the method of causality which, from what is, reasons backward to a cause corresponding to the effect, and forward to a goal corresponding to origin and development. Out of this twofoldness of the law of Causality is developed the double form of the moral proof which, as we have seen, leads from existence backward to pre-existence or the essence before existence, and forward to post-existence or the Actuality after existence. The *ἄθροισμα* lies as Origin behind; the *ὄν ἐνεκα*, as goal before; but as the Good both are one. Finally, the ontological proof of immortality develops by the path of "Eminence"; the eminence of being is being in all its dimensions; the outcome of this pregnant being is thought. Thought is the Alpha and Omega of Being.

From these remarks it is clear that all these varied forms of proof differ in their content only because they develop separately the existence and the nature of God, and similarly seek the immortality of the soul as distinct from the nature of the soul. According to this content must be determined the relationship of the varied forms of proof. Being and Essence are so related that only in the unity of both can be found the truth of each.

Before continuing the development of our subject it may be well to mention a construction of the soul which proceeds from the critical philosophy, and which merits the greater consideration, because it not only unconsciously includes the three dogmatic spheres of proof, but also from the present standpoint of philosophy finds its justification in the immanent development of the soul. This construction attributes to the soul, without detriment to its unity, two distinct elements; these elements are defined as expansive and attractive force, as relationship to the object and to the subject, more briefly still as impulse and sense. The unity of these two elements is the truth of both. They are real and active

only in their synthesis or dynamic unity. Out of their relationship are developed, according to the category of quantity, the three principal powers of the soul: Representation, in which the preponderating element is sense; as Appetite, wherein the balance inclines to the side of outward impulse; and Feeling, wherein neither element outweighs the other. From this same relationship are developed, according to the category of quality, the three different stages of unfolding upon which rests the perfectibility of the human soul.

The first stage is the period of Individuality or sense, which is followed by the period of Understanding, to which succeeds the period of Reason. The object of the first period is the sensible; the object of the last period is the supersensible or infinite; the middle period oscillates between the two. Omitting much interesting detail which belongs to this peculiar standpoint, we recognize in its outline, first, the unity of the different determinations of the soul, or simplicity, apprehended as the unity of the internal and the external, of the soul and its immanent body; second, the diremption of this unity, recognized quantitatively in the outwardly directed Appetite, and qualitatively in the Understanding, which vibrates between the internal and the external, and, while separating, seeks to unite them; third, mediated unity apprehended quantitatively in Feeling, which is seized not as the neutralization, but as the equalization of the two elements, and qualitatively in Reason, to which belongs Will as distinguished from Appetite. Reason, in distinction from Individuality, is grasped as Universality. Universality is literally the unity mediated through the circular development of the Concept or Notion. We have already recognized the truth of this Universality as Personality, just as the truth of sensuousness is Individuality, and the truth of Understanding the duplex nature of Consciousness.

From the standpoint of this ingenious conception of the nature and activity of the soul it may be said that the first or theoretical proof relates to the soul in its narrowest sense, the second or practical proof to the body, also in its narrowest sense, while the third, or ontological proof, includes body and soul, being and thought, the *δύναμις* and the *λόγος*. The object of the first proof is the simple, internal, the essential—the intensive being of force as feeling; the object of the second proof is the expansion of force,

the impulse outward. The first proof is theoretical because it apprehends its object according to its nature; the second proof is practical because its attention is directed to the body of its object, or, in other words, to its active manifestation. As externalization, the body is essentially the practical direction of the soul, the deed of thought, as the soul is the thought of thought. In the light of speculative philosophy, soul and body are revealed as the moments of the spirit, neither of which is independent of the other. The soul, as internal, is the calm, in itself inactive centre; the body, as externalization of this internality, is activity. This insight confirms the validity of the former as the theoretical, and of the latter as the practical moment. The soul is the calm, contemplative ruling moment; the body the active, effective, serving moment. Neither is independent of the other, for creation, as the active corporeality of the Supreme Principle, itself participates in this principle.

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## NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

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### *ANALYSIS OF GOETHE'S "ELECTIVE AFFINITIES."*

[We reprint the following remarkable article on Goethe's "Elective Affinities" from "The Index" of June 12, 1879.—ED.]

The central idea of the "Elective Affinities" is the sanctity of the marriage relation. "What God or Fate hath joined together, let no man put asunder"—is the lesson to be learned in this most moral of moral tales. With a skilful hand Goethe has laid bare the inmost recesses of the human heart, held up to view its loves, its passions, and its weakness, and shown too its superhuman strength, its firmness, and its nobility. He brings before us a couple, happy in their relation to each other as husband and wife. No strong, passionate sentiment binds them together; their tastes are similar, their friendship sincere; and this friendship and similarity of tastes they mistake for conjugal love. Meanwhile Charlotte, the prudent, discreet wife, all uncouseiously finds herself in love with and

beloved by her husband's friend, the Captain; and quite as unconsciously Edward, the impetuous husband, falls in love with and is loved by his wife's niece Otilie. Under these circumstances it becomes a serious question whether the present legal condition of affairs ought not to give place to a higher law—whether the marriage ought not to be one of heart to heart and not a mere outward form.

Before the question is fairly decided a new obstacle presents itself—a child comes, having claims on the united love of father and mother. The mother, keen-sighted and rigidly loyal to duty, gladly accepts this solution of the problem as sufficient; but the father, blind to everything except his own impulsive wishes, recognizes this obstacle as really no obstacle. To be sure, he is the flesh and blood parent of his child, as is also Charlotte; but in his heart he had embraced Otilie, and his wife in her heart had embraced the Captain. Edward declares such a union to be a moral adultery, and the offspring illegitimate in the highest sense.

Otilie will take no decisive steps. Here is one of those deep, magnetic natures, passive rather than active—one whose mysterious attraction is wondrously felt, and yet never to be explained. With Edward we too find her irresistible. We cannot blame him for loving what is so lovely. He has great regard and respect for his wife, but Otilie stirs the depths of his heart. With his wife his cup of happiness seemed full, but with Otilie his cup ran over; and this excess was almost essential to the impulsive, intemperate Edward. The Captain is a staid, reasonable man, always with an eye to the eternal fitness of things; and if, in a moment of passion, he went so far as to kiss Charlotte's hand, he recovered himself immediately and begged her forgiveness. Throughout the story he is ready to act as propriety demands, and it is not strange that Charlotte, with her great love of order and her rare domestic accomplishments, should have an affinity for so proper a man as the Captain.

There is a spirit of fate brooding over this novel that reminds us of the fate in the old Greek dramas. Neither party dares to take active responsibility. Even Edward, who is precipitately active, is willing that fate should decide for him. He enters the army, is always in the foremost ranks, always rushes upon the enemy as if he knew Otilie were beyond. He has continually in mind the thought of the glass bearing his initial and Otilie's which did not break when it was tossed recklessly in the air, and he believes the same fate will be quite as careful over their united destinies, let him risk what dangers he may. Otilie patiently waits her fate to be decided so soon as Charlotte and Edward shall have separated. Full of intense yearning and longing, of love which beareth all things and hopeth all things, every thought, every act, is for Edward.

In the plants, the trees, she sees only Edward's plants, Edward's trees. She tends the child because it is Edward's child. Love for Edward becomes her existence. As Otilie represents love, Charlotte represents a wise, judicious understanding. Deliberately she weighs the *pros* and *cons*, leaving her own heart entirely out of the balance. She waits, hoping that time and the thought of his boy will cool Edward's passion; that employment and perhaps a new lover will divert Otilie. As for the Captain, he can always wait for the fit time and place.

The fate which Edward trusted so implicitly does not desert him. Safe from the untold dangers of the war, he believes that fate has decided for him. He meets the Captain, tells him of his decision, overcomes the Captain's scruples as to public opinion, and, having arranged suitably for the maintenance of the Captain and Charlotte, starts the Captain for the execution of his plans. Here again fate steps in. Otilie with the child had gone to the farther shore of the pond; the boy asleep on the grass, Otilie sits beside him reading; Edward suddenly appears. With all her surprise and emotion, Otilie will make no promise to Edward until she hears the result of the Captain's interview with Charlotte. Full of agitation, she leaves Edward, goes to the boat; but alas! in her confusion she loses her foothold just as she is stepping into the boat. The child falls into the water and is drowned.

Fate seems now to have answered the question. So Charlotte thinks, so the Captain, as well as Edward. Then it is that Otilie with superhuman courage and fortitude declares that she will never marry Edward. Clearly she sees the sin in which she is entangled, and in the depths of her heart she will forgive herself only under condition of fullest renunciation. And Otilie remains inflexibly firm in her purpose. With this state of affairs, nothing remains for her but death. Love is her existence; deny her that and she must die. The poet could not do otherwise than follow the course of Nature. To Edward life is nothing without Otilie. Only death is desirable, for death alone restores Otilie to him. A gracious fate grants his desire.

Such is the phase in which Goethe has viewed one of the most vital questions of the present time. He has chosen no random characters for his *dramatis personæ*. All who are needed to discuss or weigh the important subject are brought together. Cool, calm, deliberate reason we see in the person of Charlotte. Passion is represented by Edward. Otilie is love, and the Captain public opinion. For, in discussing this question of the marriage relation, all of these have a voice in the matter. Passion is loud and demonstrative. It knows only its own desires. It will overthrow everything between itself and its object. Its own might

makes its right, and it acknowledges no law but its blind instincts. Reason too, as well as passion, has an interest in discussing this question. Nature has made the parents the guardians of the child, and reason doubts whether it may be right to leave the child to the protection of others, however suitable they may be; but, on the other hand, reason sees that where two are unequally yoked together there is discord which cannot have other than ill effects on the child. In this dilemma reason cannot decide, but appeals to a higher tribunal—to love; for love alone can solve the question—a love which is true to the highest and noblest, a love free from passion; and this love promptly decides upon self-renunciation. So when reason and passion and public opinion would err, love in the person of Otilie reveals the highest truth. She decides all. She alone is capable of seeing the truth—feeling it, perhaps we should say; for it is the heart, not the head, which makes the decision.

Whoever calls this novel of Goethe's immoral and lax in its principles must needs be more spotless than sanctity itself. With rigid sacrifice and renunciation, Goethe demands not only the sacredness of the marriage relation in outward form, but also that its inmost spirit should be inviolate. He requires that marriage should be no mere friendship brought about by propinquity or a harmony of tastes; he demands that the highest love, the utmost fidelity, the closest union, should be the bonds of marriage. If marriage has been established on any other basis, he gives to the unfortunate pair no alternative but the strictest loyalty to each other. If diversion is to be found, it is in useful employment and not in the arms or caresses of another.

It has been said of Shakespeare's plays that each is an organic whole, that every subordinate part has its peculiar fitness and adaptation to the entire play, as the leaf, the twig, and the roots do to the tree. So of this novel of Goethe's. Not simply by its fruits, as seen in the *denouement*, do we know it, but every minute part reveals the nature and character of the whole.

Almost at the outset the chemical affinities of metals and fluids become the subject of conversation. No better figure or illustration could be found to show the wonderful, secret workings of heart to heart and soul to soul than this affinity of matter for its own. Hence, magnetism and the mysteries of love play an important part throughout the book. The influence of Otilie is magnetic. She attracts, not by her brilliant intellect or rare abilities, but by her magnetism; therefore it is those of the opposite sex who are drawn to her. The Superior, Luciana, and Charlotte know nothing of those hidden qualities of Otilie's which attract the Assistant and the Architect as well as Edward. Edward on one occasion



thinks Otilie's conversation wonderful, and Charlotte coolly reminds him that Otilie had not said a word.

Not only does magnetic force play an important part in the book, but also that force which comes from human law and social organization. We find much said here in relation to order, harmony of arrangement, and taste. Landscape gardening is introduced, as also architecture; this, too, with no slight or indirect bearing on the whole. As the gardener, in subduing and compelling Nature to his own ends and purposes, must first consult her original tendencies, and govern all his plans by that; and as the architect cannot build according to his own wilfulness or caprice, but must subject himself to the eternal laws of beauty and order, so must man in his social relations look not merely to his own passions and desires, however lawful in and of themselves. He must conform to the social laws of Nature, must do no violence to the spirit of the times, but, on the contrary, come into a sacred harmony with it.

Like Shakespeare, Dante, and Homer, Goethe gives a portrait of his characters with a single stroke of the pen. Otilie's beautiful eyes, Charlotte's foot, Edward's deep, rich voice, are as significant as Homer's "white-armed Juno" or Shakespeare's "gentle Desdemona." It was absolutely essential that Otilie should have beautiful eyes. Reticent as she is, it was necessary that "the windows of the soul" should reveal the inner life. Love does not express itself in words. It has no voice. Passion is deep, intense, expressive. Hence, Edward's voice is deep and rich. Goethe was right in giving fate so active a part in this novel; for outside the human will, beyond human forethought, there seems at times a destiny, perverse or otherwise, that stands at the helm of affairs and gives direction, if not decision; and in no affairs does a destiny or blind fate seem to take more control than in matters of the heart.

Goethe is no cruel scientist dissecting human weakness merely to gratify his own or a public idle curiosity. He is a healing physician. Coolly and calmly he makes a diagnosis of the case, then prescribes, however severe, the needful remedy; and, as already hinted, the remedy in the case before us is useful activity. The old legend relating to the fall of man makes God pronounce labor as a curse upon the guilty pair. Goethe changes this curse into the greatest blessing, making it the healing balm for sin-sick souls. Thus renunciation, that sacrifice of self for the highest good of others, becomes that losing of life which shall find itself again; not a narrow, *individual* life, but a life which opens out into the broadest *personality*, a life which has become one with God.

MRS. C. K. SHERMAN.



*ION: A MONODY.*

## I.

Why, O ye willows and ye pastures bare,  
Why will ye thus your blooms so late delay,  
Wrap in chill weeds the sere and sullen day,  
And cheerless greet me wandering in despair?  
Tell me, ah, tell me! ye of old could tell—  
Whither my vanished Ion now doth fare—  
Say, have ye seen him lately pass this way,  
Ye who his wonted haunts did know full well?  
Heard ye his voice forth from the thicket swell,  
Where midst the drooping ferns he loved to stray?  
Caught ye no glimpses of my truant there?  
Tell me, oh, tell me, whither he hath flown—  
Beloved Ion flown, and left ye sad and lone,  
Whilst I through wood and field his loss bemoan.

## II.

Early through field and wood each Spring we sped,  
Young Ion leading o'er the reedy pass.  
How fleet his foot-steps and how sure his tread!  
His converse deep and weighty—where, alas!  
Like force of thought with subtlest beauty wed,  
The bee and bird and flower, the pile of grass,  
The lore of stars, the azure sky o'erhead,  
The eye's warm glance, the Fates of love and dread—  
All mirrored were in his prismatic glass.  
For endless Being's myriad-minded race  
Had in his thought their registry and place,  
Bright with intelligence, or drugged with sleep,  
Hid in dark cave, aloft on mountain steep,  
In seas immersed, ensouled in starry keep.

## III.

Now Echo answers lone from cliff and brake,  
Where we in springtime sauntering loved to go,  
Or to the mossy bank beyond the lake—  
On its green plushes oft ourselves did throw—  
There from the sparkling wave our thirst to slake,  
Dipped in the spring that bubbled up below  
Our hands for cups, and did with glee partake.  
Next to the Hermit's cell our way we make,  
Where sprightly talk doth hold the morning late.  
Departed now—ah, Hylas, too, is gone!  
Hylas, dear Ion's friend and mine—I all alone,  
Alone am left by nurelenting fate—  
Vanished my loved ones all—the good, the great:  
Why am I spared? why left disconsolate?

## IV.

Slow winds our Indian stream through meadows green,  
 By bending willows, tangled fen and brake,  
 Smooth field and farmstead doth its flow forsake :  
 'Twas in far woodpaths Ion, too, was seen,  
 But oftenest found at Walden's emerald lake  
 (The murmuring pines inverted in its sheen) ;  
 There in his skiff he rippling rhymes did make,  
 Its answering shore echoing the verse between.  
 Full-voiced the meaning of the wizard song,  
 For wood and wave and shore with kindred will,  
 Strophe, antistrophe, in turn prolong : —  
 Now wave and shore and wood are mute and still,  
 Ion, melodious bard, hath dropt his quill,  
 His harp is silent and his voice is still.

## V.

Blameless was Ion, beautiful to see,  
 With native genius, with rich gifts endowed ;  
 He might of his descent be nobly proud,  
 Yet meekly tempered was, spake modestly,  
 Nor sought the plaudits of the noisy crowd,  
 When duty called him in the thick to be.  
 His life flowed calmly clear, not hoarse nor loud ;  
 He wearied not of immortality,  
 Nor, like Tithonus, begged a time-spun shroud,  
 But life-long drank at fountains of pure truth,  
 The seer unsated of eternal youth.  
 'Tis not for Ion's sake these tears I shed,  
 'Tis for the Age he nursed, his genius fed—  
 Ion immortal is ; he is not dead.

## VI.

Did e'en the Ionian bard, Mæondes  
 (Blind minstrel, wandering out of Asia's night,  
 The Iliad of Troy's loves and rivalries  
 In strains forever tuneful to recite),  
 His raptured listeners the more delight ?  
 Nor dropt learned Plato, 'neath his olive-trees,  
 More star-bright wisdom in the world's full sight,  
 Well garnered in familiar colloquies,  
 Than did our harvester in fields of light ;  
 Nor spoke more charmingly young Charmides  
 Than our glad rhapsodist in his far flight  
 Across the continents, both new and old ;  
 His tale to studious thousands thus he told  
 In summer's solstice and midwinter's cold

## VII.

Shall from the shades another Orpheus rise,  
Sweeping with venturous hand the vocal string ;  
Kindle glad raptures, visions of surprise,  
And wake to ecstacy each slumbrous thing ;  
Flash life and thought anew in wondering eyes,  
As when our seer, transcendent, sweet, and wise,  
World-wide his native melodies did sing,  
Flushed with fair hopes and ancient memories ?  
Ah, no ! his matchless lyre must silent lie.  
None hath the vanished minstrel's wondrous skill  
To touch that instrument with art and will.  
With him winged Poesy doth droop and die,  
While our dull age, left voiceless, with sad eye  
Follows his flight to groves of song on high.

## VIII.

Come, then, Mncmosyne, and on me wait,  
As if for Ion's harp thou gav'st thine own !  
Recall the memories of Man's ancient state,  
Ere to this low orb had his form dropt down,  
Clothed in the ceremonies of his chosen fate ;  
Oblivious here of heavenly glories flown,  
Lapsed from the high, the fair, the blest estate,  
Unknowing these, and by himself unknown :  
Lo ! Ion, unfallen from his lordly prime,  
Paused in his passing flight, and, giving ear  
To heedless sojourners in weary time,  
Sang his full song of hope and lofty cheer ;  
Aroused them from dull sleep, from grisly fear,  
And toward the stars their faces did uprear.

## IX.

Why didst thou haste away, ere yet the green  
Enamelled meadow, the sequestered dell,  
The blossoming orchard, leafy grove, were seen  
In the sweet season thou hadst sung so well ?  
Why cast this shadow o'er the vernal scene ?  
No more its rustic charms of thee may tell,  
And so content us with their simple mien ;  
Was it that memory's unrelinquished spell  
(Ere men had stumbled here amid the tombs)  
Revived for thee that Spring's perennial blooms,  
Those cloud-capped alcoves where we once did dwell ?  
Translated wast thou in some rapturous dream ?  
Our once familiar faces strange must seem  
Whilst from thine own celestial smiles did stream

## X.

I tread the marble leading to his door  
 (Allowed the freedom of a chosen friend),  
 He greets me not as was his wont before,  
 The Fates within frown on me as of yore :  
 Could ye not once your offices suspend ?  
 Had Atropos her severing shears forbore,  
 Or Clotho stooped the Sundered thread to mend !  
 Yet why dear Ion's destiny deplore ?  
 What more had envious Time himself to give ?  
 His fame had reached the ocean's farthest shore.  
 Why prisoned here should Ion longer live ?  
 The questioning Sphinx declared him void of blame,  
 For wiser answer none could ever frame ;  
 Beyond all time survives his mighty name.

## XI.

Now pillowed near loved Hylas' lowly bed,  
 Beneath our aged oaks and sighing pines,  
 Pale Ion rests awhile his laurelled head.  
 (How sweet his slumber as he there reclines !)  
 Why weep for Ion here ? He is not dead ;  
 Naught of him Personal that mound confines ;  
 The hues ethereal of the morning red  
 This clod embraces never, nor enshrines.  
 Away the mourning multitude hath sped,  
 And round us closes fast the gathering night ;  
 As from the drowsy dell the sun declines,  
 Ion hath vanished from our clouded sight.  
 But on the morrow, with the budding May,  
 Afield goes Ion, at first flush of day,  
 Across the pastures on his dewy way.

A. BRONSON ALCOTT.

CONCORD, May, 1882.

*THE ATOM AND THE VOID.—A SPHINX-RIDDLE FOR MATERIALISM.*

[We copy the following passage from an address of Rev. Dr. R. A. Holland before the alumni of the St. Louis High School—June, 1878—the theme being “The Spirit of our Time,” or, as the Germans call it, the “Zeit-Geist.”—Ed.]

Then came *Œdipus* himself, our own *Zeit-Geist*, and, seizing the Sphinx by the ear, jerked her proud head to one side and hallooed boldly, “No airs with me. I have read thy riddle. The universe is dust—nothing but dust. Dust gives to matter all the flexibility it needs. The smaller and

more numerous the joints, the greater the capability of contortions; and, if its joints are almost points and numberless, Matter can writhe and wriggle into any shape of solid, liquid, or gas—can even take its tail into its mouth and prove itself to be without beginning or end. Besides, all bodies are resolvable into dust; feldspar, fungus, centipede, herring, snipe, bear-fat, and the brain of Goethe—all are resolvent into dust. Dust is as spry as Puck; dust is as familiar as the sight of a school-boy's hand and face; and do not familiarity and serviceableness constitute the value of a theory? Howbeit, I must admit that the dust of the universe is not common dust. To do its work it has to be too fine for vision. It must be imperceptible in order to explain perception. True imperceptibility in the abstract is mysterious; but the mystery in this case is too small for consideration—only an atom, nearly nothing." Whereupon the Zeit-Geist crops the ear of the Sphinx and lets it go.

But the Zeit-Geist has forgotten that his little mysteries, his nearly nothings, added together make up the big mystery, or the universe. Though he has ground the worlds to powder, the powder remains in his mortar without the loss of a grain. The weight of the problem is exactly the same. This very fine dust—what is it? What moulds it into the wondrous form of earth and sea and air? Does it originate its own motion? How? By simple attraction? Attraction alone would draw the universe into a solid impenetrable mass without possibility of motion. By simple repulsion? Repulsion alone would scatter the universe out of all possibility of form. Form implies bounds, and bounds imply a binding force. The diffusest gas must have some continuity to distinguish it as a gas. But simple repulsion would destroy all continuity, leaving not closeness enough for the encounters of a chaos. Naught could exist but independent and alien atoms. Nay, the atoms themselves could not exist, for they must exist in space and have their limit or bound which absolute repulsion would explode at once, hurling their contents to uttermost nowhere.

Moreover, if these two contradictory forces should inhere in the atom and yet remain equal and constant, the universe would have the same density throughout and forever—be everywhere solid, everywhere liquid, or everywhere gaseous, and not multiform and mobile as it now is.

Hence every atom must have power to attract, power to repel, and a choice which of these powers to use, and in what degree to use it, so as to make now the granite crag, now the mosses that grow on its clefts, and now the cascade that breaks against its midway ledges to a downward breeze of mist.

Cunning atoms! they explain the mystery of the universe by easy

condensation. They resemble the Norse ship *Skidbladner*, which could be folded to fit in a side-pocket or spread large enough to carry all the gods at once, raising whatever wind it needed by the mere set of its sails.

"Out and open, little atom," says the *Zeit-Geist*, with a pat of his hand and a puff. "Out and open, big, bigger, biggest; a sail for heat, a sail for light, a sail for electricity; three sails for life, and now the jib, fore, main, mizzen, and spanker all a-flying, with the gods themselves at the ropes for a Shakespeare's '*Tempest*' or the rhyme of the '*Ancient Mariner*.'"

And yet the ship does not go, because it has no sea. Were the atoms in contact, they would, as we have seen, no longer be atoms, but a solid mass incapable of motion—dry ground everywhere. But if they are apart they have spaces between them, and these spaces are voids, and voids are nothings. Now, nothings cannot transmit, cannot undulate, have points of the compass or degrees of distance. It was to fill up such an abyss of nothing between the sun and the earth that the *Zeit-Geist* poured into it a sea of billowing ether, for heat and light to drift across. But the ether turns out to be no sea, for it, too, is composed of atoms, separated by voids. And these voids need each to be filled with ether as much as did the great void between the earth and the sun; and should other seas of ether be poured into them, this ether would likewise prove to be atoms separated by voids, or nothings. Since, then, the least separative nothing is as large as the largest—nothing divided by ninety-five million miles being no less than nothing multiplied by the same amount—the nearest atoms are as wide apart as worlds, and the magic ship, with canvas and crew to circumnavigate the universe, lies high and dry aground in its own atomic insulation, unable to budge. Oh, befuddled *Zeit-Geist*, to rig a ship to sail without a sea!

"Not so quick," replies the *Zeit-Geist* with some thickness of tongue. "The fault is not in the atom, but in the void; atoms are facts, but voids are metaphysical. I hate metaphysics. Give me facts—facts like atoms which a man can take hold of and verify. Independent of the problem of creation, facts or things are the only truths. What one sees, hears, tastes, smells, handles—that alone is credible. Ideas are abstractions, spooks of a mental dark séance whose tin horns cannot impose on inductive philosophers like myself and Comte and Mill and Macaulay and Buckle and Thomas Gradgrind. Gradgrind—you remember him? A man of cosmic intellect and my most intimate friend. I shall never forget with what oratorical force he used to declare, '*Facts alone are wanted in life. Plant nothing else and root out everything else. You can only form the minds*'"

of reasoning animals upon facts. Nothing else will ever be of any service to them. . . . Stick to facts, sir.' "

But, if a man stick to facts, how shall he advance in knowledge? Immediate observation is the only sort of knowing that sticks to facts. Reflection leaves them at once and strays off into ideas. The less the thought, the tighter the adhesion, and hence it were stickiest not to think at all. The child knows the flower in this way better than the botanist; the coon-hunting negro feels the sweet influences of the Pleiades more distinctly than the Smithsonian astronomer; and a fool, who can only see and remember, has the absolute genius of tar and feathers. For these simple minds are unbewitched by Science, who makes her living by dissolving facts into vaporous abstractions. Moreover, the mind that would stick to facts must never talk. As soon as its tongue begins to wag, that mind breaks loose and runs away. Language will lie.

Describe, O Zeit-Geist! in glutinous words, if possible, the "three black crows which sat on a tree," as thou art wont to sing. They were "three"; but three is not a fact; nobody ever saw three; three applies to any other crows as well as to those that sat on a tree; three is an abstraction. They were "black"; but black is not a fact; no such thing exists; it is a metaphysical cheat which identifies my lady's *moire-antique* with yon charcoal-vender's cheek. They were "crows"; but many crows are dead and many yet unborn; among such as live, some are jackdaws, some are rooks, and some are known by their love of carrion, yet all are crows. Which were the three that sat on a tree? Certainly they were not all—the dead, the unborn, the living—jackdaws, rooks, and lovers of carrion. What is crow—pure crow? Nobody knows but a repentant politician, and he only by eating the words he has spoken. In the effort to describe his three black crows, the Zeit-Geist gets utterly bewildered. They vanish into birds, the birds into animals, the animals into organisms, the organisms into things, the things into blank being, which, without some other characteristic, is indistinguishable from nothing. If he tries to specialize them with properties, the properties lead him the same wild chase after phantoms that melt at last into nothing. Beaks, claws, feathers, are no more real than three and black and crow. The beaks, for example, are horn; horn is a compound of phosphate of lime and albumen; phosphate of lime is the combination of a certain acid with a certain base; acid is a substance that, under certain conditions, combines with bases, and bases are elements that, under conditions, combine with acids; but elements, substances, conditions, are metaphysics—the worst kind—what the Zeit-Geist calls "shadows of non-entity."

Still our great sticker to facts does not despair. His crows may be torn

to pieces by words which divide them into parts, elements, classes, but he insists that they do not exist as divisible compounds or anatomies. They are a relation of things rather than the things themselves. What, then, are these things of which they are relations but themselves the relations of other things which are also relations? And what at last do all these relations relate to? To nothing? But a relation that relates to nothing were no relation. And is thy fact, O giddy Zeit-Geist! this one mesh of a net which unweaves the universe and yet has not a single strand? Thinkest thou to catch crows and hold them in so loose a snare? Lift up its pouch and look. No crows are there. Instead of the jet gloss of plumage, with purple-blue reflections, thou seest transient hidings of the sun; what seemed the crooked feet are hills and valleys with their strength of forests and fruitful fields; and that semblance of wings was but a mock of the wind whose rush thou feelest between thy fingers in grasping where the phantoms last appeared.

When old Thor strove in Yotun-land to lift a cat which proved to be the Midgard serpent that coils around the world, and to drain at one swill a horn whose end lay open in the sea, the gods who heard of it laughed a laugh of thunder, and swore he was drunk. What, then, shall we think of thee and the three black crows flown through the meshes of thy strandless net of unrelenting relativities? O too confident Zeit-Geist! Would not a swallow more of Pierian settle thy stomach and unkink thy brain? Might not one deep-drawn thought disclose to thee that a totality of relations which relates to nothing else must relate to itself; that self-relation differs from the relation of one thing to another by its independence amid dependencies, and its permanence under changes; that such a relation, at once both active and passive, both means and ends, both subject and object, exists only in mind which knows itself, in will which determines itself, in personality which throughout the passing phases of knowledge and volition abides, yesterday, to-day, and forever, the same; and that this all-enfolding, all-upholding personality explains the universe in whole and every part infinitely better than thy very fine dust?

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"THE DIAL" AND CORRIGENDA.

The following corrections have been received since the article on "The Dial" was printed. The extracts made from "The White Lotus of the Good Law" were by Miss E. P. Peabody, and translated from Burnouf. Mr. C. P. Cranch (whose father was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court) spent only one winter in Louisville, supplying the pulpit of Rev. J. F. Clarke and editing "The Western Messenger." At this time the Emerson caricatures were made; but those on "The Dial" came later. Mr. Cranch says: "I don't remember that Clarke made any drawings, but he sometimes suggested



them. I think it was his idea, first, that of illustrating some of the quaint sentences of Emerson. It should be stated, too, that these and subsequent sketches were not intended as anything more than humorous attempts to put into a literal form on paper some of Emerson's quaint sentences. There was no one else I tried my hand on at that time, and the first things I did in that way were really for the private amusement of Clarke and myself and a few other Emersonians; and there was never any intention that they should be known to the public. I always took pains to repudiate any Philistine idea that anything like ridicule was here attempted." Mr. Clarke's statement is quite in agreement with this. Mr. Cranch adds: "It ought to be stated that, though I preached several years in various parts of the country, I was never ordained or settled as a parish minister; and that, though I have given a good deal of time to literary work, I have endeavored to keep mainly to my profession as a painter." He is about to publish a volume of his later and riper poems, which may appear in the course of the year.

Mr. Curtis claims that there was nothing of romance in his paper in the "Homes of American Authors," and that every incident mentioned was an actual occurrence. He had letters from Emerson and Hawthorne before he wrote his paper, to enable him to verify certain details. Mr. Curtis seems to have been misled, however, in regard to some of the incidents he relates. W. H. Channing was ordained in Cincinnati, May 10, 1839, and was not there much before that time. W. B. Greene entered the Baptist Seminary at Newton, Mass. Stearns Wheeler, as Mr. Lowell informs me, was the companion of Thoreau in a first experiment in camping-out on the borders of Lincoln pond. This was during their senior year in college, and the scene of the experiment was but a few miles from Walden pond.

In regard to his own contributions to "The Dial," Mr. Lowell writes me as follows: "I would gladly help you if I could, but have no memoranda which would help me. I think you have noted all my contributions to 'The Dial.' After forty-five years one has forgotten much, and wishes he had never had so much to forget! Till you reminded me of it I had forgotten that I had written for 'The Dial' at all. The teeth of memory loosen and drop out like those of the jaws."

G. W. C.

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## BOOK NOTICES.

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LA REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE LA FRANCE ET DE L'ÉTRANGER. Paraissant tous les mois ; dirigée par TH. RIROT.

JANUARY, 1880:

The January number of "La Revue Philosophique" for 1880 contains the following articles:

"The Sense of Color; its Origin and Development," by A. Espinas.

"The sense of color is inspired in birds and insects through their pursuit of flowers,

and from them man has inherited his instinct for color, and in this way the corresponding arts have been produced." The author continues to explain color in the animal and vegetable kingdom and its effect on men and animals, and the reason for their preference for certain hues.

"Contemporary Philosophers—M. Vacherot," by G. Séailles.

The author praises a work by M. Vacherot, regarding it as not only interesting as the history of a free mind, but as part of the logical development of French philosophy in the nineteenth century. "Science," says M. Vacherot, "is reality, and the study of metaphysics is the explanation of reality; the first controls the second, and the second completes the first."

"The Problems of Education," by Emile Boirac.

Notes and Documents:

"Notes on the History of my Parrot in its Relation to the Nature of Language," by Dr. Samuel Wilks, a member of the Royal Society of London. Extract from the "Journal of Medical Science" (Eng.).

According to Dr. Wilks, there is no difference between the vocal apparatus of animals and that of men; the power of language comes from the cerebral organization.

Books examined are:

"The Data of Ethics," by Herbert Spencer. "The Idea of Right in Germany, England, and France," by A. Fouillée. "Error," by V. Brochard. "Monads and Imagination as a Principle of Development of the World," by Froschammer (Fr.). "Principles of the Algebra of Logic, with Examples," by Macfarlane (Eng.).

FEBRUARY, 1880:

"La Revue Philosophique" for February, 1880, contains:

"Sleep and Dreams—III. Their Relation to the Theory of Memory," by J. Delboëuf.

"The Sense of Color; its Origin and Development," by A. Espinas (concluded).

"Contemporary Philosophers—M. Vacherot" (concluded).

Books examined are:

"Metaphysics; its Nature and Laws in its Relations with Religion and Science, to serve as an Introduction to the Metaphysics of Aristotle," by Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire.

Bibliographical Notices.

MARCH, 1880:

"La Revue Philosophique" for March, 1880, contains:

"The Law of Similarity in the Association of Ideas," by V. Brochard. "Two perfectly similar ideas," says the author, "would be only one idea." He compares the mind to a musical instrument in which the keys are in close relation to each other, and explains the degree of similarity of one idea with another.

"The Masters of Kant—III. Kant and J. J. Rousseau," by D. Nolen. M. Nolen compares Kant and Rousseau, who see themselves in nature. Their philosophical ideas and temperaments are studied in their points of contrast in this interesting article.

"Thales and what he has borrowed from Egypt," by P. Tannery. The author gives the progress of philosophy in Thales, and notes what is original and what has been borrowed from Egypt.

Notes and Documents:

"Memory and the Phonograph," by Guyau.

"The Somnambulism of Socrates," by Dr. P. Despina. The author regards the somnambulism of Socrates as a cataleptic state, and not madness or ecstasy.

Books examined are :

"The Evolution of Morality," by Staniland Wake (Eng.). "Scientific Philosophy," by Girard. "Contemporary German Psychology," by Th. Ribot. "Thoughts, Maxims, and Fragments," by Schopenhauer.

Review of "The Journal of Speculative Philosophy." "Mind," October, 1879; January, 1880.

APRIL, 1880 :

"La Revue Philosophique" for April, 1880, contains : "Synthetic Views on Sociology," by A. Fouillée.

"Sociology," according to this author, "springs from a study which is in a great measure mythical or poetical, and, besides moral and social, the new sociology has metaphysical consequences." The subject is considered minutely under many heads.

"The Development of the Moral Sense in the Child," by B. Perez.

At the age of three or four a child forms regular habits, which are not moral because he has no consciousness of them, and at seven months it is only through the association of ideas that he learns obedience. The author continues his subject by showing the development of the moral sense, external influences, and the effect of voluntary observation in the child.

"Sleep and Dreams," by J. Delbœuf (concluded).

Notes and Documents :

"On the Influence of Movements on the Sensations," by Ch. Richet.

"On the Impossibility of obtaining Knowledge of Geometry through a Simple Condensation of the Results of Experience," by J. Boussinesq.

Books examined are :

"Lectures and Essays," by W. K. Clifford (Eng.); "History of Moral Ideas in Antiquity," by J. Denis, 2d ed. (Fr.); "Superstition in Science," by W. Wundt, taken from "Unsere Zeit." An article by Wundt, says his critic, is always welcomed by the philosophical world, as one is sure to find erudition united to science and good sense.

MAY, 1880 :

"La Revue Philosophique" for May, 1880, contains : "Is the Actual Infinite contradictory?" An answer to M. Renouvier, by H. Lotze.

Wherein M. Renouvier and Lotze differ, according to the latter, is that the former believes the existence of the infinite to be impossible, because we can reach it only by the synthesis of its elements; Lotze believes that, if there is an infinite, it cannot, according to its nature, be exhausted by the addition of its finished parts, and that when the terms of a series are of such a nature that one cannot conceive of them except as succeeding each other, it is impossible for the series to form a finished whole, but it does not prove that a succession is impossible because it is not finished.

"Visual Forms and Aesthetic Pleasure," by J. Sully.

The author regards it as a truth, furnished by experience and deduced from general laws, that the movement of every organ is accompanied by a sensation of pleasure, which he analyzes, and various kinds of movement.

"Memory as a Biological Fact," by Th. Ribot.

M. Ribot offers a scientific analysis of memory, and shows how much it is acquired and how much it is inherited.

Notes and Documents :

"Descartes as a Stoic," by V. Brochard.

Books examined are:

"Physiology of Grief," by Mantegazza (Ital.); "More Light — Kant and Schopenhauer," by Last (Ger.).

Bibliographical Notices.

JUNE, 1880:

"La Revue Philosophique" for June, 1880, contains: "Considerations of Chemical Philosophy," by F—— and R——; "Sleep and Dreams" (concluded), by Delbœuf.

"A Critique on Kant and Religion," D. Nolen.

"Kant distinguishes two forms of sovereign good—that which is met only in God, and that which the human will seeks to realize as its supreme ideal and consists in the harmonious development of virtue and happiness."

Notes and Discussions:

"Is the Actual Infinite contradictory?" Answer to M. H. Lotze, by Ch. Renouvier.

Renouvier chiefly repeats his arguments as misunderstood by M. Lotze, as he believes.

Books examined are:

"The Religion of the Future," by T. Mamiani; "Illusory Movements," by Dr. Hoppe; "On the Physiology of Writing," by C. Vogt.

Bibliographical Notices.

JULY, 1880:

The July number of "La Revue Philosophique" for 1880 contains: "Introduction to the Study of Natural Law," by E. Beaussire.

The hypothesis of a state of nature previous to the social state has served as a point of departure for the science of natural law, but has no historic or philosophic foundation, and gives an idea of anarchy. Nature has its real place, and the only mistake is in separating it from the social state. The writer considers natural law in its position among sciences, and gives a detailed account of the history of justice.

"The Theory of Wundt's Knowledge," by H. Lachelier.

Wundt is the Professor Ordinary of Philosophy at Leipzig, and is much occupied in physiological psychology. Lachelier, in this article, makes a scientific study of his principles and his theory of knowledge. "Wundt," he says, "praises Schopenhauer for having taken for a point of departure in his philosophy the logical principle of Reason which dominates all human knowledge.

"Personality," by F. Paulhan.

This subject is considered from the standpoint of a spiritualist, and the views of various writers are compared.

Notes and Discussions:

"Historical and Geographical Determinism," by E. Lavisse.

Books examined are:

"Moral Solidarity," by H. Marion; "The Origin of Language," by Zaborowski (Fr.); "The Characteristics of the Philosophy of the Present in Germany," by Benno Erdmann (Germ.); "The Science of Education," by P. Siciliani (Ital.).

AUGUST, 1880.

"La Revue Philosophique" for August, 1880, contains: "Physiological Localizations, from the Subjective and Critical Point of View," by A. Debon.

This article is a discussion on the relation between the mind and physical sensations.

"Belief and Desire, the Possibility of their Measurement," by G. Tarde.

The author bases his arguments on the question whether psychological quantities can be measured.

"General Disorders of Memory," by Th. Ribot.

This subject is considered as to the peculiarities of disease, and many cases are given as examples.

Books examined are :

"Studies on the History of German Esthetics," since Kant, by Neudecker (Germ.); "On the Association of Ideas," by W. James (Eng.).

Intelligent criticisms on the articles in "The Journal of Speculative Philosophy," "Mind," conclude this number.

SEPTEMBER, 1880.

"La Revue Philosophique" for September, 1880, contains: "The Theory of the Comical in German Esthetics," by Ch. Bernard.

Very little attention has been given this subject by philosophers until Meier, Eberhard, Mendelsohn, and Sulzer, who have described it in every form with *finesse* and sagacity. "The risible," says Mendelsohn, "is a contrast of perfections and imperfections." The science is making progress, but is as yet in the state of mere assertions not grouped or combined. Lessing has made the boldest strides in his definition, where he establishes a point of approach between the risible and ugly; he admits ugliness in art as a necessity to produce mixed sensations, the terrible and risible. The author specifies the various elements of the comical, and what is lacking in the conception of it by numerous writers.

"Belief and Desire, the Possibility of their Measurement," by G. Tarde, is concluded.

Notes and Documents :

"The Fusion of Similar Sensations," by A. Binet.

The author gives a great variety of mental and physical sensations in examples for comparison.

"Observations on Animal Psychology," by D. Delaunay.

The author does not ascribe moral qualities to dogs, but discovers in them attention and impressions; a young dog is more governed by them than an old one which has acquired experience and intellectual qualities transmitted by inheritance. His observation on animals and their peculiarities are generally just.

Books examined are :

"Darwinism, the Sign of the Present Time," by Wigand (Fr.); "Antitheistic Theories," Robert Flint; "Invention in the Arts, in Sciences, and the Practice of Virtue," E. Joyau.

OCTOBER, 1880.

"La Revue Philosophique" for October, 1880, contains: "Somnambulism questioned," by Ch. Richet.

There is a great difference between somnambulists, but the state of somnambulism is the same with all; it can be characterized in one word—automatism. The writer refers the reader to the words of Hamlet as an analysis of somnambulism.

"An English Idealist in the Eighteenth Century, Arthur Collier," by G. Lyon.

This article comprises a personal sketch and a philosophical review of Collier as an idealist, scientist, and a man of piety.

"The Pessimism of Leopardi," by Krantz.

The fixed idea which prevails in pessimist systems gives them a deceptive appearance of strength and simplicity, according to this author, who contends that pessimism is some improvement on optimism, which says all is for the best, not that all is well; pes-

simism is more radical. The poet, being more accessible than a philosopher like Schopenhauer, enables one to see the weak side of this subject.

Varieties :

"The New Programme of Philosophy," by H. Marion.

This programme has been revised, and the most important improvement is found in the following note: The order adopted in this programme should not restrain the liberty of the professor, provided the questions pointed out are all treated, which means that any professor, master of his material and sure of himself, can manage his course as seems most logical to him.

Books examined are :

"The Psychological Doctrine of Association," by Luigi Ferri (Fr.); "Psychology of Sensibility in its History and Foundation," by Nicolas Grote; "Studies on the Manuscript of Pierre de Fermat," by C. Henry.

NOVEMBER, 1880 :

"La Revue Philosophique" for November, 1880, contains: "Political Institutions—Preliminaries," by Herbert Spencer; "Somnambulism questioned," by Ch. Richet (concluded); "Partial Disorders of the Memory," by Th. Ribot; and "Platonic Education," by P. Tannery.

In the latter article the author essays to show the importance to science of the ideas of Plato and what influence he has exerted upon the mathematical movement of his century, and among the beliefs of Plato as to education is the one of great interest today, that girls should receive the same education as boys, only that they should be educated apart.

Books examined are :

"Moral Certainty," by Ollé-Laprune; "History of Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century," by Ferraz (Fr.).

DECEMBER, 1880 :

"La Revue Philosophique" for December, 1880, contains: "The Method and Universal Mathematics of Descartes," by L. Liard. "Descartes's doctrines," says the writer, "have been the soul of all the sciences in the seventeenth century, and have remained in part the soul of contemporary sciences." The discussion of his method is complete and interesting.

"Madness in the Child," by G. Compayré.

Many samples of moral as well as mental insanity are herein given, and the ages at which it develops and the causes.

"Political Organization in general," by Herbert Spencer.

Notes and Discussions :

"On the Fusion of Similar Sensations," by J. Delbœuf.

Books examined :

"From Magdeburg to Königsberg." An interesting sketch of Karl Rosenkranz by the author prefaces this article.

Bibliographical Notices :

"On Intuition in Discoveries and Inventions," by Dr. Netter; A. Poey on "M. Littré, and A. Comté"; Coste on "God and the Soul," an Essay on Experimental Idealism; "Elements of Philosophy," by Th. Bernard (Fr.); "Pictures and Resemblances in Philosophy," by R. Eucken; "The Order of Succession in Platonic Dialogues," by Fruhmüller; "Lessing's Nathan, a Brochure," by Bloch (Germ.); "Moral Doctrines in Relation to Reality," by Sergi. "Psychological Evolution," E. J. Varona (Ital.).

VIRGINIA CHAMPLIN.

I. GERMAN PHILOSOPHICAL CLASSICS FOR ENGLISH READERS AND STUDENTS.<sup>1</sup>

Four volumes of this series have already appeared, and each one of them is an important contribution to philosophic literature. Before proceeding to examine the merits of these works separately, a few words ought to be said concerning the general purpose of the series. It is characteristic of Americans to desire to gather to themselves and assimilate results from every quarter and of all descriptions. But it has been questioned if their avidity would not meet with a serious check when they should be brought face to face with the details of German metaphysics. Judging from the present series, this does not appear to have been the case. It indicates that the promoters of the undertaking believe that the time has come to have these very details made accessible to the general reading public. The series comes at a period when scientific activity is at its height, and when very few people are confident enough even to pretend that they know what philosophy is. In the presence of these facts, also, its projectors betray no misgivings as to the requirement of the public for such a labor, and we have to inquire whether they have reckoned wisely in this matter.

We shall be helped in our estimate by reference to the prospectus, in which the editor of the series has defined its scope and intention. It is there stated that the aim of each volume "will be to furnish a clear and attractive statement of the special substance and purport of the original author's argument, to interpret and elucidate the same by reference to the historic and acknowledged results of philosophic inquiry, to give an independent estimate of merits and deficiencies, and especially to show, as occasion may require, in what way German thought contains the natural complement, or the much-needed corrective, of British speculation."

The general object of the series, as a whole, is "to render reasonably accessible to the intelligent English reader a knowledge of German philosophic thought in its leading outlines, and at the same time to furnish the special student with a valuable introduction and guide to more comprehensive studies in the same direction."

We find the justification for a work of this nature in several important considerations, one or two of which only can be alluded to here. At all times the distinctively human needs remain the same, and they are always pressing. Certain questions face every man more or less persistently, and he cannot wait for future generations to pass a verdict upon them. If he consents to live at all he must define his own relation to them. Wisdom plainly demands that he shall bring to his aid the best light that has yet been shed upon these subjects; and the Germans have surely said much about them that no man can afford to pass by slightly.

Philosophy is valuable, however, only as it is, in a way, the product of each man's own thought and life activity. Moreover, these forms of activity are constantly unfolding themselves. An adequate philosophy will recognize both the new and old. In its form of statement emphasis will be laid upon different points in different periods. Hence the need of a continual restatement of the old problems, and of their solution, and the need among different peoples of such a treatment of these problems as shall meet their own particular requirements. In other words, they must have a philosophy of their own, in the sense of dealing, from their own point of view and in an original manner, with the universal problems of philosophy.

But we fail utterly to comprehend the situation if we suppose that any age can build its philosophy entirely anew. The old problems remain, and every step of thought

<sup>1</sup> Published by Messrs. S. C. Griggs & Co., Chicago.

progress is conditioned upon what has already been done. Those who deprecate the detailed study of German philosophy lose sight of this fact. They would virtually ignore one of the most important phases of thought that the world has known. Of course this omission is impossible. The essential results of German thinking on this subject must become a part of the intellectual fibre of all who deal with these questions before any noteworthy progress in philosophy can be made. To this end the series under consideration looks, and it will be, when completed, the most important contribution that has yet been made toward its realization.

Mention should be made of the editorship of the series. Great credit is certainly due to Prof. Morris for having undertaken so large a task, and he is to be especially congratulated upon having secured the co-operation of so many eminent philosophical writers. The editor has himself contributed one volume already, and it is to be hoped that others will follow from his pen.

H. KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON. By GEORGE S. MORRIS, Ph. D., Professor of Philosophy in Michigan University.

All students of Kant are aware of the conflicting lines of thought which meet in the first of his "Critiques." The old philosophical method, which his work did so much to supersede, was the one in which Kant grew up, and he did not wholly rid himself of its preconceptions. His work was essentially a "voyage of discovery," and for this reason, "as the inquiry proceeds, words and phrases acquire, and have attached to them, new meanings." In the midst of these difficulties, to set forth Kant's meaning in a satisfactory manner requires skilful treatment. The old metaphysical point of view, that occupied by Kant at the beginning of his philosophical endeavors, must be made clear, together with the influence exercised by these early opinions on his subsequent thought. We want an exposition, moreover, of Kant's own results, precisely as he stated them, and, in connection with this, an explanation of what is implied in his premises when freed from extraneous conceptions, or, in other words, of the logical outcome of his system, when rigorously developed according to its essential spirit. All this is admirably done in the work before us. The writer's exposition of Kant's thought is clear and vigorous, and he brings to his aid an intimate acquaintance with the later phases of the movement which Kant originated.

The introduction contains a brief examination of the theory of knowledge, which Kant so energetically attacked. According to this view, knowledge is a mechanical process. Subject and object are opposed to, and outside of, each other; and are related after the manner of two physical objects. To explain how the object comes to be taken up into the opposed subject and known is more than any philosopher of mechanism or sensationalism has been able satisfactorily to do.

At each stage of the progress of the work, Kant's repeated limitations of the application of his own argument are considered, and the arbitrariness of these limitations is pointed out. A good example of this treatment is to be found in the chapter on "The Non-contingent Form of Sense." After proving to his own satisfaction the ideal nature of space and time, Kant goes on to caution the reader against the inference that space and time are therefore real in the nonmenal sense. His proof has been that they are not entities, things apart from the mind, but forms of human consciousness. He now declares that they are "exclusively subjective," that "they correspond to nothing which is contained in the real nature, whether of the absolute subject or of the absolute object." They have no "absolute objective validity." This assertion Prof. Morris shows to be



purely dogmatic, and points out that Kant is led to it by having here adopted, as his conception of the absolutely real, the conception of "thing," or "substance," in its mechanical meaning. Of course, if "the notion of dead, inert, opaque substance is the synonym of absolute reality," space and time as forms of the mind cannot partake of absolute reality. But the "Critique" again and again shows that this "conception of substance or thing is relative and not absolute." And Prof. Morris concludes that, if, as Kant demonstrates, "the conception of substance, or 'subsistence,' is applicable only to phenomenal—not to absolute—existence, and if the relation of 'inherence' is a purely phenomenal relation, then the proof that space and time neither fall under this conception nor exhibit the mentioned relation is surely no proof that they, too, are purely phenomenal!"

An important chapter is that on "The Limit of Science." In this the vexed questions of the nature of *phenomena* and *noumena*, and of the "thing-in-itself," are discussed. Upon these points, as every one knows, Kant himself is neither clear nor consistent. The various positions occupied by him from time to time are reviewed, with the conclusion that his confused treatment only serves to teach again "the untenableness of all ontological theories, which are colored by materialism," and "the truth of philosophy's universal doctrine concerning the exclusive primacy of spirit in the world of absolute reality." Kant's cardinal error at this point consists, according to the author, in making the distinction between phenomena and noumena, or things-in-themselves, rest on a distinction *without* our knowledge, or possible experience. A more complete philosophy sees that this distinction is one made *within* consciousness, and resting in the very nature of the knowing process.

Prof. Morris does not agree with Kant as to the "futility of metaphysics," provided the term metaphysics be taken in a rational sense. In speaking of the demonstrability of God's existence he says: "'Demonstrable' means 'capable of being shown,' or 'immediately pointed out'; and, in the way just described [*i. e.*, the making explicit of that which is implicit in the living experience of the human spirit], God, as a spirit, comes to be recognized as the present and immediate, universal, living and *demonstrable* precondition and goal of all our life and all our consciousness, be the object of the latter ostensibly man, God, or world."

From the beginning the author makes his own position perfectly clear. Indeed, we count it one of the leading merits of the book that it is written with the energy of conviction. In this non-committal and balancing time it is a pleasure, both to the believer and to the unbeliever, to meet with a vigorous affirmation now and then. Prof. Morris's affirmation takes the form of a defence of the position that we can penetrate in knowledge to reality; that a true science of knowledge furnishes a key to those great secrets of the universe which most vitally concern man, because such a science is a science of being or reality; and that we learn from this science that the universe is not, in its ultimate essence, mechanical, but spiritual.

As a concise statement and criticism of Kant's thought, this little book is invaluable.

### III. FICHTE'S SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. By CHARLES CARROLL EVERETT, D. D., of Harvard University.

It is not a difficult matter to give, in a brief chapter or two, the general results of Fichte's philosophizing, and to define his place among the thinkers of his time. It is quite another thing, however, to follow his reasonings, step by step, through the elaborate and often apparently fanciful deductions, and to make them comprehensible and

even attractive to ordinary thought. Dr. Everett has undertaken the latter task, and is deserving of the highest commendation for the remarkable manner in which he has carried it through. We rank his book without hesitation among the very first of its kind.

It has been said by a writer on Fichte that "his work is as arid and forbidding as the desert of Sahara. It is a *tour de force* of abstruse and repulsive metaphysics." Certainly, to one who is new to this order of conceptions, there is an air of strangeness and unreality about Fichte's whole procedure, while the relation of his thought to the familiar problems of philosophy is continually obscured by the rigorously technical nature of his various expositions, from which he seldom departs.

Dr. Everett's method of dealing with these difficulties is well chosen. Believing that "no system can be understood until belief in it is seen to be possible," he seeks to identify himself with Fichte's work, and "to make its reasonings seem conclusive where that is possible, and plausible where plausibility is all that can be hoped." In conformity with this purpose we find him, in addition to the continuous unfoldment of Fichte's thought, pausing frequently to sum up results, and to translate them into the language of common use and specify their bearing upon familiar philosophical problems. It becomes necessary, moreover, if Fichte is to be fairly represented in modern dress, to consider, to some extent, the objections raised against him by critics of his own and a later day, as well as the positive teachings of philosophers antagonistic to him. In this way, as occasion requires, we are brought into contact with some of the doctrines of Hume, Schopenhauer, Herbert Spencer, J. S. Mill, and others, on various fundamental points, and we are made to feel whatever of force there may be in Fichte's position by contrast with theirs.

An adequate treatment of Fichte requires continual reference to Kant, and a comparison of doctrines. But the author is careful to remark that the main justification for examining the relation between the two is to discover the signification of the problems, considered in themselves. What is said in this connection bears so aptly upon the antiquarian spirit which many bring to the study of philosophy that it deserves citation at length. "Indeed," he says, "the study of the history of philosophy fails of its true end when it is pursued merely as a matter of historical or curious interest. One might as well watch the changing forms in the kaleidoscope, or the shifting shadows of interlacing branches, as to study the changing forms of human thought, considered simply as changing forms. For one who feels no need of an answer to the questions with which a system of philosophy deals, that system has no significance." It is the "permanent human interest which is involved in the problems which Fichte undertakes to solve" that is sought in the work before us.

Kant left many unsolved problems, but he also left a method for their solution. Upon these problems Fichte projected his full force, divesting himself of all preliminary explanation. The categories had been taken up bodily into Kant's system, without deduction from any common unifying principle; the thing-in-itself was unexplained; there were many questions arising out of Kant's use of the Practical Reason; and, finally, his system was completely wanting in unity. All these deficiencies Fichte attempted to supply. The I is the unifying principle sought; the categories, and forms of perception, and mental faculties, are deducible from it, and, as there is nothing beyond and without it, the phantom *thing-in-itself* vanishes. Moreover, Fichte undertakes to overcome the externality and arbitrariness with which Kant had invested his postulates, by deriving them from the nature and essence of the I, and not merely assuming them, as Kant had done, to satisfy the needs of the individual.

Now, if we follow Fichte somewhat into details, his parallelism with Kant, together with the extent of his solution of the problems which baffled the latter, becomes manifest. The difficult point for Idealism, which acknowledges only spiritual activity, is to explain the external world. With Fichte this difficulty appears in the antinomy of the not-me. It is possible to prove that I do not, and cannot, transcend my own consciousness. What we call the external world lies, therefore, within this world of consciousness. On the other hand, all proof avails nothing, for the "world of objects remains to me a world that is foreign to myself." As Dr. Everett further expresses it, "If these objects are outside of my consciousness, how did they ever get into it? or, if they are in my consciousness, how did they ever get out of it?" Idealism requires that the absoluteness and independence of the I be preserved; but this is only accomplished when the I, by its own activity, and without the aid of any foreign element, produces the world of objects.

Fichte finds no theoretical solution for the contradiction here involved. The nearest approach to a solution only reduces the difficulty to its lowest terms, and is as follows: The not-me is found to be, as required, the result of the activity of the I, and not something lying outside of it. But this not-me is produced because the activity of the I is reversed, or thrown back upon itself. The occasion of this reversal is an obstacle with which the activity of the I collides. This obstacle is not, however, the not-me—the latter being produced, as already stated, by the reversed activity of the I. The nature of the obstacle is that of a mere limit.

The antinomy still remains, for even this faint limitation of the I destroys its absoluteness.

Stated in a slightly different form, the nature of the above contradiction reveals itself even more clearly. Intelligence implies limit, and limit implies finiteness. Thus we have the finite I, which is intelligent. But the I as practical has no limitations. It passes into the infinite. The result is that the infinite I and the finite I stand opposed to each other. "The one will assert itself, and will therefore be absolute. The other will be intelligent and self-conscious, and must therefore be limited. . . . Both of these elements belong to the nature of the I." Briefly, then, the antinomy is this: "The I is both infinite and finite," and the problem is to reconcile these opposing elements. Having failed theoretically, Fichte falls back upon a practical solution. It is true that the Ego is compelled to recognize a limit, and is therefore finite; but it is not constrained as to the place of the limit, and may vary it at will. In this respect it is therefore unlimited and infinite. The I, as practical, may continually remove this limit farther and farther into its own infinitude. Although the bounds of the finite can never be overstepped, this possibility of constant approach to the infinite confers upon the Ego the character of infinitude. "The reconciliation," says Dr. Everett, "is found in the fact that, while the limitation must be assumed by and for the sake of the intelligence, as a reality, absolute freedom from limit exists as a postulate. The postulate is always accomplishing itself, though it is never accomplished."

Fichte's similarity to Kant in the above reasoning is obvious. The antinomies of the latter rest upon the opposition of the understanding and the reason; that of the former depends upon the irreconcilability of two similar elements, the theoretical and practical reason, as expressed in the two phases of the Ego already considered. In the systems of each a practical solution is found for the difficulties which the theoretical reason cannot solve. But Fichte's system is the more adequate and complete. By substituting for the practical reason of Kant his own infinitely striving Ego, the postulates are capable

of a more natural explanation. For example, immortality is implied in the inherent striving of the I to realize itself, which requires an eternity for its fulfilment. The starting-point of Fichte sheds light upon the advance achieved by him. In the "Critique of Judgment" Kant suggests that there may be some principle of unity—the supernatural he calls it—in which the antagonistic theoretical and practical reasons are reconciled to each other. This principle Fichte set himself expressly to discover, and he found it in the Ego. It is in this manner that he claims to have established philosophic unity of principle.

We have given a brief outline of Fichte's general procedure, as unfolded by Dr. Everett, but enough, perhaps, to show the manner in which the subject is handled. Some mention ought to be made, in closing, of the literary merits of the book. It is rich in apt illustrations which make one at times almost forget that the author is engaged upon the most difficult philosophical problems.—M. I. SWIFT.

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IS PANTHEISM THE LEGITIMATE OUTCOME OF  
MODERN SCIENCE?<sup>1</sup>

BY ANDREW P. PEARODY.

Pantheism presupposes monism. If God is the All, or if the All is God, the All or God must be homogeneous,—either spirit or matter. The distinction between the two must be nominal, not real. Either matter must be a mode of spirit, or spirit a development of matter.

Pantheism is in itself an ambiguous term. It may denote what might be called hypertheism, or it may be a mere euphemism for a denial of the being of God. It may be consistent and co-existent with sincere devotion and fervent piety, or it may exclude the religious element from thought and feeling. Under the first of these phases of pantheism I might class together, very widely as they differ, Spinoza, Berkeley, and Schleiermacher, who, in their profound and vast conception of the All-wise, Almighty, and Infinite Being, could not imagine existence as detached from him, nay, not even by his own creative fiat. As the atmosphere enfolds the earth in its elastic embrace, pulses in every type of organized being, is insphered in the countless globules on the crest of

<sup>1</sup> Read at the Concord School of Philosophy, July 31, 1885.

the wave, swells the bird-song, is broken into unnumbered diversities of pitch and tone in pipe, flute, and organ, lends and reclaims its constituent elements in the unceasing routine of chemical processes in Nature's laboratory, yet is one and the same atmosphere, entire, continuous, unbroken, undiminished, unincreased,—so does He, who alone is, breathe in all life, assume all forms, appear in all phenomena, constitute all harmony, beauty, and grandeur, and, no less, all that seems fearful, malignant, and evil, which seems so only because we, infinitesimal though integral portions of the supreme whole, have not perception sufficiently keen and penetrating to take in the diapason in which we bear our several parts, and for that very reason can hear little outside of the melody we make. In this system the One Being is self-conscious, freely willing, and morally perfect. As compared with him, we men have such consciousness as might be conceived of as residing in the individual organs and members of the human body, if each were conscious of itself, its place, and its functions, and of nothing more, while the man in his totality comprehended all these individual consciousnesses, with the sole directing and controlling power over the organs and members. On this hypothesis we might conceive, in each individual consciousness, of reverence, trust, and love for that on which all depend for guidance and government. Thus the individual man, though himself a part of God, may cherish sentiments of loyalty and devotion toward the Divine Totality of which he is a part.

Pantheism of this type has its logical issue in the denial of the existence of matter. God must be homogeneous, else not perfect. If nature and man are, in philosophical strictness, "but the varied God," and if He exists independently of material conditions—which is the only definition that we can give of spirit—then what we call matter is but a mode of spirit, having no existence except in the consciousness of God, and in the ideas which his presentive volition offers to those sub-consciousnesses which are parts of his own all-embracing consciousness.

Toward this type of pantheism modern science manifestly does not tend; for on this theory there is neither creation, nor development, nor evolution, but only emanation, contingent solely on the Divine will, in such a way that causation can be no more than an arbitrary and in no wise necessary relation of antecedence and



consequence. This form of pantheism, though philosophically untenable, as I have no doubt you think with me, so far from being anti-religious, is in no degree repugnant to Christianity in its most orthodox type, and in those peculiar features of its history which in this sceptical age of ours lie most open to objection and cavil.

But the pantheism with which modern science is charged with being in alliance is materialistic. The only God that it owns is impersonal Law, pervading the universe, necessitating all beings, events, and phenomena, inevitable and inexorable. This Law exists only in the multiform universe which it produces, sustains, and governs, and with which it is identical in such a sense that God and the Universe, the Whole, *τό πᾶν*, are mutually convertible terms. In the totality there is no self-consciousness. Consequently prayer and communion with God cannot be. The only self-consciousness in the universe is that of individual beings sufficiently developed to possess it. God himself is an agnostic. He knows not himself nor anything else. You and I know just as much of him as we know of the universe.

This form of pantheism, if you will not rather term it atheism, is certainly not inconsistent with such statement as might be made and has been made of the development theory. If matter is uncreated and eternal; if its elementary atoms had during a past eternity, and have now, the intrinsic power of self-organization and self-development, so that one of the nebulae now floating in the far-off heavens, without any will or law save its own autonomy, must of necessity have in the process of ages its flora and fauna, its rational beings, its genius, taste, love, faith, and piety, which will in due time culminate in agnosticism; if the growth of man from a primitive speck of protoplasm is as normal and inevitable as the growth of the oak from the acorn in a congenial soil,—then there is no place for a personal God in our philosophy, and, if we shrink from the profession of blank atheism, the only alternative is to apply the name of God to embodied Law. This was the position occupied by John Stuart Mill during the larger part of his life, though he had receded from it when he wrote the essay on potential theism, published after his death. The avowed agnostics assert that no more than this is cognizable, though they give the more religiously disposed the benefit of a doubt, a possibility.

But let us see how much of this theory rests on substantial grounds. Remember that it is at best a theory, an hypothesis. Whether it will ever be more than this we cannot say. There seem, however, to be insurmountable obstacles in the way of its absolute demonstration, though not in the way of the establishment of the law of evolution on such a basis as to insure for it the general consent of thoughtful and scientific minds. Indeed, it has already reached that stage, except with certain persons who are stubborn literalists in the interpretation of Scripture. It is now generally believed, among those who are entitled to have opinions on such subjects, that the solar system—the same being probably true of other like systems—was originally a conglomeration of incandescent matter, which, in cooling, threw off successive rings that globed themselves into planets; that in this star-mist were the germs of all organic being; that specks of primitive protoplasm became self-multiplying cells; that from these cells were developed the earliest forms of self-transmitting life; that the existing species of plants and animals have been in large part the natural progeny of these earliest forms of life, and the result of originally infinitesimal differences, and accumulated increments of these differences, occasioned by varieties of position and surroundings, and that in the history of the physical universe normal development holds the same place that used to be accorded to specific creation, and may account for almost all things as they have been and are.

There are, however, points as to which a reasonable doubt exists in many minds not unscientific. If matter is eternal, how is it that it has not done more for itself in a past eternity,—that in our world there has been active development within what to the man of science is an historical epoch,—that there is incandescent star-mist still afloat in the heavens? Is it conceivable that the being that is from eternity can be mutable? Can the law of development have sprung up spontaneously? Can that law—uniform and acting upon matter originally homogeneous—account for all forms, diversities, and stages of being? Does it account, if for man, for all that he now is? Does it account for all the facts and phenomena which we call moral and spiritual? These are, all of them, points on which observation and analysis give us no data,—no grounds for reasoning. The law of development, even if estab

lished beyond doubt, does not of necessity cover the whole field. There is not sufficient proof that it comprehends all the working forces which have been or are in the universe. There may be, for aught that the scientist can affirm with certainty to the contrary, other laws, forces, and causes behind it, acting concurrently with it, or supplementing it. This certainly has been the belief of men who have had the highest reputation and authority as evolutionists. Darwin never fails to recognize the Supreme Will and Providence, and with so much of manifest sincerity and devout reverence that it cannot have been with him a mere concession to popular prejudice. Asa Gray, rather Darwin's coadjutor than his follower, and now justly holding the foremost place among evolutionists, is not only a theist, but a believing member of a Christian church of unchallenged orthodoxy. The theory in question does not in any sense or degree militate with theism. The only reason why it has been supposed to be anti-theistic is that very many persons have so identified the origin of the universe with the cosmogony of the Pentateuch, that they can conceive of God as the Creator only in the mode there specified.

Now, I do not believe that cosmogony was within the purpose of the author or compiler of the book of Genesis. His aim was to connect the name and thought of the Supreme Being with the various objects of false worship, as light, the sun, moon, and stars, and divers forms of animal and vegetable life, which had divine honors paid to them by the Egyptians and the Canaanites. With poetic feeling, and probably with a mnemonic purpose, he grouped these objects into a drama of creation in six successive acts, corresponding to the six working days of the week, in the hope, as it seems to me, that his devout readers might take those several days' works as themes for meditation, praise, and thanksgiving on the successive six days of the week, as all together on the seventh.

As a theist I look with special favor on the theory of evolution. The shaping of worlds and their inhabitants by unnumbered express acts of creation from nothing or from brute matter is inconceivable, and seems irrational,—especially so as to the creation of the many groups of species, not very far apart, which now never run into one another, and equally as to annoying and venomous plants, insects, and reptiles, which serve no discernible purpose in the economy of nature. It is difficult to imagine mosquitoes,

rattlesnakes, and skunks, with precisely such endowments as they possess, as specifically created, whether for their own happiness or for their services to other animals; while under the theory of evolution nothing is more probable than that certain conditions might lead to the contingent development, and equally to the ultimate disappearance, of forms of organized being that should sustain other than pleasant and healthful relations to their fellow-beings.

That the evolution theory presents itself to the human mind as pre-eminently rational and natural, that by its simplicity it commends itself to our ready adoption, that it has the advantage of intrinsic probability, so far from excluding a Supreme Creative Power, is precisely what we should expect in case the universe was and is the work of Omnipotent Wisdom. If there is a God, our own intelligence was derived from his, and must of necessity be in many respects in accordance with his. Though immeasurably transcending us in wisdom, he yet must, in portions of his character and administration, be intelligible and appreciable by minds that are what he has made them. The reasonableness of the development theory casts discredit, indeed, on the old idea of specific creation, but not on the belief in a Creator. Omnipotence could of course choose its own cosmogony; but it was antecedently probable that its cosmogony would be such as would be recognized with admiration by the most advanced and deep-seeing minds.

But not only is this theory consistent with theism; it is absurd on any other hypothesis. The pantheism which would claim kindred with the evolution theory wholly ignores conscious intelligence in the development of the universe. Yet eternal matter must have had in its primitive atoms the capacity of becoming all that it has been and is; that is, there must have been in the structure of those atoms that which could not fail of becoming life, muscular power, volition, mind, and soul. Each succeeding development must have had its germ in the preceding; all must have had their germs in the primitive cells; and these cells must have changed into being by fortuitous combinations of atoms swirling in chaos. Under such conditions, combinations must have taken place; but that they should have been effected with the prophecy of such marvellous and diverse issues, that our own ancestry should

have thus had their birth with the certainty that their posterity would, after some thousands of generations, trace the long pedigree back to the time when "the waters stood above the mountains," and that all this should have taken place by a spontaneous energy in the stuff of which the worlds are made, by law without a law-giver, taxes and exceeds our credulity. On the whole ascending series we have, at each stage, a cause more big with effects, till we reach the primitive cell, or the atoms whose combination formed it, where we have a cause containing a series of effects reaching on through myriads of aeons, itself uncaused. I say uncaused; for law is not a cause, but a mode of being or of action. Moreover, man is as far as ever from discerning any efficient material cause. There were several alleged causes, such as gravitation, magnetism, electricity, caloric; but they, even when we believed in their separate existence, were names, not for what we knew, but for what we did not know,—fence-words set up to hide our ignorance. They told us how, not why, things took place. They designated laws, not powers; and now, when they are found to be mutually convertible, and but one under several names, still the force of which they are modes and manifestations is as truly an unknown essence as they were. It shows us how, but does not tell us why, phenomena occur. Force is not creative, but executive. It has laws, but cannot make laws. It is an essential agent in evolution; but there is nothing in our experience or observation to indicate it as the original cause of being for that which is evolved. Force and matter conjoined could not make a universe, a world, an elephant, a butterfly, a moth, a fruitful germ.

Yet the agnostic, or the pantheist of the type now under consideration, admits the certainty of no other primitive existences than matter and force; for, if God and the universe are identical, God was not when the universe was not; he is the slowly shaping birth of matter and force, and, so long as there are nebulae still to be condensed and peopled, he is not yet all that he will be. But evolution implies the primitive existence of that which was to be evolved. Nothing can have come out of protoplasm which was not potentially in it. There must have been in rudimentary existence, uncounted ages ago, that from which omniscience could have prophesied the being of your lecturer, of his mind with such

powers as it has, and of the stage of mental development—imperfect as some may think it—in which he has lived and is likely to die a believer in a personal God. This, to me, is not incredible; but, in order to believe it, I must have, behind and beyond the law of development, an efficient creative cause. That cause I can find only in a self-conscious and freely willing Being of infinite resources and unbounded power. Such a Being could lodge in primitive atoms the capacity of becoming all that they have become.

The origin of existence is, indeed, inconceivable; but equally so are the processes of nature with which we are most familiar. The growth of the oak from the acorn, were it a unique phenomenon, would present as difficult a problem as the formation of a world or a system of worlds. I find it as hard to conceive of the one as of the other occurring by any potency that can have been innate in the constituent atoms. Yet the material universe cannot have been uncaused; while the farther back we go in any imagined series of antecedent material causes, we only increase the complexity of the problem, and ascribe an ever-growing mass of causative power to each remoter member of the series, without ever arriving at a member that can have been uncaused.

But, on the hypothesis of a Creator God, there is less strain upon our faith under the evolution theory than under that of specific creation. In the former case we ascribe to him in the vast whole what takes place, as must be admitted, in separate parts of that whole; while in the latter we ascribe to him that of which we have no known precedent or example. The theist of the old school has no doubt that life has been transmitted from the parent stock of each race, that species have been greatly modified by climate, soil, culture, and circumstances, and that in every individual instance the living plant or animal is developed from a germ issuing from antecedent life. The scientific evolutionist simply asserts that the laws or processes which are manifested in all the organic being that now exists preceded, and were represented in, the initial stages of organized life; in fine, that the Creator made the universe in the same way in which he is constantly making it anew,—that the pristine development of nature was in close analogy with what the course of nature always has been and is now. The evolution theory, then, has no pantheistic tendencies which

do not equally belong to the known and indubitable facts and phenomena that are of familiar and constant recurrence.

I have spoken of the universe as if it began to be. The theory that the present order of nature is but the continuance of what always was, of an eternal past, is set aside by modern science. Matter may be eternal in the past; the cosmos is not so. If the cosmos is God, there was a time when, there being no cosmos, there was no God. We know that there was a beginning. The shape of an oblate spheroid could have been given to the earth only by revolution on its axis in a semi-fluid state. Moreover, planetary and—so far as it can be determined—stellar motion is not in a vacuum, but in a resisting and retarding ether, so that the planetary orbits are not circular, but spiral, with diameters decreasing, in an infinitesimal ratio indeed, yet in a ratio which could not have been maintained through a past eternity without the absorption of the planets into the sun from which we have no reason to doubt that they were thrown off. Thus, while on the one hand geology is multiplying by myriads the formerly reputed centuries of the earth's duration, astronomy bears equally clear testimony to the beginning of the worlds that are now, and of the present laws and system of the universe. Nay, geology equally refutes the theory of an unbeginning, eternal series of generations, indicating a birth-time, though in an antiquity whose depths imagination cannot fathom, for organized existence,—a time when on our planet life was not. Thus, science gives us an epoch of which one of the tenable theories is that announced in the first sentence of what many believe to be the oldest book in the world: "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth."

Let us now consider somewhat in detail the alternative theory to that of an intelligent Creator. There are two alternatives. The universe either was the product of intelligent design, with power adequate to actualize its purpose, or it chanced into being. There is no middle ground; for, as I have said, if the universe is God, God was not when the universe was not. In the pantheistic theory, matter must have been eternal in the past. Its primitive atoms must have been self-existent, of various shapes, according to Epicurus and his followers; of different chemical properties, according to other later authorities; according to still later, homogeneous, but varying both in shape and in bulk. As detached

and separate, they were in, or rather they constituted, a fluid state, and were in incessant motion. For some unexplained reason their motion was not rectilinear, so that mutual impacts, adherences, and entanglements were inevitable. Thus were formed clusters of atoms, some of which blundered into symmetry, thence into organic structure, thence into life, which was the necessary outcome of organism,—a process which had been going on for myriads of ages, and the completion of which in any single portion of matter had not been without myriads of failures,—of such failures as may at this moment be represented in the still uncondensed nebulae. Failures, of course, leave no definite record, so that successful and fruitful impacts and combinations alone remain from the innumerable æons of dice-work that must have elapsed before the swirl of atoms was abated and chaos yielded to law and order.

There are about sixty elementary substances which constitute the organized and inorganic bodies on the face and in the crust of the earth. If, in the last analysis, they are homogeneous, and are—as I have no doubt that they will be found to be—one element, they can hardly represent a less numerous diversity in the shape and bulk of their component atoms; and, however this may be, it is virtually as elements that they enter into the forms in which they constitute, and must from the first have constituted, organized being. Were we to belt the solar system with figures, we could not express the number of possible combinations of two or more of these elements, any of which might have taken place in chaos: But of these combinations the immeasurably larger part would have been of elements mutually incongruous, incompatible, destructive,—a very large proportion, such as could not happen without wide-spread devastation and ruin. With the perpetual imminence of catastrophe we can hardly conceive of the survivance of any of the more congenial and hopeful combinations that had begun to be, still less of such combinations as would constitute a cosmos, an orderly world, so pervaded with mutual dependencies, ministries, and uses as to suggest to minds, if not of the highest type, considerably above the average, a unity of plan and purpose in an intelligent Creator as the only tenable cosmogony. In point of fact, we find no combinations that look as if they had merely happened into being,—none that do not seem to belong to a system; and there are very many systems which, without any un-



tual causative relations, fit into one another as do the several parts of a skilfully constructed machine, supplying one another's deficiencies and needs, their very discords resolving themselves into staccatos or interludes in the universal harmony. In fine, this world is so made that the theory of design in the Creator is in accordance with spontaneous impression and first thought. One is disabused of it only by philosophical processes that are at the outset uncongenial,—by a great deal of making believe before the belief is really entertained.

Still further, in the solar system there are many identities, proportions, and relations which denote a oneness of plan in the structure and motions of the planets and their satellites. Gravitation is indeed said to account for them; but, as I have shown, gravitation is a law, not a force, and in a chance-made universe there is an intense improbability that bodies would act upon one another at such enormous distances. Gravitation, so far from accounting for these things, is itself to be accounted for. But there are harmonies and analogies in the planetary system which it is not even pretended that gravitation can explain, and which therefore either happened or were designed. Laplace, who was a professed atheist, admitted that, over and above gravitation, there was some inscrutable cause for these phenomena. He subjected them to mathematical calculation, and as to forty-three concurrent motions of planets and satellites he made the probability of their occurrence by chance to be one to four billions four hundred millions. Until some other efficient cause shall be discovered or imagined, I must regard these myriads against one as affording a strong presumption in behalf of an intelligent Creator.

Astronomy has gone still further and extended a like calculus, with similar results, though, of course, only with approximate accuracy, to the stellar universe beyond our system, to the binary stars, to the drift of stars in space, and to the nebulous patches in the heavens.

There is indeed a logical possibility that the entire universe may have been evolved by chance, especially as there is a past eternity for the play of chance. The probability that Milton's "Paradise Lost" might be constructed by drawing letters one by one out of a bag has been calculated, and it would take five hundred thousand figures—four figures representing thousands; seven,

millions, and so on—to express the adverse probability, and yet eternity is long enough for the one chance to occur; but an immeasurably larger draft on eternity would be necessary for the successful, permanent, fruitful relations and analogies of a chance-made universe. The mathematicians in my audience will appreciate my statement when I say that if  $m$  represents the number of chances against any single combination, relation, or analogy,  $m$  raised to the  $x$  power would express the chances against the number  $x$  of such combinations, relations, or analogies as enter into a harmonious system; and  $x$  in this universe of ours would be a number so far beyond the possibility of estimate that only an infinite mind could form any conception of the  $x$  power of  $m$ .<sup>1</sup>

I do not myself feel the need of mathematical reasoning on a subject which belongs so intimately to the heart and soul; but chance is sometimes talked of in a vague way, as if it were the most natural of suppositions that things happened to be as they are, while in truth chance is a mathematical idea, with its determinate logic and calculus, and what it really means and is actually worth can be made plain only by a mathematical statement.

Let me now speak of some portions and features of the universe which are not accounted for by the evolution theory alone,—which indicate choice, design, and will in a sense other than can be implied in the conception of a God merely co-extensive and identical with nature. This may be affirmed of beauty. Symmetry and adaptation, though not infrequently essential to beauty, do not of themselves create beauty. In the process of evolution every organ and member of every planet or animal must have been generated by need and circumstance, and perfected by use; and, were this all, there could be nothing in the various organisms that was not necessarily allied to the condition, habits, wants, or further development of the species, or was not the vestige of some anterior stage of development. There could have been no surplusage, but only rigid parsimony. We see, however, much that does not serve, and never has served, any functional purpose. Over and above all possible use, present or past, there is a superfluity of beauty,—flowers of the richest dye and most graceful contour, a

<sup>1</sup> The mathematical calculations here given formed, in substance, a part of an article by the writer in the "Princeton Review" for March, 1880, on "The Religious Aspects of the Logic of Chance and Probability."

hundred-fold larger than are needed to shelter the tiny seed ripening at their base, iridescent plumage which gives no added speed or power, in fine, numberless combinations of forms and tints that have no imaginable purpose but to adorn the gala-ropes which are Nature's working-day attire.

The beauty of the universe is the more noteworthy when we consider that it belongs to decay no less than to growth, to autumn no less than to spring, to death no less than to life. The system is one in which decline and dissolution are perpetual; death feeds life, and life, while it lasts, is prolonged only by dying daily. Were the problem presented to a theoretic world-builder of a world in which the tokens and aspects of vigorous and fruitful life shall alternate with periods as long or longer of life waning, extinct, renewed only by infinitesimal increments, he might provide in his scheme for some fair show of bloom, fruitage, and exuberant gladness, but could in thought and vision go no farther. So to embroider the veil thrown over retreating and perishing life as to make it even more gorgeously and gloriously beautiful than that whose vanished splendor it covers, postulates a more than automatic process, more than a God imbedded in nature, unconscious, otiose. It implies in the creative force a conscious love of beauty,—an æsthetic nature which must have rejoiced in the loveliness of its works when the only song of praise was that of the morning stars, and which kindled a kindred æsthetic sense and joy in the living souls of men. I do not mean to except beauty from the evolution theory. I have no doubt that what of beauty there is in beast and bird, tree, shrub, and flower, was potentially in the primitive cells from which they sprang; but that every member of each ascending series should be so fringed and garlanded as to serve no purpose save that of gladdening the eye and heart, betokens not mere self-developing nature, but a beauty-breathing, joy-giving spirit presiding over the birth of nature, flowing in the myriad streams in which the fountain of life has parted itself along the ages, and ever revealing itself to recipient minds and souls.

To pass to another topic of similar bearing, on the pantheistic hypothesis life must have been at the outset spontaneous. Matter under certain conditions crystallized—if I may borrow the term—into cells, from which sprang, was propagated, transmitted, de-

veloped, all the life that has been and is in our planet. If this was the case, is it conceivable that matter should no longer be capable, under the most favorable conditions, of bursting into life? Spontaneous life has, indeed, its place in the popular belief. Stagnant water, decaying vegetables, decomposing animal tissues, have been thought to breed insects and worms. But science interposes its negative. Some thirty or forty years ago there was almost a pæan chanted by scientists of the then nascent and anathematized school of evolutionists when the *Acarus Crossii* was announced as a parentless species of animalcules that had been born of pure water; but the experiment, on more minute investigation, proved unsatisfactory, and has, I believe, never been successfully repeated. Thus we have no evidence that there has been in this world life which was not derived from pre-existent life. What life is we know not; but we do know all the constituent elements of animal and vegetable structure, all the methods of their combination, and all their modes of action. If matter and force alone existed in the beginning, they equally exist now, are at our free command, and can be combined in unnumbered ways so as to perform movements and acts analogous to those of living beings. Yet matter has as yet never, within the knowledge of man, begun to live, whether by its own inherent tendencies or by the application of science, art, and skill. If the source of life were in matter, we might not unfitly expect the origination of life within historical epochs. But, as we can trace back to matter everything in organic being, life alone excepted, is it not at least probable that life came from elsewhere? If all the life of which we have any knowledge was derived from pre-existent life, does not analogy point to pre-existent life as the primeval source of all terrestrial life, and thus justify our belief in a self-existent life-giver?

But, even if life in itself be not admitted to indicate primeval and underived life as its source, there are characteristics of human life which contradict the theory of a material origin. Human life, we cannot doubt, has been transmitted through a long succession of human ancestors, and, it may be, through previous æons of a subter-human parentage. Yet, as it now exists, it can be discriminated in certain essential aspects from brute life. We have no reason to suppose that other animals than man have any ideas, conceptions, purposes, sentiments, aspirations which have not their

source, their object, their measure, their limit in the material universe. The most intelligent of them have taken in through the senses all that they know and think, and can have been prompted by experiences derived only through the senses in all that they do. Their enjoyment is commensurate with favorable external conditions,—the only seeming exceptions, those of strong attachment to human beings, being really cases in point; for they are cases in which the animal's self-dependence has been merged in a dependence the withdrawal of which leaves him destitute and incapable of any other resource. But man has a supra-sensual life. He has conceptions to which nothing in the material universe corresponds, sentiments that have no material counterpart or object, desires and aspirations entirely independent of the outward world, the capacity of a happiness so utterly non-contingent on external conditions that it can be maintained in its fulness under circumstances that in themselves can be productive only of suffering and misery. Human ethics are super-sensual. Developed man has a system of morality to which hedonism does not hold the key. He recognizes virtues which can give no pleasure except in the consciousness of their exercise,—moral evil which inflicts no other misery than the sense of its evilness. The intrinsic and eternal Right comprehends fitnesses and excludes unfitnesses which can by no possibility have become known through any material sources or by any material experiences. This supra-sensual life must have had its origin, its beginning, and can have been derived only from a kindred parent-life,—not from a God co-extensive and identical with material nature, but from God who is a spirit, and of whose moral nature man's is the outcome.

Finally, the religious consciousness of men under all forms of culture and of worship bears testimony to the existence of him whom, in distinction from the pantheistic conception, we term a personal God. In the most literal sense, we cannot, indeed, be conscious of the being of God, or of any being but our own. But we can be conscious of a Divine sonship, as we are of traits inherited from human parents or ancestors,—of a tendency to worship without which no mere training could make us worshippers,—of a capacity for love which human loves can never satisfy,—of an appetency for good which the thought of One supremely good underlies. All that is most noble in us, while consciously subjective, blends

spontaneously with and in the conception of objective truth, beauty, and goodness; and the traits of that truth, beauty, and goodness, so far as they are objective in our thought and feeling, are unified. The more intense these conceptions are, first subjectively, then and thence objectively, the less are they scattered, the less is their polytheistic tendency, the more distinct and unvarying is their polarization in One supremely True, Beautiful, and Good.

Nor yet can we shut out the testimony borne in all ages by the souls that have prayed in faith and sincerity. That in the inner man they have experienced what seemed an answer to their prayers none can doubt; for it is the very persons that have asked of God strength for duty, support in trial, peace under adverse conditions, who have wrought the most valiantly, endured the most bravely, lived the most truly above the care-cumbered and sorrow-stricken world. Somehow, men have been lifted by prayer into a higher region of experience. Either they have lifted themselves without a purchase, or they have got a purchase on the throne of the Eternal God. The former alternative is opposed to all known laws of spiritual dynamics; the latter cannot be if there is no God other than Nature.

## IS PANTHEISM THE LEGITIMATE OUTCOME OF MODERN SCIENCE?<sup>1</sup>

BY EDMUND MONTGOMERY.

The question here proposed is a timely one. It ought to receive a prompt and decisive answer. After so much accurate research into the constitution of things, modern science ought to be able to tell us whether it rightly leads to the conclusion that all natural occurrences are manifestations of one and the same eternal power. If this is its legitimate outcome, then we may safely rejoice that the long conflict between science and religion has at last ended in peaceful union; that modern Science and modern Chris-

<sup>1</sup> Read before the Concord School of Philosophy, July 31, 1885.

tianity, in spite of so much ostensible enmity, have nevertheless—each by its separate road—reached the same haven of truth and repose. For impartial judges will hardly deny that modern Christianity, freeing itself more and more thoroughly from authoritative decrees, trusting more and more implicitly the dictates of rational self-consciousness, has come in its inmost heart to avow the transcendent unity of all that is essentially real, and therewith its identity with the one eternal power, from which everything is believed to originate, and in which we ourselves are said “to live, and move, and have our being.” Indeed, the *rationalis* of modern Christianity, in its esoteric formulation, has become one with the philosophy now taught in our foremost Christian universities—a philosophy endeavoring to prove the reality-constituting efficiency of thought, and the resting of all such reality in one supreme, universal Intelligence.

It is an historical fact that human thinking, whenever it has been free to expand to its utmost, has all but invariably reached pantheistic conclusions. From whatever manifold data it may start, it generally ends by identifying and unifying everything. The manifest interdependence of all natural phenomena, and their unitary wielding from a hidden sphere of efficiency, has always impressed contemplative minds with a keen sense of its paramount import.

In the Vedas, the great Power underlying phenomena is made to exclaim: “I am the light in the sun and moon; I am the brilliancy in flame, the radiance in all shining things, the light in all lights, the sound in the air, the fragrance in earth, the eternal seed of all things that exist, the life in all; I am the goodness of the good; I am the beginning, middle, end, the eternal in time, the birth and death of all.”

An ancient Egyptian hymn thus addresses the same unitary Power: “Thou art the Lord of Lords, who revealeth himself in all that is, and hath names in everything. Thou art Youth and Age. Thou givest life to the earth and its streams. Thou art heaven, thou art earth, thou art fire, thou art water, thou art air, and whatever is in the midst of them.”

It is universally felt, the world over, that the essence of reality is acting-power, which to us means phenomena-producing efficiency. And it is a natural tendency of our human comprehen-

sion to unify such power; to regard all phenomenal revelations as the manifestation of one and the same eternal efficiency.

In its early poetic rapture, the mind of world-dependent man, intoxicated with pantheistic veneration and awe, finds divine presence and fulfilment in every natural object and event. But, sooner or later, ripened experience, with its miseries and disappointed hopes, causes it to relinquish its youthful faith in temporal facts and aspirations. Sickened at all the cruel happenings of this delusive and transitory realm of sense, it ends in yearning toward deliverance from the insufficiency of time-mutations, through reunion with the eternally One.

The transcendent enlightenment that, in the solitude of Bohimanda, filled the ardent soul of Gautama with blessed peace, and the message of deliverance to all men; that in the Judean wilderness entered the compassionate heart of Jesus, bracing it with unwavering fortitude to show—in opposition to all the killing powers of this earth—the way to the kingdom “which shall never be destroyed,” there to become “perfect as the Father in heaven is perfect”; the enlightenment that with ineffable satisfaction has entranced the mystics and saints of all ages and climes; that beautiful enlightenment has ever consisted in the penetration of the dreamlike evanescence of this whole checkered display of sense, urging the undying life in us to draw near and nearer the unbroken light of eternal Perfection; renouncing for evermore the delusive allurements of this temporal scene of passionate strife.

Manifest existence, restless shifting in Time; it is only an unreal semblance, a phenomenally estranged emanation from eternal All-Being. This is the conviction that has ever formed the central incentive to saintly life.

Now, is it true that modern science, assiduously testing such phenomenal existence, following it up in all its intricate relations with rigorous precision, that genuine objective science, has actually arrived at the same ancient pantheistic conclusion? Does it, in all verity, likewise teach us that the things and events of this world are but transient manifestations of one and the same transcendent and eternal Force, Energy, Power, or whatever name may be given to the inferred cause and substratum of all apparent existence?

If, as now claimed by eminent philosophers, science has posi-



tively shown that all natural phenomena are but so many modes of manifestation of one persistent Force or Efficiency, all such modes being mutually convertible, so that new phenomena only arise through metamorphoses of previous modes of manifestation—if such is really the verdict of modern science—then assuredly its outcome is full-fledged Pantheism.

I have no desire whatever to contest any legitimate outcome, and if it were Buddhistic Nirvana, or even the place where Dives received his compensation. But let us scrutinize somewhat more attentively the great principle of the Conservation of Energy or Persistence of Force, which seems so suddenly and strangely to have landed modern science in the mystic realm of transcendental Pantheism. I say *transcendental* Pantheism, because natural science has often before been tempted to acknowledge in the common material substratum a pantheistic One-and-All, differing altogether from the transcendental source of immaterial energy here assumed.

Natural science has reached the principle of the Conservation and Transmutation of Energy by detaching, from the constant quantity known as matter, or rather mass, all modes of motion, and therewith all activity in nature. To such activity it gives the name of Energy, and maintains with regard to it that it is likewise a constant quantity, never diminishing nor augmenting, but undergoing transmutations from one mode into another.

Mayer, of Heilbronn, the illustrious discoverer of this great magistral and potent Abracadabra of modern science, explains that matter, the passive half of nature, being notably a ponderable object, activity or energy is distinguished from it by being an imponderable "object"; and that this immaterial object is the cause of all effects; at once producer and product; at once *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*; effect of itself, veritable *causa sui*. One mode of energy—kinetic energy, for example—is the cause of another mode of energy—heat, for example—and the kinetic energy causes the heat-effect simply by converting itself into it. Mayer says: "Since *e* becomes *e*, and *e* becomes *f*, etc., we must regard these various magnitudes as different modes, under which one and the same object makes its appearance."

Modern science, however, while playing such surprising juggling-tricks with the immaterial "object" called energy, refrains

from doing the like with the material object called mass. And here it is that our pantheistic imagination encounters its first serious check. Never, by any means, does modern science contrive to make it plausible that one kind of mass becomes converted into another kind of mass—a pound of oxygen into a pound of hydrogen, or a pound of carbon into a pound of sulphur. And no alchemy of art or thought can avail to make different masses result from the varied manifestation of one and the same unitary power. For, even if we admit that our present chemical elements are really compounds, consisting of multiples of one and the same primordial unit of mass, such original homogeneous substratum science looks upon, and is in fact compelled to look upon, as made up of discrete elements of stuff—of such stuff, we may philosophically add, as matter is likely to be, independently of our perceiving it. As far as natural science can at all proceed with its analysis—and, by dint of its newly acquired appliance of spectral analysis, it can proceed very far—it everywhere detects persistent, individuated units, as the original material, of which all things in nature are composed. It finds elementary separateness, primordial multiplicity, and by no means indiscernible Oneness, invariably underlying that reality, which we perceive as the objects of this world. These are, evidently, compounds of definite given units, not differentiations of a conjectured unity. They are gradually elaborated combinations of primitive particles of world-stuff, not particularizations within the identical perfection of pre-existent All-Being. Further into the mystery of creation science cannot penetrate. But such is its ultimate, veritable, legitimate outcome—an outcome utterly and uncompromisingly *un*-pantheistic.

And now to revert to the energy by which the natural compounds are moved to display their various modes of activity; it is indeed only a whimsical fiction, a conceptual trick of our abstracting and unifying mind, to conceive such energy as one and the same immaterial, indestructible entity, entering in and out the inert masses, and metamorphosing itself into all manner of modes. A motion cannot possibly exist independently of its moving mass. It cannot detach itself from such a mass and become a separate thing in order to enter some other mass. Energy is avowedly a *product* of mass and velocity. How, then, can energy, leaving its mass behind, nevertheless remain quantitatively equal?

Modern science, so naïvely proud of this its Will-o'-the-wisp conception of natural efficiency, has obviously—here at the very starting-point of its deductions—lost itself in fancies as erratic as any dream of speculative philosophy. With deeply-felt humiliation be it confessed that the notion of an immaterial agent playing in mid-air, in free space, a complicated game of billiards with elements of mass, is not a very edifying cosmological outcome of our much-vaunted modern science. And this outcome is certainly not Pantheism.

But, perhaps, by allowing full swing to conceptual Thought, that arch-juggler—by force of some dexterous dialectical handling of the stubborn results of science—may, after all, succeed in bringing about a pantheistic outcome. Indeed, accepting the notion of Energy as formulated by modern science, if the stolid *caput mortuum* of things called mass could only itself be somehow converted into such energy, then we should have in our world but one single immaterial entity, metamorphosing itself into every known mode of manifestation; and that would evidently be Pantheism.

Nothing easier, says our juggler. For, if mass were not energy, how could it affect our own being so as to become conscious to us? In fact, when the matter is reconsidered, it will become clear that mass, instead of being effectless inertia, must itself constitute a very centre of efficacious energy. Mass exists and is known to us by its resistance; and what is resistance but energy? It is measured by means of its weighing pressure; and what is weighing pressure but again energy? Obviously, in whatever way we may ascertain the existence of mass, and by whatever sense we may realize such existence, energy, and nothing but energy, is found as the whole essence and substance of it. Mass, then, is no effectless *caput mortuum*, as assumed by philosophically unenlightened science, no inert plaything of a disparate immaterial power, but is itself identical with that power, forms itself part of the energy-emanating potency, through which our phenomenal world issues into manifest existence. I think our dialectical juggler may confidently challenge any one within hearing distance to disprove the truth of these assertions—assertions which undoubtedly have the genuine pantheistic ring.

But now arises the supreme puzzle in the world-problem, and

that is to fix the veritable seat of the nature-constituting power, of the phenomena-producing efficiency. Here again our consummate juggler steps in, seizes upon the only reality which his art has left in existence, and, with a facile turn of his dialectical skill, shows us that this sole efficiency in nature can be nothing but mental intelligence. For is it not true that the subjective sensations of resistance and pressure, or other subjective sensations, standing as signs for these; is it not true that such mental facts are the only actual data from which our conscious being, our understanding or intelligence, constructs that phenomenon of solidity which we call mass? And are not all other properties of this intelligence-constructed nucleus of objective phenomena, its motions included, likewise put together by our constructive intelligence from other data of sense, which are also only purely mental facts? Resisting, extended, shaped, visible, tangible, audible, tastable, scented objects, and all their sundry relations to each other within that system of phenomenal existence, which in our consciousness constitutes the world we know, is it not all in all the work of our constructive intelligence? And this being so, is it not undeniable that all objective world-phenomena are intellectual constructions, products of synthetical thought; that Thought is thus the veritable, universal power, the great and sole creator and artificer of phenomenal existence?—No reality whatever, no world—external to Thought.

If mental philosophy be admitted into the system of knowledge here designated under the name of “modern science,” then this, its Eleatic, neo-Platonic, neo-Kantian, transcendentalistic outcome is outright Pantheism, whatever Theistic twists may be given to it in some quarters. It does not essentially affect the pantheistic character of this outcome, whether the all-efficient, reality-constituting power be conceived by human understanding as eternal Reason, or creative Will, or all-embracing, super-mental Perfection; the universal meaning of it all is an entity infinitely transcending all modes of phenomenal existence, being the common, identical source and origin of them all.

On various occasions, while propounding and defending my own naturalistic views, I have endeavored, to the best of my ability, to enter into the spirit of this profound and venerable system of thought that, from old, has inspired so many noble minds.

and from which all other philosophy has emanated. In the light of a new science of vitality and organization I have sought to give a different explanation to its truths, and to lay open its deficiencies and fallacies. Here I will only reassert that the ethical aims of genuine Transcendentalism and the ethical aims of genuine Naturalism are diametrically opposed to each other, and can never be reconciled. If supreme reality and truth are indeed pre-existent facts, securely resting in a universal Intelligence, and our phenomenal world means only the inadequate rethinking on our part of such eternal reality and truth, then, consistently, our final aim must necessarily be the dissipation, through adequate thinking, of the illusive phenomenality which differentiates our individual intelligence from universal Intelligence. Our inmost striving can only be for deliverance from the sense-wrought confusion of temporality, leading to complete re-identification with the eternally One.

Asepticism and Quietism are the necessary outcome of all lofty Pantheism; and Pantheism the necessary outcome of the religion of self-questioning consciousness, as well as of that of an *ens am- plissimum* or Absolute.

The central belief of Naturalism, on the other hand, is the conviction of the extra-mental existence and veritable reality of powers actually affecting our sensibility. It firmly maintains, as a steadfast basis of all its reasoning, that individual perceptions are compelled by powers not forming part of our own consciousness; and that these perceptions signify representatively, but with minute precision, the true characteristics of the compelling powers. All doings of natural life, all investigations of natural science, are, in fact, prompted by this fundamental belief, and find their realization and verification in the world of perceptual compulsion. It follows therefrom that what we consciously realize as our own body is likewise only a group of such compelled perceptions and, that not these perceptions themselves, but the powers compelling them, are constituting our real bodily existence—an existence forming part of the great system of extra-mental powers, of which our whole perceptual world is but a more or less faithful symbolical representation.

Naturalism further recognizes that this our extra-mental being is standing in most manifold and complicated relations to other

extra-mental existents; and that it has been gradually, phylogenetically moulded and intimately organized through constant interaction with these existents. In consequence of this, its vital reactions are found to constitute pre-organized responses to the actions of the other power-complexes, and its own actions show themselves capable of influencing, in pre-established ways, the existence of other power-complexes.

Veritable reality, then—the reality phenomenally represented in consciousness—is found to consist of a system of definite, interdependent, interacting, extra-mental power-complexes. These efficient existents, compelling the perceptual objects of our consciousness, have to be looked upon as of *complex* nature, because analysis proves them to be composed of constituent parts. The dream-like phenomenality in nature, the transient appearance and evanescence of perceptive realizations, is evidently due to the nature of our consciousness, and not to the nature of the power-complexes compelling its perceptions. Our consciousness or mind represents, in fitful gleams, under varying conditions and temporal intermissions, the incomparably more steadfast existence and nature of the extra-mental power-complexes. And the natural *phenomena* or perceptive objects of our conscious world are therefore by no means manifestations of one and the same Force or Unknowable, but, on the contrary, manifestations of an extra-mental, non-phenomenal nature, at least as diversified and specialized as its mental representations. Pantheism is consequently no legitimate outcome of Naturalism, the genuine philosophy of natural science.

The utterly erroneous conception, that manifest existence consists of nothing but phenomena which are mutually convertible, has given rise to this pseudo-scientific revival of the pantheistic philosophy of the Absolute. But not even within the world of phenomena, which exists only in individual consciousness, does one phenomenon or mode of manifestation become really metamorphosed into another. Physical modes, which as such are only peculiar conscious phenomena, do not become transformed into other such physical modes, or into any other kind of conscious phenomenon whatever. The preceding mental state, whether objective or subjective, whether physical or purely ideal, whether extrinsically compelled or intrinsically arising, does not itself *produce* the following mental state, as Fichte once tried to make us

believe. Much less does an extra-mental power-complex become transformed into its mental representation; for example, that definite power-complex steadfastly abiding out there into that occasionally-appearing conscious object which I call a Tree. And still less are the changes in phenomenal manifestations caused by one power-complex being metamorphosed into another power-complex. The action and effect of one power-complex on another does not consist in their being mutually transformed one into the other. And neither is the change, perceived by us, during activity, as motion, itself an efficient entity, passing over from one power-complex to another. Changes in nature, while occurring, affect our sensibility, and are realized by us through the shifting of the whole or of parts of our perceptual objects. It is this sensible shifting which we call motion. Quite obviously, such motion is a mere mental sign of the changing influences which the extra-mental complexes exert on each other. But by illusively objectifying and fictitiously endowing with independent efficiency this mere mental sign of veritable change, modern science arrives at its false conclusion concerning the persistence of Force and convertibility of its modes. It mistakes motion, the perceptual phenomenon, for an actual and direct manifestation of objective, extra-mental Force. And as changes manifest themselves to us as motions, and one mode of motion *seems* to produce or to transform itself into another, it rashly concludes that motion, which thus stands for all activity in nature, is itself the causative force; that its various modes are, therefore, modes of efficient power; and that the unitary entity, thus metamorphosing itself into all manner of modes, is an all-efficient Unknowable. This pantheistic conclusion is—as has been here clearly shown—the outcome of illegitimate reasoning, and not of genuine modern science.

The results of modern science point to a gradual elaboration of abiding and diversified power-complexes, not to the metamorphosis of fleeting modes of manifestation of one and the same eternal Power. The philosophy of Evolution is quite incompatible with the philosophy of a protean, all-powerful Unknowable. Evolution which conceives “every kind of being as the product of modifications wrought by insensible gradations on a pre-existing kind of being” cannot be brought in harmony with the convertibility of one mode of an unknowable into another.

The extra-mental power-complexes with which modern science actually deals modify each other, mostly very gradually, through intricate modes of interaction. They are therefore slow results of complicated elaboration, which process is altogether operated in the non-phenomenal sphere of extra-mental subsistence.

Our own personality we are justified in regarding as the most consummate outcome, within our own ken, of this natural process of development—a development wholly inscrutable in its origin and efficiency. The mental phenomena of our personality are certainly not produced by motions within the perceptual body, which constitutes for us and others its sensible realization. But they are the outcome of transcendent activities, occurring in that mysterious entity which, beyond all consciousness, is carrying on, with unremitting faithfulness, the wondrous functions of life.

In our being are consolidated the hard-won results of endless vital travail. Wrought from insentient chaos, our world-harmonized existence, with delicately sensitive throb, now answers to most subtle and far-reaching influences. Sympathetically, with ever-widening comprehension, it re-echoes the thrill of connatural existence. But how precarious this precious, toil-wrought inheritance of high-pitched, consentient vitality! Within this very moment of actual presence, we here on earth, sole surviving embodiment of ever-struggling, victorious life, only through the unrelaxing effort of uplifting efficiencies, are snatched, from instant to instant, from the grasp of all-engulfing Time and Death, a dizzy whirl of creative commotion significantly shaping and livingly sustaining our being. And on this restless foil of incessant formative stir, in self-luminous glory, the transcendent import of our time-conquering, world-responsive nature stands revealed within the phenomenal repose of our all-realizing mental presence.

Actual living existence, thus recognizing its transcendent indebtedness to the Past, and its sacred duty to a Future wholly dependent on it, can it have the heart in self-indulgent renunciation to abandon its creative trust and task, giving itself up to the quietistic aims of Pantheism, by which it may well enough succeed in losing its own being in the eternal nonentity of Nirvana, but by which it will also most assuredly cause surviving human life to drop from its cultured height, and swiftly to fall a prey to the hideous miseries of mere instinct-driven savagery?



A creed which, universally and consistently lived up to, involves the voluntary extermination of the human race, leaving our fair dwelling-place one vast arena of murderous brute-passions, and which, lived up to only by the better part of mankind, would lead to degradation of social existence—such a creed is not the one fostered by science. Nowise is the legitimate outcome of modern science Pantheism.

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### IS MODERN SCIENCE PANTHEISTIC?

BY G. H. HOWISON.

In turning over the foregoing question for several months, I have become more and more impressed with the conviction that any satisfactory answer to it depends upon a clear apprehension of the meaning of its terms. What *is* pantheism? And what features are there in modern science that can give color to the supposition that pantheism is its proper result? Or, if such a supposition is well founded, why should the result be regarded as undesirable? If science establishes, or clearly tends to establish, the pantheistic view of the universe, why should this awaken alarm? What hostility to the vital interests of human nature can there be in such a view? Can there be a possible antagonism between the truth and the real interests of man?

The question before us probably does not convey to most minds the depth and intensity of interest which is so manifestly conveyed by the question of Immortality recently discussed—at least not on its surface. Yet a consideration of it in the detail of the subsidiary questions that have just been mentioned will not only secure the clearness requisite to an intelligent answer, but will bring the real depth of its interest into view, and will show this to be no less profound, while it is far more comprehensive than that of the former problem. It is for this reason that I venture to offer the reflections that have passed in my own mind in the endeavor to clear up the detailed questions that the general problem involves.

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In the hope of contributing something toward that definite apprehension of its bearings which is indispensable to any real and permanent effect of its discussion, I will proceed to consider those questions in their proper succession.

#### I. WHAT PANTHEISM IS.

Of the several questions that I have specified, perhaps none is surrounded with such vagueness and obscurity as the first—What *is* pantheism? The generally recognized defenders of religion, the theologians who speak with the hoary authority and with the weight of presumptive evidence that the traditional and, indeed, historic bodies of organized and instituted religion naturally impart, are in the habit of drawing a sharp *verbal* distinction between theism and pantheism, as they also do between theism and deism; but when the independent and unbiased thinker, anxious for clearness and precision, inquires after the *real* distinction intended by these names, he hardly finds it in any sense that awakened thought will recognize as at once intelligible and reasonable. We constantly hear that theism is contradicted by both deism and pantheism; by the one through its assertion of the divine personality at the expense of the divine revelation and providence; by the other through its assertion of the divine omnipresence at the expense of the separateness of the divine personality from the world. We hear constantly, too, that theism, to be such, must teach that there is a being who is *truly* God, or that the First Principle of the universe is a HOLY PERSON, who has revealed his nature and his will to his intelligent creatures, and who superintends their lives and destinies with an incessant providence that aims, by an all-pervading interference in the events of the world, to secure their obedience to his will as the sole sufficient condition of their blessedness. All this, however, is but an abstract and very vague formula, after all. Of the *quomodo* for reconciling the contradiction whose extremes are represented by the deism and the pantheism which it condemns it has nothing to say. *How* the divine personality is to be thought so as to comport with the divine omnipresence, or *how* the omnipresent providence of God is to be reconciled with his distinctness from the world, the general proclamation of orthodox theism has no power to show. And, when we pass from the general formula to the desired details, we are too

often then made aware that the professedly theistic doctrine is hampered up with a mass of particulars which are, in truth, profoundly at variance with its own principle; that confusion or contradiction reigns where clearness ought to be; that merely anthropomorphic and mechanical conceptions usurp the place of the required divine and spiritual realities. We discover, for instance, that, in the mechanical interpretation of theism, every doctrine is construed as deism that refuses its assent to a discontinuous and special providence, or to an inconstant, limited, and contra-natural revelation; and that, on the other hand, every theory is condemned as pantheism that denies the separation of God from the world, and asserts instead his omnipresent immanence in it. And we even find that, in the hands of such interpreters, theism is identified with the belief in mechanical and artificial theories of the *quomodo* of atonement, or, as such writers are fond of calling it, of "the plan of salvation." Into the rightful place of the sublime fact of the all-pervading providence and all-transforming grace that makes eternally for righteousness are set hypothetical explanatory schemes of expiation by sacrifice, of appeal by the suffering of the innocent, of ransom by blood, of federal covenant and imputation, of salvation by faith alone; and the theories of the divine nature and administration which omit these details, or refuse to take them literally, are stamped as deism or as pantheism, even though the omission or refusal be dictated by a perception of the incompatibility of the rejected schemes with the fundamental principles of ethics, and, therefore, with the very nature of divine revelation. And thus, in the end, by mere confusion of thought and by inability to rise above conceptions couched in the limited forms of space and of time, the original theistic formula—which, in its abstract setting off of theism against deism and pantheism, is quite unobjectionable, and indeed, so far as it goes, entirely correct—is brought into contradiction with its own essential idea.

Still, it must never be forgotten that these ill-grounded efforts at the completer definition of theism are made in behalf of a real distinction. We shall not fail to find it true, I think, that there *is* a view of the world for which deism may be a very proper name, and another view which may most appropriately be called pantheism; that these are radically distinct from theism, defined

as the doctrine of a personal Creator who reveals himself by omnipresent immanence in the world, to the end of transforming it, through the agencies of moral freedom, into his own image, and of establishing a realm of self-determining persons, who freely and immortally do his will. Nor, as I believe, shall we fail to find that the doctrines named deism and pantheism are *historic* doctrines; that they are not merely conceivable abstractions, but have been advocated by actual men, of a very real persuasion and a very discernible influence. Nor can I doubt that these two doctrines, in their deviations from the theistic theory, will be recognized by our sound judgment as *defects*, and consequently be reckoned as injurious opinions. Only it must be understood that the sole ground of this judgment is to be our untrammelled rational conviction; and that if we were to find this conviction on the side of deism or of pantheism, we ought none of us to hesitate to take the one or the other as the sounder and more commendable view.

In asking, now, what pantheism exactly is, we may avail ourselves of a useful clue, for a beginning, in the apparent meaning of the name itself. The derivation of this from the two Greek words *pan*, all, and *theos*, God, would seem to make it mean either (1) that the All is God, or else (2) that God is all—that God alone really exists. The name, then, hints at two very distinct doctrines: it signifies either (1) that the mere total of particular existences is God; in other words, that the universe, as we commonly call it, is itself the only absolute and real being; or (2) that God, the absolute Being, is the only real being—all finite existence is merely his transitory form of appearance, and is thus, in truth, illusion. We might convey the one or the other of these diverse doctrines by the name, according as we should pronounce it *pantheism* or *pan-theism*. In either way, the word may be made to cover an absolute identification of God and the universe. In the former way, God is merged in the universe; in the latter, the universe is merged in God.

And, in fact, pantheism, as an historic theory, has actually presented itself in these two forms. The doctrine has come forward in a considerable variety of expressions or schemes of exposition, such as those of Heraclitus, Parmenides, and the Stoics, in ancient times, not to speak of the vast systems lying at the basis of the Hindu religions; or those of Bruno and Vanini, Schelling (in his

early period), Oken, Schopenhauer, and Hartmann, in our modern era. But various as are these schemes, they may all be recognized as falling into one or the other of the two comprehensive forms which we have just seen to be suggested by the common name. These two forms may evidently be styled, respectively, the atheistic and the acosmic form of pantheism, as the one puts the sensible universe in the place of God, and thus annuls his being, while the other annuls the reality of the cosmos, or world of finite existences, by reducing the latter to mere modes of the being of the one and only Universal Substance. Both forms are manifestly open to the criticism visited upon pantheism by the standard defenders of theism—namely, that it contradicts the essence of the divine nature by sacrificing the distinctness of the divine personality to a passion for the divine omnipresence; the sacrifice of the distinctness, at any rate, is obvious, even if the incompatibility of such a loss of distinct being with the true nature of a godhead be not at first so evident; though that this loss *is* incompatible with a real divinity will, I think, presently appear. And both forms of pantheism are, in the last analysis, atheisms; the one obviously, the other implicitly so. The one may be more exactly named a physical or theoretical atheism, as it dispenses with the distinct existence of God in his function of Creator; the other may properly be called a moral or practical atheism, as, in destroying the freedom and the immortality of the individual, it dispenses with God in his function of Redeemer. Under either form, the First Principle is emptied of attributes that are vital to deity; in the first the *entire* proper and distinct being of God disappears; in the second, all those attributes are lost that present God in his adorable characters of justice and love, and in the ultimate terms of his omniscience and omnipotence. Perfect omniscience and omnipotence are only to be realized in the complete control of *free* beings, and the creation in them of the divine image by *moral* instead of physical influences.

## II. THE RELATION OF PANTHEISM TO MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM.

It will aid us in a correct apprehension of pantheism if we appreciate its relations to other anti-theistic forms of philosophy, particularly to materialism, and to what is known as subjective idealism. It will become clear that it forms a higher synthesis of

thought than either of these. Its conception of the world may be read out either in materialistic or idealistic terms; and this is true whether we take it in its atheistic or its acosmic form. Yet, on a first inspection, this hardly seems to be the case. On the contrary, one is at first quite inclined to identify its first form with materialism outright, and to recognize in its second form a species of exaggerated spiritualism; and hence to contrast the two forms as the materialistic and the idealistic. Further reflection does not entirely do away with this mistake, for the apparent identity of atheistic pantheism with materialism is very decided; and the only correction in our first judgment that we next feel impelled to make, is to recognize the double character of acosmic pantheism. The one and only Universal Substance, in order to include an exhaustive summary of all the phenomena of experience, must be taken, no doubt, as both extending and being conscious. But is the Universal Substance an extended being that thinks? or is it a thinking being that apprehends itself under a peculiar mode of consciousness called extension? In other words, is the thinking of the one Eternal Substance grounded in and mediated by its extended being? or has its extension existence only in and through its thinking? Which attribute is primary and essential, and makes the other its derivative and function? Under the conception of the sole existence of the Absolute, the question is inevitable, irresistible, and irreducible. It thus becomes plain that, to say nothing of a third hypothesis of the mutually independent parallelism of the two attributes, acosmic pantheism may carry materialism as unquestionably as it carries idealism, though not, indeed, so naturally or coherently. And sharper inquiry at last makes it equally clear that atheistic pantheism will carry idealism as consistently as it carries materialism, if doubtless less naturally. For, although in the sum-total of the particular existences there must be recognized a gradation from such existences as are unconscious up to those that are completely conscious, and although it would be the more natural and obvious view to read the series as a development genetically upward from atoms to minds, still the incomprehensibility of the transit from the unconscious to the conscious cannot fail to suggest the counter-hypothesis, and the whole series may be conceived as originating ideally in the perceptive constitution and experience of the conscious members of

it. There is, however, a marked distinction between the two orders of idealism given, respectively, by the acosmic pantheism and by the atheistic: the former, grounded in the consciousness of the Universal Substance, has naturally a universal and, in so far, an *objective* character; the latter has no warrant except the thought in a particular consciousness, and no valid means of raising this warrant even into a common or general character, much less into universality; it is accordingly particular and *subjective*. Pantheism, then, in both its forms, is not only a more comprehensive view of the world than either materialism or any one-sided idealism, whether abstractly universal or only subjective, inasmuch as it makes either of them possible; but it is also a deeper and more organic view, because it does bring in, at least in a symbolic fashion, the notion of a universal in some vague sense or other. This advantage, however, it does not secure with any fulness except in the acosmic form. Indeed, the atheistic form is so closely akin to the less organic theories of materialism and subjective idealism that we may almost say we do not come to pantheism proper until we pass out of the atheistic sort and find ourselves in the acosmic. An additional gain afforded by pantheism, and eminently by acosmic pantheism, is the conception of the intimate union of the First Principle with the world of particular phenomena; the creative cause is stated as spontaneously manifesting its own nature in the creation; it abides immanently in the latter, and is no longer conceived as separated from it and therefore itself specifically limited in space and in time, as it is conceived in the cruder dualistic and mechanical view of things, with which human efforts at theological theory so naturally begin.

### III. THE CONTRAST BETWEEN PANTHEISM AND DEISM.

At this point we strike the eminent merit of pantheism, as contrasted with deism. By the latter name it has been tacitly agreed to designate that falling short of theism which stands counter to pantheism. As the latter is defective by confounding God and the world in an indistinguishable identity, so deism comes short by setting God in an isolated and irreducible separation from the world. Deism thus falls partly under the same condemnation of materiality which a rational judgment pronounces upon sensuous theism, with its physically anthropomorphic conceptions of the

Creator, dwelling in his peculiar quarter of space called Heaven, and its mechanical theory of his communication with the world by way of "miracle" alone—by way, that is, independent, and even subversive, of the ordered process of means and end in nature.<sup>1</sup> But while thus suffering from mechanical limitations in thought, deism must still be allowed its relative merit, too. That merit is the criticism which it makes upon the mechanical method of physically anthropomorphic theism. If, in the interest of distinguishing the Creator from the creation, God is to be thought as capable of existing without a world, and as *separated* from the creation, then, as deism justly says, it is purely arbitrary to declare the separation overcome by means of mechanical miracle. Consistency, and, in so far, rationality, would rather require that the separation be kept up; and the folly of the anthropomorphic dualism is made to display itself in the deistic inference, which it cannot consistently retute, that the divine revelation and providence, without which the practical religion indispensable to the reality of theism cannot have being, are, by the separateness of the divine existence, rendered impossible.

#### IV. THE PERMANENT INSIGHT CONTAINED IN PANTHEISM.

In approaching, then, the question, Why should pantheism be regarded as a doctrine to avoid? we must be careful not to neglect the fact that it plays a valuable and, indeed, an indispensable part in the formation of a genuine theological theory. It is the transitional thought by which we ascend out of the idolatrous anthropomorphism of sensuous theism into that complete and rational theism which has its central illumination in the realized truth of the divine omnipresence. In the immanence of God in the world it finds the true basis—the rational theory—of the divine perpetual providence; in his indwelling in the creature, as "the Light

<sup>1</sup> I must be understood here as reflecting only upon the popular thaumaturgical conceptions of the supernatural. The genuine doctrine of miracle has, to my mind, a speculative truth at its basis, profound and irrefragable; the truth, namely, that the causal organization of nature—the system of ever-ascending evolution from cause to differing effect—can never be accounted for in terms of the mere sensible antecedents, but requires the omnipresent activity of an immanent but supersensible, transcendent, rationally personal cause; and that the system of nature is therefore a Perpetual Miracle. The natural order flowing from this Miracle is, however, immutable and irreversible, and irreconcilable with the possibility of "miracle" in the vulgar sense.



which lighteth every man that cometh into the world," it finds a like basis and theory for the universal and perpetual divine revelation. Indeed, in this realized and now fully uttered omnipresence of God, and in God's active indwelling in the inmost spirit of man, it lays the rational foundation for the Perpetual Incarnation, the doctrine of the Divine Humanity; and, when Christianity sets the doctrine of the Triune God in the very centre of practical religion, pantheism prepares the way to vindicate it as the genuine interpreter of a rational theism. That the Eternal eternally generates himself in our higher human nature; that this Son of Man is truly and literally the Son of God, and the Son only begotten: that, by the discipline of life in worlds of imperfection, men, and through them the whole creation, ascend by devout faith (or fidelity) toward this Son, and, by his life, immortally unto God in the Holy Spirit—this, the epitome and essence of Christian theism, first becomes apprehended as a rationally natural truth in the insight which pantheism brings with it, that God is not separate from the world but immediately present in it, and that the distinction between the Creator and the creature, between the human soul and its redeeming God, can never be truly stated as a distinction in place and time, as a separation in space and by a period. And it is not until the pantheistic insight has been realized in our minds, whether by name or no it matters not, that we discover clearly that this fundamental religious truth, which none of us, upon reflection, would think of denying, and which in some sense we may rightly say we have always known, is effectually violated by our ordinary anthropomorphic conceptions.

#### V. THE PERMANENT DEFECT OF PANTHEISM.

But, while this permanent insight of pantheism must be carried up into all genuine theistic thought, it remains also true that it falls seriously short of the theological conception demanded by the highest practical religion. For the possibility of religion as a practical power in human life—the very conception of theism as an operative force in the spirit—depends not merely on the omnipresent existence and work of God, but upon the freedom (that is, the unqualified reality) and the immortality of man. Indeed, if the space permitted, it might clearly be shown, not only that man cannot be properly man apart from freedom, immortality, and

God, but that God cannot be properly God apart from man and man's immortality and freedom; in other words, that the self-existent, free perfection of the Godhead, by virtue of its own nature, demands for its own fulfilment the establishment and the control of a world that is God's own image; the *divine* creation must completely reflect the divine nature, and must therefore be a world of moral freedom, self-regulating and eternal. But this demand of a genuine theism pantheism cannot meet. Its theory, whether in the atheistic or in the acosmic form, lies in the very contradiction of human freedom and immortality. Indeed, we may say, summarily, that the distinction between theism and pantheism, even in the loftiest form of the latter, lies just in this—that theism, in asserting God, asserts human freedom and immortality; but that pantheism, while apparently asserting God to the extreme, denies his moral essence by denying the immortality and the freedom of man.

#### VI. WHY PANTHEISM IS A DOCTRINE TO BE DEPRECATED.

And now we see why pantheism is at war with the permanent interests of human nature. Those interests are wholly identified with the vindication of freedom and immortal life; and this not on the ground of the mere immediate desire we have for freedom and permanent existence, which would, indeed, be shallow and even unworthy of a rational being, but on the profound and never-to-be-shaken foundation laid by reason in its highest form of conscience. For, when this highest form of reason is thoroughly interpreted, we know that the value of freedom and immortality lies in their indispensableness to our discipline and growth in divine life. To no theory of the world can man, then, give a willing and cordial adhesion, if it strikes at the heart of his individual reality and contradicts those hopes of ceaseless moral growth that alone make life worth living. Not in its statement of the Godhead as the all and in all, taken by itself, but in its necessarily consequent denial of the reality of man—of his freedom and immortal growth in goodness—is it that pantheism betrays its insufficiency to meet the needs of the genuine human heart. It is true, to be sure, that this opposition between the doctrine of the One Sole Reality and our natural longings for permanent existence, or our natural bias in favor of freedom and re-

sponsibility, in itself settles nothing as to the truth or falsity of the doctrine. It might be that the system of nature—it might be that the Author of nature—is not in sympathy or accord with “the bliss for which we sigh.” But so long as human nature is what it is, so long as we remain prepossessed in favor of our freedom and yearn for a life that may put death itself beneath our feet, so long will our nature reluctate, and even revolt, at the prospect of having to accept the pantheistic view; so long shall we inevitably draw back from that vast and shadowy Being who, for us and for our highest hopes, must be verily the Shadow of Death. Nay, we must go farther, and say that, even should the science of external nature prove pantheism true, this would only array the interests of science against the interests of man—the interests that man can never displace from their supreme seat in *his* world, except by abdicating his inmost nature and putting his conscience to an open shame. The pantheistic voice of science would only proclaim a deadlock in the system and substance of truth itself, and herald an implacable conflict between the law of nature and the law written indelibly in the human spirit. The heart on which the vision of a possible moral perfection has once arisen, and in whose recesses the still and solemn voice of duty has resounded with majestic sweetness, can never be reconciled to the decree, though this issue never so authentically from nature, that bids it count responsible freedom an illusion, and surrender existence on that mere threshold of moral development which the bound of our present life affords. Such a defeat of its most sacred hopes the conscience can neither acquiesce in nor tolerate. Nor can it be appeased or deluded by the pretext that annihilation may be devoutly accepted as self-sacrifice in behalf of an infinite “fulness of life” for the universe—a life in which the individual conscience is to have no share. In defence of this pantheistic piety, quoting the patriarch of many tribulations, in his impassioned cry, “Though He slay me, yet will I trust in Him!” is as vain as it is profane. This is only to repeat the fallacious paradox of those grim and obsolete sectarians who held that the test of a state of grace was “willingness to be damned for the glory of God.” The spirit that truly desires righteousness longs with an unerring instinct for immortality as the indispensable condition of entire righteousness, and, when invited to approve its own im-

molation for the furtherance of the divine glory, will righteously answer as a noble matron, applying for admission to the Church, once answered the inquisitorial session of her Calvinistic society: "I am assuredly *not* willing to be damned for the glory of God; were I so, I should not be *here!*"

VII. THE PROFOUND INTEREST OF THE PANTHEISTIC PROBLEM.

This is what makes the question of pantheism, as a possible outcome of science, of such vital concern. Science is thus made to appear as the possible utterer of the doom of our most precious hopes, the quencher of those aspirations which have hitherto been the soul of man's grandest as well as of his sublimest endeavors, the destroyer of those beliefs which are the real foundation of the triumphs of civilization—of all that gives majesty and glory to history. To present universal nature as the ocean in which man and his moral hopes are to be swallowed up is to transform the universe for man into a system of radical and irremediable *evil*, and thus to make genuine religion an impossibility; and not only genuine religion, but also all political union and order, which stands, among the affairs and institutions of this world of sense, as the outcome and the image of the religious vision. Belief in the radical and sovereign goodness of the universe and its Author and Sustainer is the very essence of religious faith and of political fealty. It is impossible that either faith or fealty can continue in minds that have once come to the realizing conviction that the whole of which we form a part, and the originating Principle of that whole, are hostile, or even indifferent, not merely to the permanent existence of man, but to his aspirations after the fulness of moral life. A professed God who either cannot or will not bring to fulfilment the longing after infinite moral growth that has once arisen in his creature, is not, for such a creature, and cannot be, true God at all:

"The wish that of the living whole  
 No life may fail beyond the grave—  
 Derives it not from what we have  
 The likest God within the soul?

. . . . .  
 "And he, shall he—

- “Man, the last work, who seemed so fair,  
Such splendid purpose in his eyes,  
Who rolled the psalm to wintry skies,  
Who built him fanes of fruitless prayer—
- “Who trusted God was love indeed,  
And love Creation’s final law,  
Though Nature, red in tooth and claw  
With ravine, shrieked against his creed—
- “Who loved, who suffered countless ills,  
Who battled for the True, the Just—  
Be blown about the desert dust,  
Or sealed within the iron hills?
- “No more?—A monster, then, a dream,  
A discord! Dragons of the prime,  
That tare each other in their slime,  
Were mellow music, matched with him!”

It is this profound feeling, which Tennyson has thus so faithfully expressed, that gives to the question before us in these days its anxious import. Let us not fail to realize that pantheism means, not simply the all-pervasive interblending and interpenetration of God and the creation, but the sole reality of God, and the obliteration of freedom, of moral life and of immortality for man.

#### VIII. WHY SHOULD MODERN SCIENCE GIVE ALARM OF PANTHEISM?

It is urgent, then, to inquire if there is anything in the nature of modern science that really gives color to the pantheistic view. It is obvious enough that there are not wanting philosophers, or even schools of philosophy, who read pantheism in science as science appears to them. But the real question is: Is such a reading the authentic account of the teachings of science itself? Here we must not mistake the utterances of men of science for the unadulterated teachings of science; for, on this borderland of science and philosophy, it need not be surprising if men familiar with only that method of investigation which science pursues, and not at home in the complex and varied history of philosophical speculation, should sometimes, or even often, be inclined to a hasty in-

ference when the borderland is reached, and, overlooking the fact that their science and its method have necessary limits, take that view in philosophy which the illegitimate extension of their method would indicate. Disregarding, then, the mere opinions of certain cultivators of science, we are here to ask the directer, more searching and more pertinent question, What is there—if, indeed, there be anything—in the nature of science itself, as science is now known—what are the elements in it and in its method, that might be taken to point toward a pantheistic interpretation of the universe and its Source?

And to this it must in all candor be answered that, both in the method of modern science and in the two commanding principles that have legitimately resulted from that method, there is that which unquestionably *suggests* the pantheistic view. Nothing less than the most cautious discrimination, founded on a precise and comprehensive knowledge of the course of philosophical inquiry, can detect the exact reach, the limits, and the real significance of this suggestion, or expose the illegitimacy of following it without reserve. The trait to which I am now referring in the *method* of science is its rigorously experimental and observational character; indeed, its strictly empirical or tentative character. And the two commanding *results*, which now in turn play an organizing part in the subsidiary method of all the sciences, are (1) the principle of the conservation of energy, and (2) the principle of evolution manifesting itself in the concomitant phenomenon of natural selection—the struggle of each species with its environment for existence, and the survival of the fittest. The apparent implications of this method and of these two principles accordingly deserve, and must receive, our most careful present attention.

How, then, does the experimental, or, more accurately, the empirical, method of science suggest the doctrine of pantheism? By limiting our serious belief to the evidence of experience—exclusively to the evidence of the senses. The method of science demands that nothing shall receive the high credence accorded to science, except it is attested by the evidence of unquestionable presentation in sensible experience. All the refinements of scientific method—the cautions of repeated observation, the probing subtleties of experiment, the niceties in the use of instruments of precision, the principle of reduction to mean or average, the allow-

ance for the "personal equation," the final casting out of the largest mean of possible errors in experiment or observation, by such methods, for instance, as that of least squares—all these refinements are for the single purpose of making it certain that our basis of evidence shall be confined to what has actually been present in the world of sense; we are to know beyond question that such and such conjunctions of events have *actually* been present to the senses, and precisely *what* it is that thus remains indisputable fact of sense, after all possible additions or misconstructions of our mere thought or imagination have been cancelled out. Such conjunctions in unquestionable sense-experience, isolated and purified from foreign admixture by carefully contrived experiment, we are then to raise by generalization into a tentative expectation of their continued recurrence in the future—*tentative* expectation, we say, because the rigor of the empirical method warns us that the act of generalization is a step beyond the evidence of experience, and must not be reckoned any part of science, except as it continues to be verified in subsequent experience of the particular event. Thus natural science climbs its slow and cautious way along the path of what it calls the laws of nature; but it gives this name only in the sense that there has been a constancy in the conjunctions of past experience, a verification of the tentative generalization suggested by this, and a consequent continuance of the same tentative expectancy, which, however, waits for renewed verification, and refrains from committing itself unreservedly to the absolute invariability of the law to which it refers. Unconditional universality, not to say necessity, of its ascertained conjunctions, natural science neither claims nor admits.

Now, to a science which thus accepts the testimony of experience with this undoubting and instinctive confidence that never stops to inquire what the real grounds of the possibility of experience itself may be, or whence experience can possibly derive this infallibility of evidence, but assumes, on the contrary, that the latter is underived and immediate—to such a science it must seem that we have, and can have, no verifiable assurance of any existence but the Whole—the mere aggregate of sense-presented particulars hitherto actual or yet to become so. Thus the very method of natural science tends to obliterate the feeling of the transcendent, or at least to destroy its credit at the bar of disciplined judg-

ment, and in this way to bring the votary of natural investigation to regard the Sum of Things as the only reality.

On this view, the outcome of the scientific method might seem to be restricted to that form of pantheism which I have named the atheistic. Most obviously, the inference would be to materialism, the lowest and most natural form of such pantheism; yet subtler reasoning, recognizing that in the last resort experience must be consciousness, sees, in the subjective idealism which states the Sum of Things as the aggregate of the perceptions of its conscious members, the truer fulfilment of the method that presupposes the sole and immediate validity of experience. But beyond even this juster idealistic construction of atheistic pantheism—beyond *either* form of atheistic pantheism, in fact—the mere method of natural science would appear to involve consequences which, even granting the legitimacy of belief in the transcendent, would render the transcendent God the sole reality—that is, would bring us to acosmic pantheism. For the empirical method, so far from vindicating either the freedom of the personal will or the immortality of the soul, withholds belief from both, as elements that can never come within the bounds of possible experience; so that the habit of regarding nothing but the empirically attested as part of science dismisses these two essential conditions of man's reality beyond the pale of true knowledge, and into the discredited limbo of unsupported assumptions.

It is, however, not until we pass from the bare method of natural science to its two great modern consequences, and take in their revolutionary effect as subsidiaries of method in every field of natural inquiry, that we feel the full force of the pantheistic strain which pulls with such a tension in many modern scientific minds. It is in the principle of the conservation of energy, and in that of evolution, particularly as viewed under its aspect of natural selection, that we encounter the full force of the pantheistic drift. And it seems, at the first encounter, irresistible. That all the changes in the universe of objective experience are resolvable into motions, either molar or molecular; that, in spite of the incalculable variety of these changes of motion, the sum-total of movement and the average direction of the motions is constant and unchangeable; that an unvarying correlation of all the various modes of motion exists, so that each is convertible into its correlate at a constant



numerical rate, and so that each, having passed the entire circuit of correlated forms, returns again into its own form undiminished in amount: all this seems to point unmistakably to a primal energy—a ground-form of moving activity—one and unchangeable in itself, immanent in but not transcendent of its sum of correlated forms, while each instance of each form is only a transient and evanescent mode of the single reality. Nor, apparently, is this inference weakened by the later scholium upon the principle of the conservation of energy, known as the principle of the dissipation of energy. On the contrary, the pantheistic significance of the former principle seems to be greatly deepened by this. Instead of a constant whole of moving activity, exhibited in a system of correlated modes of motion, we now have a vaster correlation between the sum of actual energies and a vague but prodigious mass of potential energy—the “waste-heap,” as the physicist Balfour Stewart has pertinently named it, of the power of the universe. Into this vast “waste-heap” all the active energies in the world of sense seem to be continually vanishing, and to be destined at last to vanish utterly: we shift, under the light of this principle of dissipation, from a primal energy, immanent, but not transcendent, to one immanent in the sum of correlated actual motions, and also transcendent of them. Very impressive is the view that here arises of a dread Source of Being that engulfs all beings; it is Brahm again, issuing forth through its triad Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva—creation, preservation, and annihilation—to return at last into its own void, gathering with it the sum of all its transitory modes. And let us not forget that the conceptions out of which this image of the One and All is spontaneously formed are the ascertained and settled results of the science of nature in its exactest empirical form.

When to this powerful impression of the principle of conservation, as modified by that of dissipation, we now add the proper effect of the principle of evolution, the pantheistic inference appears to gather an overpowering weight, in no way to be evaded. As registered in the terms of a rigorous empirical method, evolution presents the picture of a cosmic Whole, constituted of varying members descended from its own primitive form by differentiations so slight and gradual as not to suggest difference of origin or distinction in kind, but, on the contrary, to

indicate clearly their kinship and community of origin. Still, these differentiations among the members, and the consequent differences in their adaptation to the Whole, involve a difference in their power to persist amid the mutual competition which their common presence in the Whole implies. In this silent and unconscious competition of tendencies to persist, which is called, by a somewhat exaggerated metaphor, the struggle for existence, the members of the least adaptation to the Whole must perish earliest, and only those of the highest adaptation will finally survive. So, by an exaggeration akin to that of the former metaphor, we may name the resulting persistence of the members most suited to the Whole the survival of the fittest; and as it is the Whole that determines the standard of adaptation, we may also, by figuratively personifying the Whole, call the process of antagonistic interaction through which the survivors persist a process of natural selection. Here, now, the points of determinative import for inference are these: that the "survival" is only of the *fittest to the Whole*; that it is the Whole alone that "selects"; that no "survival," as verified to the strictly empirical method, can be taken as permanent, but that even the latest must be reckoned as certified only to date, with a reservation, at best, of "tentative expectancy" for hope of continuance; that "natural selection," *as empirically verified*, is a process of cancellation, a selection only to death; and that the Whole alone has the possibility of final survival. The "tentative expectation" founded on the entire sweep of the observed facts, and not extended beyond it, would be that the latest observed survivor, man, is destined, like his predecessors, to pass away, supplanted by some new variation of the Whole, of a higher fitness to it. And so on, endlessly.

This clear pointing, by an empirically established and empirically construed doctrine of evolution, toward the One-and-All that swallows all, seems to gain further clearness still when the principles of conservation and of evolution are considered, as they must be, in their inseparable connection. They work in and through each other. Conservation and correlation of energy, and their "rider" of dissipation, are in the secret of the mechanism of the process of natural selection, with its deaths and its survivals; evolution is the field, and its resulting forms of existence, more and more complex, are the outcome of the operations of the cor-

related, conserved, and dissipated energies; and, in its principle of struggle and survival, evolution works in its turn in the very process of the correlation, dissipation, and conservation of energy. It therefore seems but natural to identify the potential energy—the “waste-heap” of power—of correlation with the Whole of natural selection. And thus we appear to reach, by a cumulative argument, the One and Only in which all shall be absorbed.

If we now add to these several indications, both of the method and of the two organic results of modern science, the further weighty discredit that the principles of conservation and evolution appear to cast upon the belief in freedom and immortality, the pantheistic tone in modern science will sound out to the full. This discredit comes, for human free-agency, from the closer nexus that the correlation of forces seems plainly to establish between every possible human action and the antecedent or environing chain of events in nature out of which the web of its motives must be woven; and from the pitch and proclivity that must be transmitted, according to the principle of evolution, by the heredity inseparable from the process of descent. For immortality, the discredit comes, by way of the principle of evolution, through its indication, under the restrictions of the empirical method, of the transitoriness of all survivals, and through its necessary failure to supply any evidence whatever of even a *possible* survival beyond the sensible world, with which empirical evolution has alone to do; while, by way of the principle of the conservation and dissipation of energy, the discredit comes from the doom that manifestly seems to await all forms of actual energy, taken in connection with the general discredit of everything unattested by the senses, which the persistent culture of empiricism begets.

In short, while the empirical method ignores, and must ignore, any supersensible principle of existence whatever, thus tending to the identification of the Absolute with the Sum of Things, evolution and the principle of conservation have familiarized the modern mind with the continuity, the unity, and the uniformity of nature in an overwhelming degree. In the absence of the conviction, upon independent grounds, that the Principle of existence is personal and rational, the sciences of nature can hardly fail, even upon a somewhat considerate and scrutinizing view, to convey the impression that the Source of things is a vast and shadowy

Whole, which sweeps onward to an unknown destination, "regardless," as one of the leaders of modern science has said, "of consequences," and unconcerned as to the fate of man's world of effort and hope, apparently so circumscribed and insignificant in comparison.

IX. MODERN SCIENCE IS, STRICTLY, NON-PANTHEISTIC.

But now that we come to the closer question, whether this impression is really warranted, we stand in need of exact discrimination. With such discrimination we shall find that, decided as the inference to pantheism from the methods and principles just discussed seems to be, it is, after all, illegitimate.

Our first caution here must be to remember that it is not science in its entire compass that is concerned in the question we are discussing. It is only "modern science," popularly so called—that is, science taken to mean only the science of nature; and not only so, but further restricted to signify only what may fitly enough be described as the *natural* science of nature; that is, so much of the possible knowledge of nature as can be reached through the channels of the senses; so much, in short, as will yield itself to a method strictly observational and empirical.

Hence, the real question is, whether empirical science, confined to nature as its proper object, can legitimately assert the theory of pantheism. And with regard now, first, to the argument drawn with such apparent force from the mere method of natural science, it should be plain to a more scrutinizing reflection that shifting from the legitimate *disregard* of a supersensible principle, which is the right of the empirical method, to the deliberate assumption that there *is* no such principle, because there is and can be no sensible evidence of it, is an abuse of the method in question—an unwarrantable extension of its province to decisions lying by its own terms beyond its ken. This shifting is made upon the assumption that there can be no science founded on any other than empirical evidence. That there is, and can be, no science deserving the name, except that which follows the empirical method of mere *natural* science, is a claim which men of science are prone to make, but which the profoundest thinkers the world has known—such minds as Plato, or Aristotle, or Hegel—have certainly pronounced a claim unfounded, and, indeed, a sheer assump-

tion, contradicted by evidence the clearest, if oftentimes abstruse. When, instead of blindly following experience, we raise the question of the real nature and the sources of experience itself, and push it in earnest, it then appears that the very possibility of the experience that seems so rigorously to exclude supersensible principles, and particularly the rational personality of the First Principle, is itself dependent for its existence on such Principle and principles; that, in fact, these enter intellectually into its very constitution. But, in any case, this question of the nature of experience, of the limits of possible knowledge, and whether these last are identical with the limits of possible experience, is one in the taking up of which we abandon the field of nature and enter the very different field of the theory of cognition. In this, the pursuer of natural science, as such, has not a word to say. Here his method is altogether insufficient and unavailing; if the problem can be solved at all, it can only be by methods that transcend the bounds of merely empirical evidence.

So, again, in the inferences to pantheism from the conservation of energy and the principle of evolution. Strong as the evidence seems, it arises in both cases from violating the strict principles of the natural scientific method. All inferences to a whole of potential energy, or to a whole determinant of the survivals in a struggle for existence, are *really* inferences—passings beyond the region of the experimental and sensible *facts* into the empirically unknown, empirically unattested, empirically unwarranted region of supersensible *principles*. The exact scientific truth about all such inferences, and the supposed realities which they establish, is, that they are unwarranted by natural science; and that this refusal of warrant is only the expression by natural science of its incompetency to enter upon such questions.

Natural science may therefore be said to be silent on this question of pantheism; as indeed it is, and from the nature of the case must be, upon all theories of the supersensible whatever—whether theistic, deistic, or atheistic. Natural science has no proper concern with them. Science may well enough be said to be *non*-pantheistic, but so also is it non-theistic, non-deistic, non-atheistic. Its position, however, is not for that reason anti-pantheistic any more than it is anti-theistic, or anti-deistic, or anti-atheistic. It is rather *agnostic*, in the sense, that is, of declining to affect knowl-

edge in the premises, because these are beyond its method and province. In short, its agnosticism is simply its *neutrality*, and does not in the least imply that agnosticism is the final view of things. The investigation of the final view, the search for the First Principle, science leaves to methods far other than her own of docile sense-experience—methods that philosophy is now prepared to vindicate as higher and far more trustworthy. Yet, when once the supersensible Principle is reached in some other way—the way of philosophy, as distinguished from that of natural science—science will then furnish the most abundant confirmations, the strongest corroborations; the more abundant and the stronger in proportion as the First Principle presented by philosophy ascends, evolution-wise, from materialism, through pantheism, to rational theism. For science *accords* most perfectly with the latter, although she is, in herself, wholly unable to attain the vision of it. But it must be a theism that subsumes into its conceptions of God and man all the irrefutable insights of materialism, of deism, and, eminently, of pantheism; of which, as I will hope this paper has shown, there are those of the greatest pertinence and reality, if also of the most undeniable insufficiency.

## THE FACTS ABOUT EXTERNAL PERCEPTION.

BY PAYTON SPENCE.

Everybody admits the existence of the external world; but philosophers differ in opinion as to what that thing is which they, in common with everybody else, call the external world. People in general, when they speak of the external world, mean something outside of and separate and apart from themselves. The Idealist believes that the external world is simply our sensations, which somehow become external perceptions, still remaining sensations, however; and that, therefore, the outness and otherness of things is apparent, not real. The Realist believes that our sensations are one thing, while the external world is quite another thing, having an existence of its own outside of the mind, separate and apart from our sensations, existing though sensation had never come

into being, enduring though sensation should cease, and persisting though the possibility of sensation were abolished forever.

If, therefore, the existence of something outside of, and separate and apart from, our sensations is made as certain as the existence of those sensations themselves, Idealism must be abandoned. In that event, while it might be interesting and highly important, on other considerations, to know what that something is, yet it is obvious that, so far as the question of Idealism and Realism is concerned, such knowledge is unimportant. It would not be necessary to demonstrate any of its qualities or properties, or that it has qualities or properties, although I shall endeavor to do both. Its simple existence, if made as certain as the existence of our sensations, is a refutation of Idealism.

Furthermore, it is, of course, unimportant what name we give to that something which is separate and apart from our sensations. We may call it matter, or force, or spirit, or any other imaginable name; if its existence is proved, Realism must be accepted. Hence, Berkeley, and those who, with him, believe that the Deity is the objectifying, externalizing agency to our sensations, are, in fact, Realists. On that theory, the Deity is the something which is separate and apart from our sensations, and which objectifies them, not in any arbitrary, hap-hazard way, but only on certain conditions, and according to a fixed, ascertainable method; and hence, when we ascertain those conditions and formulate that method, we have put the subject into scientific shape; and then it is very evident that, as science, it is godless, and, of course, nothing has been gained by calling the objectifying agent Deity—matter, force, spirit, or any other name would have answered as well.

I may here further remark that, of course, Realism is not necessarily Dualism. It does not necessarily follow that the something which is separate and apart from our sensations is matter as an ultimate, distinct from mind as an ultimate, and that, therefore, there are two ultimates, matter and mind. My own views upon this point I have explained in my "New Theory of Consciousness" (see "Journal of Speculative Philosophy," July, 1880), in which I have endeavored to show that the atom of matter is an ultimate of consciousness, and that consciousness, therefore, is our ultimate cosmical constituent.

In this article I shall use the terms external world, external object, and object in the realistic sense; not, however, to prejudice the case, but simply to give a uniform, definite meaning to words which I shall have frequent occasion to use.

In the outset of our discussion of external perception, we find it necessary to disabuse the mind of the reader of one of the errors which encumber the subject—an error which everybody seems to regard as a truth established beyond all contradiction. It is well enough expressed in the following quotation from Lewes, in which, however, it is mixed up with another error that is almost as universal, and to which we shall presently call special attention, namely, the erroneous belief that a single sensation can give us a perception: “I burn myself in the fire; I am conscious of the sensation; I have certain and immediate knowledge of that. But I can only be certain that a change has taken place in my consciousness; when from that change I infer the existence of an external object (the fire) my inference may be correct, but I have obviously shifted my ground. Consciousness—my principle of certitude—forsakes me. I go out of myself to infer the existence of something which is not self. My knowledge of the sensation was *immediate*, indubitable. My knowledge of the object is *mediate*, uncertain. Directly, therefore, we leave the ground of consciousness for inference, avenues of doubt are opened.” It will be seen that the above statement is made in a positive, unquestioning form, as though the truth of it was not for a moment to be doubted, either by himself or any one else; and yet the whole science of demonstrated mathematics protests against it as an untruth that will not stand a moment’s investigation. A demonstrated proposition of geometry is just as certain and indubitable as any one of the simple intuitions of which that demonstration consists; and yet our knowledge of the proposition is always *mediate*, while our knowledge of the intuition is *immediate*. The error amounts to this: that there is no absolute certainty of anything except that which lies directly and immediately upon our consciousness, as is the case with our sensations and all self-evident truths; as, for instance, when I look at a line which is divided into parts, and see that one of those parts is less than the whole. Now, a demonstrated truth does not and cannot, in that sense, lie directly and immediately upon our consciousness. In other words,



it is not a sensation; we cannot see it, feel it, taste it, or apprehend it by any of our senses; nor can we grasp it with our consciousness directly and immediately, even as a perception or as a conception, as we shall show more fully hereafter. We can only know it by memory as a proposition the truth of which has already been demonstrated, or else we must know it by going through the demonstration. Could we grasp it as a perception or as a conception, and thus know it of itself and by itself, directly and immediately, it would not need a demonstration.

The erroneous belief that we cannot be certain of anything except that which we know *immediately*, is the cause, on the one hand, of those immense, desperate, and persistent, but futile efforts that have been made in the endeavor to prove that we do know the external world *immediately*; and, on the other hand, of that despondent and hopeless surrendering of the question as one which is utterly insoluble, either because our perception of the external world is a result of the direct but inscrutable action of the Deity, or else because it is an ultimate fact, incapable of further analysis. Furthermore, the erroneous opinion to which we are calling attention has its effect upon those who believe that our knowledge of the external world is *mediate*; it destroys the value of the conclusion which they have reached and leaves them burdened with the conviction that the existence of the external world is still problematic and uncertain.

The sum of the angles made by the crossing of the two straight lines before me, is equal to four right angles. Of this I am as certain as I am that the upper part of one of those lines is less than the whole line. The propositions are both absolutely true. One of them is self-evidently true; the other is demonstratively true. The truth of the one I reach immediately by a single intuition; the truth of the other I reach mediately by a series of intuitions. I cannot escape from the truth of either. Similarly, I am as certain that external objects exist, separate and apart from my sensations, as I am that my sensations themselves exist. The latter certainty is the certainty of a single intuition; the former certainty is the certainty of a series of intuitions. The one is a self-evident truth, the other is a demonstrated truth; therefore I cannot escape from the truth of either. Being both truths, they have not permitted, and will never permit, the human mind to

rest contented with any theory of external perception which does not admit them both as unquestionable facts.

The subject of external perception is encumbered by another fundamental error. It is believed by many that every sensation is spontaneously converted into a perception, or causes a perception; that this happens in some mysterious way, without the aid or prompting of any cause other than the *single* sensation itself, operating through an original principle of our constitution—in other words, that a sensation necessarily and unavoidably becomes or causes a perception as necessarily and unavoidably as an impression upon an organ of sense becomes a sensation. As we have seen, the erroneous doctrine of *immediate* perception is an outgrowth of the fundamental error that we cannot be certain of anything except that which we know immediately. Now, the erroneous theory of immediate perception necessarily gives rise to the false opinion that a single sensation can, and always does, of itself, become or cause a perception. We shall undertake to show hereafter, however, that a single sensation does not and cannot become a perception or cause a perception, or be itself thrown to the external, either in reality or in appearance, as it is in perception; for, without an understanding of this fact, it is not possible to understand the fundamental difference between a sensation and a perception, and their true relations to each other; and hence it is not possible to understand external perception.

The erroneous opinion that has been, and still is, entertained upon this subject, and that must necessarily be entertained by every one who holds the doctrine of immediate perception, is thus expressed by Brown: "Certain sensations irresistibly, and by a law of our nature, suggest, without any process of reasoning and without the intervention of any *tertium quid*, the notion of something external and an invincible belief in its real existence." Reid expresses substantially the same opinion in many places, as in the following instance: "But every such impression, by the laws of the drama, is followed by a sensation, which is the first scene exhibited to the mind; and this scene is quickly succeeded by another, which is the perception of the object." It seems to me that Spencer also drops into this error when he says: "In sensation proper, at least if it is a sensation of touch, heat, or pain, I not only contemplate the affection as an affection of myself—as a

state through which my consciousness is passing or has passed—but I also contemplate it as existing in a certain part of my body, as standing in certain relations of position. I perceive where it is. But, though under both these aspects sensation must be regarded as a species of perception, it will readily be seen to differ widely from perception proper.”

I shall not undertake a *special* refutation of the above view of sensation, but shall proceed at once to the consideration of our subject, external perception, beginning, however, with an account of sensation with which it is so intimately connected, and upon which it is dependent. If my explanation of sensation and of its relations to perception be correct, it becomes a refutation of the foregoing erroneous view of the subject just to the extent that it differs from that view; and it will be found to differ from it fundamentally.

Every sensation is a state of consciousness; as such it is internal and must ever remain internal; by no possibility can it be made external. Now, aside from our sensations, there are no other means or instrumentalities by which we can know the external world; but, as our sensations are wholly internal and incapable of being shifted to the external, how is it possible that we can ever know anything about an external world? And how is it possible even that the thought or conception of an external world should ever have entered the human mind? Yet, while it is a fact that all our affections through the senses are wholly internal, and can never be made other than internal, it is equally a fact that, in some way, the idea of an external world has got into our consciousness, and has taken such forcible possession, assuming such dominion there, that it gives its own character even to our sensations, making them seem as external as itself. That apple out there is somehow embraced by my consciousness as an external thing—an object outside of and apart from myself—and that externality is so pronounced, so overpowering a reality, that the red color, which is naught but an internal sensation and must ever remain internal, is apparently drawn out of its real abiding-place, and seems painted upon the surface of the apple, as objective as the apple itself. How is this?

It is not an easy matter to get a clear conception of what a sensation really is. We seldom, if ever, have a sensation alone as a

conscious experience, standing apart from all other sensations and perceptions so as to reveal its true character. Every single sensation automatically relates itself to an object and object properties and to groups of other sensations, actual and reproduced, thus giving rise to a perception in which the sensation is seemingly localized as something exterior to the mind—something objective. This seeming objectivity does not pertain to a sensation proper, but does pertain necessarily, as we shall show, to any sensation which forms part of a perception. Therefore, when we localize a sensation, we give it an element that does not belong to it—an element which, to that extent, converts it into a perception, or rather a part of a perception. As the outcome of animal evolution, our nervous system is so organized that it is almost impossible for us to experience a sensation proper; that is, a sensation which is not automatically localized—objectified. We are compelled, therefore, to resort to a process of mental dissection, as it were, separating this simple mental state from others with which it is ordinarily so bound up as to be in a great measure disguised. To do this, we must defeat, as it were (and reject results where we cannot defeat processes), those automatic actions of our highly developed nervous system by which every sensation is at once related to an object and its properties and to other sensations, actual or reproduced, and thus becomes localized as a part of a perception. Many sensations, probably most of our sensations, cannot be treated experimentally in this way, so irresistibly and unavoidably does our nervous system work them up into perceptions; nor can we devise any method by which we can arrest the process at that stage where we are conscious of them as sensations only, and before they have been worked up into perceptions.

I obliterate, in imagination, all the results of my past experience, together with the experience itself, and the power of remembering or reproducing it, either voluntarily or spontaneously; and, furthermore, I imagine that I am deprived of all my faculties and capacities except the sense of sight. In this imaginary state I close my eyelids, and am immersed in light alternating with darkness. The light that reaches the retina of my eye causes me to experience what would be called a consciousness of light. But to call it a consciousness of light would make it more complex than it really is, by implying that there are two mental states;

that is, the sensation, light, and a consciousness of that light. It is more in keeping with the simplicity of the phenomenon to call it a state of conscious illumination, the illumination and the consciousness being one and the same thing. While that state lasts, illumination is the plenitude of the mind—the sum total of the ego—so that I am, for the time being, simply a conscious illumination, not a consciousness of an illumination, but a consciousness which is illumination, an illumination which is consciousness. This is a sensation.

You are looking at a red apple, the red of which seems to you as external as the apple itself. I, in the imaginary state just described, open my closed eyelids, and how is my consciousness affected by the apple? Only the light from it affects me, and I have a sensation called red. The sum total of my being is a state of consciousness called red. I know nothing of the apple; I only feel red; and it is not a red which I refer to something that is distinct from myself; but I myself am the red, and that is all there is of me; beyond that, I know nothing, feel nothing, infer nothing, am nothing. To you the red is out there, external, a part of the apple; to me the red is internal, and is a part of me—is me. Here, then, there is seemingly a vast difference between your red and my red; between the red which seems outside of you as a part of an external object, and the red which is inside of me—is me. Yet these two reds, in their real nature, are precisely alike; they are precisely the same subjective states, and can never be otherwise; and when we shall have made this plain, and shall also have shown the genesis of your red from my red, we shall have made considerable progress in the solution of the difficulties involved in external perception. My red, the subjective red, is of course a sensation, and nothing more. Your red, while remaining a subjective sensation, is a part of your perception of the apple, and to that extent may be spoken of, in brief, as a perception. In my case the red is felt; in your case it is felt also, because its real nature can never be changed; but, in addition to being felt, it seemingly loses its internal character, and is apparently projected to the external, and, being worked up into a perception, we may say it is perceived. To this extent, then, we see the difference between a sensation and what might be called a perception of a sensation, the latter being a sensation *plus* an appear-

ance of externality. Then the difficulty of this part of the subject is narrowed down to this question: How is this appearance of externality added to that which is essentially internal, and which must ever remain internal in reality? Mere sensations alone, singly or in combination, cannot make the addition, as is evident from the following considerations:

1st. Every *single, unrelated* sensation is essentially and unchangeably internal; hence, to put it in a negative form, no single, unrelated sensation can ever become external, either in reality or in appearance; and, therefore, it can never become a perception or a part of a perception. Such a change in its character cannot take place without a cause, and as, by the supposition, the sensation is single and unrelated, there is no cause for any change whatever; and hence it must remain internal in appearance as well as in reality.

2d. All sensations, being internal, no relation of the sensations of any one or more of the senses, can cause them to be projected to the external, either in reality or in appearance. All sensations are subjective; and hence all their relations to each other are relations in the subject, and, therefore, relations in time only; and, as there is nothing, and can be nothing, either in their nature or in the nature of their relations, to suggest the idea of space, they cannot be projected into space, either in reality or in appearance. The reader will please observe that I speak of the relations of *sensations only*; and he must therefore be careful not to introduce any other element into the relation but the bare sensations themselves, and whatever results from their relations; otherwise he may unconsciously mix up those sensations with the very thing which, as we shall see, gives them seeming objectivity, and he may thus delude himself into the belief that related sensations alone may become perceptions, or parts of perceptions.

Therefore we (Berkeley and Hume included) must look beyond mere sensation and related sensations for that something—that additional element in the combination—by which a sensation becomes a part of a perception, that is, a sensation *plus* seeming externality. Any analysis of perception into mere sensations or related sensations is incomplete, for the simple reason that the very *sine qua non* of perception is overlooked—that very element is omitted which, as we shall see, converts sensations into parts of

perceptions, and the perceived sensations *plus* that element into the perceived object. That omitted element, as we shall see, is the object itself, the very apple upon the surface of which the red seems painted. Therefore, we shall find that instead of mere sensations giving us external perception—in other words, instead of our related sensations becoming to us an object—instead of the redness, the sweetness, the fragrance, the touch, being combined into an apple, and constituting all there is of it, it is the object itself which externalizes the sensations; it is the real apple which makes your sensations, red, sweet, touch, fragrant, seem outside of you and grouped together into an apple. Well, we say, there is a real apple out there, existing as something separate and apart from our sensations; and we have shown that mere sensations, isolated, or simply related to themselves alone, cannot make us perceive that apple; then how is the real apple brought to our consciousness and made a thing of *knowledge*, seeing that it can only be done through the instrumentality of our sensations?

The law of the *object* in external perception is this: *In external perception, the simultaneous convergence of the sensations of two or more of the senses upon the source or cause of those sensations demonstrates the existence of that source or cause as a something—an object—which is separate and apart from the sensations themselves.* That such is the method by which we know the object I shall now endeavor to show.

Let us suppose that both you and I have all our senses abolished, and also all the knowledge and experience which we have acquired through them, as well as all the organized results of that experience. Now, I am suddenly endowed with the sense of smell and the sense of sight; I mean the faculty of feeling colors, lights, and shades, and, of course, I do not include the muscular sense which is ordinarily associated with the sense of sight, in the adjustment of the eye to distances, the convergence of the axis of the eyes, the rolling of the eye in and out, up and down, etc. I see a red color, and I smell a fragrance. But they give me no knowledge of anything but themselves and their relations in time, either as occurring simultaneously or in succession to each other. They cause in me no perception of an object—no perception, or even suspicion of the existence of the apple which causes both sensations; and, moreover, they give me no idea that the two sensa-

tions are, or can be, combined or related into an object—an apple. On the other hand, you are suddenly endowed with the sense of sight and the sense of feeling, together with the power of muscular motion, but not the muscular sense, as it is not necessary to the illustration. Through the sense of sight you also see the red color; at the same time you move your hand forward until you feel a touch just when your hand seems to reach the color. You perceive an object which, you say, looks red; and the red is seemingly no longer within yourself, but outside of you, apparently pertaining to the object itself—you perceive the red apple. Now, what is the reason of the vast difference between my experience, through the instrumentality of *two* sensations, and your experience, through the instrumentality of *two* sensations also—my experience in which my sensations remain internal in appearance as well as in reality, and in which no external object is inferred, suggested, suspected, or thought of, and your experience in which your sensations make you believe (we will call it *believe* for the present) that you have come upon something which is outside of yourself—an object, and that that object is red?

The only difference in the two cases is this: In your experience, the two sensations converge each upon the source or cause of the other, and thus *demonstrate* that source as something separate and apart from themselves, and therefore an external object. In my experience, the two sensations do not converge each upon the source or cause of the other; and hence they do not demonstrate or suggest anything beyond themselves. To return to your experience, for mine needs no further explanation. You see the red color; at the same time you move your hand forward until you believe that you feel the red with your fingers—no, you do not believe *that*, and could only be made to believe it by finding that what you reach feels red to your fingers as well as looks red to your eyes; and if you did believe that you touched the red, the sensation, with your fingers, you would give up your erroneous belief the moment you closed your eyes and still felt the touch, although the red, the sensation, then ceased to exist—well, you move your hand forward until you believe that you feel the place where the red is—no, you never can believe that you feel a mere place, or locality, or the nothingness of mere empty space—you move your hand forward, then, until you believe that you feel



the object which is red, and see the object which you touch. It is as though the hand said to the eye, "Follow me, and I will take you to the cause of that red which you see"; while the eye says to the hand, "I follow you, and show you the cause of that touch which you feel." The one demonstrates to the other a something which is foreign to them both, separate and apart from both—something which neither one alone could ever attain to or suspect the existence of.

But why call this process of making us conscious of the existence of an external object a *demonstration*? Simply because it is a demonstration. Demonstration is the method of bringing to our knowledge, by two or more intuitions, that which we cannot know by a single intuition. For instance; two triangles lie before me, and I am told that two angles and the included side of the one are equal to the two angles and the included side of the other; and I am further told that, such being the case, the two triangles themselves must be equal. Now, this latter equality I can never know by a single intuition—that is, by simply looking at the two triangles—in the same way that I know that the line before me, which is divided into parts, is greater than any one of its parts. Therefore I must demonstrate the equality of the triangles by a series of intuitions, each one of which, being absolutely certain, brings me to the absolute certainty that the triangles are equal. My first intuitive certainty is that the two equal sides, when applied to each other, coincide; my second and third intuitions are that the other two sides of each of the triangles must coincide with each other as far as we choose to produce them; and my fourth intuition is that those two sets of coinciding sides must meet in the same point; and now I know that the two triangles, when applied to each other, must coincide throughout, and are therefore equal. In no other way can I *know* that equality. Now, if I am told that an object is something separate and apart from my sensations, I cannot know that fact by a single intuition—I cannot see it, feel it, taste it, or grasp it *immediately* by any one of the senses. But I do know it by means of two or more intuitions which are so related to each other and to it that my knowledge of it is just as certain as my knowledge of the intuitions themselves—and hence it is demonstrated. But it will be said: "This object, which is thus brought to my knowledge, is such a shadowy

nothing, without properties, or with properties (which we shall presently show that it has) like itself, invisible, intangible, non-perceivable, and inconceivable; how can it be a demonstration?" We reply that in all these respects it resembles all demonstrated truths, they being just such shadowy nothings—invisible, intangible, non-perceivable, and inconceivable—as we shall have occasion to show hereafter.

Then, in external perception, the simultaneous convergence of two or more of the senses upon the common cause of their present sensations demonstrates the existence of that cause as an object separate and apart from those sensations. But the demonstrated object is only one of the elements of that compound phenomenon called an external perception. Its other elements will now engage our attention.

The consideration of the *primary* and *secondary* qualities of objects usually forms a part, and a very large part, of all discussions of the subject of external perception. Of course they are introduced into such discussions for the purpose of throwing some light upon a subject whose principles have thus far seemed hidden in the most impenetrable darkness. I believe, however, that every one who has studied what has been written about the primary and secondary qualities, in the hope of getting some light upon the subject of external perception, has ended his studies in vexation and disappointment, and has come to the conclusion, if he had not already reached it, that even the clearest and most profound thinkers unavoidably drift into disorder and confusion when they endeavor to explain a subject without the guidance of the true principle which underlies it.

Locke throws no light upon the subject of external perception by telling us that the primary qualities "are inseparable from body," while the secondary qualities are "nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us"; and "that the ideas of primary qualities are resemblances of them; and their patterns really exist in the bodies themselves; but the ideas produced in us by the secondary qualities have no resemblances to them at all." Reid throws no light upon external perception with his invalid reason for the baseless distinction that our knowledge of the primary qualities is "clear" and "distinct," while our knowledge of the secondary qualities is "obscure,"

because the notion we have of the former is "direct," while that of the latter is "relative" only. Stewart throws no light upon external perception by saying that "the line which I draw between the primary and secondary qualities is this, that the former necessarily involve the notion of extension or outness, whereas the latter are only conceived as the unknown causes of known sensations." Bain throws no light upon external perception, and, I may say, rather beclouds the subject when he makes *uniformity in experience* the characteristic of a primary quality, and therefore makes color barely escape being raised to the dignity of a primary quality, so that a little more uniformity in the experience of all persons with a color, for instance red (which, for want of that uniformity, is now a sensation, a subject quality), would convert it into an object (primary) quality. In fact, Bain's boundary-line between his object (primary) qualities and the subject qualities is so shadowy and indeterminate that he himself at times ignores it altogether, or else does not see it; as when he speaks of *resistance* as a *feeling*, and therefore a *subject* quality, and yet, at the same time, classes it with the *object* qualities by saying that "the fundamental properties of the material or object world are force, or *resistance*, and extension." Hamilton throws no light upon external perception by informing us that "in the primary qualities perception predominates; in the secondary, sensation"; that "where matter is known as principal" (it would have been a flash of light to have shown us how *matter* can be *known* at all with a *certainty*) "in its relation to mind, and mind only known as subordinate in its correlation to matter, we have perception proper, rising superior to sensation; this is seen in the primary qualities" (and yet where matter, or primary qualities, or both, predominate so much as to be left alone, they go blink out, and can neither be seen, nor felt, nor perceived, nor even conceived, as we shall see hereafter), "where, on the contrary, mind is principal," etc. Nor does Spenser throw any light upon external perception with his new nomenclature—statical, dynamical, and statico-dynamical—for substantially the same things that others call primary, secondary, and secundo-primary.

In discussing the primary and the secondary qualities, in their relation to external perception, the important matter to determine is this: Since we know both these sets of qualities through the in-

strumentality of our sensations, what are the conditions under which our sensations give us a knowledge of the primary qualities, and what are the conditions under which our sensations give us a knowledge (though it cannot be called knowledge) of the secondary properties, and what is the nature of that knowledge in both cases?

With regard to the secondary qualities, we have but little to say; first, because we do not *know* them; and, secondly, because they have no direct bearing upon our subject, since they take no part in external perception. We have already shown how our sensations are traced to their source in the demonstrated object. But of those properties in the object that cause the sensations we *know* nothing, either by intuition as we *know* the sensations themselves, or by demonstration as we *know* the object. We may conjecture and speculate about them; as, for instance, we may say that, perhaps, a red color and the object quality which causes it are as much alike as the two voices in the telephone—the one at the delivering end which is the cause, and the one at the receiving end which is the effect; but such conjectures and speculations can never amount to a *knowledge* of the secondary qualities of objects.

The primary qualities, of course, are always spoken of as qualities of the object and not of the subject; but we look in vain for any reason for such a disposition of them beyond, we may say, the very obvious fact that they are very different from our sensations; and, as the latter evidently pertain to the subject, it seems reasonable to conclude that the primary qualities pertain to the object. But, not understanding the true reason why the primary qualities must be qualities of the object and not of the subject, writers often speak of them as though, while being qualities of the object, they were still mere affections of our senses (subject qualities), which can be seen, felt, and otherwise known, in the same way that we see a color, feel a touch, or smell a fragrance. Hence Berkeley easily broke through their ill-defined distinctions and loose explanations; and, to this day, they have found it impossible to answer him, from their standpoint.

No single sensation or combination of mere sensations can give us a primary quality; it can only be demonstrated to us in the same way in which, as we have shown, the object is demonstrated

to us—namely, by the simultaneous convergence upon it of the sensations of two or more senses, thus proving that it really exists externally as an attribute of the object, and not as a sensation or a group of sensations pertaining to the subject. For the purpose of showing the correctness of our position, and also for the purpose of showing the confusion of thought which prevails on this subject (all for the want of a knowledge of the law of the primary qualities), I make the following extract from Hamilton, in which he endeavors to prove that the sensations of sight alone can give us a knowledge of the primary quality called *extension*. I shall criticise it as I go, begging the reader, however, to bear in mind that I am deprived of all my powers and faculties except the sense of sight alone, and that, when I say sight, I do not include the sense of the muscular contraction of the muscles of the eye, which is so intimately connected with it, and by which, in connection with the sense of sight, extension may be brought to our knowledge in the manner hereafter explained. The reader is also requested to hold *sensations* to their *true character* as mere subjective affections, and not to allow them to be tintured with anything that pertains to *perceptions* only, as is apt to be done, in spite of himself, by that automatic action of his nervous system already referred to. In this condition Hamilton says to me :

“ 1. All are agreed that we see extension as colored.” *We see extension!* I see (have the sensation called) red, and green, and blue, and yellow, and all the other colors, lights, and shades. I see nothing else, and can see nothing else. “ 2. The power of perceiving colors”—*perceiving colors!* What is that? I feel—have the sensation of—color; if perceiving means that, then I can understand you; but if it means something else, then I can never understand you. “The power of perceiving colors” (which I can never do) “involves the power of perceiving differences of color.” Yes, if I could *perceive*, I could perceive; but I can only feel. “ 3. The colors discriminated in vision are, or may be, placed side by side.” *Placed side by side*—what is that again? Have I got sides and places in me as well as sensations? *When* (I cannot say *where* yet) do they arise, and how? and how do they feel alone, or side by side? If when you say “placed side by side” you mean coming to my consciousness one after another in time, or one at the same time with another,

then I understand you ; otherwise I do not, and cannot. " 4. The contrasted colors, thus bounding each other, will form, by their meeting, a visible line." *Bounding each other*—yes, I understand—one beginning *when* the other ends (Hamilton would laugh, for he meant *where*, which word, however, when applied to one or more subjective states, would be sheer incompatibility). But, *visible line*, I do not understand that. Only colors, lights, and shades are felt by me ; and I only know that in me (in my consciousness) they come and go one after another in time, or one at the same time with another. If *visible line* is any one of such experiences of mine, then I can be made to comprehend it ; otherwise never.

The same process of reasoning implied in the foregoing criticism will apply to all sensations (mere sensations and nothing else), whether isolated or related to each other. Hence, the two negative propositions which we laid down in reference to the relation of sensations to perceptions will also apply to the relation of sensations to the primary qualities of objects, namely : 1. No single sensation can give us a primary quality. 2. No number of mere related sensations of any one or more senses can give us a primary quality. Should the reader still harbor any doubts of the truth of the foregoing propositions, he must surrender them if I succeed, as I expect to, in showing that the primary qualities are demonstrated qualities of the object, and, as such, are separate and apart from our sensations, as much so as the object itself, and therefore can never be seen, felt, tasted, or known *immediately* by any of the senses.

Put in the affirmative form, the law of the primary qualities is this : *A primary quality is a quality which is demonstrated to pertain to the object by the simultaneous convergence upon it of the sensations of two or more senses.* The sensations of color and of touch may be simultaneously converged so as to reveal to each other their common source—an object—and thus prove the object ; but that does not necessarily imply a convergence upon any quality of the object ; and hence, in that case, the object only is proved, not its qualities. But suppose that I am reduced, as in a former supposition, to the sense of sight alone, and have everything to learn. I see a red color. That is all I know about it, or about anything else. It tells me nothing. Now, I am further endowed with the sense of touch and the power of muscular motion, but

not the muscular sense, simply because the latter is not necessary to complete the illustration. I move my hand till I see that it touches the source of the red; and the red and the touch demonstrate the object, as already explained. Now, while I am looking at the red, I run my hand along over the surface of the object, and I see that my hand feels over that surface which is red, and I feel that the red which I see embraces the whole surface which gives me the sensation of touch; and thus extension is made known to me through the compound relation of the two sensations and the demonstrated object. The very first point at which sight and feeling converge is, by demonstration, a point of the object, not of the subject; and, as I move my hand along, each succeeding point is, by demonstration, a point of the object, not of the subject; and so the succession of points are, by demonstration, a succession of points in the object; and hence the succession of points—the extension—is a property of the object, not of the subject.

The same process of reasoning brings us to the conclusion that the primary quality called *solidity* is a quality of the object, not of the subject, and is demonstrated to be such by the convergence of two sensations, namely—that of touch, an affection of the sense of feeling, and that of resistance (force), an affection of the muscular sense.

In attempting to make out the genesis of our knowledge of this primary quality, *solidity*, the difficulties of the subject are very much increased by the absence of suitable terms that would help us to isolate, in thought, the two sensations, touch and resistance, and the primary quality, *solidity*, which they demonstrate. The terms *touch*, *resistance*, and *solidity* carry meanings which overlap each other, each one implying more or less of the import of both the others as well as its own; so that, in the popular mind, they are greatly entangled, the word touch implying more or less of resistance and *solidity*, resistance more or less of touch and *solidity*, and *solidity* more or less of touch and resistance. This tincturing of each with the meaning of the others follows the most cautious investigator in spite of himself, and, to a great extent, prevents him from perceiving the real relation of the phenomena which the words represent.

For the purpose of ridding the subject, as far as possible, of



this embarrassment, we would remind the reader that the meaning of the word *touch* must be limited to the simple sensation of contact, which may be best realized if the hand is at rest while the object is caused to come in contact with it; we thus free it of the muscular feeling of resistance, and also to some extent of the idea of solidity. The word *solidity* so obstinately carries with it the idea of both the feelings of touch and resistance by which the quality called solidity is demonstrated, that it is very difficult to think of it as a primary quality which, like extension, cannot be felt or seen at all. It does not stand apart in the mind from touch and resistance as distinctly as extension stands apart from color and touch. On this account, perhaps the term impenetrability would answer better than solidity; but impenetrability carries a non-technical meaning that is always obtruded upon the technical one, and it is objectionable on that account. The suggestion of the word will, at any rate, act as a corrective which will help us to hold the word solidity to the restricted meaning to which we wish to limit it—that is, to the primary quality, without any admixture either of the feeling of touch or of resistance. The word force, which is sometimes used as synonymous with our other term, *resistance*, might also act as a corrective to that term, and help us to hold it to the mere feeling of muscular contraction, isolated from the feeling of touch and from the idea of solidity. I deem it best, however, not to use the term at all, on account of the difficulty of restricting it as it should be. I shall therefore speak of the feeling of muscular contraction as the feeling of muscular contraction.

Now, my eyes being closed, if I bring my hand in contact with an object, the simple contact (when isolated from the feeling of muscular contraction by which it is brought about) gives me the sensation of touch; at the same time, the feeling of muscular contraction is abruptly modified the moment the feeling of touch begins: therefore the modified feeling of muscular contraction makes known to me the cause, the source of the sensation of touch, and the sensation of touch makes known to me the cause of the modification of the feeling of muscular contraction, and thus the object is demonstrated. Now, if, while the contact with the object continues, I increase the muscular effort, and thus intensify the feeling of muscular contraction, I at the same time intensify the feeling of touch, and a quality of the object is demon-



strated, called solidity, the various degrees and modifications of which, such as hardness, softness, fluidity, elasticity, etc., are dependent upon the modifications of the force of the muscular contractions, and hence the modifications of the feeling of muscular contraction and the modifications of the feeling of touch caused by the modifications of the force of the muscular contractions and by variations in the object touched. Solidity, then, is not a sensation, nor a mere combination of sensations, but is a demonstrated quality of the object.

Thus far, then, our analysis of external perception yields us two elements of its constitution, namely, a demonstrated object, and demonstrated object properties. But these two elements, either alone or in combination with each other, can never make a perception. We cannot perceive a mere object without properties; we cannot perceive the primary qualities, extension and solidity, without an object; nor can we perceive an object which has the qualities extension and solidity. In this respect they resemble all other demonstrated truths. All demonstrated truths are non-perceivable, and, because non-perceivable, inconceivable, using the term conceivable in its sharply defined and restricted acceptance.

Thus, I have before me a right-angled triangle with a square erected upon each of its three sides. I look at it for a long time, but in vain do I try to perceive or conceive the relative size of the big square as compared with the two small ones. But, now, I have discovered a process by which I demonstrate to myself that the big one is exactly equal to the sum of the two little ones, and it makes me just as certain of that fact as I am that either square is before me. With this positive knowledge of the true relation between those squares, I again try to perceive or conceive that the big one is equal to the sum of the two little ones, but I fail as completely as I did on the first trial, that is, I fail to perceive or conceive that the big one, *because it is a square upon the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle, is equal to the sum of the squares upon the other two sides*—for all this must be embraced in the perception or the conception. All my efforts to perceive or conceive that equality hopelessly end in one of two things: I either give up the effort as futile, and rest convinced that they are equal because I have just demonstrated them to be so, or else

I abridge the demonstration as much as possible, so that I take in the main steps of the operation, almost at a single grasp of my vision or of my imagination, in my efforts to perceive it or conceive it. But still it remains a demonstration, however abridged; and, hence, what I really perceive or conceive are the successive intuitions which enable me to know with an absolute certainty that the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides.

The existence of a mere object, aside from its properties, is a demonstrated fact, and, as such, it is non-perceivable, although it is known to exist with as absolute a certainty as that of the existence of the sensations by which it is proved. Furthermore, as its properties, extension and solidity, are also demonstrated facts, they of themselves are as non-perceivable as the object itself. And, finally, an extended, solid object, as is evident, is no more perceivable than the object alone or its properties alone; and yet its existence as an extended solid object—as a demonstration—is absolutely certain. But to exist in a world of such objects would be tantamount to existing in no world at all. Then, in external perception, something else must be added to this non-perceivable world by which it becomes a real perception, and, hence, the real world such as everybody knows it to be.

This brings us to the consideration of our sensations as an element in external perception in a very different way from that by which they demonstrate the existence of the non-perceivable object and its non-perceivable qualities. In other words, having shown that our sensations are the means by which the non-perceivable object, together with its non-perceivable properties, is demonstrated, we have now to show that these same sensations are the means by which the non-perceivable object and properties combined are made perceivable. We will, at the same time, show that, in doing this, our sensations—which as sensations alone are not perceptions, and hence are non-perceivable—do, when conjoined with the object and its qualities, become perceivable with them; so that the non-perceivable object and qualities, conjoined with the non-perceivable sensations, become the object perceived. *Thus, object and sensations—object and subject—determine each other.*

I perceive that red apple. The red, which I know is a sensation

essentially internal, seems to be out there, pertaining to the apple, as objective as the apple itself. We have seen that no mere sensation or combination of mere sensations can give that red such seeming objectivity. We have also seen that the two demonstrated elements of all external perceptions—the non-perceivable object and its non-perceivable qualities—can only be demonstrated to us by the convergence of the sensations of two or more senses upon them; in other words, by the combined relation of object and object properties with two or more sensations. Now, if we analyze this relation a little closer, it will be discovered that, in such a relation, the sensations, the subject qualities, from the very fact that they are thus related, must necessarily partake in appearance of the externality of the object and object qualities to which they are related, and must, therefore, seem to pertain to them. Thus, by supposition, I am again stripped of all my senses except that of sight, and have everything to learn. I see a red color. I experience the sensation for a long while; but it remains true to its real nature—subjective without change or apparent change. Now the sense of feeling and muscular motion are conferred upon me. I raise my hand before my eyes, and I cease to feel the sensation of red; it is obliterated. My conviction that it was an affection of myself is not shaken, however. I now move my hand farther from me, at the same time moving it from side to side, before me, and the red alternately appears and disappears; finally my hand touches something; but, as I continue to move it from side to side in contact with that something, the red appears and disappears as before. By this process both the object and its properties are demonstrated, as already explained, so that I know that, out there, is a solid, extended object. Now, by the same process, and at the same time that it gives me the demonstrations, I have traced the red to its source—the object; and by a delusion, which I have no means *at the time* of correcting, the red seems to be just under my hand, upon the surface of the object which is its source; and hence it seems to pertain to the object, not to the subject. I say, we have no means, *at the time*, of correcting the delusion; for our only means, at the time, are the related elements—the sensations, the object and the object qualities—and it is they, as related, that cause the delusion. Thus, the red, the sensation, defines and determines both the demonstrated object and

its properties, and is itself defined and determined by them; and now I have an external perception of a red object.

In the same way the feeling of touch becomes located seemingly upon the object, and associated with those modifications of solidity known as hardness, softness, elasticity, smoothness, etc. Thus, our object is perceived as a something which is shining, smooth, red, extended, hard, standing separate and apart from ourselves.

In the foregoing illustration, and in other similar ones made use of in this article, I have condensed into a few lines of description, and into a few moments of duration, vast processes of animal and human evolution, individual development and personal experiences, which might perhaps require volumes for their full description, and certainly have occupied ages in their full accomplishment. The reader will, of course, bear in mind that my brief illustrations, consisting of imaginary *personal* experiences, are to be taken simply as illustrations of vast processes of animal and human experiences with the accompanying organization of such experiences, the former varying so slowly and imperceptibly, and the latter creeping together so sluggishly and solidifying so silently, that no change seems startling or abrupt, and nothing is left (not even upon consciousness, animal or human) but results, induced and organized by methods and processes which can only be known subsequently through the investigations and analyses of science.

In conclusion, we have shown that an *unperceived* object is an extended, solid something which is separate and apart from our sensations.

We have also shown that we are as absolutely certain of the existence of that extended, solid something as we are of the existence of our sensations.

We have also shown that a *perceived* object is a union of—

1. A demonstrated object.
2. Demonstrated object properties.
3. Sensations, or subject properties.

Therefore, in external perception, there is a union of object and subject; and it turns out that this union is a more definite reality than we have, perhaps, hitherto been led to suppose.

## IS PANTHEISM THE LEGITIMATE OUTCOME OF MODERN SCIENCE?

BY W. T. HARRIS.<sup>1</sup>

### I. *Three Theologic Views of the World.*

In all theological and philosophical discussions it is necessary to go at once behind words to their meaning. In mathematics, natural science, and ethical science, it is of course equally necessary to define terms and use them consistently; but, inasmuch as natural and ethical sciences relate to facts and phenomena of observation and consist in large part of an inventory of such phenomena, it follows that there is much that remains of value after deducting careless and inaccurate reasoning, and making allowance for confusion in the use of terms. In philosophy and theology we do not find a store of immediate facts that retain their value even when misused by reflection. These sciences deal with reflection and results of reflection.

"Pantheism" is a term now very often used to name that view of the universe which, while it rejects the doctrine of a Personal First Cause of the world, on the other hand insists upon the dependence of nature and man upon a substantial principle or an impersonal Power from which everything emanates and into which it all returns. This use of the word "Pantheism" is comparatively a recent one. It was used by Toland early in the last century to denote a polytheistic worship of all the gods.

Our present inquiry in regard to the outcome of modern science doubtless requires us to employ the word in the meaning first defined. The question is, whether modern science leads toward a belief in a personal God or toward a belief in a blind unconscious power, or, finally, whether science finds only things and forces in the universe without unity in a first principle. For there are three hypotheses instead of two—atheism, pantheism, and theism. To him who finds no necessity for an ultimate unity of all things, there is only atheism. To him who sees the necessity of unity, but finds it a mere essence or substance from which

<sup>1</sup> Read at the Concord School of Philosophy, July 30, 1885.

things in their multiplicity arise, and into which they return, there is pantheism. Finally, the theist sees the necessity of unity, but, more than this, sees too the necessity of the form of personality as the form of any ultimate unity or totality.

Before discussing the tenability of either of these views let us consider for a moment the practical interest involved in them. In the idea of God, man defines for himself his theory of the origin and destiny of the world. The whence and the whither of nature and of man are involved in this idea, and through it, therefore, are determined his theoretical views and his practical activities. If he believes that this supreme principle is blind fate, unconscious force, or something devoid of intelligence and will, this belief will constantly modify all his thoughts and deeds, and ultimately shape them into harmony with his faith. If, on the other hand, he regards this supreme principle as a conscious personality, as absolute intelligence and will, this view will likewise shape his thoughts and deeds, but with a radically different result. The former theory is unfriendly to the persistence and triumph of human beings, or of any rational beings whatever. It will not account for the origin of conscious beings, showing how conscious reason is involved as a presupposition of unconscious being, or how the unconscious must necessarily develop into consciousness as one among its potentialities; still less can that theory permit the persistence of conscious individualities, for that would admit consciousness to be the highest principle, and not a mere phase or potentiality of unconscious being. Even if conscious individuals could emanate from an unconscious first principle, they would be finite and transitory phases, mere bubbles rising to the surface and breaking into nothing. The activity of the First Principle—and all conceptions of the First Principle must regard it as active—must be in accordance with its own nature, must tend to shape all things so as to correspond to that nature. For activity is expression; that which acts utters itself on that upon which it acts. It gives rise to modifications in an object by acting upon it, and these are its own expression; it again modifies, through its continued action upon the object, the modification which it had previously caused, and in all this continued action only secures a more perfect expression of itself.

An unconscious Absolute would in the first place express itself

in unconscious individualities. If we suppose that there were conscious individualities already existing upon which it could act, such an Absolute would produce modifications in them that would tend in the direction of an obliteration of the element of consciousness. On the other hand, the activity of a conscious Absolute would tend continually to the elevation of all unconscious beings, if there were any, toward consciousness. For its activity would tend to establish an expression of itself—the counterpart of its own being—in the object. If its created objects developed into consciousness, they would be sustained on that plane by the influence of the Absolute, and not allowed to lapse.

To unconscious beings it is all the same whether the Absolute is conscious or unconscious. It may create them and destroy them without cessation—what is that to them? But to human beings, or to any other rational beings, such a blind fate as an unconscious Absolute is utterly hostile and repugnant in every aspect. Their struggle for existence is a conscious one, and they strive ever toward a more complete consciousness and a larger sphere of directive will-power over the world in the interest of conscious, rational purposes. But an unconscious First Principle would be an absolute bar to the triumph of any such struggle. The greater the success of man's struggle for self-consciousness and freedom, the more unstable would become his existence. It would result in his being further removed from harmony with the activity of the unconscious absolute substance, and that activity would be more directly hostile and subversive of man's activity the more he had developed by rational culture. Hence, with a belief in an unconscious Absolute, rational beings find themselves in the worst possible situation in this world. Pessimism is their only true creed. Any sort of culture, development, or education for the so-called "faculties of the mind," all deeds having for their object the elevation of the race into knowledge and goodness—whatever, in short, is calculated to produce and foster human individuality—must have only one net result—the increase of pain. For the destruction of conscious individuality is attended with pain; and, the more developed and highly organized the individuality, the greater the pain attending upon its dissolution. Nor is the pain balanced by the pleasure of the exercise of human activity in its transient existence, for the negation and consequent pain is twofold—the

pain of birth and growth from a lower to a higher order of existence, and the pain of decay and death. The conscious struggle, being in direct opposition to the activity of forces of the Absolute involved in the creation of the personal beings, is a struggle full of pain; finally, the beings vanish through the agency of the destructive forces of the Absolute, a second pain, still more terrible.

On the basis of atheism there is utter indifference with regard to the ultimate origin and destiny of individual things. Inasmuch as immediate and independent existence is assumed for each and every thing, there is no origination, properly so called, nor any destiny. Everything is as it is, and absolutely so, on the strict atheistical basis. Each thing has always been and always will be: strict atheism is atomism. It is not atheism to hold that things and events are mere phenomena or appearances, and that behind them there are noumena or substantial beings or powers and forces. For such a theory implies a conviction that multiplicity demands unity, and this theory carried out results in the all-absorbing unity of pantheism. To remain on the standpoint of atheism it is requisite to deny relativity. According to atheism, there can be no essential dependence. All relations are accidental and each thing is sufficient for itself.

Once admitting the principle of relativity, atheism is no longer logically tenable. Mutual dependence among things reduces them to unity. This unity may be conceived as personal or as impersonal—and the result is theism or pantheism. According to pantheism, each and every immediate being is phenomenal. It is apparent and not real. It is a “manifestation of a hidden and inscrutable essence,” as Herbert Spencer asserts. Why “inscrutable” if it “manifests” itself, we ask? Because the essence in itself is devoid of all form and individuality. Individual things we can see and examine, but the essence which abides when all these things are destroyed, that we cannot perceive by any one of our five senses. The essence is abstract. It originates particular things, and it swallows them up again. They are not complete enough to reveal the essence. If one comes to the conception of essence by discovering necessary dependence on the part of things as exhibited in the process of change (origination and decay), he conceives it as negative unity—in other words, as a unity existing on a higher plane than the things and existing after



their destruction. Any force in its process of manifestation creates a series of states or conditions in matter each of which may be called a "thing." In the series the force abides and completes its manifestation through the creation and destruction of the states called "things," for force is a unity on a higher plane than that of the "things." Now, these forces themselves are not to be regarded as independent or as totalities, but as mutually dependent and relative. Hence they reduce again to a still higher unity, the so-called "persistence of force." The particular forces are abstract as compared with the things which they make; the ultimate force is an ultimate abstraction inasmuch as it retains neither the forms of things nor the forms of the special forces. Heat, light, electricity, gravitation, magnetism—all lose their characteristics in the ultimate force. In view of this conception, there is no immediate being that can survive throughout the entire process of the world. All must perish. Everything that has form and character must pass away. Things organic and inorganic, human beings and institutions, none are persistent. This is Pantheism.

But if the standpoint of reflection upon the facts and processes of the world is that of theism, the outlook is entirely different. Instead of a formless highest principle which is hostile to the permanence of all particular individuals, a highest principle is set up whose nature is perfect form. Perfect form contains not only the forming principle, but also the formed; it is self-determined and self-active, and hence subject and object. For theism finds the ultimate and absolute to be personality or perfect form instead of the negation of all form. Hence the world-process is to be interpreted rather as the evolution of this perfect form or conscious being rather than as a process of producing individualities with no purpose except to annul them. There is an ideal at the summit of the universe, perfect personality, the goal toward which creation moves. Hence with theism there is immortality for man and infinite progress possible. The divine Being is perfect form, and its influence gives a tendency in the universe toward the survival of whatever reaches conscious personality. It is understood here that personality implies consciousness and free will. Personality, according to theism, is not *per se* finite and limited, but is the true form of infinitude because it is self-determination, self-activity,

and not something which is originated and sustained by something else. Imperfect creatures, like men, participate in this self-activity, and have the possibility of infinitely growing into it by their own free activity.

In stating the practical interest involved in the three views of the world, we encounter here the chief objection which is made to theism. It is held that personality cannot be the form of the absolute or infinite, because limits and determinations are necessarily implied in the conception of personality; theism is therefore regarded as anthropomorphism. Theism departs from pantheism just at this point. The absolute is conceived as negative by pantheism. It is devoid of all attributes and properties—empty of all determinations. But theism conceives the absolute as self-determination or self-activity. Pantheism arrives at the void; theism arrives at the fullness of being.

The substantial thought of theism—its road to the idea of personality—is this: Every being must be either independent or dependent; if dependent, it belongs to some other being upon which it depends. The independent being is a whole or total. The independent being is likewise determinate, possessing attributes and properties. That which possesses no properties or attributes neither exists for itself nor for anything else—it is a pure nothing. Hence such an absolute as pantheism conceives is a pure nothing, and no real absolute. On the other hand, there are two kinds of determinate beings—those that are determined through others, and those that are determined by their own activity.

Finite beings are, as Spinoza said, those that are determined through others—depending on others and, therefore, belonging to other beings. Infinite beings are those which are their own others—depend on their own activity for their qualities and attributes. But the agnostic says: "I can form no idea whatever of a self-activity; it is only a word and means no more than 'round square' or 'white black.'" This convenient method of disposing of an idea by pronouncing it unthinkable is, however, not available. It proves altogether too much. Herbert Spencer uses it to disprove the fundamental notions that form the basis of Theology, Self-existence, and Creation. They are unthinkable. But he forgets his test of truth when he comes to the second part of his book and proves the persistence of force and matter. He admits that per-

sistent force is inconceivable, although he claims to be more certain of its existence than he is of any object of experience. Inconceivability, in fact, is no hindrance to cognition at all for any agnostic, because the term means nothing but unpicturability. Not only is self-activity unpicturable, but any motion or activity whatever is unpicturable, either in the imagination or on canvas. "A thing cannot move where it is, and, of course it cannot move where it is not," said Zeno. All categories involving activity are equally inconceivable — such, for example, as force, becoming, change, process, birth, and decay. So also are all categories of relation and dependence. But it may be said truly that all these ideas are conceivable if one adopts an adequate definition of "conceivable" and does not confound it with "picturable." A concept is not properly a picture at all, but rather a rule or schema for the formation of pictures. Under the concept horse we picture to ourselves a particular horse, but we at once recognize the difference between our picture and the general schema which we think in our concept.

The important element in a concept is the definition. Just as the unpicturable notion of "persistent force" is an ultimate truth according to Mr. Herbert Spencer, so, if rightly considered, self-activity or self-determination is presupposed by persistent force, and persistent force is unthinkable except in the form of self-activity.

According to the idea of correlation of forces, one force in acting passes over into another. Thus heat, light, electricity, and other forces vanish the one into the other. Thus forces, thought as a complete series, make up a circle of activity, the last of the series becoming the first. The persistent force is the energy common to all and underlying all. Each particular force is aroused to activity by the action of another, but the persistent force is not a particular force over against another, but the totality of energy as a unity. The persistent force is, of course, an energy, an activity, that is not derived from another. It is therefore self-active. It is clear, therefore, that persistent force is not happily named "force." A force is usually thought as existing in a state of tension with other forces; it is conditioned by them, and essentially a finite being. But the all-inclusive energy of the entire system of forces is a self-related energy, and hence a self-activity.

We now can see the futility of the argument against theism that it involves anthropomorphism. Self-activity is not finite limitation, but mastery over limitation. Self-activity, which belongs to the very definition of mind, is the essence of freedom and power to transcend limits. But it is surprising that while repudiating self-consciousness and will, the two forms of self-activity, pantheism is ready to admit force or power as an attribute of the absolute. Force or power, implying a tension of opposites, is an idea actually below the anthropomorphic idea, because it directly involves finitude.

Perfect form or self-existent being must necessarily be self-determined being, and, therefore, have the form of mind or self-consciousness, and, inasmuch as man has this form, it may be called anthropomorphic. All totalities, all independent beings, have the form of self-determination, and are subject and object of themselves, and in this sense anthropomorphic. To speak of anthropomorphism in this sense as limitation is like saying that the form of infinitude is a limitation. Persistent force, regarded as the totality of the complex of finite particular forces (or as an "ultimate scientific idea"), is of necessity self-determined, and hence it, too, is anthropomorphic.

## II. *The Method of Modern Science.*

Having thus considered the definitions of pantheism and the outcome of the generalizations made by the scientific mind in our time looking toward the ultimate nature of the principle underlying the world of objectivity, let us turn our attention to the aspect of modern science that is least identified with philosophical thinking—namely, its empirical method. If we can learn by our investigation what it presupposes, we shall find ourselves in a position to determine the answer to the objection made to all philosophical and theological conclusions whatever—the objection, namely, from the standpoint of "positive" or empirical science to the effect that we cannot transcend experience, and that experience is only possible in regard to finite and relative objects, and in no wise possible in regard to an ultimate principle. On this ground it utterly repudiates what it calls "introspection" and the "method of introspection." Moreover, it declares against all generalizations not based on and derived from external experiment, claiming

that all scientific knowledge is knowledge obtained through specialization and actual inventory of details. It thus rejects all inferences of a theological character and holds them to be unwarranted by science.

It is not the necessity of specialization for purposes of making an inventory of nature that militates against philosophy or theology, for why should not both these exist as well as specialized inventorying? It is the attitude of the scientists against all general surveys. They assume that these general surveys are not only unnecessary, but vicious in all science; hence they deny the existence of a scientific philosophy or theology.

But this assumption of scientists can be shown to be wholly grounded on a misapprehension of their own procedure in scientific knowing. It is due, in other words, to an incorrect account of the processes involved in the scientific method itself. It is a simple matter to initiate and carry on some one of the scientific processes by which discoveries are made, but the system of science as a whole is presupposed as a sort of invisible guide or norm that makes possible the act of specialization. We have division of labor and the specialization of the work of the individual because of the system of collection and distribution which commerce carries on, and by which it supplies each with the needed food, clothing, and shelter that he does not produce, for the reason that he is engaged in his special vocation that furnishes only one of the many required necessities.

The special scientist cannot confine his attention to one subject without definition and limitation effected by the collective labors of his fellows, not only in their special departments lying contiguous to his own, but as well by their labors to state the relations of the special results to each other.

In order, therefore, to discuss with profit this question of Pantheism as the outcome of modern natural science, we must first investigate the relation of specialized inquiry to its organization into a system, or, in other words, to a general survey of the whole scientific field.

The specialist sometimes supposes that his industry is all that is required for the creation of science in its completeness. He condemns what is called the philosophy of his subject as though it were premature generalization and unwarranted systematizing.

On the other hand, it must be confessed that the philosopher is apt to be impatient at the plodding toil and narrow gains of the specialist. But the fact that it needs both species of investigation becomes evident when we look to the practical field of human activity. Man must act as well as think.

The will executes while the intellect surveys or analyzes. In the performance of a deed the will should act in view of all the circumstances, but this view of all the circumstances is an intellectual survey. Hence human action demands a general survey of the circumstances before it in order to act rationally. Suppose we omit the philosophical activity of the intellect—leave out the generalization consequent on a survey of the whole—and try to act with the aid of the specializing intellect alone? Then the will resolves and executes in view of a fragmentary circumstance, and does not weigh one particular motive with another. The result will be lame and impotent, because it lacks considerateness and looks neither before nor after, but acts from one motive, and a trivial one, because it is an intentionally special view and not a general survey.

The necessity of practical activity in any province, therefore, demands the intellectual activity of forming a general survey, as well as the intellectual activity of analyzing and specializing. It is important to see how these co-ordinate.

Rational will-power is the will under the guidance of directive intelligence. This intelligence surveys various objects of action and selects one of them as desirable; it surveys likewise various modes of action and adopts what seems to be the best. Now, it is clear enough that analytical investigation may divide and subdivide objects and means forever; if the will waits for the completion of analytical investigation, it waits forever. The analytical intelligence can never arrive at a conclusion. Its analysis only serves to open up new vistas of further investigation. But at any point of its procedure it is possible for the intellect to stop its analytical investigation and unify its results by comparison, sum all up in a general conclusion, saying, "In view of all that is thus far discovered, this conclusion will follow." The trend is discoverable when only two facts are ascertained; a third fact may reveal a modification of the previously discovered trend, or perhaps only confirm it. The practical activity, whenever called upon

to perform a deed demands a cessation of analytical investigation and the interposition of a general survey, in order to discover the trend that is revealed by the facts discovered; with this provisional view of the whole, it acts as rationally as is possible with its imperfect intelligence.

Admitting that the increase of light by the further discovery of new facts by the aid of the analytical intellect is a never-ending process, we shall admit also that the will may act more and more rationally according to the quantity of analytical, specializing work of the intellect that has been performed. But there can be no direct step from the specializing activity to the will-activity of man. There must always supervene a summing up of those special results in a general survey before they become of any practical use. The jury must not permit themselves to decide until the case is closed. The case must be closed when only a part of the facts are in, because only a part of the facts can be ascertained. In any science the facts can never be all ascertained, because each fact is divisible by analysis into constituent facts, each process into constituent processes forever. This is evident from the infinite divisibility of time and space. Therefore we may affirm without contradiction that specializing science must admit the necessary intervention of the philosophic activity which takes general views or surveys before its results can become useful in human activity.

But this is not all: if we examine what constitutes a science we shall be compelled to acknowledge that mere specializing analytical industry can never produce a science. Science is systematic knowledge. Facts are so united to other facts within a science that each fact sheds light upon all facts; and every fact upon each fact. From the special facts discovered by the analytical activity of the intellect, not only no practical use would ensue, but no theoretic use except through their synthesis by general surveys. A science results only after the particular facts obtained by analytic specialization are summed up. The case must be closed, and for the moment the assumption made that all the facts are in, if we are to discover the connecting link which binds the facts into a system. Without system no mutual illumination occurs among the facts; each is opaque and dark. So long as a fact in a science does not yet help explain other facts, and receive



explanation from them, it is as yet no organic part of the science. It is itself an evidence of the imperfection of the science. The science appears only when the general survey has become possible. Facts are united into a system by principles—energies that include forces and laws.

Studying more carefully the function of the synthetic activity of the mind as seen in the general survey, its difference from the analytic activity becomes clear. The analytic specializing divides and subdivides the fact or process before it, and goes from wholes to parts. The synthetic discovers unities of facts by means of relations of dependence. This phase or fact and that phase or fact are parts or results of one process, and so it concludes that they may be comprehended in one. Then, again, it steps back from the discovered unity and looks for relation to other unities and its dependence on a higher process, which unites it with co-ordinate processes. Each new generalization is only an element of a higher generalization.

Science demands inventory, general survey, and experiment. Even in the matter of making an inventory, science avails itself of general survey under the form of definition. No definition can be made without such a survey, for it involves an attempt to grasp together a whole class under some common characteristic. Without the definition hovering in the mind, how shall one know which facts to include in its inventory and which to exclude? To take any and all facts without limiting the selection within a category would be the purest futility. Inventory proceeds, therefore, by recognizing new individuals as belonging to a previously described class. Within this class new characteristics are to be recognized and new sub-classifications made. Experiment, too, starts from a principle already generalized or assumed as an hypothesis—thus grounded in a general survey, like the inventory-process, only far more explicit. A fact is to be found and identified by the inventory; but by the experiment it is to be constructed. The theory or hypothesis is derived from general survey, and it furnishes the rule for the construction of the fact. If it finds the reality accord with it, there is verification of the theory or hypothesis—the principle is confirmed. If the reality does not result according to the theory, there is a refutation of it. The theory was simply an extension of the



conclusion drawn from the general survey from what was before known.

Analytical specialization is most successful in the form of experiment, and is guided by hypotheses. Witness the immense fertility of biological research in recent science when its industry is guided by the Darwinian hypothesis. That hypothesis is, of course, like all theories, the result of a general survey, the synthetic activity of the mind. This is what may be called the philosophical activity of the mind. It closes the case, stops the process of analysis and inventory of new facts, assumes that all facts are in, and asks in view of them: "What unity, what principle is presupposed?" The answer to this question unites into a system what is known, and furnishes an hypothesis or provisional theory for further analysis and inventory of special facts. Thus the philosophical activity enters science as an indispensable factor, and alternates with the analytical activity that discovers new facts.

But there is another phase of the synthetic activity of mind which transcends this hypothetic synthesis, this making of provisional theories. It is the *a priori* synthesis that underlies all mental activity. Intellect recognizes by an *a priori* act time and space as the logical condition of the existence of all nature—the entire totality of facts and events. What it knows of Time and Space is formulated in the science of mathematics as so much theory of nature that is known *a priori*. So much is not in need of experimental verification, because it is certain at the very outset that nothing can exist in the world unless it conforms to the mathematical laws of time and space. Besides the mathematical elements of theory there are other *a priori* elements equally sovereign in their sway over experience; such are the law of causality, the principles of excluded middle and contradiction, the ideas of quality and quantity, the idea of the conservation of energy. The mariner ploughs the sea, looking from wave to wave, passing from horizon to horizon, but he holds on his course only by the observations which he makes ever and anon of the eternal stars. So the specialist lifts his eyes from the multitudinous seas of facts through which he moves to the fixed lights of mathematical truth or to the planets of provisional theory, and is able to go forward to a desired haven.

### III. *Scientific Method presupposes Living Energy as First Principle.*

The synthetic activity of the intellect looks at the history of its object. It expects to find in the history of its growth and development a complete revelation of the nature of its object. That which offers itself to the senses as the object perceived is not the whole of the phenomenon, but only one of its manifestations. We may call the phenomenon the entire process of manifestation, including all the phases. In one moment some one phase is exhibited, in another moment some other phase.

The acorn which we see lying on the ground is not the whole process of its manifestation—not the whole phenomenon. It is only a temporary phase in the growth of an oak. In the course of time this acorn would sprout from the soil and become, first a sapling, then a great tree, bearing acorns again. The acorn itself depends upon the whole process which forms the life of the oak, and is to be explained only by that process. So likewise any other phase or immediate manifestation in the life of the oak—its existence as a young sapling, or as a great tree, or as a crop of leaves, blossoms, or, indeed, a single leaf, or blossom, or bud.

Science sees the acorn in the entire history of the life of the oak. It sees the oak in the entire history of all its species, in whatever climes they grow. It sees the history of the oak in the broader and more general history of the life of all trees, of all plants; and, finally, it considers plant life in its relations to the mineral below it and to the animal above it.

To see an object in its necessary relations to the rest of the world in time and space is to comprehend it scientifically.

The object just before our senses now is only a partial revelation of some being that has a process or history, and we must investigate its history to gain a scientific knowledge of it. Its history will reveal what there is in it. No object is a complete revelation of itself at one and the same moment. The water which we lift to our lips to drink has two other forms: it may be solid, as ice, or an elastic fluid, as steam. It can be only one of these at a time. Science learns to know what water is by collecting all its phases—solid, liquid, and gaseous—and its properties as revealed in the history of its relations to all other objects in the

world. So, likewise, the pebble which we pick up on the street is to be comprehended through its geological history—its upheaval as primitive granite, its crushing by the glaciers of the Drift Period, and its grinding and polishing under icebergs.

We must trace whatever we see through its antecedent forms, and learn its cycle of birth, growth, and decay. This is the advice of modern science. We must learn to see each individual thing in the perspective of its history. All aspects of nature have been, or will be, brought under this method of treatment. Even the weather of to-day is found to be conditioned by antecedent weather, and the Signal Bureau now writes the history of each change in the weather here as a progress of an atmospheric wave from west to east. The realm which was thought a few years since to be hopelessly under the dominion of chance, or subject to incalculably various conditions and causes, is found to be capable of quite exact investigation. This is all due to the method of studying each particular thing as a part of a process. When the storm-signal stations extend all over the world, we shall learn to trace the history of atmospheric waves and vortices back to the more general movements of the planet, diurnal and annual, and we shall find the connecting links which make a continuous history for the weather of to-day with the eternal process of exchange going on between the frigid and torrid air-zones, and trace the relation of this to the telluric process of earthquakes and the periodic variation of sun-spots and their dependence upon the orbital revolution of Jupiter and other planets. Doubtless we shall not see a science of astrology, predicting the fortune of the individual man by the foreordained aspects of the planets under which he was born; but it is quite probable that, when the history of the meteorological process becomes better known, we shall be able to cast the horoscope of the weather for an entire season.

This method of science, now consciously followed by our foremost men of science, is not an accidental discovery, but one which necessarily flows out of the course of human experience. For what is experience but the process of collecting the individual perceptions of the moment into one consistent whole? Does not experience correct the imperfection of first views and partial insights by subsequent and repeated observations? The present has to be adjusted to the past and to the future. Man cannot choose—he

must learn in the school of experience; and the process of experience, blindly followed upon compulsion, when chosen by conscious insight as its method, becomes science.

The difference, therefore, between the scientific activity of the mind and the ordinary common-sense activity lies in this difference of method and point of view. The ordinary habit of mind occupies itself with the objects of the senses as they are forced upon its attention by surrounding circumstances, and it does not seek and find their unity. The scientific habit of mind chooses its object, and persistently follows its thread of existence through all its changes and relations.

Science has not been conscious of its method to such a degree that it could follow it without deviation until quite recent times. We might say that Darwin, of our own generation, is the first to bring about the use of the historical method as a conscious guide to investigation. And, indeed, although science has found the true method, it has not seen the ground of the method—its ultimate presupposition. It has much to say of evolution, and justifies its method by the doctrine of development of all that is from antecedent conditions. Homogeneity and simplicity characterize the first stages; complexity and difference of quality and function characterize the later stages. There is growth in a special direction. By survival we learn to know what is most in accord with the final purpose of nature. But we cannot see this teleology or final purpose except by taking very large arcs of the total circle of development.

The reason for this historical method, however, is to be found in the necessity already shown, to wit: All total or whole beings—that is to say, independent beings—are self-determined beings. Self-activity is the basis of all causal action, all dependence, all transference of influence. Hence it follows that when we behold a manifestation, phase, or incomplete exhibition of something, we look farther to see the whole of which it is a part. We look back to its antecedents, and forward to its consequents, and by these construct its history. We have not found it as a whole until we have found it as energy that initiates its own series of changes and guides them to a well-defined goal. The oak as a living organism thus initiates its series of reactions against its environment of earth and air, and converts the elements which it takes up

from without into vegetable cells, and with these builds its organs and carries itself forward in a well-defined method of growth from acorn through sapling, tree, blossom, fruitage, to acorn again as the result. All inorganic processes likewise, when traced into their history, exhibit the form of cycles, or revolutions, that return into the same form that they began with, thus repeating their beginning, or rather making a sort of spiral advance upon it. The energy that repeats again and again its cycle of activity is either life itself or an image or *simulacrum* of life. The annual round of the seasons, the daily succession of day and night, the cycle of growth of the planets themselves, or even of the solar systems—each of these is an image of life, as Plato long ago pointed out. All points back to an efficient energy somewhere that is its own cause in the sense that it originates its movements and changes and causes its own realization.

#### IV. *Three Stages of Scientific Consciousness.*

The reason why this presupposition of a First Principle in the form of a living energy is not seen clearly by all students of natural science is to be found in the repudiation of introspection—which we have disensed above as the boasted advantage claimed by the specializing analytical activity of science. In thinking there are three stages of culture or development, well marked, since the time of Plato. These three grades of culture in thought stand for three degrees of capacity to think the First Principle of the world. Or rather each of these grades has its View of the World peculiar to itself. The difference between the several stages of thought depends upon the capacity to see an object in its entirety.

*a.* The lowest stage of thinking considers its objects as isolated and independent things, and ignores the importance of relations. As it isolates its objects and holds them apart or abstracts them from all relations, I call it “abstract” thinking. As it supposes that all relations are non-essential and due to merely external combining of objects, it insists on thinking atoms as the ultimate elements of existence. It is the atom-stage of thought. As it knows by experience that bodies are composite, its theory sustains itself by holding that large bodies are made of small bodies.

*b.* But a higher stage of thinking supervenes when the mind begins to become conscious of essential relations; when it discovers

that one object depends upon another in such a manner that a change in the one modifies the other, it comes to see that objects are not independent existences, but that they are terms of ratios. Change one term of a ratio, or fraction, and you must change the other, or else the value of the ratio or fraction will suffer change. To find that an object is a term of a ratio is to find that it is not a whole complete existence in itself, but that it is a portion of an including whole, and is what it is only through the activity of a process. At this stage of thinking it discovers that objects are phenomena and not essential beings. Take this stone under my feet. It seems to me at first to be something complete in itself, but observation and reflection convince me that it is heavy and attracted to the centre of the earth and to the sun and to all the stars, however distant. Change the weight of the earth and you change the weight of this stone, and the relation of its gravity to its cohesion changes, and who knows whether a single quality of it would remain as it is? Everything is phenomenal, a manifestation of a sort of ratio of forces hidden behind the visible objects, and these visible objects reveal those forces in their properties and changes. Since the discovery of the law of gravity by Newton our studies of the world have been coming gradually to this stage. I call it the "concrete" stage of thought, because it thinks things in their concrete relations.

c. But this is not the highest stage of thought. Even natural science has achieved a higher thought than this in its best minds. Plato long ago discriminated four stages of thought, and called the highest stage the one that thought things as a totality or as a whole, whose principle he called "self-movement." Looking not at any result in particular, but at the spirit of the scientific inquiry, or at the method it uses, we have found that its purpose is to study an object as a part of a process having a history. We have seen how it traces out the several stages of the process and finds the antecedent steps through which the object came to be as it is, and infers the steps that it will next develop. Any process is complete when its end produces its beginning again. Then each fact is explained by all others, and contributes in turn to their explanation.

The First Principle, as seen by the most elementary stage of thought, is an atom, or rather a universe of atoms. For it looks upon everything as perfectly real, perfectly independent. If it

thinks of the action of one thing upon another, it is in the habit of personifying things after the manner of Feticism. There is not One Supreme Person, but many co-ordinate personalities exist for it in accidental relation to each other. Each is an atom at rest, or a personal atom when in motion.

The second stage of thought has begun to reflect profoundly. It has seen essential relation, or dependence. Since the discovery of dependence resolves what had seemed separate and plural into unity—for a dependent being is only a part of some whole that is independent—it follows that this second stage arrives at an all-absorbing unity as the First Principle of the universe. It reaches a pantheistic view of the world. This is the prevailing stage of culture of those who are interested in natural science on account of its general surveys of the universe, just as feticism is the natural point of view of those who are interested in the mere inventory of the things of the world, the first stage of science and the first stage of thought. It may be well to remark here that even the highest religion, when seized by a mind incapable of any other than the atom-stage of thinking, will be lowered into some form of feticism.

The third stage of thought arises in natural course by the growth of reflection up to the point where it sees the totality of relation. Relation traced out must return to the being from whence it started. This is to be clearly conceived only as self-activity. Even the doctrine of Persistent Force, upon which Mr. Spencer lays so much stress as the ultimate idea of science, involves this notion of self-activity, as we have already shown. For this persistent force, which is neither heat, light, electricity, nor magnetism, but is the underlying force, is certainly not correlated with any of the particular forces, but is a totality by itself. Hence it is not incited to activity by another force, but must be self-incited. It incites all the special forces to activity while itself is self-determined.

#### V. *Theism the True Outcome of Science.*

To the question whether modern natural science is pantheistic, therefore, we are constrained to answer, Yes, in its middle stages of thought, because the second stage of thinking is in its very nature pantheistic. But modern natural science is likewise atheistic



when we view it as reflected in minds that have not got beyond the first stage of thought. They do not reach a thought of a unity transcending all finite individuals, but rest in the idea of an indefinite multiplicity of atomic individuals. But science is theistic in all minds that see the trend of its method. The study of all things in the light of the history of their evolution discovers a progress toward "perfect form" or conscious being. Stated in the law of survival of the fittest, the universe is so constituted as to place a premium on the development of intellect and will-power. This would be impossible on the basis of pantheism.

In proportion to the degree of self-activity reached by any individual, it achieves control over nature and possesses ability to make social combinations with its fellows. By this capacity for social combination, man of all animals is able to move against nature in an aggregate as a race, and infinitely surpass his efforts as an individual or as a multitude of individuals detached from organization into a social whole. It follows that in proportion as science directs itself to the study of human institutions it becomes impressed with the superiority of spiritual laws over the laws governing organic and inorganic bodies. By intelligence and will man can form institutions and make possible the division of labor and the collection and distribution of the aggregate productions of the entire race. Each individual is enabled by this to contribute to the good of the whole, and likewise to share in the aggregate of all the fruits of industry.

While material bodies exclude each other and do not participate, spirits, endowed with intelligence and will, participate and share in such a manner as to raise the individual to the potency of the race. This amounts to making the individual a universal. When each receives the fruits of the physical labor of all, each fares as well as if he were sole master and all mankind were his slaves; but as master he would be charged with the supervision and direction of all—an infinite burden; this burden he avoids in free social combination, wherein each for his own interest works at his best for the sake of the market of the world, and thus benefits all, though incited by his selfish desire for gain. The material productions of the race are, however, of small moment compared with the fund of human experience, which is first lived and then collected and distributed to each man, so that each lives the



life of all and profits by the experience of all. The scientific man inventories nature through the sense-perceptions of all his fellow-men, and assists his reflections by the aid of their ideas. The life of the whole is vicarious; the individual gets its results without having to render for them the equivalent of pain and labor incident to the original experience.

Participation is the supreme principle of the life of spirit—of intelligent and volitional being. Experience has discovered, by the mistakes of myriads of lives, what human deeds are conducive to the life of participation which endows the individual with the fruits of the labor and the wisdom of this experience of the race. Hence the will acts in the channels marked out as co-operative with the whole. This is moral action.

As science widens its domain and correlates one province with another, it comes to realize in consciousness the spiritual principle of participation which makes science itself possible as the accredited knowledge attained by the joint labors of the race. It comes to realize, moreover, that its method implies in another shape the same principle, because it makes each fact throw light on every other while it explains each in the accumulated light of all the rest. Using the symbol of society, and its principle of participation which is the essence of spiritual life, we may say that science spiritualizes nature by setting each of its individual facts in the light of all facts, and thus making it universal by the addition of the totality of its environment.

Unless the universe were based on a spiritual basis, whence could come the significance of the universal as the illuminating and explaining principle? Just as the principle of the division of labor in the province of productive industry, so, too, the principle of specialization in the prosecution of scientific investigation is rendered possible by the spiritual principle of participation. It presupposes the collection and distribution of the results of all and to all. While material products diminish by distribution, spiritual products, in the shape of moral habits and intellectual insights, increase by being shared. The more a truth is reflected in the minds of others, the better it is defined and understood. The investigator may safely trust himself on his lonely journey into details because he is sure that these details are fragments of the total process and organically related to the whole, so that he is

bound to find the unity again when he has completed the discovery of the history of the fragment before him. The typical man of science, Cuvier, can see the whole animal in one of his bones; Agassiz can see the whole fish in one of his scales; Lyell can see the history of a pebble in its shape and composition; Winckelmann sees the whole statue of a Greek goddess in a fragment of the nose or the angle of the opening eyelids. "All is in all," as Jacotot used to say. But not the fulness of realization of the highest is in the lowest. The lowest presupposes the highest as its Creator, of which it is the manifestation, although not the *adequate revelation*. By so much as material bodies lack of self-activity they lack of revealing the highest principle. According to the principle of Evolution, all things are on the way toward the realization of the perfect form. The perfect form is self-activity, as personal intelligence and will. While in the lower orders of being the individual is farthest off from realizing the entire species within its singularity, yet in the higher orders that possess intelligence and will, this becomes possible, and each may, by continued activity, enter into the heritage of the race in knowledge and ethical wisdom. The perfect form is that complete self-determination which constitutes Absolute Personality. Finite relativity is grounded on the self-relativity of such an Absolute. In the investigation of this field of relativity Science is discovering the pre-supposition, and in this quest it is therefore on its way toward Theism.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

A TRIBUTE TO THE HEROES GRANT AND GARFIELD.

BY WILLIAM ELLERY CHANNING.

I.—GARFIELD: THE MARTYRED CHRISTIAN PATRIOT.

*“Crete,<sup>1</sup> look! the ships have come.”*

The many fade, the one remains and smiles,  
Life's shadows fly, 'tis heaven that's whispering near,  
Beyond the grave, beyond the farthest isles,  
From all the old romantic World,—a tear;—  
Like the wild bugle's call that told his flight  
Upon the dark, the starless, sorrowing night.

Oh! not the soldier's doom, the bleeding strife,  
Oh! not in falling age with silvery hair;  
Borne like the seasons o'er a people's life,  
His sweet endurance warmed the sobbing air.  
For such a man to live, for such to die,  
It sanctifies, it wafts on high our low humanity.

Dear heart, how calm, how patient was thy thought,  
When the fell anguish slowly mined thy frame!  
Dear, generous soul, thy loftier manner brought  
A nation's tear-drops round an honored name.  
We weep for thee,—weep that we are not thine,  
In all thy true sublimity, one so divine.

'Tis autumn's breath that lifts the moaning sea,  
The vessels float across her surges borne,  
And falls around the brave monotony,  
That ceaseless surf-note from old ocean torn;  
How cheerful was his thought, “Crete, I am glad;  
Look at the ships! they feel for me, be not sad.”

A nation weeps! Cold hearts that *must* not feel,  
Come forth and waste their efforts in the stream;  
These hours are monuments and stamp their seal  
Upon a people's history. Oh, we deem,  
Mother and friend! thy life all sacredly,  
Even as he spake, “Be of good cheer,” to thee.

<sup>1</sup> [These words were spoken in his last week, and the bugle was heard upon the last night! “Crete,” the name he gave his wife.]

*The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.*

There is a death, it consecrates man's lot,—  
 He does *not* die, he lives far more than all;  
 His life is just begun, oh, sorrow not!  
 He lifts—himself, he lifts his tear-stained pall.  
 The people weep; such heavenly virtues claim  
 A sea of patient tears, they bathe a glorious name.

Yes, glorious! 'tis a hero's loftiest death,  
 No anxious dread, no moans, nor weak complaint,—  
 Nothing save gentlest tenderness, that breath  
 With fearful, fatal anguish, palsied, faint;  
 No sigh, no dull reproach, "I love the sea;"  
 'Twas all; the sunlit waves, he loved their gentle glee.

He felt them beat along the patient shore.  
 Where the wild gull flew baffling on the breeze,  
 The ever-rolling crash the pebbles bore,  
 The dark green gulf-weed tossing off the seas,—  
 He saw it all: "Crete, see! the ships have come;  
 They're glad for me," the pageant seemed like home.

He dreamt of his far homestead 'mid the fields,  
 He saw the meadows and the sighing woods,  
 His wounds must pierce, but love that nature yields  
 Beat in his noble breast, and her glad moods,  
 Like the strong currents of the autumnal wind,  
 Poured thro' his generous thought, his healthful mind.

"And is this all,—came there no hope for me,—  
 This sorrow, and the wail of nations in my ear?  
 No justice, Lord! how must I pray to thee,  
 When here am I and he on yonder bier?  
 He was my all, my heart, my joy and life:  
 O God! renew my peace, oh, still this strife!"

No more, no more a tear, no more a sigh,  
 Heaven does not weep when lives the good man there,  
 But angels sing and holy seraphs cry,  
 "The good are now in rest, the heart in prayer."  
 He never dies in vain who lived to do  
 His duty as *he* did, dies not that virtue true!

## II.—GRANT: THE DEFENDER OF THE UNION.

A hero's crown, a hero's tribute bear!  
 What shall it be? yon hoop of glittering stones  
 That old-world kings hereditary wear?  
 Or mouldering shrines carved from their victim's bones?  
 Not such for thee, modest, and true, and right,  
 Our patriot Grant, thy countrymen's delight.

Far, where "the Beauteous river,"<sup>1</sup> rolling, runs;  
 Far, thro' the walnut groves, the sycamore;  
 Down, down the purple vales whose glorious suns  
 Array the seasons with their fruitful lore,—  
 There, from his modest home, a hero came,  
 Beneath the ancestral trees that lisped his name.

Gentle of speech, most kindly in his heart,  
 He grew to manhood, loved and prized by all,  
 One of our noble classes, by his art  
 Mechanic raised above the royal thrall,  
 Man, from the working classes, free and good,  
 By virtue of such rank, sweet to the multitude.

The landscape smiled, the purple vales shone fair,  
 Light waved the alder-tassels o'er the streams,  
 And yet a haze crept o'er the lake, the air,  
 A troubled murmur breaking the gay dreams.  
 Grant! in thy patriot-heart thou heard'st the call:  
 God calls for manhood,—“Freedom must not fall.”

Thou heard'st that cry for freedom in thy soul;  
 Then peaceful, tender streams ran red with gore,  
 The generous field bore crops of bloody tales,  
 The wave with sinking ships all stranded o'er.  
 Just God! such strife as *this* must brothers see?  
 Father of love, fearful were victory!

Years fled and fled, yet marched the embattled host;  
 The mother sank,—she wept her murdered boy;  
 The church-yard groaned, squadrons are raised and lost,  
 When shall war end,—is fate a nation's toy?  
 When *must* it end? The Union shall remain,  
 As *one*, un Sundered still, they try their plots in vain.

He found the path, the war-path of the fray.  
 He said: “I fight it out upon this line,”  
 Come weal or woe, or fair or foul the day,  
 An iron hand demands a steel divine.  
 Unyielding, fixed, yet merciful to all,  
 Grant kept his line and saved the Union's fall.

A thousand years may run, his name shall stand  
 Bright as a sunshine pillar on the past.  
 His gentle heart, his resolute command,  
 Loved by us all, as North or South is fast,—  
 Fast in the nation's heart,—whate'er may come,  
 Grant is the people's pride, his country's home.

<sup>1</sup> The meaning of “*Ohio*,” the Indian name.

The strife is o'er, the landscape smiles again ;  
 Far o'er her fertile vales the sun-god pours  
 His purple blessings on the inland main,  
 And smiling ships embrace her peaceful shores.  
 Thro' heaven's design our Grant was sent to be  
 Chosen of him, to bring us Liberty!

LECTURES ON PANTHEISM AT THE CONCORD SCHOOL.

In this number we print four of the discussions of the Symposium at the Concord School of Philosophy held last summer. The subject, "Is Pantheism the Legitimate Outcome of Modern Science?" was treated also by Messrs. John Fiske and Francis Ellingwood Abbot in elaborate papers, which have since been expanded by their authors into books and published. The following advertisements indicate the character of the contents of these books:

THE IDEA OF GOD AS AFFECTED BY MODERN KNOWLEDGE. By JOHN FISKE.

*Contents:* Difficulty of expressing the Idea of God so that it can be readily understood; The Rapid Growth of Modern Knowledge; Sources of the Theistic Idea; Development of Monotheism; The Idea of God as immanent in the World; The Idea of God as remote from the World; Conflict between the Two Ideas, commonly misunderstood as a Conflict between Religion and Science; Anthropomorphic Conceptions of God; The Argument from Design; Simile of the Watch replaced by Simile of the Flower; The Craving for a Final Cause; Symbolic Conceptions; The Eternal Source of Phenomena; The Power that makes for Righteousness; Notes.

Published by Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston and New York. 16mo. Price, \$1.

SCIENTIFIC THEISM. By FRANCIS ELLINGWOOD ABBOT, Ph. D.

*General Synopsis of the Argument for Scientific Theism.*

- I. The Foundation of Scientific Theism is the Philosophized Scientific Method.
- II. The Ground-Principle of the Philosophized Scientific Method is the Infinite Intelligibility of the Universe *per se*.
  1. What is Intelligibility?  
*Ans.* Intelligibility is the Possession of an Immanent Relational Constitution.
  2. What is Intelligence?

*Ans.* Intelligence is :

- (1) The Sole Discoverer of Immanent Relational Constitutions.
  - (2) The Sole Creator of Immanent Relational Constitutions.
  - (3) Identical in all Forms, and in all Teleological.
- III. The Infinite Intelligibility of the Universe proves its Infinite Intelligence, because only an Infinite Intelligence could create an Infinite Relational Constitution.
- IV. The Synchronous Infinite Intelligibility and Infinite Intelligence of the Universe prove that it is an Infinite Subject-Object, or Infinite Self-conscious Intellect.
- V. The Immanent Relational Constitution of the Universe-Object, being Infinitely Intelligible, must be an Absolutely Perfect System of Nature ; therefore :
1. Not Chaos, which would be no System at all.
  2. Not a mere Multitude of Monads or Atoms, which would be an Unintelligible Aggregate of Systems.
  3. Not a mere Machine, which would be an Imperfect System.
  4. But a Cosmical Organism, which is the only Absolutely Perfect System.
- VI. The Infinitely Intelligible and Absolutely Perfect Organic System of Nature proves that the Universe-Object is the Eternal, Organic, and Teleological Self-Evolution of the Universe-Subject—the Eternal Self-Realization or Self-Fulfilment of Creative Thought in Created Being—the Infinite Life of the Universe *per se*.
- VII. The Infinite Organic and Organific Life of the Universe *per se* proves that it is Infinite Wisdom and Infinite Will—Infinite Beatitude and Infinite Love—Infinite Rectitude and Infinite Holiness—Infinite Wisdom, Goodness, and Power—Infinite Spiritual Person—the LIVING AND LIFE-GIVING GOD FROM WHOM ALL THINGS PROCEED.
- VIII. Therefore, the Philosophized Scientific Method creates the only Idea of God which can at once satisfy both Head and Heart ; and Scientific Theism creates the only Real Reconciliation of Science and Religion.

Little, Brown & Co., Publishers, Boston. 1 vol., 12mo. Price, \$2.

## BOOK NOTICES.

STORIES FROM ROBERT BROWNING. By FREDERIC MAY HOLLAND, Author of "The Reign of the Stoics." With an Introduction by Mrs. SUTHERLAND ORR. London: George Bell and Sons. York Street, Covent Garden, 1882.

This volume is an English reprint of the American edition, and shows how welcome to England is any foreign evidence of the Browning cult. The long introduction, by Mrs. Orr, is mainly an exegesis and eulogium of the poems, whose intricacies and historical setting Mr. Holland has clearly unfolded. His effort is very useful for the beginner in Browning. It gives the needed key to many recondite and difficult allusions; at the same time the inner significance is not neglected. "Sordello" even is made plain. The historical facts connected with "Strafford" and "The Return of the Druses" are given with sufficient fulness to clear the way for the reader; and by simply reducing such poems as "The Ring and the Book," "Colombe's Birthday," to an outline story in prose form, a light is let into Browning's confessed obscurities for which every reader will be grateful to Mr. Holland.

J. A.

MARTIN LUTHER: A STUDY OF THE REFORMATION. By EDWIN D. MEAD. Boston: George H. Ellis, 141 Franklin Street, 1884.

Mr. Mead pictures for us in this volume the principal events in Luther's life; their relation to their own age and significance to ours. He looks upon the Reformation as the central point of modern history and Luther the central figure; and draws the lines from him to all succeeding attempts to liberate the mind of man from error and establish civil and religious freedom. We quote from the beginning of Chapter VII. Mr. Mead's view of the fundamental standpoint of Luther.

"Luther stands for Rationalism. He stands also for Intellectualism in religion. You think, perhaps, the two words mean one thing. I mean by Intellectualism here the doctrinal and speculative factor in religion, as contrasted with the ethical and practical. Protestantism was primarily an intellectual movement. I do not say it was not a moral movement too. I have pointed out some of the gross immoralities which provoked it, and there is no doubt that these were what first and chiefly moved the masses to the Reformation. But Luther saw, Protestantism saw or believed it saw, the cause of the immorality to be false doctrine; and it believed the cure to be true doctrine. Herein—in its primary intellectualism—the Lutheran movement differs from the Wesleyan movement, and, in a very great degree, from Christianity. Herein it resembles the Unitarian movement in New England. 'The scribes and the Pharisees sit in Moses' seat,' said Christ. 'All, therefore, whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do, but do not ye after their works.' And Wesley had very little trouble with the English catechism, but very much trouble with English immorality and irreligion. But with Luther the case is different. He was not primarily a practical reformer, but a doctrinal reformer. 'Wyclif and Huss,' he said, 'assailed the immoral conduct of the papists; but I chiefly oppose and resist their doctrine. I affirm, roundly and plainly, that they preach not the truth. To this I am called. I take the goose by the neck and set the



knife to its throat. I fall upon the pope's soul—his doctrine—not regarding his body—that is, his wicked person and life. When I can show that the papists' doctrine is false, which I have shown, then I can easily prove that their manner of life is evil. For, when the word remains pure, the manner of life, though something therein be amiss, will be pure also.'

"With his usual reckless inconsistency he says on the same page: 'Our manner of life is as evil as that of the papists'; and we well know that he did pay very much regard to the pope's 'wicked person and life.' But this passage truly and well illustrates the fundamental character of Luther's mind and the order of his thought." J. A.

ÉMILE; OR, CONCERNING EDUCATION. Extracts, containing the Principal Elements of Pedagogy found in the First Three Books. With an Introduction and Notes. By JULES STEEG, Député, Paris, France. Translated by ELEANOR WORTHINGTON, formerly of the Cook County Normal School, Ill. Boston: Published by Ginn, Heath, & Co., 1885.

These extracts are published chiefly in the interest of teachers and educators, and are a valuable contribution to the literature of Pedagogies. The compiler, M. Jules Steeg, remarks in his introduction that "there is no one who does not know the book by name and by reputation; but how many parents, and even teachers, have never read it!" He goes on to explain this neglect of a once famous book as due, in part, to the great changes in social and political conditions since it was written, which have antiquated some portions, while others have become so well incorporated into modern ideas of education as to be commonplace. It is, however, important for educators to know the historical course of their own science; and to such these extracts will be welcome, and they will, perhaps, wish hereafter to become acquainted with the whole of *Emile*, and the extraordinary effects of the work upon educational ideas throughout Europe. No single book ever made so much noise in the world. It was the gospel of the latter half of the eighteenth century. Condemned by church and state, its principles were accepted and practiced in private, especially in Germany and Switzerland. Three celebrated educators were inspired by it—Basedow, Pestalozzi, and Froebel. This will be enough to recommend it to the attention of all those who are at present discussing the Kindergarten, and the enlargement of the scope of education, from the nursery to the university. J. A.

THE LITERARY REMAINS OF THE LATE HENRY JAMES. Edited, with an Introduction, by WILLIAM JAMES. BOSTON: James R. Osgood & Co., 1885.

This volume is in the nature of a filial tribute, from one of Henry James's two distinguished sons. The introduction, consisting of 113 pages, is in part expository, in part a bringing together, of Henry James's special philosophical and theological ideas. It shows him to have been a philosopher with no very well-defined system, and a theologian without a church. He was *sui generis*; a great critic, and master of a style that commended his discussions of subjects not generally popular. His son and editor describes justly, we think, his literary characteristics:

"From the very outset of his literary career we find him in the effortless possession of that style with which the reader will soon become acquainted, and which, to its great dignity of evidence and full and homely vocabulary, united a sort of inward palpitating human quality, gracious and tender, precise, fierce, scornful, humorous by turns, recalling the rich vascular temperament of the old English masters rather than that of an American of to-day."

Whether the reader will find all these descriptive epithets justified, we will not undertake to forecast; if the half of them is true, it is great praise. We see nothing ourselves to remind us of old English masters, and much that does indicate the American of to-day, whose literary token is an effort to make himself heard by a diction out of proportion to the thing said. American writers have not yet attained poise and repose, but are unduly stimulated by the immense material activities which surround them, and the vast spaces and distances over which they strain to make their voices heard. Yet it may be these very moral and natural features which, by their continental proportions, will finally constitute a literature and a mode of expression distinctively American, in contrast to those which have been the products, in other times and countries, of narrower boundaries and more concentrated populations. Former literatures have been, to a degree, localized; ours, the long-hoped-for American, can never be confined to particular cities and districts, on account of our homogeneous race, our spacious territory, and ease of communication.

The editor of this volume, after speaking of Mr. James's style, goes on to sum up the subject-matter which it illuminates. He says that "few authors have so devoted their lives to the monotonous elaboration of one single bundle of truths." The contents of this bundle, divested of all wrappings, is a message as to the true relation between mankind and its Creator. This was the effort of his life. He kept repeating it as long as he lived, but did not vary its essential terms. This relation of mankind to God he apprehended in its theological expression; and so, as his son and editor declares, he found himself born into a time when his work was without effect. His time was not interested in what most interested him; if it stopped to listen, it was puzzled, and never sincerely studied him. It is also doubtless true that his theological position was supposed to impugn most current theologies. Still he never gave up nor grew silent, but continued his unheeded work to the end, consoled by the truths to which from youth he had dedicated his life.

The introduction is followed by a short and unfinished autobiography. As far as it extends it is an analysis of the moral and spiritual conflicts of his childhood. There is, toward the close of this fragment, a brief episode, in which his peculiar ideas respecting the institution of the family, as a temporary condition of society, find a very clear expression. It must be kept in mind, in reading the following remarkable passage to which we have just alluded, that the intensity of Mr. James's belief in a final divine form of humanity forced him to look upon all civic institutions as provisional. He had no doubtful substitute to offer, such as usually invalidates social reforms; but lived and thought in the contemplation of a divine ideal.

"The truth is, that the family tie—the tie of reciprocal ownership which binds together parent and child, brother and sister—was, when it existed in its integrity, a purely legal, formal, typical tie, intended merely to represent or symbolize to men's imagination the universal family, or household of faith, eventually to appear upon the earth. But it never had the least suspicion of its own spiritual mission. It was bound, in fact, in the interest of self-preservation, to ignore this its vital representative function, to regard itself as its own end, and coerce its children consequently into an allegiance often very detrimental to their future spiritual manhood. For any refining or humanizing influence accordingly which the family is to exert upon its members we must look exclusively to the future of the institution, when it will be glorified for the first time into a natural or universal bond. It is a denial of order to demand of the subterranean germ what we expect of the full corn in the ear."

"Man is destined to experience the broadest conceivable unity with his kind—a unity regulated by the principle of spontaneous taste or attraction exclusively; and it is only our puerile civic *régime*, with its divisions of rich and poor, high and low, wise and ignorant, free and bond, which keeps him from freely realizing this destiny; or rather let us say that it is the debasing influence which this civic *régime* exerts upon the heart and mind of men that keeps them as yet strangers even in thought to their divine destiny. Now, the isolated family bond is the nucleus or the citadel of this provisional civic economy; and practically, therefore, the interest of the isolated family is the chief obstacle still presented to the full evolution of human nature. I do not say that the family in this country *consciously* antagonizes the social spirit in humanity, or is at all aware, indeed, of that deeper instinct of race-unity which is beginning to assert itself. Still, it is a very rancorous and deep-rooted prejudice, and speculatively operates every sort of vexatious hindrance to the spread of the social spirit. The 'rich' family looks down upon the 'poor' family, the 'cultivated' family upon the 'uncultivated' one—the consequence being that this old convention which we have inherited from our European ancestry still profoundly colors our practical ethics, and blights every effort and aspiration toward race-harmony."

In corroboration of this view of the origin and destiny of the family institution he thinks that he sees, even in the infant, signs of an instinct in opposition to domestic rule: and that the child soon finds his real life beyond the home circle. And, speaking of his own personal experience in reference to the preceding speculations, he confesses that, although his own domestic situation was full of natural affections and joys, "nevertheless, I was never so happy at home as away from it."

In reflecting on this attitude of Mr. James toward one of the most sacred of our social institutions, we must constantly remind ourselves that it is not to be separated from his general idea of the relation of man to God, and his vision of society as the final redeemed form of man—man, in short, fully endowed with divine attributes and leading on this earth a heavenly life.

There follows after this autobiographic fragment a series of essays connected under the general title of "Spiritual Creation." This makes the body of the present volume. There are fifteen chapters of it, and we name some of the more important. The first chapter is entitled "The Indigestible Newspaper"; the fifth, "Nature a Hostile Element in Creation"; the eighth, "A Conscience of Sin"; the tenth, "Mr. Emerson"; the eleventh, "Swedenborg and Science"; the twelfth, "Science in Relation to the Intellect."

It is worth while to read what he says of Emerson, as he speaks from long and intimate acquaintance. His criticism of Emerson, as an intellectual and spiritual being, is altogether unique, slightly perverse, or in the spirit of contradiction; and shows in an objective manner Mr. James's idiosyncrasies on the spiritual side.

The volume concludes with "Some Personal Recollections of Carlyle," and a complete bibliography of Mr. James's writings.

JOHN ALBEE.

SELECTED POEMS FROM MICHELANGELO BUONARROTI. With Translations from Various Sources. Edited by EDNAH D. CHENEY. Author of "Gleanings in the Fields of Art." BOSTON: Lee and Shepard, Publishers. NEW YORK: Charles T. Dillingham, 1885.

The poems of Michelangelo were not intended for publication, but were written to satisfy an inward need to complete an inward self-cultivation. They were first printed

fifty-nine years after his death ; but not until the middle of the present century was there a complete edition, edited from original sources. Michelangelo's poetry has the same qualities as his art ; it is strong, lofty, and restrained. (His sonnets have been called "sculptured.") The sentiment of love with which it abounds is elevated to the same spiritual plane as in Dante's "Vita Nuova" and the "Divine Comedy." The "Uranian Venus" is the Muse of both. Philosophy, in its broadest meaning, is the foundation of Michelangelo's as of Dante's power. Dante was an Aristotelian ; Mrs. Cheney thinks that Michelangelo leaned more to Plato. Often and often has the likeness between the two great Italians been shown.

We reprint from this valuable selection a sonnet to Dante, and Madrigal VII., both translated by Mrs. Cheney, who thinks that the Madrigal gives Michelangelo's whole philosophy of art and beauty.

We also reprint Sonnet LII., translated by Wordsworth, perhaps the finest of those addressed to Vittoria Colonna. It reflects the same ideal of love that is everywhere found in Dante. That this feeling of spirituality was mutually experienced is testified by a sentence in one of Vittoria Colonna's letters to Michelangelo : "Stabile amicizia et legata in cristiano nodo, securissima affezione." J. A.

#### TO DANTE.

(1545.)

From Heaven he came, a mortal then ;  
 And Hell's just path and Mercy's highway trod,  
 Living, returned to look upon his God,  
 And give his holy light to us again :  
 A shining star, that with its brilliant rays  
 Illumed in evil times the nest where I was born.  
 As guerdon fit for him, this wicked earth I scorn  
 God, his creator, him alone repays.  
 I speak of Dante ; for, alas ! ill known  
 His labors are, by that foul mob ingrate,  
 Whose honors fail but to the just alone.  
 Would I were he ! for born to such a fate,  
 His bitter exile, and his courage shown,  
 I would not change for Earth's most happy state.

#### MADRIGAL.

VII.

To bind me to my calling high,  
 By birth was given me beauty's light,  
 Lantern and mirror of two noble arts ;  
 And other faith is but a falsity.  
 This bears the soul alone to its proud height  
 To paint, to sculpture, this all strength imparts,  
 And other judgments foolish are and blind,  
 Which draw from sense the beauty that can move  
 And bear to heaven each heart with wisdom sane  
 No road divine our eyes infirm may find ;  
 The mortal may not from that world remove  
 Whence without grace to hope to rise is vain.

## TO VITTORIA COLONNA.

## SONNET LII.

No mortal object did these eyes behold  
 When first they met the placid light of thine.  
 And my soul felt her destiny divine,  
 And hope of endless peace in me grew bold:  
 Heaven-born, the soul a heavenward course must hold.  
 Beyond the visible world she soars to seek  
 (For what delights the sense is false and weak)  
 Ideal Form, the universal mould.  
 The wise man, I affirm, can find no rest  
 In that which perishes; nor will he lend  
 His heart to aught which doth on time depend.  
 'Tis sense, unbridled will, and not true love,  
 That kills the soul; love betters what is best,  
 Even here below, but more in heaven above.

PESTALOZZI'S LEONARD AND GERTRUDE. Translated and abridged by Eva Channing.  
 Boston: Published by Ginn, Heath, & Co., 1885.

Whether it be possible to condense into 181 small pages the full purport of Pestalozzi's large work of the above title we have some doubt. But here are, at least, some choice selections, valuable in themselves and also as an incentive to a more complete study of Pestalozzi.

"Leonard and Gertrude" is not strictly a pedagogical treatise in the disguise of a story, as is Rousseau's "Émile," but is a picture of Swiss peasant life in the eighteenth century, interspersed with reflections on life, politics, morals, religion, and education. The portions selected for translation are chiefly those concerning the nurture and education of children. We quote the following passage, not for its intrinsic excellence, but for historical comparison, as a landmark and starting-point of certain elementary principles now accepted and more fully developed, yet in Pestalozzi's time considered novel and doubtful.

"The new master was anxious, above all, to accustom his charges to strict order, and thus lead them to the true wisdom of life. He began school punctually on the stroke of the clock, and did not allow any one to come in late. He also laid great stress on good habits and behavior. The children were obliged to come to school clean in person and apparel, and with their hair combed. While standing, sitting, writing, and working, they always were taught to keep the body erect as a candle. The school-room must be clean as a church, and he would not suffer a pane of glass to be missing from the window, or a nail to be driven crooked in the floor. Still less did he allow the children to throw the smallest thing upon the floor, or to eat while they were studying; and it was even arranged that in getting up and sitting down they should not hit against each other."

J. A.

ASPECTS OF HUMANITY. By RICHARD RANDOLPH, author of "Sober Thoughts on Staple Themes," etc.

The above-named work was originally published, though but slightly advertised, in the year 1869. It is a brief Philosophical Allegory, professing to connect Religion with all Science, not "falsely so called," by identifying the process of Revelation with the

progressive (however gradual or intermittent) Generation of Thought in the healthy consciousness of mankind. Illustrative passages by contemporaries and predecessors are appended. As being also relevant to the purpose of the work, some texts are here subjoined, taken from Purver's Version of the Bible, favorably known even outside of the Society of Friends, of which the Translator was a member:

"Truth blossoms up out of the earth, and righteousness beams down from heaven."—(Ps. lxxxv, 11.)

"Whatever He shall hear will speak."—(John xvi, 13.)

"All things belonging to life and piety are of His divine power that is given us through the knowledge of Him who has called us by glory and virtue. . . . There is not any prophecy of Scripture of its own exposition."—(2 Pet. i, 3, 20.)

Price, 60 cents; if mailed, 65 cents. For sale by Frank A. Sniffen, Friends' Institute, 1316 Filbert Street, Philadelphia.

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